diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c | 113 |
1 files changed, 113 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c b/sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1bde72 --- /dev/null +++ b/sendmail/test/t_exclopen.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Sendmail, Inc. and its suppliers. + * All rights reserved. + * + * By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set + * forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of + * the sendmail distribution. + * + */ + +/* +** This program tests your system to see if you have the lovely +** security-defeating semantics that an open with O_CREAT|O_EXCL +** set will successfully open a file named by a symbolic link that +** points to a non-existent file. Sadly, Posix is mute on what +** should happen in this situation. +** +** Results to date: +** AIX 3.2 OK +** BSD family OK +** BSD/OS 2.1 OK +** FreeBSD 2.1 OK +** DEC OSF/1 3.0 OK +** HP-UX 9.04 FAIL +** HP-UX 9.05 FAIL +** HP-UX 9.07 OK +** HP-UX 10.01 OK +** HP-UX 10.10 OK +** HP-UX 10.20 OK +** Irix 5.3 OK +** Irix 6.2 OK +** Irix 6.3 OK +** Irix 6.4 OK +** Linux OK +** NeXT 2.1 OK +** Solaris 2.x OK +** SunOS 4.x OK +** Ultrix 4.3 OK +*/ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#ifndef lint +static char id[] = "@(#)$Id: t_exclopen.c,v 8.6 2001/09/23 03:35:41 ca Exp $"; +#endif /* ! lint */ + +static char Attacker[128]; +static char Attackee[128]; + +static void +bail(status) + int status; +{ + (void) unlink(Attacker); + (void) unlink(Attackee); + exit(status); +} + +int +main(argc, argv) + int argc; + char **argv; +{ + struct stat st; + + sprintf(Attacker, "/tmp/attacker.%d.%ld", getpid(), time(NULL)); + sprintf(Attackee, "/tmp/attackee.%d.%ld", getpid(), time(NULL)); + + if (symlink(Attackee, Attacker) < 0) + { + printf("Could not create %s->%s symlink: %d\n", + Attacker, Attackee, errno); + bail(1); + } + (void) unlink(Attackee); + if (stat(Attackee, &st) >= 0) + { + printf("%s already exists -- remove and try again.\n", + Attackee); + bail(1); + } + if (open(Attacker, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644) < 0) + { + int save_errno = errno; + + if (stat(Attackee, &st) >= 0) + { + printf("Weird. Open failed but %s was created anyhow (errno = %d)\n", + Attackee, save_errno); + bail(1); + } + printf("Good show! Exclusive open works properly with symbolic links (errno = %d).\n", + save_errno); + bail(0); + } + if (stat(Attackee, &st) < 0) + { + printf("Weird. Open succeeded but %s was not created\n", + Attackee); + bail(2); + } + printf("Bad news: you can do an exclusive open through a symbolic link\n"); + printf("\tBe sure you #define BOGUS_O_EXCL in conf.h\n"); + bail(1); + + /* NOTREACHED */ + exit(0); +} |