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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssh/session.c442
1 files changed, 289 insertions, 153 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index ce46f1d..4321535 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -1,14 +1,39 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
- */
-/*
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.15 2000/05/30 17:23:37 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.37 2000/09/07 20:27:53 deraadt Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
@@ -26,6 +51,11 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.15 2000/05/30 17:23:37 markus Exp $");
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#include <login_cap.h>
+#endif
/* types */
@@ -60,6 +90,7 @@ void session_pty_cleanup(Session *s);
void session_proctitle(Session *s);
void do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command, struct passwd * pw);
void do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command, struct passwd * pw);
+void do_login(Session *s);
void
do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
@@ -71,25 +102,23 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
extern char *__progname;
extern int log_stderr;
extern int debug_flag;
+extern unsigned int utmp_len;
+
+extern int startup_pipe;
/* Local Xauthority file. */
static char *xauthfile;
+/* original command from peer. */
+char *original_command = NULL;
+
/* data */
#define MAX_SESSIONS 10
Session sessions[MAX_SESSIONS];
-/* Flags set in auth-rsa from authorized_keys flags. These are set in auth-rsa.c. */
-int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_pty_flag = 0;
-
-/* RSA authentication "command=" option. */
-char *forced_command = NULL;
-
-/* RSA authentication "environment=" options. */
-struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+static login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
/*
* Remove local Xauthority file.
@@ -143,7 +172,7 @@ void
do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
{
Session *s;
- int type;
+ int type, fd;
int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
int have_pty = 0;
char *command;
@@ -156,6 +185,10 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
* authentication.
*/
alarm(0);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ }
/*
* Inform the channel mechanism that we are the server side and that
@@ -170,6 +203,13 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
s = session_new();
s->pw = pw;
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
+ error("unable to get login class");
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+
/*
* We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
* or a command.
@@ -248,7 +288,10 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
break;
}
-#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
+ if (!options.xauth_location) {
+ packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+ break;
+ }
if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
break;
@@ -284,15 +327,13 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
break;
}
strlcat(xauthfile, "/cookies", MAXPATHLEN);
- open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
+ fd = open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
restore_uid();
fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, NULL);
success = 1;
break;
-#else /* XAUTH_PATH */
- packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
- break;
-#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) {
@@ -333,6 +374,7 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type);
}
if (forced_command != NULL) {
+ original_command = command;
command = forced_command;
debug("Forced command '%.500s'", forced_command);
}
@@ -492,41 +534,17 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command, struct passwd * pw)
void
do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command, struct passwd * pw)
{
- FILE *f;
- char buf[100], *time_string;
- char line[256];
- const char *hostname;
int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
- int quiet_login;
pid_t pid;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- struct stat st;
- time_t last_login_time;
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
- /* Get remote host name. */
- hostname = get_canonical_hostname();
-
- /*
- * Get the time when the user last logged in. Buf will be set to
- * contain the hostname the last login was from.
- */
- if (!options.use_login) {
- last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name,
- buf, sizeof(buf));
- }
-
/* Fork the child. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- pid = getpid();
-
- /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has
- changed. */
+ /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
@@ -550,67 +568,10 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command, struct passwd * pw)
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
-/* XXXX ? move to do_child() ??*/
- /*
- * Get IP address of client. This is needed because we want
- * to record where the user logged in from. If the
- * connection is not a socket, let the ip address be 0.0.0.0.
- */
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
- }
- /* Record that there was a login on that terminal. */
- record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, hostname,
- (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+ /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+ if (command == NULL && !options.use_login)
+ do_login(s);
- /* Check if .hushlogin exists. */
- snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
- quiet_login = stat(line, &st) >= 0;
-
- /*
- * If the user has logged in before, display the time of last
- * login. However, don't display anything extra if a command
- * has been specified (so that ssh can be used to execute
- * commands on a remote machine without users knowing they
- * are going to another machine). Login(1) will do this for
- * us as well, so check if login(1) is used
- */
- if (command == NULL && last_login_time != 0 && !quiet_login &&
- !options.use_login) {
- /* Convert the date to a string. */
- time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
- /* Remove the trailing newline. */
- if (strchr(time_string, '\n'))
- *strchr(time_string, '\n') = 0;
- /* Display the last login time. Host if displayed
- if known. */
- if (strcmp(buf, "") == 0)
- printf("Last login: %s\r\n", time_string);
- else
- printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, buf);
- }
- /*
- * Print /etc/motd unless a command was specified or printing
- * it was disabled in server options or login(1) will be
- * used. Note that some machines appear to print it in
- * /etc/profile or similar.
- */
- if (command == NULL && options.print_motd && !quiet_login &&
- !options.use_login) {
- /* Print /etc/motd if it exists. */
- f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
- if (f) {
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f))
- fputs(line, stdout);
- fclose(f);
- }
- }
/* Do common processing for the child, such as execing the command. */
do_child(command, pw, s->term, s->display, s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data, s->tty);
@@ -648,6 +609,87 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command, struct passwd * pw)
}
}
+const char *
+get_remote_name_or_ip(void)
+{
+ static const char *remote = "";
+ if (utmp_len > 0)
+ remote = get_canonical_hostname();
+ if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len)
+ remote = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ return remote;
+}
+
+/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
+void
+do_login(Session *s)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char *time_string;
+ char buf[256];
+ char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ struct stat st;
+ time_t last_login_time;
+ struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Get the time and hostname when the user last logged in. */
+ hostname[0] = '\0';
+ last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name,
+ hostname, sizeof(hostname));
+
+ /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+ record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+ get_remote_name_or_ip(), (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+
+ /* Done if .hushlogin exists. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+#else
+ if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+#endif
+ return;
+ if (last_login_time != 0) {
+ time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
+ if (strchr(time_string, '\n'))
+ *strchr(time_string, '\n') = 0;
+ if (strcmp(buf, "") == 0)
+ printf("Last login: %s\r\n", time_string);
+ else
+ printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname);
+ }
+ if (options.print_motd) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
+ "/etc/motd"), "r");
+#else
+ f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
+#endif
+ if (f) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stdout);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
* already exists, its value is overriden.
@@ -738,33 +780,52 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
const char *display, const char *auth_proto,
const char *auth_data, const char *ttyname)
{
- const char *shell, *cp = NULL;
+ const char *shell, *hostname = NULL, *cp = NULL;
char buf[256];
- FILE *f;
+ char cmd[1024];
+ FILE *f = NULL;
unsigned int envsize, i;
char **env;
extern char **environ;
struct stat st;
char *argv[10];
- f = fopen("/etc/nologin", "r");
- if (f) {
- /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents and exit. */
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
- fputs(buf, stderr);
- fclose(f);
- if (pw->pw_uid != 0)
+ /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */
+ if (options.use_login && command != NULL)
+ options.use_login = 0;
+
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) && pw->pw_uid)
+ f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", _PATH_NOLOGIN,
+ _PATH_NOLOGIN), "r");
+#else
+ if (pw->pw_uid)
+ f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r");
+#endif
+ if (f) {
+ /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents and exit. */
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stderr);
+ fclose(f);
exit(254);
+ }
}
- /* Set login name in the kernel. */
- if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
- error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Set uid, gid, and groups. */
+ /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
/* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */
if (!options.use_login) {
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ (LOGIN_SETALL & ~LOGIN_SETPATH)) < 0) {
+ perror("unable to set user context");
+ exit(1);
+
+ }
+#else
+ if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
+ error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("setgid");
exit(1);
@@ -778,15 +839,19 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw->pw_uid);
+#endif
}
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
- fatal("Failed to set uids to %d.", (int) pw->pw_uid);
+ fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
}
/*
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+#endif
#ifdef AFS
/* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */
@@ -810,7 +875,12 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
+#else
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+#endif
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
_PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
@@ -847,6 +917,9 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", term);
if (display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", display);
+ if (original_command)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
+ original_command);
#ifdef KRB4
{
@@ -875,6 +948,9 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
+ /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
+ if (options.use_login)
+ hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip();
/*
* Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
* the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
@@ -911,9 +987,14 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
close(i);
/* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */
- if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0)
+ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: %s\n",
pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0))
+ exit(1);
+#endif
+ }
/*
* Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc and
@@ -948,38 +1029,38 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
- }
-#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
- else {
+ } else if (options.xauth_location != NULL) {
/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
if (auth_proto != NULL && auth_data != NULL) {
char *screen = strchr(display, ':');
if (debug_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Running %.100s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
- XAUTH_PATH, display, auth_proto, auth_data);
+ options.xauth_location, display,
+ auth_proto, auth_data);
if (screen != NULL)
fprintf(stderr,
"Adding %.*s/unix%s %s %s\n",
- screen-display, display,
+ (int)(screen-display), display,
screen, auth_proto, auth_data);
}
- f = popen(XAUTH_PATH " -q -", "w");
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
+ options.xauth_location);
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", display,
auth_proto, auth_data);
if (screen != NULL)
fprintf(f, "add %.*s/unix%s %s %s\n",
- screen-display, display,
+ (int)(screen-display), display,
screen, auth_proto, auth_data);
pclose(f);
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s -q -\n",
- XAUTH_PATH);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ cmd);
+ }
}
}
-#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
-
/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
cp = strrchr(shell, '/');
if (cp)
@@ -1031,8 +1112,8 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
} else {
/* Launch login(1). */
- execl("/usr/bin/login", "login", "-h", get_remote_ipaddr(),
- "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, NULL);
+ execl("/usr/bin/login", "login", "-h", hostname,
+ "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, NULL);
/* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
@@ -1170,6 +1251,8 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
unsigned int len;
char *term_modes; /* encoded terminal modes */
+ if (no_pty_flag)
+ return 0;
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
return 0;
s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
@@ -1217,10 +1300,22 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
unsigned int len;
int success = 0;
char *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
+ int i;
packet_done();
log("subsystem request for %s", subsys);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
+ if(strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+ debug("subsystem: exec() %s", options.subsystem_command[i]);
+ do_exec_no_pty(s, options.subsystem_command[i], s->pw);
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!success)
+ log("subsystem request for %s failed, subsystem not found", subsys);
+
xfree(subsys);
return success;
}
@@ -1228,6 +1323,11 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
int
session_x11_req(Session *s)
{
+ int fd;
+ if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+ debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
+ return 0;
+ }
if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
return 0;
@@ -1268,12 +1368,49 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s)
return 0;
}
strlcat(xauthfile, "/cookies", MAXPATHLEN);
- open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
+ fd = open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
restore_uid();
fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, s);
return 1;
}
+int
+session_shell_req(Session *s)
+{
+ /* if forced_command == NULL, the shell is execed */
+ char *shell = forced_command;
+ packet_done();
+ s->extended = 1;
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+ do_exec_no_pty(s, shell, s->pw);
+ else
+ do_exec_pty(s, shell, s->pw);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+session_exec_req(Session *s)
+{
+ unsigned int len;
+ char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
+ packet_done();
+ if (forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = forced_command;
+ debug("Forced command '%.500s'", forced_command);
+ }
+ s->extended = 1;
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+ do_exec_no_pty(s, command, s->pw);
+ else
+ do_exec_pty(s, command, s->pw);
+ if (forced_command == NULL)
+ xfree(command);
+ return 1;
+}
+
void
session_input_channel_req(int id, void *arg)
{
@@ -1303,23 +1440,9 @@ session_input_channel_req(int id, void *arg)
*/
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
- packet_done();
- s->extended = 1;
- if (s->ttyfd == -1)
- do_exec_no_pty(s, NULL, s->pw);
- else
- do_exec_pty(s, NULL, s->pw);
- success = 1;
+ success = session_shell_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
- char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
- packet_done();
- s->extended = 1;
- if (s->ttyfd == -1)
- do_exec_no_pty(s, command, s->pw);
- else
- do_exec_pty(s, command, s->pw);
- xfree(command);
- success = 1;
+ success = session_exec_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
success = session_pty_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
@@ -1523,11 +1646,24 @@ session_proctitle(Session *s)
void
do_authenticated2(void)
{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
*/
alarm(0);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ pw = auth_get_user();
+ if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
+ error("unable to get login class");
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
server_loop2();
if (xauthfile)
xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL);
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