diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c | 345 |
1 files changed, 207 insertions, 138 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c index 5b87f19..956875d 100644 --- a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c +++ b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c @@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ #include "ntp_calendar.h" #include "ntp_leapsec.h" -#include "openssl/asn1_mac.h" #include "openssl/bn.h" #include "openssl/err.h" #include "openssl/evp.h" #include "openssl/pem.h" #include "openssl/rand.h" #include "openssl/x509v3.h" +#include "libssl_compat.h" #ifdef KERNEL_PLL #include "ntp_syscall.h" @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ session_key( u_long lifetime /* key lifetime */ ) { - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* message digest context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* message digest context */ u_char dgst[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; /* message digest */ keyid_t keyid; /* key identifer */ u_int32 header[10]; /* data in network byte order */ @@ -263,9 +263,11 @@ session_key( hdlen = 10 * sizeof(u_int32); break; } - EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(crypto_nid)); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)header, hdlen); - EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, dgst, &len); + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(crypto_nid)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)header, hdlen); + EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, dgst, &len); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); memcpy(&keyid, dgst, 4); keyid = ntohl(keyid); if (lifetime != 0) { @@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ make_keylist( struct interface *dstadr /* interface */ ) { - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; /* NTP timestamp */ struct autokey *ap; /* autokey pointer */ struct value *vp; /* value pointer */ @@ -377,14 +379,16 @@ make_keylist( if (tstamp != 0) { if (vp->sig == NULL) vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)vp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, sizeof(struct autokey)); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)vp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, sizeof(struct autokey)); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); peer->flags |= FLAG_ASSOC; } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); } DPRINTF(1, ("make_keys: %d %08x %08x ts %u fs %u poll %d\n", peer->keynumber, keyid, cookie, ntohl(vp->tstamp), @@ -820,8 +824,8 @@ crypto_recv( * errors. */ if (vallen == (u_int)EVP_PKEY_size(host_pkey)) { - u_int32 *cookiebuf = malloc( - RSA_size(host_pkey->pkey.rsa)); + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(host_pkey); + u_int32 *cookiebuf = malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); if (!cookiebuf) { rval = XEVNT_CKY; break; @@ -830,7 +834,7 @@ crypto_recv( if (RSA_private_decrypt(vallen, (u_char *)ep->pkt, (u_char *)cookiebuf, - host_pkey->pkey.rsa, + rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != 4) { rval = XEVNT_CKY; free(cookiebuf); @@ -1421,7 +1425,7 @@ crypto_verify( ) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* server public key */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp, tstamp1 = 0; /* timestamp */ tstamp_t fstamp, fstamp1 = 0; /* filestamp */ u_int vallen; /* value length */ @@ -1533,12 +1537,16 @@ crypto_verify( * signature. If the identity exchange is verified, light the * proventic bit. What a relief. */ - EVP_VerifyInit(&ctx, peer->digest); + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_VerifyInit(ctx, peer->digest); /* XXX: the "+ 12" needs to be at least documented... */ - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&ep->tstamp, vallen + 12); - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx, (u_char *)&ep->pkt[i], siglen, - pkey) <= 0) + EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&ep->tstamp, vallen + 12); + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, (u_char *)&ep->pkt[i], siglen, + pkey) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_SIG); + } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); if (peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_VRFY) peer->crypto |= CRYPTO_FLAG_PROV; @@ -1564,7 +1572,7 @@ crypto_encrypt( ) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* public key */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; /* NTP timestamp */ u_int32 temp32; u_char *puch; @@ -1592,7 +1600,7 @@ crypto_encrypt( puch = vp->ptr; temp32 = htonl(*cookie); if (RSA_public_encrypt(4, (u_char *)&temp32, puch, - pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey), RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0) { msyslog(LOG_ERR, "crypto_encrypt: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); free(vp->ptr); @@ -1604,13 +1612,15 @@ crypto_encrypt( return (XEVNT_OK); vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, vallen); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &vallen, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, vallen); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &vallen, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(vallen <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(vallen); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_OK); } @@ -1817,7 +1827,7 @@ crypto_send( void crypto_update(void) { - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* message digest context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* message digest context */ struct cert_info *cp; /* certificate info/value */ char statstr[NTP_MAXSTRLEN]; /* statistics for filegen */ u_int32 *ptr; @@ -1828,6 +1838,8 @@ crypto_update(void) if (hostval.tstamp == 0) return; + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + /* * Sign public key and timestamps. The filestamp is derived from * the host key file extension from wherever the file was @@ -1838,10 +1850,10 @@ crypto_update(void) pubkey.siglen = 0; if (pubkey.sig == NULL) pubkey.sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&pubkey, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, pubkey.ptr, ntohl(pubkey.vallen)); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, pubkey.sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&pubkey, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, pubkey.ptr, ntohl(pubkey.vallen)); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, pubkey.sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); pubkey.siglen = htonl(len); } @@ -1858,11 +1870,11 @@ crypto_update(void) cp->cert.siglen = 0; if (cp->cert.sig == NULL) cp->cert.sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&cp->cert, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, cp->cert.ptr, + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&cp->cert, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, cp->cert.ptr, ntohl(cp->cert.vallen)); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, cp->cert.sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, cp->cert.sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); cp->cert.siglen = htonl(len); } @@ -1909,10 +1921,10 @@ crypto_update(void) } if (tai_leap.sig == NULL) tai_leap.sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&tai_leap, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, tai_leap.ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, tai_leap.sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&tai_leap, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, tai_leap.ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, tai_leap.sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); tai_leap.siglen = htonl(len); } @@ -1922,6 +1934,7 @@ crypto_update(void) ntohl(hostval.tstamp)); record_crypto_stats(NULL, statstr); DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_update: %s\n", statstr)); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); } /* @@ -2061,7 +2074,7 @@ bighash( BIGNUM *bk /* BIGNUM * to */ ) { - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* message digest context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* message digest context */ u_char dgst[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; /* message digest */ u_char *ptr; /* a BIGNUM as binary string */ u_int len; @@ -2069,9 +2082,11 @@ bighash( len = BN_num_bytes(bn); ptr = emalloc(len); BN_bn2bin(bn, ptr); - EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, EVP_md5()); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ptr, len); - EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, dgst, &len); + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_md5()); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, ptr, len); + EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, dgst, &len); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); BN_bin2bn(dgst, len, bk); free(ptr); } @@ -2139,9 +2154,10 @@ crypto_alice( { DSA *dsa; /* IFF parameters */ BN_CTX *bctx; /* BIGNUM context */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; u_int len; + const BIGNUM *q; /* * The identity parameters must have correct format and content. @@ -2151,7 +2167,7 @@ crypto_alice( return (XEVNT_ID); } - if ((dsa = peer->ident_pkey->pkey->pkey.dsa) == NULL) { + if ((dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(peer->ident_pkey->pkey)) == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_alice: defective key"); return (XEVNT_PUB); } @@ -2162,10 +2178,11 @@ crypto_alice( if (peer->iffval != NULL) BN_free(peer->iffval); peer->iffval = BN_new(); - len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); + DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, NULL, &q, NULL); + len = BN_num_bytes(q); BN_rand(peer->iffval, len * 8, -1, 1); /* r mod q*/ bctx = BN_CTX_new(); - BN_mod(peer->iffval, peer->iffval, dsa->q, bctx); + BN_mod(peer->iffval, peer->iffval, q, bctx); BN_CTX_free(bctx); /* @@ -2182,13 +2199,15 @@ crypto_alice( return (XEVNT_OK); vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_OK); } @@ -2210,11 +2229,13 @@ crypto_bob( DSA *dsa; /* IFF parameters */ DSA_SIG *sdsa; /* DSA signature context fake */ BN_CTX *bctx; /* BIGNUM context */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; /* NTP timestamp */ BIGNUM *bn, *bk, *r; u_char *ptr; u_int len; /* extension field value length */ + const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g; + const BIGNUM *priv_key; /* * If the IFF parameters are not valid, something awful @@ -2224,7 +2245,9 @@ crypto_bob( msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_bob: scheme unavailable"); return (XEVNT_ID); } - dsa = iffkey_info->pkey->pkey.dsa; + dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(iffkey_info->pkey); + DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); + DSA_get0_key(dsa, NULL, &priv_key); /* * Extract r from the challenge. @@ -2245,15 +2268,14 @@ crypto_bob( bctx = BN_CTX_new(); bk = BN_new(); bn = BN_new(); sdsa = DSA_SIG_new(); BN_rand(bk, len * 8, -1, 1); /* k */ - BN_mod_mul(bn, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, bctx); /* b r mod q */ + BN_mod_mul(bn, priv_key, r, q, bctx); /* b r mod q */ BN_add(bn, bn, bk); - BN_mod(bn, bn, dsa->q, bctx); /* k + b r mod q */ - sdsa->r = BN_dup(bn); - BN_mod_exp(bk, dsa->g, bk, dsa->p, bctx); /* g^k mod p */ + BN_mod(bn, bn, q, bctx); /* k + b r mod q */ + BN_mod_exp(bk, g, bk, p, bctx); /* g^k mod p */ bighash(bk, bk); - sdsa->s = BN_dup(bk); + DSA_SIG_set0(sdsa, bn, bk); BN_CTX_free(bctx); - BN_free(r); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bk); + BN_free(r); #ifdef DEBUG if (debug > 1) DSA_print_fp(stdout, dsa, 0); @@ -2290,13 +2312,15 @@ crypto_bob( /* XXX: more validation to make sure the sign fits... */ vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_OK); } @@ -2323,6 +2347,9 @@ crypto_iff( u_int len; const u_char *ptr; int temp; + const BIGNUM *p, *g; + const BIGNUM *r, *s; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; /* * If the IFF parameters are not valid or no challenge was sent, @@ -2337,7 +2364,7 @@ crypto_iff( ntohl(ep->fstamp)); return (XEVNT_FSP); } - if ((dsa = peer->ident_pkey->pkey->pkey.dsa) == NULL) { + if ((dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(peer->ident_pkey->pkey)) == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_iff: defective key"); return (XEVNT_PUB); } @@ -2362,15 +2389,18 @@ crypto_iff( /* * Compute g^(k + b r) g^(q - b)r mod p. */ - BN_mod_exp(bn, dsa->pub_key, peer->iffval, dsa->p, bctx); - BN_mod_exp(bk, dsa->g, sdsa->r, dsa->p, bctx); - BN_mod_mul(bn, bn, bk, dsa->p, bctx); + DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL); + DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, NULL, &g); + DSA_SIG_get0(sdsa, &r, &s); + BN_mod_exp(bn, pub_key, peer->iffval, p, bctx); + BN_mod_exp(bk, g, r, p, bctx); + BN_mod_mul(bn, bn, bk, p, bctx); /* * Verify the hash of the result matches hash(x). */ bighash(bn, bn); - temp = BN_cmp(bn, sdsa->s); + temp = BN_cmp(bn, s); BN_free(bn); BN_free(bk); BN_CTX_free(bctx); BN_free(peer->iffval); peer->iffval = NULL; @@ -2456,9 +2486,10 @@ crypto_alice2( { RSA *rsa; /* GQ parameters */ BN_CTX *bctx; /* BIGNUM context */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; u_int len; + const BIGNUM *n; /* * The identity parameters must have correct format and content. @@ -2466,7 +2497,7 @@ crypto_alice2( if (peer->ident_pkey == NULL) return (XEVNT_ID); - if ((rsa = peer->ident_pkey->pkey->pkey.rsa) == NULL) { + if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(peer->ident_pkey->pkey)) == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_alice2: defective key"); return (XEVNT_PUB); } @@ -2477,10 +2508,11 @@ crypto_alice2( if (peer->iffval != NULL) BN_free(peer->iffval); peer->iffval = BN_new(); - len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL); + len = BN_num_bytes(n); BN_rand(peer->iffval, len * 8, -1, 1); /* r mod n */ bctx = BN_CTX_new(); - BN_mod(peer->iffval, peer->iffval, rsa->n, bctx); + BN_mod(peer->iffval, peer->iffval, n, bctx); BN_CTX_free(bctx); /* @@ -2497,13 +2529,15 @@ crypto_alice2( return (XEVNT_OK); vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_OK); } @@ -2525,12 +2559,13 @@ crypto_bob2( RSA *rsa; /* GQ parameters */ DSA_SIG *sdsa; /* DSA parameters */ BN_CTX *bctx; /* BIGNUM context */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; /* NTP timestamp */ BIGNUM *r, *k, *g, *y; u_char *ptr; u_int len; int s_len; + const BIGNUM *n, *p, *e; /* * If the GQ parameters are not valid, something awful @@ -2540,7 +2575,8 @@ crypto_bob2( msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_bob2: scheme unavailable"); return (XEVNT_ID); } - rsa = gqkey_info->pkey->pkey.rsa; + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(gqkey_info->pkey); + RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &p, &e); /* * Extract r from the challenge. @@ -2561,15 +2597,14 @@ crypto_bob2( bctx = BN_CTX_new(); k = BN_new(); g = BN_new(); y = BN_new(); sdsa = DSA_SIG_new(); BN_rand(k, len * 8, -1, 1); /* k */ - BN_mod(k, k, rsa->n, bctx); - BN_mod_exp(y, rsa->p, r, rsa->n, bctx); /* u^r mod n */ - BN_mod_mul(y, k, y, rsa->n, bctx); /* k u^r mod n */ - sdsa->r = BN_dup(y); - BN_mod_exp(g, k, rsa->e, rsa->n, bctx); /* k^b mod n */ + BN_mod(k, k, n, bctx); + BN_mod_exp(y, p, r, n, bctx); /* u^r mod n */ + BN_mod_mul(y, k, y, n, bctx); /* k u^r mod n */ + BN_mod_exp(g, k, e, n, bctx); /* k^b mod n */ bighash(g, g); - sdsa->s = BN_dup(g); + DSA_SIG_set0(sdsa, y, g); BN_CTX_free(bctx); - BN_free(r); BN_free(k); BN_free(g); BN_free(y); + BN_free(r); BN_free(k); #ifdef DEBUG if (debug > 1) RSA_print_fp(stdout, rsa, 0); @@ -2599,13 +2634,15 @@ crypto_bob2( return (XEVNT_OK); vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_OK); } @@ -2633,6 +2670,8 @@ crypto_gq( const u_char *ptr; long len; u_int temp; + const BIGNUM *n, *e; + const BIGNUM *r, *s; /* * If the GQ parameters are not valid or no challenge was sent, @@ -2649,10 +2688,11 @@ crypto_gq( ntohl(ep->fstamp)); return (XEVNT_FSP); } - if ((rsa = peer->ident_pkey->pkey->pkey.rsa) == NULL) { + if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(peer->ident_pkey->pkey)) == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_gq: defective key"); return (XEVNT_PUB); } + RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, &e); if (peer->iffval == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_gq: missing challenge"); return (XEVNT_ID); @@ -2671,6 +2711,7 @@ crypto_gq( ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return (XEVNT_ERR); } + DSA_SIG_get0(sdsa, &r, &s); /* * Compute v^r y^b mod n. @@ -2679,16 +2720,16 @@ crypto_gq( msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_gq: missing group key"); return (XEVNT_ID); } - BN_mod_exp(v, peer->grpkey, peer->iffval, rsa->n, bctx); + BN_mod_exp(v, peer->grpkey, peer->iffval, n, bctx); /* v^r mod n */ - BN_mod_exp(y, sdsa->r, rsa->e, rsa->n, bctx); /* y^b mod n */ - BN_mod_mul(y, v, y, rsa->n, bctx); /* v^r y^b mod n */ + BN_mod_exp(y, r, e, n, bctx); /* y^b mod n */ + BN_mod_mul(y, v, y, n, bctx); /* v^r y^b mod n */ /* * Verify the hash of the result matches hash(x). */ bighash(y, y); - temp = BN_cmp(y, sdsa->s); + temp = BN_cmp(y, s); BN_CTX_free(bctx); BN_free(y); BN_free(v); BN_free(peer->iffval); peer->iffval = NULL; @@ -2789,9 +2830,10 @@ crypto_alice3( { DSA *dsa; /* MV parameters */ BN_CTX *bctx; /* BIGNUM context */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; u_int len; + const BIGNUM *p; /* * The identity parameters must have correct format and content. @@ -2799,10 +2841,11 @@ crypto_alice3( if (peer->ident_pkey == NULL) return (XEVNT_ID); - if ((dsa = peer->ident_pkey->pkey->pkey.dsa) == NULL) { + if ((dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(peer->ident_pkey->pkey)) == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_alice3: defective key"); return (XEVNT_PUB); } + DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, NULL, NULL); /* * Roll new random r (0 < r < q). @@ -2810,10 +2853,10 @@ crypto_alice3( if (peer->iffval != NULL) BN_free(peer->iffval); peer->iffval = BN_new(); - len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->p); + len = BN_num_bytes(p); BN_rand(peer->iffval, len * 8, -1, 1); /* r mod p */ bctx = BN_CTX_new(); - BN_mod(peer->iffval, peer->iffval, dsa->p, bctx); + BN_mod(peer->iffval, peer->iffval, p, bctx); BN_CTX_free(bctx); /* @@ -2830,13 +2873,15 @@ crypto_alice3( return (XEVNT_OK); vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_OK); } @@ -2857,11 +2902,14 @@ crypto_bob3( DSA *dsa; /* MV parameters */ DSA *sdsa; /* DSA signature context fake */ BN_CTX *bctx; /* BIGNUM context */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* signature context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* signature context */ tstamp_t tstamp; /* NTP timestamp */ BIGNUM *r, *k, *u; u_char *ptr; u_int len; + const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; + BIGNUM *sp, *sq, *sg; /* * If the MV parameters are not valid, something awful @@ -2871,7 +2919,9 @@ crypto_bob3( msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_bob3: scheme unavailable"); return (XEVNT_ID); } - dsa = mvkey_info->pkey->pkey.dsa; + dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(mvkey_info->pkey); + DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); + DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key); /* * Extract r from the challenge. @@ -2892,18 +2942,20 @@ crypto_bob3( */ bctx = BN_CTX_new(); k = BN_new(); u = BN_new(); sdsa = DSA_new(); - sdsa->p = BN_new(); sdsa->q = BN_new(); sdsa->g = BN_new(); + sp = BN_new(); sq = BN_new(); sg = BN_new(); while (1) { - BN_rand(k, BN_num_bits(dsa->q), 0, 0); - BN_mod(k, k, dsa->q, bctx); - BN_gcd(u, k, dsa->q, bctx); + BN_rand(k, BN_num_bits(q), 0, 0); + BN_mod(k, k, q, bctx); + BN_gcd(u, k, q, bctx); if (BN_is_one(u)) break; } - BN_mod_exp(u, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, bctx); /* A^k r */ - BN_mod_mul(sdsa->p, u, r, dsa->p, bctx); - BN_mod_exp(sdsa->q, dsa->priv_key, k, dsa->p, bctx); /* gbar */ - BN_mod_exp(sdsa->g, dsa->pub_key, k, dsa->p, bctx); /* ghat */ + BN_mod_exp(u, g, k, p, bctx); /* A^k r */ + BN_mod_mul(sp, u, r, p, bctx); + BN_mod_exp(sq, priv_key, k, p, bctx); /* gbar */ + BN_mod_exp(sg, pub_key, k, p, bctx); /* ghat */ + DSA_set0_key(sdsa, BN_dup(pub_key), NULL); + DSA_set0_pqg(sdsa, sp, sq, sg); BN_CTX_free(bctx); BN_free(k); BN_free(r); BN_free(u); #ifdef DEBUG if (debug > 1) @@ -2934,13 +2986,15 @@ crypto_bob3( return (XEVNT_OK); vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (XEVNT_OK); } @@ -2968,6 +3022,9 @@ crypto_mv( u_int len; const u_char *ptr; int temp; + const BIGNUM *p; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; + const BIGNUM *sp, *sq, *sg; /* * If the MV parameters are not valid or no challenge was sent, @@ -2982,10 +3039,12 @@ crypto_mv( ntohl(ep->fstamp)); return (XEVNT_FSP); } - if ((dsa = peer->ident_pkey->pkey->pkey.dsa) == NULL) { + if ((dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(peer->ident_pkey->pkey)) == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_mv: defective key"); return (XEVNT_PUB); } + DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, NULL, NULL); + DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key); if (peer->iffval == NULL) { msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_mv: missing challenge"); return (XEVNT_ID); @@ -3002,14 +3061,15 @@ crypto_mv( ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return (XEVNT_ERR); } + DSA_get0_pqg(sdsa, &sp, &sq, &sg); /* * Compute (gbar^xhat ghat^xbar) mod p. */ - BN_mod_exp(u, sdsa->q, dsa->pub_key, dsa->p, bctx); - BN_mod_exp(v, sdsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, bctx); - BN_mod_mul(u, u, v, dsa->p, bctx); - BN_mod_mul(u, u, sdsa->p, dsa->p, bctx); + BN_mod_exp(u, sq, pub_key, p, bctx); + BN_mod_exp(v, sg, priv_key, p, bctx); + BN_mod_mul(u, u, v, p, bctx); + BN_mod_mul(u, u, sp, p, bctx); /* * The result should match r. @@ -3080,7 +3140,7 @@ cert_sign( ASN1_INTEGER *serial; /* serial number */ X509_NAME *subj; /* distinguished (common) name */ EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* public key */ - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; /* message digest context */ + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; /* message digest context */ tstamp_t tstamp; /* NTP timestamp */ struct calendar tscal; u_int len; @@ -3176,13 +3236,15 @@ cert_sign( vp->siglen = 0; if (tstamp != 0) { vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen); - EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)vp, 12); - EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len); - if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_SignInit(ctx, sign_digest); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (u_char *)vp, 12); + EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, vp->ptr, len); + if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) { INSIST(len <= sign_siglen); vp->siglen = htonl(len); } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); } #ifdef DEBUG if (debug > 1) @@ -3368,13 +3430,12 @@ cert_parse( ) { X509 *cert; /* X509 certificate */ - X509_EXTENSION *ext; /* X509v3 extension */ struct cert_info *ret; /* certificate info/value */ BIO *bp; char pathbuf[MAXFILENAME]; const u_char *ptr; char *pch; - int temp, cnt, i; + int cnt, i; struct calendar fscal; /* @@ -3422,7 +3483,7 @@ cert_parse( * objects at this time, since the real crunch can happen only * when the time is valid but not yet certificated. */ - ret->nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cert->cert_info->signature->algorithm); + ret->nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert); ret->digest = (const EVP_MD *)EVP_get_digestbynid(ret->nid); ret->serial = (u_long)ASN1_INTEGER_get(X509_get_serialNumber(cert)); @@ -3446,9 +3507,16 @@ cert_parse( */ cnt = X509_get_ext_count(cert); for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { + X509_EXTENSION *ext; + ASN1_OBJECT *obj; + int nid; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data; + ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i); - temp = OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object); - switch (temp) { + obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); + nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj); + + switch (nid) { /* * If a key_usage field is present, we decode whether @@ -3466,7 +3534,7 @@ cert_parse( else if (strcmp(pathbuf, "Private") == 0) ret->flags |= CERT_PRIV; DPRINTF(1, ("cert_parse: %s: %s\n", - OBJ_nid2ln(temp), pathbuf)); + OBJ_nid2ln(nid), pathbuf)); break; /* @@ -3474,12 +3542,13 @@ cert_parse( * contains the GQ public key. */ case NID_subject_key_identifier: - ret->grpkey = BN_bin2bn(&ext->value->data[2], - ext->value->length - 2, NULL); + data = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext); + ret->grpkey = BN_bin2bn(&data->data[2], + data->length - 2, NULL); /* fall through */ default: DPRINTF(1, ("cert_parse: %s\n", - OBJ_nid2ln(temp))); + OBJ_nid2ln(nid))); break; } } @@ -3669,10 +3738,10 @@ crypto_key( DPRINTF(1, ("crypto_key: %s\n", statstr)); #ifdef DEBUG if (debug > 1) { - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) - DSA_print_fp(stdout, pkey->pkey.dsa, 0); - else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) - RSA_print_fp(stdout, pkey->pkey.rsa, 0); + if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) + DSA_print_fp(stdout, EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey), 0); + else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) + RSA_print_fp(stdout, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey), 0); } #endif return (pkp); @@ -3882,7 +3951,7 @@ crypto_setup(void) filename); exit (-1); } - if (pinfo->pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pinfo->pkey) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { msyslog(LOG_ERR, "crypto_setup: host key is not RSA key type"); exit (-1); |
