diff options
author | ae <ae@FreeBSD.org> | 2017-03-18 22:04:20 +0000 |
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committer | ae <ae@FreeBSD.org> | 2017-03-18 22:04:20 +0000 |
commit | e6fbe68844bdd64b17c07bde1f7367c92c0ec9d9 (patch) | |
tree | 7a64df52f03594cf57022c25bab5cbf6ec29d162 /sys/netinet6/ip6_ipsec.c | |
parent | 7aecbe85bebfa92d4148511a0fd803ff742a5fee (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-e6fbe68844bdd64b17c07bde1f7367c92c0ec9d9.zip FreeBSD-src-e6fbe68844bdd64b17c07bde1f7367c92c0ec9d9.tar.gz |
MFC r304572 (by bz):
Remove the kernel optoion for IPSEC_FILTERTUNNEL, which was deprecated
more than 7 years ago in favour of a sysctl in r192648.
MFC r305122:
Remove redundant sanity checks from ipsec[46]_common_input_cb().
This check already has been done in the each protocol callback.
MFC r309144,309174,309201 (by fabient):
IPsec RFC6479 support for replay window sizes up to 2^32 - 32 packets.
Since the previous algorithm, based on bit shifting, does not scale
with large replay windows, the algorithm used here is based on
RFC 6479: IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm without Bit Shifting.
The replay window will be fast to be updated, but will cost as many bits
in RAM as its size.
The previous implementation did not provide a lock on the replay window,
which may lead to replay issues.
Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8468
MFC r309143,309146 (by fabient):
In a dual processor system (2*6 cores) during IPSec throughput tests,
we see a lot of contention on the arc4 lock, used to generate the IV
of the ESP output packets.
The idea of this patch is to split this mutex in order to reduce the
contention on this lock.
Update r309143 to prevent false sharing.
Reviewed by: delphij, markm, ache
Approved by: so
Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8130
MFC r313330:
Merge projects/ipsec into head/.
Small summary
-------------
o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec.
o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel
option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading
and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules.
o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by
default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type
support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for
inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs.
setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA.
o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is
build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel).
It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs.
o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special
methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
should be included to declare all the needed things to work
with IPsec.
o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed.
Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods.
o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC.
o PF_KEY SADB was reworked:
- now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace,
and all SAs MUST have unique SPI.
- several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB.
- SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads
can do SA lookups in the same time.
- many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes
in SADB.
- SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers:
SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They
can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses.
o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to
avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support
only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported
for both INET and INET6.
o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches
used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet.
o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does
check for full history of applied IPsec transforms.
o References counting rules for security policies and security
associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform
code.
o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms.
tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in
SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting.
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
MFC r313331:
Add removed headers into the ObsoleteFiles.inc.
MFC r313561 (by glebius):
Move tcp_fields_to_net() static inline into tcp_var.h, just below its
friend tcp_fields_to_host(). There is third party code that also uses
this inline.
MFC r313697:
Remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
The inpcb structure has inp_sp pointer that is initialized by
ipsec_init_pcbpolicy() function. This pointer keeps strorage for IPsec
security policies associated with a specific socket.
An application can use IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket
options to configure these security policies. Then ip[6]_output()
uses inpcb pointer to specify that an outgoing packet is associated
with some socket. And IPSEC_OUTPUT() method can use a security policy
stored in the inp_sp. For inbound packet the protocol-specific input
routine uses IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method to check that a packet conforms
to inbound security policy configured in the inpcb.
SCTP protocol doesn't specify inpcb for ip[6]_output() when it sends
packets. Thus IPSEC_OUTPUT() method does not consider such packets as
associated with some socket and can not apply security policies
from inpcb, even if they are configured. Since IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY()
method is called from protocol-specific input routine, it can specify
inpcb pointer and associated with socket inbound policy will be
checked. But there are two problems:
1. Such check is asymmetric, becasue we can not apply security policy
from inpcb for outgoing packet.
2. IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() expects that caller holds INPCB lock and
access to inp_sp is protected. But for SCTP this is not correct,
becasue SCTP uses own locks to protect inpcb.
To fix these problems remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
This imply that IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options
will be not applicable to SCTP sockets. To be able correctly check
inbound security policies for SCTP, mark its protocol header with
the PR_LASTHDR flag.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9538
MFC r313746:
Add missing check to fix the build with IPSEC_SUPPORT and without MAC.
MFC r313805:
Fix LINT build for powerpc.
Build kernel modules support only when both IPSEC and TCP_SIGNATURE
are not defined.
MFC r313922:
For translated packets do not adjust UDP checksum if it is zero.
In case when decrypted and decapsulated packet is an UDP datagram,
check that its checksum is not zero before doing incremental checksum
adjustment.
MFC r314339:
Document that the size of AH ICV for HMAC-SHA2-NNN should be half of
NNN bits as described in RFC4868.
PR: 215978
MFC r314812:
Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope.
Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb.
Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface
or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope.
Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked
agains inbound packets after IPsec processing.
Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope.
Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4)
interface.
And security policies created by application using setsockopt()
IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to
packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list
PCB policies via setkey(8) utility.
Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of
security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags:
'-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces,
i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL
scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed.
To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified.
sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the
kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering
by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested
scopes.
For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy
is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL
policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security
policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used
to keep if_index.
After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like:
# setkey -DPt
0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any
in ipsec
esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145
spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0
refcnt=1
# setkey -DPg
::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0
out none
spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global
refcnt=1
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805
PR: 212018
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netinet6/ip6_ipsec.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet6/ip6_ipsec.c | 297 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 297 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/ip6_ipsec.c b/sys/netinet6/ip6_ipsec.c deleted file mode 100644 index a99f1db..0000000 --- a/sys/netinet6/ip6_ipsec.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,297 +0,0 @@ -/*- - * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1988, 1993 - * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include <sys/cdefs.h> -__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); - -#include "opt_inet.h" -#include "opt_sctp.h" -#include "opt_ipsec.h" - -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/systm.h> -#include <sys/kernel.h> -#include <sys/mac.h> -#include <sys/malloc.h> -#include <sys/mbuf.h> -#include <sys/protosw.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <sys/socketvar.h> -#include <sys/sysctl.h> -#include <sys/syslog.h> - -#include <net/if.h> -#include <net/if_var.h> -#include <net/vnet.h> - -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <netinet/in_systm.h> -#include <netinet/in_var.h> -#include <netinet/ip.h> -#include <netinet/ip6.h> -#include <netinet/in_pcb.h> -#include <netinet/ip_var.h> -#include <netinet/ip_options.h> -#ifdef SCTP -#include <netinet/sctp_crc32.h> -#endif - -#include <machine/in_cksum.h> - -#include <netipsec/ipsec.h> -#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> -#include <netipsec/xform.h> -#include <netipsec/key.h> -#ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG -#include <netipsec/key_debug.h> -#else -#define KEYDEBUG(lev,arg) -#endif - -#include <netinet6/ip6_ipsec.h> -#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> - -extern struct protosw inet6sw[]; - -#ifdef IPSEC_FILTERTUNNEL -static VNET_DEFINE(int, ip6_ipsec6_filtertunnel) = 1; -#else -static VNET_DEFINE(int, ip6_ipsec6_filtertunnel) = 0; -#endif -#define V_ip6_ipsec6_filtertunnel VNET(ip6_ipsec6_filtertunnel) - -SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet6_ipsec6); -SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet6_ipsec6, OID_AUTO, filtertunnel, - CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ip6_ipsec6_filtertunnel), 0, - "If set filter packets from an IPsec tunnel."); - -/* - * Check if we have to jump over firewall processing for this packet. - * Called from ip6_input(). - * 1 = jump over firewall, 0 = packet goes through firewall. - */ -int -ip6_ipsec_filtertunnel(struct mbuf *m) -{ - - /* - * Bypass packet filtering for packets previously handled by IPsec. - */ - if (!V_ip6_ipsec6_filtertunnel && - m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_DONE, NULL) != NULL) - return (1); - return (0); -} - -/* - * Check if this packet has an active SA and needs to be dropped instead - * of forwarded. - * Called from ip6_forward(). - * 1 = drop packet, 0 = forward packet. - */ -int -ip6_ipsec_fwd(struct mbuf *m) -{ - - return (ipsec6_in_reject(m, NULL)); -} - -/* - * Check if protocol type doesn't have a further header and do IPSEC - * decryption or reject right now. Protocols with further headers get - * their IPSEC treatment within the protocol specific processing. - * Called from ip6_input(). - * 1 = drop packet, 0 = continue processing packet. - */ -int -ip6_ipsec_input(struct mbuf *m, int nxt) -{ - - /* - * enforce IPsec policy checking if we are seeing last header. - * note that we do not visit this with protocols with pcb layer - * code - like udp/tcp/raw ip. - */ - if ((inet6sw[ip6_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0) - return (ipsec6_in_reject(m, NULL)); - return (0); -} - -/* - * Called from ip6_output(). - * 1 = drop packet, 0 = continue processing packet, - * -1 = packet was reinjected and stop processing packet - */ - -int -ip6_ipsec_output(struct mbuf **m, struct inpcb *inp, int *error) -{ - struct secpolicy *sp; - - /* - * Check the security policy (SP) for the packet and, if - * required, do IPsec-related processing. There are two - * cases here; the first time a packet is sent through - * it will be untagged and handled by ipsec4_checkpolicy. - * If the packet is resubmitted to ip6_output (e.g. after - * AH, ESP, etc. processing), there will be a tag to bypass - * the lookup and related policy checking. - */ - if (m_tag_find(*m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_DONE, NULL) != NULL) { - *error = 0; - return (0); - } - sp = ipsec4_checkpolicy(*m, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND, error, inp); - /* - * There are four return cases: - * sp != NULL apply IPsec policy - * sp == NULL, error == 0 no IPsec handling needed - * sp == NULL, error == -EINVAL discard packet w/o error - * sp == NULL, error != 0 discard packet, report error - */ - if (sp != NULL) { - /* - * Do delayed checksums now because we send before - * this is done in the normal processing path. - */ -#ifdef INET - if ((*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA) { - in_delayed_cksum(*m); - (*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_DELAY_DATA; - } -#endif - if ((*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) { - in6_delayed_cksum(*m, (*m)->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); - (*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6; - } -#ifdef SCTP - if ((*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP_IPV6) { - sctp_delayed_cksum(*m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)); - (*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_SCTP_IPV6; - } -#endif - - /* NB: callee frees mbuf */ - *error = ipsec6_process_packet(*m, sp->req); - KEY_FREESP(&sp); - if (*error == EJUSTRETURN) { - /* - * We had a SP with a level of 'use' and no SA. We - * will just continue to process the packet without - * IPsec processing. - */ - *error = 0; - goto done; - } - - /* - * Preserve KAME behaviour: ENOENT can be returned - * when an SA acquire is in progress. Don't propagate - * this to user-level; it confuses applications. - * - * XXX this will go away when the SADB is redone. - */ - if (*error == ENOENT) - *error = 0; - goto reinjected; - } else { /* sp == NULL */ - if (*error != 0) { - /* - * Hack: -EINVAL is used to signal that a packet - * should be silently discarded. This is typically - * because we asked key management for an SA and - * it was delayed (e.g. kicked up to IKE). - */ - if (*error == -EINVAL) - *error = 0; - goto bad; - } - /* No IPsec processing for this packet. */ - } -done: - return (0); -reinjected: - return (-1); -bad: - if (sp != NULL) - KEY_FREESP(&sp); - return (1); -} - -#if 0 -/* - * Compute the MTU for a forwarded packet that gets IPSEC encapsulated. - * Called from ip_forward(). - * Returns MTU suggestion for ICMP needfrag reply. - */ -int -ip6_ipsec_mtu(struct mbuf *m) -{ - int mtu = 0; - /* - * If the packet is routed over IPsec tunnel, tell the - * originator the tunnel MTU. - * tunnel MTU = if MTU - sizeof(IP) - ESP/AH hdrsiz - * XXX quickhack!!! - */ -#ifdef IPSEC - struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; - int ipsecerror; - int ipsechdr; - struct route *ro; - sp = ipsec_getpolicybyaddr(m, - IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND, - IP_FORWARDING, - &ipsecerror); - if (sp != NULL) { - /* count IPsec header size */ - ipsechdr = ipsec_hdrsiz(m, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND, NULL); - - /* - * find the correct route for outer IPv4 - * header, compute tunnel MTU. - */ - if (sp->req != NULL && - sp->req->sav != NULL && - sp->req->sav->sah != NULL) { - ro = &sp->req->sav->sah->route_cache.sa_route; - if (ro->ro_rt && ro->ro_rt->rt_ifp) { - mtu = ro->ro_rt->rt_mtu ? ro->ro_rt->rt_mtu : - ro->ro_rt->rt_ifp->if_mtu; - mtu -= ipsechdr; - } - } - KEY_FREESP(&sp); - } -#endif /* IPSEC */ - /* XXX else case missing. */ - return mtu; -} -#endif |