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-rw-r--r--sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c113
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diff --git a/sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c b/sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c
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+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Sendmail, Inc. and its suppliers.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set
+ * forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of
+ * the sendmail distribution.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+** This program tests your system to see if you have the lovely
+** security-defeating semantics that an open with O_CREAT|O_EXCL
+** set will successfully open a file named by a symbolic link that
+** points to a non-existent file. Sadly, Posix is mute on what
+** should happen in this situation.
+**
+** Results to date:
+** AIX 3.2 OK
+** BSD family OK
+** BSD/OS 2.1 OK
+** FreeBSD 2.1 OK
+** DEC OSF/1 3.0 OK
+** HP-UX 9.04 FAIL
+** HP-UX 9.05 FAIL
+** HP-UX 9.07 OK
+** HP-UX 10.01 OK
+** HP-UX 10.10 OK
+** HP-UX 10.20 OK
+** Irix 5.3 OK
+** Irix 6.2 OK
+** Irix 6.3 OK
+** Irix 6.4 OK
+** Linux OK
+** NeXT 2.1 OK
+** Solaris 2.x OK
+** SunOS 4.x OK
+** Ultrix 4.3 OK
+*/
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef lint
+static char id[] = "@(#)$Id: t_exclopen.c,v 8.6 2001/09/23 03:35:41 ca Exp $";
+#endif /* ! lint */
+
+static char Attacker[128];
+static char Attackee[128];
+
+static void
+bail(status)
+ int status;
+{
+ (void) unlink(Attacker);
+ (void) unlink(Attackee);
+ exit(status);
+}
+
+int
+main(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char **argv;
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ sprintf(Attacker, "/tmp/attacker.%d.%ld", getpid(), time(NULL));
+ sprintf(Attackee, "/tmp/attackee.%d.%ld", getpid(), time(NULL));
+
+ if (symlink(Attackee, Attacker) < 0)
+ {
+ printf("Could not create %s->%s symlink: %d\n",
+ Attacker, Attackee, errno);
+ bail(1);
+ }
+ (void) unlink(Attackee);
+ if (stat(Attackee, &st) >= 0)
+ {
+ printf("%s already exists -- remove and try again.\n",
+ Attackee);
+ bail(1);
+ }
+ if (open(Attacker, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644) < 0)
+ {
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
+ if (stat(Attackee, &st) >= 0)
+ {
+ printf("Weird. Open failed but %s was created anyhow (errno = %d)\n",
+ Attackee, save_errno);
+ bail(1);
+ }
+ printf("Good show! Exclusive open works properly with symbolic links (errno = %d).\n",
+ save_errno);
+ bail(0);
+ }
+ if (stat(Attackee, &st) < 0)
+ {
+ printf("Weird. Open succeeded but %s was not created\n",
+ Attackee);
+ bail(2);
+ }
+ printf("Bad news: you can do an exclusive open through a symbolic link\n");
+ printf("\tBe sure you #define BOGUS_O_EXCL in conf.h\n");
+ bail(1);
+
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ exit(0);
+}
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