diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sbin/routed/input.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sbin/routed/input.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/sbin/routed/input.c b/sbin/routed/input.c index f177226..4f5c947 100644 --- a/sbin/routed/input.c +++ b/sbin/routed/input.c @@ -31,12 +31,13 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#if !defined(lint) && !defined(sgi) && !defined(__NetBSD__) +#ifndef lint +#if 0 static char sccsid[] = "@(#)input.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/5/93"; -#elif defined(__NetBSD__) -static char rcsid[] = "$NetBSD$"; #endif -#ident "$Revision: 1.1.1.5 $" +static const char rcsid[] = + "$Id$"; +#endif /* not lint */ #include "defs.h" @@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ input(struct sockaddr_in *from, /* received from this IP address */ * * RIPv2 authentication is lame. Why authenticate queries? * Why should a RIPv2 implementation with authentication disabled - * not be able to listen to RIPv2 packets with authenication, while + * not be able to listen to RIPv2 packets with authentication, while * RIPv1 systems will listen? Crazy! */ if (!auth_ok @@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ input(struct sockaddr_in *from, /* received from this IP address */ } } - /* According to RFC 1723, we should ignore unathenticated + /* According to RFC 1723, we should ignore unauthenticated * queries. That is too silly to bother with. Sheesh! * Are forwarding tables supposed to be secret, when * a bad guy can infer them with test traffic? When RIP |
