Import kernel audit framework:

- Management of audit state on processes.
- Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state.
- Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel
  thread to asynchronously store records on disk.
- Audit event argument.
- Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library.
- Audit event pre-selection.
- Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd
  of kernel audit events.

Much work by:	wsalamon
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.

1 files changed, 803 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8aaab69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,803 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Computer, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1.  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2.  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *     documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3.  Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
+ *     its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *     from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
+ * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/filedesc.h>
+#include <sys/ipc.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/socketvar.h>
+#include <sys/protosw.h>
+#include <sys/domain.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
+
+#include <security/audit/audit.h>
+#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
+
+/*
+ * Calls to manipulate elements of the audit record structure from system
+ * call code.  Macro wrappers will prevent this functions from being
+ * entered if auditing is disabled, avoiding the function call cost.  We
+ * check the thread audit record pointer anyway, as the audit condition
+ * could change, and pre-selection may not have allocated an audit
+ * record for this event.
+ *
+ * XXXAUDIT: Should we assert, in each case, that this field of the record
+ * hasn't already been filled in?
+ */
+void
+audit_arg_addr(void * addr)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_addr = addr;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ADDR);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_exit(int status, int retval)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitstatus = status;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_exitretval = retval;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EXIT);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_len(int len)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = len;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LEN);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_fd(int fd)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fd = fd;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FD);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_fflags(int fflags)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags = fflags;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_FFLAGS);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_gid(gid_t gid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_egid(gid_t egid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = egid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EGID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_euid(uid_t euid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = euid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_EUID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_rgid(gid_t rgid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = rgid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RGID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_ruid(uid_t ruid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = ruid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RUID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_sgid(gid_t sgid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sgid = sgid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SGID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_suid(uid_t suid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_suid = suid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SUID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_groupset(gid_t *gidset, u_int gidset_size)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gidset_size; i++)
+		ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset[i] = gidset[i];
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset_size = gidset_size;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_GROUPSET);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_login(char *login)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_login, login, MAXLOGNAME);
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_LOGIN);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_ctlname(int *name, int namelen)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	bcopy(name, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, namelen * sizeof(int));
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_len = namelen;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CTLNAME | ARG_LEN);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_mask(int mask)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mask = mask;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MASK);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_mode(mode_t mode)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_mode = mode;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_MODE);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_dev(int dev)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_dev = dev;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_DEV);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_value(long value)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_value = value;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VALUE);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_owner(uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_uid = uid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_gid = gid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UID | ARG_GID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_pid(pid_t pid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pid = pid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_PID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_process(struct proc *p)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if ((ar == NULL) || (p == NULL))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXXAUDIT: PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p);
+	 */
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = p->p_au->ai_auid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_euid = p->p_ucred->cr_uid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_egid = p->p_ucred->cr_groups[0];
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ruid = p->p_ucred->cr_ruid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rgid = p->p_ucred->cr_rgid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = p->p_au->ai_asid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid = p->p_au->ai_termid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_EUID | ARG_EGID | ARG_RUID |
+	    ARG_RGID | ARG_ASID | ARG_TERMID | ARG_PROCESS);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_signum(u_int signum)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = signum;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_socket(int sodomain, int sotype, int soprotocol)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+ 
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_domain = sodomain;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_type = sotype;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_protocol = soprotocol;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXXAUDIT: Argument here should be 'sa' not 'so'.  Caller is responsible
+ * for synchronizing access to the source of the address.
+ */
+void
+audit_arg_sockaddr(struct thread *td, struct sockaddr *so)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL || td == NULL || so == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	bcopy(so, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr, sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockaddr));
+	switch (so->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET);
+		break;
+
+	case AF_INET6:
+		ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRINET6);
+		break;
+
+	case AF_UNIX:
+		audit_arg_upath(td, ((struct sockaddr_un *)so)->sun_path, 
+				ARG_UPATH1);
+		ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SADDRUNIX);
+		break;
+	/* XXXAUDIT: default:? */
+	}
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_auid(uid_t auid)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = auid;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_auditinfo(struct auditinfo *au_info)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auid = au_info->ai_auid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_asid = au_info->ai_asid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_success = au_info->ai_mask.am_success;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_amask.am_failure = au_info->ai_mask.am_failure;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.port = au_info->ai_termid.port;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_termid.machine = au_info->ai_termid.machine;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUID | ARG_ASID | ARG_AMASK | ARG_TERMID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_text(char *text)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXXAUDIT: Why do we accept a possibly NULL string here?
+	 */
+	/* Invalidate the text string */
+	ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_TEXT);
+	if (text == NULL)
+		return;	
+
+	if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text == NULL)
+		ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITTEXT,
+		    M_WAITOK);
+
+	strncpy(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, text, MAXPATHLEN);
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_TEXT);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_cmd(int cmd)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd = cmd;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_CMD);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_svipc_cmd(int cmd)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_cmd = cmd;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_CMD);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_svipc_perm(struct ipc_perm *perm)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	bcopy(perm, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm, 
+		sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_perm));
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_PERM);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_svipc_id(int id)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_id = id;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ID);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_svipc_addr(void * addr)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_addr = addr;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_ADDR);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_posix_ipc_perm(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_uid = uid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_gid = gid;
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_pipc_perm.pipc_mode = mode;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_POSIX_IPC_PERM);
+}
+
+void
+audit_arg_auditon(union auditon_udata *udata)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	bcopy((void *)udata, &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon, 
+		sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_auditon));
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_AUDITON);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Audit information about a file, either the file's vnode info, or its
+ * socket address info.
+ */
+void
+audit_arg_file(struct proc *p, struct file *fp)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+	struct socket *so;
+	struct inpcb *pcb;
+	struct vnode *vp;
+	int vfslocked;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXXAUDIT: Why is the (ar == NULL) test only in the socket case?
+	 */
+	switch (fp->f_type) {
+	case DTYPE_VNODE:
+	case DTYPE_FIFO:
+		/*
+		 * XXXAUDIT: Only possibly to record as first vnode?
+		 */
+		vp = fp->f_vnode;
+		vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
+		vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, curthread);
+		audit_arg_vnode(vp, ARG_VNODE1);
+		VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, curthread);
+		VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
+		break;
+
+	case DTYPE_SOCKET:
+		ar = currecord();
+		if (ar == NULL)
+			return;
+
+		/*
+		 * XXXAUDIT: Socket locking?  Inpcb locking?
+		 */
+		so = (struct socket *)fp->f_data;
+		if (INP_CHECK_SOCKAF(so, PF_INET)) {
+			if (so->so_pcb == NULL)
+				return;
+			ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_type =
+				so->so_type;
+			ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_domain =
+				INP_SOCKAF(so);
+			ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_protocol =
+				so->so_proto->pr_protocol;
+			pcb = (struct inpcb *)so->so_pcb;
+			ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_raddr =
+				pcb->inp_faddr.s_addr;
+			ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_laddr =
+				pcb->inp_laddr.s_addr;
+			ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_rport =
+				pcb->inp_fport;
+			ar->k_ar.ar_arg_sockinfo.so_lport =
+				pcb->inp_lport;
+			ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SOCKINFO);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		/* XXXAUDIT: else? */
+		break;
+	}
+
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Store a path as given by the user process for auditing into the audit 
+ * record stored on the user thread. This function will allocate the memory to 
+ * store the path info if not already available. This memory will be 
+ * freed when the audit record is freed.
+ *
+ * XXXAUDIT: Possibly assert that the memory isn't already allocated?
+ */
+void
+audit_arg_upath(struct thread *td, char *upath, u_int64_t flag)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+	char **pathp;
+
+	if (td == NULL || upath == NULL) 
+		return;		/* nothing to do! */
+
+	/*
+	 * XXXAUDIT: Witness warning for possible sleep here?
+	 */
+	KASSERT((flag == ARG_UPATH1) || (flag == ARG_UPATH2),
+	    ("audit_arg_upath: flag %llu", flag));
+	KASSERT((flag != ARG_UPATH1) || (flag != ARG_UPATH2),
+	    ("audit_arg_upath: flag %llu", flag));
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (flag == ARG_UPATH1)
+		pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1;
+	else
+		pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2;
+
+	if (*pathp == NULL)
+		*pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
+
+	canon_path(td, upath, *pathp);
+
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, flag);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function to save the path and vnode attr information into the audit 
+ * record. 
+ *
+ * It is assumed that the caller will hold any vnode locks necessary to
+ * perform a VOP_GETATTR() on the passed vnode.
+ *
+ * XXX: The attr code is very similar to vfs_vnops.c:vn_stat(), but
+ * always provides access to the generation number as we need that
+ * to construct the BSM file ID.
+ * XXX: We should accept the process argument from the caller, since
+ * it's very likely they already have a reference.
+ * XXX: Error handling in this function is poor.
+ *
+ * XXXAUDIT: Possibly KASSERT the path pointer is NULL?
+ */
+void
+audit_arg_vnode(struct vnode *vp, u_int64_t flags)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+	struct vattr vattr;
+	int error;
+	struct vnode_au_info *vnp;
+	struct thread *td;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXXAUDIT: Why is vp possibly NULL here?
+	 */
+	if (vp == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Assume that if the caller is calling audit_arg_vnode() on a
+	 * non-MPSAFE vnode, then it will have acquired Giant.
+	 */
+	VFS_ASSERT_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
+	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "audit_arg_vnode");
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)	/* This will be the case for unaudited system calls */
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXXAUDIT: KASSERT argument validity instead?
+	 *
+	 * XXXAUDIT: The below clears, and then resets the flags for valid
+	 * arguments.  Ideally, either the new vnode is used, or the old one
+	 * would be.
+	 */
+	if ((flags & (ARG_VNODE1 | ARG_VNODE2)) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	td = curthread;
+
+	if (flags & ARG_VNODE1) {
+		ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE1);
+		vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode1;
+	} else {
+		ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg &= (ARG_ALL ^ ARG_VNODE2);
+		vnp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_vnode2;
+	}
+
+	error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td);
+	if (error) {
+		/* XXX: How to handle this case? */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vnp->vn_mode = vattr.va_mode;
+	vnp->vn_uid = vattr.va_uid;
+	vnp->vn_gid = vattr.va_gid;
+	vnp->vn_dev = vattr.va_rdev;
+	vnp->vn_fsid = vattr.va_fsid;
+	vnp->vn_fileid = vattr.va_fileid;
+	vnp->vn_gen = vattr.va_gen;
+	if (flags & ARG_VNODE1)
+		ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE1);
+	else
+		ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_VNODE2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The close() system call uses it's own audit call to capture the 
+ * path/vnode information because those pieces are not easily obtained
+ * within the system call itself.
+ */
+void
+audit_sysclose(struct thread *td, int fd)
+{
+	struct vnode *vp;
+	struct file *fp;
+	int vfslocked;
+
+	audit_arg_fd(fd);
+
+	if (getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, fd, &fp) != 0)
+		return;
+
+	vp = fp->f_vnode;
+	vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
+	vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
+	audit_arg_vnode(vp, ARG_VNODE1);
+	VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
+	VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
+	fdrop(fp, td);
+}