diff options
| author | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2006-12-21 09:51:34 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2006-12-21 09:51:34 +0000 |
| commit | 6fa1425be4ba1838fbf0b757c9cbbb6c0da6811f (patch) | |
| tree | 0e00125c1e53f64a611961efffaf3188df3fc0d6 /sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c | |
| parent | 24b8c057ed5ff8edf963e31c6cd9eaf0514469b2 (diff) | |
| download | FreeBSD-src-6fa1425be4ba1838fbf0b757c9cbbb6c0da6811f.zip FreeBSD-src-6fa1425be4ba1838fbf0b757c9cbbb6c0da6811f.tar.gz | |
Remove mac_enforce_subsystem debugging sysctls. Enforcement on
subsystems will be a property of policy modules, which may require
access control check entry points to be invoked even when not actively
enforcing (i.e., to track information flow without providing
protection).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Suggested by: Christopher dot Vance at sparta dot com
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c index 8802a50..d946bb9 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c @@ -260,9 +260,6 @@ mac_check_inpcb_deliver(struct inpcb *inp, struct mbuf *m) M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m); - if (!mac_enforce_socket) - return (0); - label = mac_mbuf_to_label(m); MAC_CHECK(check_inpcb_deliver, inp, inp->inp_label, m, label); |
