Make additional parts of sys/geom/eli more usable in userspace

The upcoming GELI support in the loader reuses parts of this code
Some ifdefs are added, and some code is moved outside of existing ifdefs

The HMAC parts of GELI are broken out into their own file, to separate
them from the kernel crypto/openssl dependant parts that are replaced
in the boot code.

Passed the GELI regression suite (tools/regression/geom/eli)
 Files=20 Tests=14996
 Result: PASS

Reviewed by:	pjd, delphij
MFC after:	1 week
Sponsored by:	ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D4699

1 files changed, 87 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h
index e4dbee6..3deb865 100644
--- a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h
+++ b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.h
@@ -40,8 +40,6 @@
 #include <sys/libkern.h>
 #include <sys/lock.h>
 #include <sys/mutex.h>
-#include <sys/queue.h>
-#include <sys/tree.h>
 #include <geom/geom.h>
 #else
 #include <assert.h>
@@ -49,6 +47,8 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <strings.h>
 #endif
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <sys/tree.h>
 #ifndef _OpenSSL_
 #include <sys/md5.h>
 #endif
@@ -132,15 +132,15 @@
 /* Switch data encryption key every 2^20 blocks. */
 #define	G_ELI_KEY_SHIFT		20
 
+#define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN	0
+#define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_HW		1
+#define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW		2
+
 #ifdef _KERNEL
 extern int g_eli_debug;
 extern u_int g_eli_overwrites;
 extern u_int g_eli_batch;
 
-#define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN	0
-#define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_HW		1
-#define	G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW		2
-
 #define	G_ELI_DEBUG(lvl, ...)	do {					\
 	if (g_eli_debug >= (lvl)) {					\
 		printf("GEOM_ELI");					\
@@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ struct g_eli_worker {
 	LIST_ENTRY(g_eli_worker) w_next;
 };
 
+#endif	/* _KERNEL */
+
 struct g_eli_softc {
 	struct g_geom	*sc_geom;
 	u_int		 sc_version;
@@ -200,15 +202,35 @@ struct g_eli_softc {
 	size_t		 sc_sectorsize;
 	u_int		 sc_bytes_per_sector;
 	u_int		 sc_data_per_sector;
+#ifndef _KERNEL
+	int		 sc_cpubind;
+#else /* _KERNEL */
 	boolean_t	 sc_cpubind;
 
 	/* Only for software cryptography. */
 	struct bio_queue_head sc_queue;
 	struct mtx	 sc_queue_mtx;
 	LIST_HEAD(, g_eli_worker) sc_workers;
+#endif /* _KERNEL */
 };
 #define	sc_name		 sc_geom->name
-#endif	/* _KERNEL */
+
+#define	G_ELI_KEY_MAGIC	0xe11341c
+
+struct g_eli_key {
+	/* Key value, must be first in the structure. */
+	uint8_t		gek_key[G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN];
+	/* Magic. */
+	int		gek_magic;
+	/* Key number. */
+	uint64_t	gek_keyno;
+	/* Reference counter. */
+	int		gek_count;
+	/* Keeps keys sorted by most recent use. */
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(g_eli_key) gek_next;
+	/* Keeps keys sorted by number. */
+	RB_ENTRY(g_eli_key) gek_link;
+};
 
 struct g_eli_metadata {
 	char		md_magic[16];	/* Magic value. */
@@ -569,6 +591,60 @@ g_eli_hashlen(u_int algo)
 	return (0);
 }
 
+static __inline void
+eli_metadata_softc(struct g_eli_softc *sc, const struct g_eli_metadata *md,
+    u_int sectorsize, off_t mediasize)
+{
+
+	sc->sc_version = md->md_version;
+	sc->sc_inflight = 0;
+	sc->sc_crypto = G_ELI_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN;
+	sc->sc_flags = md->md_flags;
+	/* Backward compatibility. */
+	if (md->md_version < G_ELI_VERSION_04)
+		sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER;
+	if (md->md_version < G_ELI_VERSION_05)
+		sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_SINGLE_KEY;
+	if (md->md_version < G_ELI_VERSION_06 &&
+	    (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) != 0) {
+		sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY;
+	}
+	if (md->md_version < G_ELI_VERSION_07)
+		sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_ENC_IVKEY;
+	sc->sc_ealgo = md->md_ealgo;
+
+	if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) {
+		sc->sc_akeylen = sizeof(sc->sc_akey) * 8;
+		sc->sc_aalgo = md->md_aalgo;
+		sc->sc_alen = g_eli_hashlen(sc->sc_aalgo);
+
+		sc->sc_data_per_sector = sectorsize - sc->sc_alen;
+		/*
+		 * Some hash functions (like SHA1 and RIPEMD160) generates hash
+		 * which length is not multiple of 128 bits, but we want data
+		 * length to be multiple of 128, so we can encrypt without
+		 * padding. The line below rounds down data length to multiple
+		 * of 128 bits.
+		 */
+		sc->sc_data_per_sector -= sc->sc_data_per_sector % 16;
+
+		sc->sc_bytes_per_sector =
+		    (md->md_sectorsize - 1) / sc->sc_data_per_sector + 1;
+		sc->sc_bytes_per_sector *= sectorsize;
+	}
+	sc->sc_sectorsize = md->md_sectorsize;
+	sc->sc_mediasize = mediasize;
+	if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME))
+		sc->sc_mediasize -= sectorsize;
+	if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH))
+		sc->sc_mediasize -= (sc->sc_mediasize % sc->sc_sectorsize);
+	else {
+		sc->sc_mediasize /= sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
+		sc->sc_mediasize *= sc->sc_sectorsize;
+	}
+	sc->sc_ekeylen = md->md_keylen;
+}
+
 #ifdef _KERNEL
 int g_eli_read_metadata(struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *pp,
     struct g_eli_metadata *md);
@@ -583,8 +659,6 @@ void g_eli_config(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, const char *verb);
 void g_eli_read_done(struct bio *bp);
 void g_eli_write_done(struct bio *bp);
 int g_eli_crypto_rerun(struct cryptop *crp);
-void g_eli_crypto_ivgen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *iv,
-    size_t size);
 
 void g_eli_crypto_read(struct g_eli_softc *sc, struct bio *bp, boolean_t fromworker);
 void g_eli_crypto_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp);
@@ -592,6 +666,8 @@ void g_eli_crypto_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp);
 void g_eli_auth_read(struct g_eli_softc *sc, struct bio *bp);
 void g_eli_auth_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp);
 #endif
+void g_eli_crypto_ivgen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *iv,
+    size_t size);
 
 void g_eli_mkey_hmac(unsigned char *mkey, const unsigned char *key);
 int g_eli_mkey_decrypt(const struct g_eli_metadata *md,
@@ -620,6 +696,8 @@ void g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *md, size_t mdsize);
 void g_eli_crypto_hmac(const uint8_t *hkey, size_t hkeysize,
     const uint8_t *data, size_t datasize, uint8_t *md, size_t mdsize);
 
+void g_eli_key_fill(struct g_eli_softc *sc, struct g_eli_key *key,
+    uint64_t keyno);
 #ifdef _KERNEL
 void g_eli_key_init(struct g_eli_softc *sc);
 void g_eli_key_destroy(struct g_eli_softc *sc);