diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/auth.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssh/auth.c | 94 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 50 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c index 228fe42..5d1f218 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.75 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -23,40 +24,57 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.60 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $"); -RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); +__RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/param.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include <paths.h> +#endif +#include <pwd.h> #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H #include <login.h> #endif #ifdef USE_SHADOW #include <shadow.h> #endif - #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include <libgen.h> #endif +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "log.h" +#include "buffer.h" #include "servconf.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "bufaux.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "misc.h" -#include "bufaux.h" #include "packet.h" #include "loginrec.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; +extern int use_privsep; extern Buffer loginmsg; +extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; /* Debugging messages */ Buffer auth_debug; @@ -232,6 +250,9 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; char *authmsg; + if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) + return; + /* Raise logging level */ if (authenticated == 1 || !authctxt->valid || @@ -260,44 +281,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) record_failed_login(authctxt->user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); +# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + if (authenticated) + sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg); +# endif #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) { - ssh_audit_event_t event; - - debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d", - method, (int)geteuid()); - /* - * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave, - * we must be careful to send each event only once and with - * enough privs to write the event. - */ - event = audit_classify_auth(method); - switch(event) { - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: - if (geteuid() == 0) - audit_event(event); - break; - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: - /* - * This is required to handle the case where privsep - * is enabled but it's root logging in, since - * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a - * successful login. - */ - if (geteuid() == 0) - audit_event(event); - else - PRIVSEP(audit_event(event)); - break; - default: - error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event); - } - } + if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) + audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); #endif } @@ -310,7 +302,6 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method) switch (options.permit_root_login) { case PERMIT_YES: return 1; - break; case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) return 1; @@ -337,7 +328,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method) static char * expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) { - char *file, *ret; + char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN]; + int i; file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); @@ -349,14 +341,11 @@ expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) if (*file == '/') return (file); - ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); - if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN || - strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN || - strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN) + i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); + if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); - xfree(file); - return (ret); + return (xstrdup(ret)); } char * @@ -493,6 +482,9 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) #endif struct passwd *pw; + parse_server_match_config(&options, user, + get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr()); + pw = getpwnam(user); if (pw == NULL) { logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", @@ -580,6 +572,8 @@ fakepw(void) fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1; fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1; + fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw->pw_uid; + fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD fake.pw_class = ""; #endif |
