diff options
| author | markm <markm@FreeBSD.org> | 2000-07-17 12:23:04 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | markm <markm@FreeBSD.org> | 2000-07-17 12:23:04 +0000 |
| commit | 8d7820758595ec235d4238e286c63546a533f9d3 (patch) | |
| tree | 340bfc3b8cc0e99ad95e3e127e973e17127f38fb /sys/sys/random.h | |
| parent | 542bea8cf0b0bdbb6b61e4bb41cce819a51347da (diff) | |
| download | FreeBSD-src-8d7820758595ec235d4238e286c63546a533f9d3.zip FreeBSD-src-8d7820758595ec235d4238e286c63546a533f9d3.tar.gz | |
Add randomness write functionality. This does absolutely nothing for
entropy estimation, but causes an immediate reseed after the input
(read in sizeof(u_int64_t) chunks) is "harvested".
This will be used in the reboot "reseeder", coming in another
commit. This can be used very effectively at any time you think
your randomness is compromised; something like
# (ps -gauxwww; netstat -an; dmesg; vmstat -c10 1) > /dev/random
will give the attacker something to think about.
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/sys/random.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/sys/random.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/sys/sys/random.h b/sys/sys/random.h index 1b99532..4888ec5 100644 --- a/sys/sys/random.h +++ b/sys/sys/random.h @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ u_int read_random(char *, u_int); void write_random(char *, u_int); -enum esource { RANDOM_KEYBOARD, RANDOM_MOUSE }; +enum esource { RANDOM_WRITE, RANDOM_KEYBOARD, RANDOM_MOUSE }; void random_harvest(u_int64_t, u_int, u_int, u_int); #endif |
