diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c | 70 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 63 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c | 34 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c | 22 |
14 files changed, 152 insertions, 106 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index c2c8d57..d1fc716 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -295,8 +295,44 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) blocksize = 0; frag_off = 0; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */ while (s->init_num > 0) { + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) { + /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */ + + if (frag_off > 0) { + /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */ + + if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { + /* + * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have + * contained the message header plus one other byte. + * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least + * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went + * wrong. + */ + return -1; + } + + /* + * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new + * message header for this fragment. + */ + s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + } else { + /* + * We must have been called again after a retry so use the + * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need + * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because + * that should already have been done before the retry. + */ + frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off; + } + } + used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize; if (s->d1->mtu > used_len) @@ -309,8 +345,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */ ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); - if (ret <= 0) + if (ret <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; return ret; + } used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize; if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len; @@ -336,25 +374,6 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) * XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - if (s->init_off != 0) { - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); - s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - - /* - * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should - * be safe - */ - if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu) - len = curr_mtu; - else - len = s->init_num; - } - - /* Shouldn't ever happen */ - if (len > INT_MAX) - len = INT_MAX; - if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible @@ -442,7 +461,16 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) } s->init_off += ret; s->init_num -= ret; - frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + frag_off += ret; + + /* + * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it + * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the + * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be + * updated again later. + */ + dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0); } } return (0); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.c index cf58567..f2839bd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* ssl/kssl.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ +/* ssl/kssl.c */ /* * Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project * 2000. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.h index 9a57672..ae8a51f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ +/* ssl/kssl.h */ /* * Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project * 2000. project 2000. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h index 46dcef2..8e6a6d6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ +/* ssl/kssl.h */ /* * Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project * 2000. project 2000. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c index 4289272..07e9df8 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) } cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p); - if (cp == NULL) { + if (cp == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(s->session->ciphers, cp) < 0) { ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER); SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return (-1); @@ -598,6 +598,11 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s) s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i; n2s(p, i); s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i; + if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { + ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return -1; + } n2s(p, i); s->s2->challenge_length = i; if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) || @@ -687,8 +692,12 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s) prio = cs; allow = cl; } + + /* Generate list of SSLv2 ciphers shared between client and server */ for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) { - if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z); + if ((cp->algorithm_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) == 0 || + sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, cp) < 0) { (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z); z--; } @@ -697,6 +706,13 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers = prio; } + + /* Make sure we have at least one cipher in common */ + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(s->session->ciphers) == 0) { + ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return -1; + } /* * s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on * both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index bc5254c..04cc9f5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -2350,37 +2350,44 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok); + -1, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); - if (n < 4) { - /* need at least status type + length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - n2l3(p, resplen); - if (resplen + 4 != n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + /* + * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if + * tlsext_status_expected is set + */ + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + } else { + if (n < 4) { + /* need at least status type + length */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + n2l3(p, resplen); + if (resplen + 4 != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); @@ -3603,7 +3610,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) DH_free(dh_srvr); } - if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768) + if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024) || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c index 64793d6..f846cb5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -3206,13 +3206,6 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); return (ret); } - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) { - if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { - DH_free(dh); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - return (ret); - } - } if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp); s->cert->dh_tmp = dh; @@ -3263,6 +3256,8 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME: if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { + size_t len; + if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); s->tlsext_hostname = NULL; @@ -3270,7 +3265,8 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) ret = 1; if (parg == NULL) break; - if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { + len = strlen((char *)parg); + if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME); return 0; } @@ -3710,13 +3706,6 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); return 0; } - if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) { - if (!DH_generate_key(new)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(new); - return 0; - } - } if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(cert->dh_tmp); cert->dh_tmp = new; @@ -4337,6 +4326,21 @@ int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s) } #endif } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { + if (SSL_in_init(s)) { + /* + * We can't shutdown properly if we are in the middle of a + * handshake. Doing so is problematic because the peer may send a + * CCS before it acts on our close_notify. However we should not + * continue to process received handshake messages or CCS once our + * close_notify has been sent. Therefore any close_notify from + * the peer will be unreadable because we have not moved to the next + * cipher state. Its best just to avoid this can-of-worms. Return + * an error if we are wanting to wait for a close_notify from the + * peer and we are in init. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT); + return -1; + } /* * If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */ diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index ee83105..ab28702 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ +/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -1004,6 +1004,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } + if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + s->hit = 0; /* * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in @@ -1681,20 +1687,9 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; - if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || - dhp->priv_key == NULL || - (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { - if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } else { - dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); - dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); - if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } + if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; } r[0] = dh->p; r[1] = dh->g; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index afec1f5..ae8c925 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st { # define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L -/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */ +/* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L /* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */ # define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0 @@ -2092,7 +2092,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) # define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ - SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,clistlen,(int *)slist) + SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ @@ -2713,6 +2713,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291 +# define SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN 396 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN 318 @@ -3056,6 +3057,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275 # define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 # define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 +# define SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT 407 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 # define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c index 6d1366f..dd3b2af 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "ssl3_setup_key_block"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_read_buffer"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_write_buffer"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN), "ssl3_shutdown"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "ssl3_write_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "ssl3_write_pending"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_add_cert_chain"}, @@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED), "session id context uninitialized"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ), "short read"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT), "shutdown while in init"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR), "signature algorithms error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE), diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index f2071db..2744be8 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1060,10 +1060,7 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) return -1; } - if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) - return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); - else - return (1); + return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s); } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 68390d3..b182998 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -573,9 +573,6 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, int r; #endif - if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) - goto err; - if (session_id + len > limit) { fatal = 1; goto err; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c index f46544b..514fcb3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; /* * must be same as col (see - * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) + * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */ sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index 3176d1e..d9ba99d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -3157,22 +3157,20 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) } # endif + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; /* * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the * callback */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) - && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { + && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int r; /* - * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no - * response. + * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback + * knows there is no response */ - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (r == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; @@ -3583,7 +3581,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) { - int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0; + int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) return; if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { @@ -3599,9 +3597,9 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, *psign_nid = sign_nid; } if (psignhash_nid) { - if (sign_nid && hash_nid) - OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid); - else + if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef + || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, + sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } |
