diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/dev/iwn/if_iwn.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/dev/iwn/if_iwn.c | 58 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/sys/dev/iwn/if_iwn.c b/sys/dev/iwn/if_iwn.c index 90a602a..14fb002 100644 --- a/sys/dev/iwn/if_iwn.c +++ b/sys/dev/iwn/if_iwn.c @@ -2668,11 +2668,7 @@ iwn_rx_compressed_ba(struct iwn_softc *sc, struct iwn_rx_desc *desc, KASSERT(ni != NULL, ("no node")); KASSERT(m != NULL, ("no mbuf")); - if (m->m_flags & M_TXCB) - ieee80211_process_callback(ni, m, 1); - - m_freem(m); - ieee80211_free_node(ni); + ieee80211_tx_complete(ni, m, 1); txq->queued--; txq->read = (txq->read + 1) % IWN_TX_RING_COUNT; @@ -2934,29 +2930,6 @@ iwn_tx_done(struct iwn_softc *sc, struct iwn_rx_desc *desc, int ackfailcnt, ni = data->ni, data->ni = NULL; vap = ni->ni_vap; - if (m->m_flags & M_TXCB) { - /* - * Channels marked for "radar" require traffic to be received - * to unlock before we can transmit. Until traffic is seen - * any attempt to transmit is returned immediately with status - * set to IWN_TX_FAIL_TX_LOCKED. Unfortunately this can easily - * happen on first authenticate after scanning. To workaround - * this we ignore a failure of this sort in AUTH state so the - * 802.11 layer will fall back to using a timeout to wait for - * the AUTH reply. This allows the firmware time to see - * traffic so a subsequent retry of AUTH succeeds. It's - * unclear why the firmware does not maintain state for - * channels recently visited as this would allow immediate - * use of the channel after a scan (where we see traffic). - */ - if (status == IWN_TX_FAIL_TX_LOCKED && - ni->ni_vap->iv_state == IEEE80211_S_AUTH) - ieee80211_process_callback(ni, m, 0); - else - ieee80211_process_callback(ni, m, - (status & IWN_TX_FAIL) != 0); - } - /* * Update rate control statistics for the node. */ @@ -2969,8 +2942,27 @@ iwn_tx_done(struct iwn_softc *sc, struct iwn_rx_desc *desc, int ackfailcnt, ieee80211_ratectl_tx_complete(vap, ni, IEEE80211_RATECTL_TX_SUCCESS, &ackfailcnt, NULL); } - m_freem(m); - ieee80211_free_node(ni); + + /* + * Channels marked for "radar" require traffic to be received + * to unlock before we can transmit. Until traffic is seen + * any attempt to transmit is returned immediately with status + * set to IWN_TX_FAIL_TX_LOCKED. Unfortunately this can easily + * happen on first authenticate after scanning. To workaround + * this we ignore a failure of this sort in AUTH state so the + * 802.11 layer will fall back to using a timeout to wait for + * the AUTH reply. This allows the firmware time to see + * traffic so a subsequent retry of AUTH succeeds. It's + * unclear why the firmware does not maintain state for + * channels recently visited as this would allow immediate + * use of the channel after a scan (where we see traffic). + */ + if (status == IWN_TX_FAIL_TX_LOCKED && + ni->ni_vap->iv_state == IEEE80211_S_AUTH) + ieee80211_tx_complete(ni, m, 0); + else + ieee80211_tx_complete(ni, m, + (status & IWN_TX_FAIL) != 0); sc->sc_tx_timer = 0; if (--ring->queued < IWN_TX_RING_LOMARK) { @@ -3091,11 +3083,7 @@ iwn_ampdu_tx_done(struct iwn_softc *sc, int qid, int idx, int nframes, KASSERT(ni != NULL, ("no node")); KASSERT(m != NULL, ("no mbuf")); - if (m->m_flags & M_TXCB) - ieee80211_process_callback(ni, m, 1); - - m_freem(m); - ieee80211_free_node(ni); + ieee80211_tx_complete(ni, m, 1); ring->queued--; ring->read = (ring->read + 1) % IWN_TX_RING_COUNT; |