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authorchris <chris@FreeBSD.org>2002-01-02 19:56:57 +0000
committerchris <chris@FreeBSD.org>2002-01-02 19:56:57 +0000
commite643be615003e71160e5c647a908b06ccf14a058 (patch)
treea8dd2b09f5c6ef957253be7a382c0144e9e4a06a /lib/libc/string/strcpy.3
parent009b0965a2c0f7ed16e2ca195f68df951f3b155a (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-e643be615003e71160e5c647a908b06ccf14a058.zip
FreeBSD-src-e643be615003e71160e5c647a908b06ccf14a058.tar.gz
Copy the sample `SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS' section from sec-doc.7.
This will be trimmed as the FreeBSD Security Architecture document is fleshed out and committed. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libc/string/strcpy.3')
-rw-r--r--lib/libc/string/strcpy.366
1 files changed, 66 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libc/string/strcpy.3 b/lib/libc/string/strcpy.3
index 0666e7d..ba764d7 100644
--- a/lib/libc/string/strcpy.3
+++ b/lib/libc/string/strcpy.3
@@ -149,12 +149,78 @@ Note that because
.Xr strlcpy 3
is not defined in any standards, it should
only be used when portability is not a concern.
+.Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
+The
+.Fn strcpy
+function is easily misused in a manner which enables malicious users
+to arbitrarily change a running program's functionality through a
+buffer overflow attack.
+(See
+the FSA.)
+.Pp
+Avoid using
+.Fn strcpy .
+Instead, use
+.Fn strncpy
+or
+.Fn strlcpy
+and ensure that no more characters are copied to the destination buffer
+than it can hold.
+Don't forget to NUL-terminate the destination buffer,
+as
+.Fn strncpy
+will not terminate the destination string if it is truncated.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Fn strncpy
+can also be problematic.
+It may be a security concern for a string to be
+truncated at all.
+Since the truncated string will not be as long as the original,
+it may refer to a completely different resource
+and usage of the truncated resource
+could result in very incorrect behavior.
+Example:
+.Pp
+.Bd -literal
+void
+foo(const char *arbitrary_string)
+{
+ char onstack[8];
+
+#if defined(BAD)
+ /*
+ * This first strcpy is bad behavior. Don't use strcpy()!
+ */
+ (void)strcpy(onstack, arbitrary_string); /* BAD! */
+#elif defined(BETTER)
+ /*
+ * The following two lines demonstrate better use of
+ * strncpy().
+ */
+ (void)strncpy(onstack, arbitrary_string, sizeof(onstack) - 1);
+ onstack[sizeof(onstack - 1)] = '\\0';
+#elif defined(BEST)
+ /*
+ * These lines are even more robust due to testing for
+ * truncation.
+ */
+ if (strlen(arbitrary_string) + 1 > sizeof(onstack))
+ err(1, "onstack would be truncated");
+ (void)strncpy(onstack, arbitrary_string, sizeof(onstack));
+#endif
+}
+.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr bcopy 3 ,
.Xr memccpy 3 ,
.Xr memcpy 3 ,
.Xr memmove 3 ,
.Xr strlcpy 3
+.Rs
+.%T "The FreeBSD Security Architecture"
+.%J "/usr/share/doc/{to be decided}"
+.Re
.Sh STANDARDS
The
.Fn strcpy
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