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author | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-03-06 17:28:24 +0000 |
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committer | rwatson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-03-06 17:28:24 +0000 |
commit | 171a68d94e414871c4132341ec09c0d725614399 (patch) | |
tree | e1e016d8b94d2af81c8b05a3d5eac2bf66245a60 /sys/kern/vfs_acl.c | |
parent | 1915fa0c31116940e87db58ecfe886fad1b07951 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-171a68d94e414871c4132341ec09c0d725614399.zip FreeBSD-src-171a68d94e414871c4132341ec09c0d725614399.tar.gz |
o Introduce filesystem-independent POSIX.1e ACL utility routines to
support implementations of ACLs in file systems. Introduce the
following new functions:
vaccess_acl_posix1e() vaccess() that accepts an ACL
acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm() Convert mode bits to ACL rights
acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry() Build ACL entry from mode/uid/gid
acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode() Generate file mode from ACL
acl_posix1e_check() Syntax verification for ACL
These functions allow a file system to rely on central ACL evaluation
and syntax checking, as well as providing useful utilities to
allow ACL-based file systems to generate mode/owner/etc information
to return via VOP_GETATTR(), and to support file systems that split
their ACL information over their existing inode storage (mode, uid,
gid) and extended ACL into extended attributes (additional users,
groups, ACL mask).
o Add prototypes for exported functions to sys/acl.h, sys/vnode.h
Reviewed by: trustedbsd-discuss, freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/vfs_acl.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/vfs_acl.c | 445 |
1 files changed, 440 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/vfs_acl.c b/sys/kern/vfs_acl.c index 0e9fc40..7ee457b 100644 --- a/sys/kern/vfs_acl.c +++ b/sys/kern/vfs_acl.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /*- - * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Robert N. M. Watson + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Robert N. M. Watson * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -25,10 +25,9 @@ * * $FreeBSD$ */ - /* - * Generic routines to support file system ACLs, at a syntactic level - * Semantics are the responsibility of the underlying file system + * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. + * Support for POSIX.1e access control lists. */ #include <sys/param.h> @@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/acl.h> -static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ACL, "acl", "access control list"); +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ACL, "acl", "access control list"); static int vacl_set_acl(struct proc *p, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp); @@ -56,6 +55,442 @@ static int vacl_aclcheck(struct proc *p, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp); /* + * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics. + * Return 0 on success, else an errno value. Should be merged into + * vaccess() eventually. + */ +int +vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, struct acl *acl, mode_t acc_mode, + struct ucred *cred, int *privused) +{ + struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask; + mode_t dac_granted; + mode_t cap_granted; + mode_t acl_mask_granted; + int group_matched, i; + + /* + * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory + * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt + * to use privileges granted via cap_granted. In some cases, + * which privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", + * in which case fall back on first match for the time being. + */ + if (privused != NULL) + *privused = 0; + + /* + * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found + * a DAC match that has failed to allow access. + */ +#ifndef CAPABILITIES + if (suser_xxx(cred, NULL, PRISON_ROOT) == 0) + cap_granted = (VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VADMIN); + else + cap_granted = 0; +#else + cap_granted = 0; + + if (type == VDIR) { + if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, + CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, PRISON_ROOT)) + cap_granted |= VEXEC; + } else { + if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, + CAP_DAC_EXECUTE, PRISON_ROOT)) + cap_granted |= VEXEC; + } + + if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, + PRISON_ROOT)) + cap_granted |= VREAD; + + if ((acc_mode & VWRITE) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_WRITE, + PRISON_ROOT)) + cap_granted |= VWRITE; + + if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_FOWNER, + PRISON_ROOT)) + cap_granted |= VADMIN; +#endif /* CAPABILITIES */ + + /* + * Check the owner. + * Also, record locations of ACL_MASK and ACL_OTHER for reference + * later if the owner doesn't match. + */ + acl_mask = acl_other = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { + switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { + case ACL_USER_OBJ: + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid) + break; + dac_granted = 0; + dac_granted |= VADMIN; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + dac_granted |= VEXEC; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + dac_granted |= VREAD; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + dac_granted |= VWRITE; + if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode) + return (0); + if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == + acc_mode) { + if (privused != NULL) + *privused = 1; + return (0); + } + goto error; + + case ACL_MASK: + acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; + break; + + case ACL_OTHER: + acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; + break; + + default: + } + } + + /* + * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields + * are masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify + * the ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential + * user matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, + * assume that the mask allows all requests to succeed. + * Also keep track of the location of ACL_OTHER for later consumption. + */ + if (acl_other == NULL) { + /* + * XXX: This should never happen. Only properly formatted + * ACLs should be passed to vaccess_acl_posix1e. + * Should make this a panic post-debugging. + */ + printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n"); + return (EPERM); + } + if (acl_mask != NULL) { + acl_mask_granted = 0; + if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC; + if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + acl_mask_granted |= VREAD; + if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + acl_mask_granted |= VWRITE; + } else + acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE; + + /* + * We have to check each type even if we know ACL_MASK will reject, + * as we need to know what match there might have been, and + * therefore what further types we might be allowed to check. + * Do the checks twice -- once without privilege, and a second time + * with, if there was a match. + */ + + /* + * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. + */ + for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { + switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { + case ACL_USER: + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid) + break; + dac_granted = 0; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + dac_granted |= VEXEC; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + dac_granted |= VREAD; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + dac_granted |= VWRITE; + dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; + if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode) + return (0); + if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == + acc_mode) { + if (privused != NULL) + *privused = 1; + return (0); + } + goto error; + } + } + + /* + * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a + * "best" match. Iterate across, testing each potential group + * match. Make sure we keep track of whether we found a match + * or not, so that we know if we can move on to ACL_OTHER. + */ + group_matched = 0; + for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { + switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { + case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: + case ACL_GROUP: + if (groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred)) { + dac_granted = 0; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + dac_granted |= VEXEC; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + dac_granted |= VREAD; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + dac_granted |= VWRITE; + dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; + + if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode) + return (0); + + group_matched = 1; + } + default: + } + } + + if (group_matched == 1) { + /* + * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via + * pure DAC. Try again, this time with privilege. + */ + for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { + switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { + case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: + case ACL_GROUP: + if (groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, + cred)) { + dac_granted = 0; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & + ACL_PERM_EXEC) + dac_granted |= VEXEC; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & + ACL_PERM_READ) + dac_granted |= VREAD; + if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & + ACL_PERM_WRITE) + dac_granted |= VWRITE; + dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; + if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | + cap_granted)) == acc_mode) { + if (privused != NULL) + *privused = 1; + return (0); + } + } + default: + } + } + /* + * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient. + * Return failure. + */ + goto error; + } + + /* + * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER. + */ + dac_granted = 0; + if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + dac_granted |= VEXEC; + if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + dac_granted |= VREAD; + if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + dac_granted |= VWRITE; + + if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode) + return (0); + if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == acc_mode) { + if (privused != NULL) + *privused = 1; + return (0); + } + +error: + return ((acc_mode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES); +} + +/* + * For the purposes of file systems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an + * inode with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry + * to an acl_perm_t. + */ +acl_perm_t +acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode) +{ + acl_perm_t perm = 0; + + switch(tag) { + case ACL_USER_OBJ: + if (mode & S_IXUSR) + perm |= ACL_PERM_EXEC; + if (mode & S_IRUSR) + perm |= ACL_PERM_READ; + if (mode & S_IWUSR) + perm |= ACL_PERM_WRITE; + return (perm); + + case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: + if (mode & S_IXGRP) + perm |= ACL_PERM_EXEC; + if (mode & S_IRGRP) + perm |= ACL_PERM_READ; + if (mode & S_IWGRP) + perm |= ACL_PERM_WRITE; + return (perm); + + case ACL_OTHER: + if (mode & S_IXOTH) + perm |= ACL_PERM_EXEC; + if (mode & S_IROTH) + perm |= ACL_PERM_READ; + if (mode & S_IWOTH) + perm |= ACL_PERM_WRITE; + return (perm); + + default: + printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); + return (0); + } +} + +/* + * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the + * appropriate type. + */ +struct acl_entry +acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) +{ + struct acl_entry acl_entry; + + acl_entry.ae_tag = tag; + acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode); + switch(tag) { + case ACL_USER_OBJ: + acl_entry.ae_id = uid; + break; + + case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: + acl_entry.ae_id = gid; + break; + + case ACL_OTHER: + acl_entry.ae_id = 0; + break; + + default: + acl_entry.ae_id = 0; + printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); + } + + return (acl_entry); +} + +/* + * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries. + */ +mode_t +acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry, + struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry) +{ + mode_t mode; + + mode = 0; + if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + mode |= S_IXUSR; + if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + mode |= S_IRUSR; + if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + mode |= S_IWUSR; + if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + mode |= S_IXGRP; + if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + mode |= S_IRGRP; + if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + mode |= S_IWGRP; + if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_EXEC) + mode |= S_IXOTH; + if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_READ) + mode |= S_IROTH; + if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_PERM_WRITE) + mode |= S_IWOTH; + + return (mode); +} + +/* + * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an + * implementing file system to determine if it should accept this and + * rely on the POSIX.1e ACL properties. + */ +int +acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl) +{ + int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group; + int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i; + + /* + * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum + * defined for acl_t. + * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are + * present: + * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ + * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ + * Exactly one ACL_OTHER + * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one + * ACL_MASK entry must also appear. + * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS. + * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation. + * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field. + */ + num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group = + num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0; + if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || acl->acl_cnt < 0) + return (EINVAL); + for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { + /* + * Check for a valid tag. + */ + switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { + case ACL_USER_OBJ: + num_acl_user_obj++; + break; + case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: + num_acl_group_obj++; + break; + case ACL_USER: + num_acl_user++; + break; + case ACL_GROUP: + num_acl_group++; + break; + case ACL_OTHER: + num_acl_other++; + break; + case ACL_MASK: + num_acl_mask++; + break; + default: + return (EINVAL); + } + /* + * Check for valid perm entries. + */ + if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) != + ACL_PERM_BITS) + return (EINVAL); + } + if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) || + (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1)) + return (EINVAL); + if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) && + (num_acl_mask != 1)) + return (EINVAL); + return (0); +} + +/* * These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the * syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file * descriptor to a vnode (unlocked). The aclp pointer is assumed |