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diff --git a/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsop-key-rollover-requirements-02.txt b/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsop-key-rollover-requirements-02.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6bece56..0000000 --- a/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsop-key-rollover-requirements-02.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,389 +0,0 @@ - -DNSOP G. Guette -Internet-Draft IRISA / INRIA -Expires: July 19, 2005 O. Courtay - Thomson R&D - January 18, 2005 - - Requirements for Automated Key Rollover in DNSSEC - draft-ietf-dnsop-key-rollover-requirements-02.txt - -Status of this Memo - - By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable - patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, - and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with - RFC 3668. - - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering - Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that - other groups may also distribute working documents as - Internet-Drafts. - - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months - and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any - time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference - material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. - - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - - This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2005. - -Copyright Notice - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. - -Abstract - - This document describes problems that appear during an automated - rollover and gives the requirements for the design of communication - between parent zone and child zone during an automated rollover - process. This document is essentially about in-band key rollover. - - - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 1] -Internet-Draft Automated Rollover Requirements January 2005 - -Table of Contents - - 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. The Key Rollover Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 3. Basic Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 4. Messages authentication and information exchanged . . . . . . 5 - 5. Emergency Rollover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 6. Security consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - A. Documents details and changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 2] -Internet-Draft Automated Rollover Requirements January 2005 - -1. Introduction - - The DNS security extensions (DNSSEC) [4][6][5][7] uses public-key - cryptography and digital signatures. It stores the public part of - keys in DNSKEY Resource Records (RRs). Because old keys and - frequently used keys are vulnerable, they must be renewed - periodically. In DNSSEC, this is the case for Zone Signing Keys - (ZSKs) and Key Signing Keys (KSKs) [1][2]. Automation of key - exchanges between parents and children is necessary for large zones - because there are too many changes to handle. - - Let us consider for example a zone with 100000 secure delegations. - If the child zones change their keys once a year on average, that - implies 300 changes per day for the parent zone. This amount of - changes is hard to manage manually. - - Automated rollover is optional and resulting from an agreement - between the administrator of the parent zone and the administrator of - the child zone. Of course, key rollover can also be done manually by - administrators. - - This document describes the requirements for a protocol to perform - the automated key rollover process and focusses on interaction - between parent and child zone. - -2. The Key Rollover Process - - Key rollover consists of renewing the DNSSEC keys used to sign - resource records in a given DNS zone file. There are two types of - rollover, ZSK rollovers and KSK rollovers. - - During a ZSK rollover, all changes are local to the zone that renews - its key: there is no need to contact other zones administrators to - propagate the performed changes because a ZSK has no associated DS - record in the parent zone. - - During a KSK rollover, new DS RR(s) must be created and stored in the - parent zone. In consequence, data must be exchanged between child - and parent zones. - - The key rollover is built from two parts of different nature: - o An algorithm that generates new keys and signs the zone file. It - can be local to the zone, - o the interaction between parent and child zones. - - One example of manual key rollover [3] is: - o The child zone creates a new KSK, - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 3] -Internet-Draft Automated Rollover Requirements January 2005 - - o the child zone waits for the creation of the DS RR in its parent - zone, - o the child zone deletes the old key, - o the parent zone deletes the old DS RR. - - This document concentrates on defining interactions between entities - present in key rollover process. - -3. Basic Requirements - - This section provides the requirements for automated key rollover in - case of normal use. Exceptional case like emergency rollover is - specifically described later in this document. - - The main condition during a key rollover is that the chain of trust - must be preserved to every validating DNS client. No matter if this - client retrieves some of the RRs from recursive caching name server - or from the authoritative servers for the zone involved in the - rollover. - - Automated key rollover solution may be interrupted by a manual - intervention. This manual intervention should not compromise the - security state of the chain of trust. If the chain is safe before - the manual intervention, the chain of trust must remain safe during - and after the manual intervention - - Two entities act during a KSK rollover: the child zone and its parent - zone. These zones are generally managed by different administrators. - These administrators should agree on some parameters like - availability of automated rollover, the maximum delay between - notification of changes in the child zone and the resigning of the - parent zone. The child zone needs to know this delay to schedule its - changes and/or to verify that the changes had been taken into account - in the parent zone. Hence, the child zone can also avoid some - critical cases where all child key are changed prior to the DS RR - creation. - - By keeping some resource records during a given time, the recursive - cache servers can act on the automated rollover. The existence of - recursive cache servers must be taken into account by automated - rollover solution. - - Indeed, during an automated key rollover a name server could have to - retrieve some DNSSEC data. An automated key rollover solution must - ensure that these data are not old DNSSEC material retrieved from a - recursive name server. - - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 4] -Internet-Draft Automated Rollover Requirements January 2005 - -4. Messages authentication and information exchanged - - This section addresses in-band rollover, security of out-of-band - mechanisms is out of scope of this document. - - The security provided by DNSSEC must not be compromised by the key - rollover, thus every exchanged message must be authenticated to avoid - fake rollover messages from malicious parties. - - Once the changes related to a KSK are made in a child zone, there are - two ways for the parent zone to take this changes into account: - o the child zone notify directly or not directly its parent zone in - order to create the new DS RR and store this DS RR in parent zone - file, - o or the parent zone poll the child zone. - - In both cases, the parent zone must receive all the child keys that - need the creation of associated DS RRs in the parent zone. - - Because errors could occur during the transmission of keys between - child and parent, the key exchange protocol must be fault tolerant. - Should an error occured during the automated key rollover, an - automated key rollover solution must be able to keep the zone files - in a consistent state. - -5. Emergency Rollover - - Emergency key rollover is a special case of rollover decided by the - zone administrator generally for security reasons. In consequence, - emergency key rollover can break some of the requirement described - above. - - A zone key might be compromised and an attacker can use the - compromised key to create and sign fake records. To avoid this, the - zone administrator may change the compromised key or all its keys as - soon as possible, without waiting for the creation of new DS RRs in - its parent zone. - - Fast changes may break the chain of trust. The part of DNS tree - having this zone as apex can become unverifiable, but the break of - the chain of trust is necessary if the administrator wants to prevent - the compromised key from being used (to spoof DNS data). - - Parent and child zones sharing an automated rollover mechanism, - should have an out-of-band way to re-establish a consistent state at - the delegation point (DS and DNSKEY RRs). This allows to avoid that - a malicious party uses the compromised key to roll the zone keys. - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 5] -Internet-Draft Automated Rollover Requirements January 2005 - -6. Security consideration - - The automated key rollover process in DNSSEC allows automated renewal - of any kind of DNS key (ZSK or KSK). It is essential that parent - side and child side can do mutual authentication. Moreover, - integrity of the material exchanged between the parent and child zone - must be provided to ensure the right DS are created. - - As in any application using public key cryptography, in DNSSEC a key - may be compromised. What to do in such a case can be describe in the - zone local policy and can violate some requirements described in this - draft. The emergency rollover can break the chain of trust in order - to protect the zone against the use of the compromised key. - -7. Acknowledgments - - The authors want to thank members of IDsA project for their - contribution to this document. - -8 Normative References - - [1] Gudmundsson, O., "Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR)", - RFC 3658, December 2003. - - [2] Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J. and E. Lewis, "Domain Name System KEY - (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag", - RFC 3757, May 2004. - - [3] Kolkman, O., "DNSSEC Operational Practices", - draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-operational-practice-01 (work in - progress), May 2004. - - [4] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC - 2535, March 1999. - - [5] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S. Rose, - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", - draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-11 (work in progress), October - 2004. - - [6] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S. Rose, - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", - draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-13 (work in progress), October - 2004. - - [7] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S. Rose, - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", - draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-09 (work in progress), October - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 6] -Internet-Draft Automated Rollover Requirements January 2005 - - 2004. - -Authors' Addresses - - Gilles Guette - IRISA / INRIA - Campus de Beaulieu - 35042 Rennes CEDEX - FR - - EMail: gilles.guette@irisa.fr - URI: http://www.irisa.fr - - Olivier Courtay - Thomson R&D - 1, avenue Belle Fontaine - 35510 Cesson S?vign? CEDEX - FR - - EMail: olivier.courtay@thomson.net - -Appendix A. Documents details and changes - - This section is to be removed by the RFC editor if and when the - document is published. - - Section about NS RR rollover has been removed - - Remarks from Samuel Weiler and Rip Loomis added - - Clarification about in-band rollover and in emergency section - - Section 3, details about recursive cache servers added - - - - - - - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 7] -Internet-Draft Automated Rollover Requirements January 2005 - -Intellectual Property Statement - - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any - intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to - pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described - in this document or the extent to which any license under such - rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent - that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. - Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in - IETF Documents can be found in BCP 78 and 79. - - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any - assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an - attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use - of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this - specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository - at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention - any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other - proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required - to implement this standard. Please address the information to the - IETF at ietf-ipr.org. - - - Full Copyright Statement - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject - to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and - except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. - - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS - OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET - ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, - INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE - INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED - WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - - Acknowledgment - - Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the - Internet Society. - - - - - -Guette & Courtay Expires July 19, 2005 [Page 8] |
