MFC: r276861, r276863

Merge OpenSSL 1.0.1k.

1 files changed, 22 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/RSA_public_encrypt.3 b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/RSA_public_encrypt.3
index 5e9cdee..c6d9f85 100644
--- a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/RSA_public_encrypt.3
+++ b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/RSA_public_encrypt.3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.25 (Pod::Simple 3.28)
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.27 (Pod::Simple 3.28)
 .\"
 .\" Standard preamble:
 .\" ========================================================================
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
 .    ds PI \(*p
 .    ds L" ``
 .    ds R" ''
+.    ds C`
+.    ds C'
 'br\}
 .\"
 .\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform.
@@ -48,17 +50,24 @@
 .\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index
 .\" entries marked with X<> in POD.  Of course, you'll have to process the
 .\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion.
-.ie \nF \{\
-.    de IX
-.    tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
+.\"
+.\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'.
+.de IX
 ..
-.    nr % 0
-.    rr F
-.\}
-.el \{\
-.    de IX
+.nr rF 0
+.if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1
+.if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{
+.    if \nF \{
+.        de IX
+.        tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
 ..
+.        if !\nF==2 \{
+.            nr % 0
+.            nr F 2
+.        \}
+.    \}
 .\}
+.rr rF
 .\"
 .\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2).
 .\" Fear.  Run.  Save yourself.  No user-serviceable parts.
@@ -124,7 +133,7 @@
 .\" ========================================================================
 .\"
 .IX Title "RSA_public_encrypt 3"
-.TH RSA_public_encrypt 3 "2014-10-15" "1.0.1j" "OpenSSL"
+.TH RSA_public_encrypt 3 "2015-01-08" "1.0.1k" "OpenSSL"
 .\" For nroff, turn off justification.  Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
 .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
 .if n .ad l
@@ -154,7 +163,7 @@ session key) using the public key \fBrsa\fR and stores the ciphertext in
 \&\s-1PKCS\s0 #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode.
 .IP "\s-1RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING\s0" 4
 .IX Item "RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING"
-EME-OAEP as defined in \s-1PKCS\s0 #1 v2.0 with \s-1SHA\-1\s0, \s-1MGF1\s0 and an empty
+EME-OAEP as defined in \s-1PKCS\s0 #1 v2.0 with \s-1SHA\-1, MGF1\s0 and an empty
 encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
 .IP "\s-1RSA_SSLV23_PADDING\s0" 4
 .IX Item "RSA_SSLV23_PADDING"
@@ -168,7 +177,7 @@ Encrypting user data directly with \s-1RSA\s0 is insecure.
 .PP
 \&\fBflen\fR must be less than RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) \- 11 for the \s-1PKCS\s0 #1 v1.5
 based padding modes, less than RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) \- 41 for
-\&\s-1RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING\s0 and exactly RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) for \s-1RSA_NO_PADDING\s0.
+\&\s-1RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING\s0 and exactly RSA_size(\fBrsa\fR) for \s-1RSA_NO_PADDING.\s0
 The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling
 \&\fIRSA_public_encrypt()\fR.
 .PP
@@ -187,7 +196,7 @@ On error, \-1 is returned; the error codes can be
 obtained by \fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3).
 .SH "CONFORMING TO"
 .IX Header "CONFORMING TO"
-\&\s-1SSL\s0, \s-1PKCS\s0 #1 v2.0
+\&\s-1SSL, PKCS\s0 #1 v2.0
 .SH "SEE ALSO"
 .IX Header "SEE ALSO"
 \&\fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3), \fIrand\fR\|(3), \fIrsa\fR\|(3),