Currently we are unable to use capsicum for the primary worker process,

because we need to do ioctl(2)s, which are not permitted in the capability
mode. What we do now is to chroot(2) to /var/empty, which restricts access
to file system name space and we drop privileges to hast user and hast
group.

This still allows to access to other name spaces, like list of processes,
network and sysvipc.

To address that, use jail(2) instead of chroot(2). Using jail(2) will restrict
access to process table, network (we use ip-less jails) and sysvipc (if
security.jail.sysvipc_allowed is turned off). This provides much better
separation.

MFC after:	1 week

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/sbin/hastctl/hastctl.c b/sbin/hastctl/hastctl.c
index cf692ce..c4cd6a4 100644
--- a/sbin/hastctl/hastctl.c
+++ b/sbin/hastctl/hastctl.c
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		    cfg->hc_controladdr);
 	}
 
-	if (drop_privs(true) != 0)
+	if (drop_privs(NULL) != 0)
 		exit(EX_CONFIG);
 
 	/* Send the command to the server... */