Merge kld access control checks from the MAC tree: these access control

checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting
kld operations.  This permits policies to limit access to kld operations
based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks
on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc).

Approved by:	re
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories

16 files changed, 488 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_linker.c b/sys/kern/kern_linker.c
index b936159..eab20b1 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_linker.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_linker.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "opt_ddb.h"
+#include "opt_mac.h"
 
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/kernel.h>
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <sys/lock.h>
 #include <sys/mutex.h>
 #include <sys/sx.h>
+#include <sys/mac.h>
 #include <sys/module.h>
 #include <sys/linker.h>
 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
@@ -474,6 +476,11 @@ linker_file_unload(linker_file_t file)
 	/* Refuse to unload modules if securelevel raised. */
 	if (securelevel > 0)
 		return (EPERM);
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_kld_unload(curthread->td_ucred);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+#endif
 
 	KLD_DPF(FILE, ("linker_file_unload: lf->refs=%d\n", file->refs));
 	if (file->refs == 1) {
@@ -824,6 +831,12 @@ kldfind(struct thread *td, struct kldfind_args *uap)
 	linker_file_t lf;
 	int error = 0;
 
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_kld_stat(td->td_ucred);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+#endif
+
 	mtx_lock(&Giant);
 	td->td_retval[0] = -1;
 
@@ -854,6 +867,12 @@ kldnext(struct thread *td, struct kldnext_args *uap)
 	linker_file_t lf;
 	int error = 0;
 
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_kld_stat(td->td_ucred);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+#endif
+
 	mtx_lock(&Giant);
 
 	if (SCARG(uap, fileid) == 0) {
@@ -889,6 +908,12 @@ kldstat(struct thread *td, struct kldstat_args *uap)
 	int namelen, version;
 	struct kld_file_stat *stat;
 
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_kld_stat(td->td_ucred);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+#endif
+
 	mtx_lock(&Giant);
 
 	lf = linker_find_file_by_id(SCARG(uap, fileid));
@@ -938,6 +963,12 @@ kldfirstmod(struct thread *td, struct kldfirstmod_args *uap)
 	module_t mp;
 	int error = 0;
 
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_kld_stat(td->td_ucred);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+#endif
+
 	mtx_lock(&Giant);
 	lf = linker_find_file_by_id(SCARG(uap, fileid));
 	if (lf) {
@@ -967,6 +998,12 @@ kldsym(struct thread *td, struct kldsym_args *uap)
 	struct kld_sym_lookup lookup;
 	int error = 0;
 
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_kld_stat(td->td_ucred);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+#endif
+
 	mtx_lock(&Giant);
 
 	if ((error = copyin(SCARG(uap, data), &lookup, sizeof(lookup))) != 0)
@@ -1800,6 +1837,11 @@ sysctl_kern_function_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	linker_file_t lf;
 	int error;
 
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_kld_stat(req->td->td_ucred);
+	if (error)
+		return (error);
+#endif
 	sysctl_wire_old_buffer(req, 0);
 	mtx_lock(&kld_mtx);
 	TAILQ_FOREACH(lf, &linker_files, link) {
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_mac.c b/sys/kern/kern_mac.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_mac.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_mac.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/kern/link_elf.c b/sys/kern/link_elf.c
index 75c95cd..3e5224e 100644
--- a/sys/kern/link_elf.c
+++ b/sys/kern/link_elf.c
@@ -27,11 +27,13 @@
  */
 
 #include "opt_ddb.h"
+#include "opt_mac.h"
 
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/kernel.h>
 #include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mac.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
 #include <sys/mutex.h>
 #include <sys/proc.h>
@@ -556,6 +558,13 @@ link_elf_load_file(linker_class_t cls, const char* filename,
     if (error)
 	return error;
     NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
+#ifdef MAC
+    error = mac_check_kld_load(curthread->td_ucred, nd.ni_vp);
+    if (error) {
+	firstpage = NULL;
+	goto out;
+    }
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Read the elf header from the file.
diff --git a/sys/kern/link_elf_obj.c b/sys/kern/link_elf_obj.c
index 75c95cd..3e5224e 100644
--- a/sys/kern/link_elf_obj.c
+++ b/sys/kern/link_elf_obj.c
@@ -27,11 +27,13 @@
  */
 
 #include "opt_ddb.h"
+#include "opt_mac.h"
 
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/kernel.h>
 #include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mac.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
 #include <sys/mutex.h>
 #include <sys/proc.h>
@@ -556,6 +558,13 @@ link_elf_load_file(linker_class_t cls, const char* filename,
     if (error)
 	return error;
     NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
+#ifdef MAC
+    error = mac_check_kld_load(curthread->td_ucred, nd.ni_vp);
+    if (error) {
+	firstpage = NULL;
+	goto out;
+    }
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Read the elf header from the file.
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
index 17cf52e..3e7e6bb 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ int	mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred);
 int	mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
 int	mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value);
 int	mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
+int	mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
+int	mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred);
+int	mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred);
 int	mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
 int	mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
 	    unsigned long cmd, void *data);
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
index 20988fa..96fc060 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
@@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ struct mac_policy_ops {
 	int	(*mpo_check_kenv_set)(struct ucred *cred, char *name,
 		    char *value);
 	int	(*mpo_check_kenv_unset)(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
+	int	(*mpo_check_kld_load)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+		    struct label *vlabel);
+	int	(*mpo_check_kld_stat)(struct ucred *cred);
+	int	(*mpo_check_kld_unload)(struct ucred *cred);
 	int	(*mpo_check_mount_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
 		    struct label *mntlabel);
 	int	(*mpo_check_pipe_ioctl)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c
index 82eded8..bf6c999 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
+static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
+
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
 }
 
 int
+mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
+		return (0);
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/sys/sys/mac.h b/sys/sys/mac.h
index 17cf52e..3e7e6bb 100644
--- a/sys/sys/mac.h
+++ b/sys/sys/mac.h
@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ int	mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred);
 int	mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
 int	mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value);
 int	mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
+int	mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
+int	mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred);
+int	mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred);
 int	mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
 int	mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
 	    unsigned long cmd, void *data);
diff --git a/sys/sys/mac_policy.h b/sys/sys/mac_policy.h
index 20988fa..96fc060 100644
--- a/sys/sys/mac_policy.h
+++ b/sys/sys/mac_policy.h
@@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ struct mac_policy_ops {
 	int	(*mpo_check_kenv_set)(struct ucred *cred, char *name,
 		    char *value);
 	int	(*mpo_check_kenv_unset)(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
+	int	(*mpo_check_kld_load)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+		    struct label *vlabel);
+	int	(*mpo_check_kld_stat)(struct ucred *cred);
+	int	(*mpo_check_kld_unload)(struct ucred *cred);
 	int	(*mpo_check_mount_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
 		    struct label *mntlabel);
 	int	(*mpo_check_pipe_ioctl)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,