Upgrade to OpenSSH 5.3p1.

73 files changed, 1931 insertions, 1077 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
index f802c0d..b2df660 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,282 @@
+20090926
+ - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
+         [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update for release
+ - (djm) [README] update relnotes URL
+ - (djm) [packet.c] Restore EWOULDBLOCK handling that got lost somewhere
+ - (djm) Release 5.3p1
+
+20090911
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Change the -lresolv check so it works on Mac OS X
+   10.6 (which doesn't have BIND8_COMPAT and thus uses res_9_query).  Patch
+   from jbasney at ncsa uiuc edu.
+
+20090908
+ - (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix test for server-assigned remote forwarding port
+   (-R 0:...); bz#1578, spotted and fix by gavin AT emf.net; ok dtucker@
+
+20090901
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1639: use AC_PATH_PROG to search the path for
+   krb5-config if it's not in the location specified by --with-kerberos5.
+   Patch from jchadima at redhat.
+
+20090829
+ - (dtucker) [README.platform] Add text about development packages, based on
+   text from Chris Pepper in bug #1631.
+
+20090828
+ - dtucker [auth-sia.c] Roll back the change for bug #1241 as it apparently
+   causes problems in some Tru64 configurations.
+ - (djm) [sshd_config.5] downgrade mention of login.conf to be an example
+   and mention PAM as another provider for ChallengeResponseAuthentication;
+   bz#1408; ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [sftp-server.c] bz#1535: accept ENOSYS as a fallback error when
+   attempting atomic rename(); ok dtucker@
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in] bz#1505: Solaris make(1) doesn't accept make variables
+   in argv, so pass them in the environment; ok dtucker@
+ - (dtucker) [channels.c configure.ac] Bug #1528: skip the tcgetattr call on
+    the pty master on Solaris, since it never succeeds and can hang if large
+    amounts of data is sent to the slave (eg a copy-paste).  Based on a patch
+    originally from Doke Scott, ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [clientloop.c configure.ac defines.h] Make the client's IO buffer
+   size a compile-time option and set it to 64k on Cygwin, since Corinna
+   reports that it makes a significant difference to performance.  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Fix the syntax of the Solaris tcgetattr entry.
+
+20090820
+ - (dtucker) [includes.h] Bug #1634: do not include system glob.h if we're not
+   using it since the type conflicts can cause problems on FreeBSD.  Patch
+   from Jonathan Chen.
+ - (dtucker) [session.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.h] Bugs #1249 and #1567: move
+   the setpcred call on AIX to immediately before the permanently_set_uid().
+   Ensures that we still have privileges when we call chroot and
+   pam_open_sesson.  Based on a patch from David Leonard.
+
+20090817
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Check for headers before libraries for openssl an
+   zlib, which should make the errors slightly more meaningful on platforms
+   where there's separate "-devel" packages for those.
+ - (dtucker) [sshlogin.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.{c,h}] Bug #1595: make
+   PrintLastLog work on AIX.  Based in part on a patch from Miguel Sanders.
+
+20090729
+ - (tim) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config] Change script to call correct error
+   function. Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+
+20090713
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c] Reduce answer buffer size so it
+   fits into 16 bits to work around a bug in glibc's resolver where it masks
+   off the buffer size at 16 bits.  Patch from Hauke Lampe, ok djm jakob.
+
+20090712
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Include sys/param.h for the sys/mount.h test,
+   prevents configure complaining on older BSDs.
+ - (dtucker [contrib/cygwin/ssh-{host,user}-config] Add license text. Patch
+   from Corinna Vinschen.
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] Bug #1534: move the deletion of PAM credentials on
+   logout to after the session close.  Patch from Anicka Bernathova,
+   originally from Andreas Schwab via Novelll ok djm.
+
+20090707
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] better support for automated
+   scripts and fix usage of eval.  Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+
+20090705
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/27 09:29:06
+     [packet.h packet.c]
+     packet_bacup_state() and packet_restore_state() will be used to
+     temporarily save the current state ren resuming a suspended connection.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/27 09:32:43
+     [roaming_common.c roaming.h]
+     It may be necessary to retransmit some data when resuming, so add it
+     to a buffer when roaming is enabled.
+     Most of this code was written by Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/27 09:35:06
+     [readconf.h readconf.c]
+     Add client option UseRoaming. It doesn't do anything yet but will
+     control whether the client tries to use roaming if enabled on the
+     server. From Martin Forssen.
+     ok markus@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/30 14:54:40
+     [version.h]
+     crank version; ok deraadt
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/07/02 02:11:47
+     [ssh.c]
+     allow for long home dir paths (bz #1615).  ok deraadt
+     (based in part on a patch from jchadima at redhat)
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/07/05 19:28:33
+     [clientloop.c]
+     only send SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT if we're in compat20; from dtucker@
+     ok deraadt@ markus@
+
+20090622
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/22 05:39:28
+     [monitor_wrap.c monitor_mm.c ssh-keygen.c auth2.c gss-genr.c sftp-client.c]
+     alphabetize includes; reduces diff vs portable and style(9).
+     ok stevesk djm
+     (Id sync only; these were already in order in -portable)
+
+20090621
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/17 21:37:00
+     [ssh.c]
+     pass correct argv[0] to openlog(); ok djm@
+  - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/19 15:15:09
+     [ssh.1]
+     for "Ciphers", just point the reader to the keyword in ssh_config(5), just
+     as we do for "MACs": this stops us getting out of sync when the lists
+     change;
+     fixes documentation/6102, submitted by Peter J. Philipp
+     alternative fix proposed by djm
+     ok markus
+   - tobias@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/23 08:31:19
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     Fixed a possible out-of-bounds memory access if the environment variable
+     SHELL is shorter than 3 characters.
+     with input by and ok dtucker
+   - tobias@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/23 19:38:04
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     My previous commit didn't fix the problem at all, so stick at my first
+     version of the fix presented to dtucker.
+     Issue notified by Matthias Barkhoff (matthias dot barkhoff at gmx dot de).
+     ok dtucker
+   - sobrado@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/26 08:38:39
+     [sftp-server.8 sshd.8 ssh-agent.1]
+     fix a few typographical errors found by spell(1).
+     ok dtucker@, jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/13 19:07:44
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     fix possessive; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/14 16:33:42
+     [sftp-server.c]
+     remove unused option character from getopt() optstring; ok markus@
+   - jj@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/14 21:10:54
+     [servconf.c]
+     Fixed a few the-the misspellings in comments. Skipped a bunch in
+     binutils,gcc and so on. ok jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/17 19:23:06
+     [session.c]
+     use INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME for setproctitle() of in-process sftp-server;
+     ok djm@ markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/17 19:40:17
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     clarify that even internal-sftp needs /dev/log for logging to work; ok
+     markus@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/18 18:39:10
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     tweak previous; ok stevesk
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/04/21 15:13:17
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     clarify we cd to user's home after chroot; ok markus@ on
+     earlier version; tweaks and ok jmc@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/25 06:48:01
+     [channels.c packet.c clientloop.c packet.h serverloop.c monitor_wrap.c
+     monitor.c]
+     Put the globals in packet.c into a struct and don't access it directly
+     from other files. No functional changes.
+     ok markus@ djm@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:31:25
+     [canohost.h canohost.c]
+     Add clear_cached_addr(), needed for upcoming changes allowing the peer
+     address to change.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:33:39
+     [clientloop.c]
+     Send SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT when the client disconnects. From a larger
+     change from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:34:36
+     [kex.c kex.h]
+     Move the KEX_COOKIE_LEN define to kex.h
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:36:07
+     [packet.h packet.c]
+     Add packet_put_int64() and packet_get_int64(), part of a larger change
+     from Martin Forssen.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/27 06:38:16
+     [sshconnect.h sshconnect.c]
+     Un-static ssh_exchange_identification(), part of a larger change from
+     Martin Forssen and needed for upcoming changes.
+     ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/05/28 16:50:16
+     [sshd.c packet.c serverloop.c monitor_wrap.c clientloop.c sshconnect.c
+     monitor.c Added roaming.h roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c]
+     Keep track of number of bytes read and written. Needed for upcoming
+     changes. Most code from Martin Forssen, maf at appgate dot com.
+     ok markus@
+     Also, applied appropriate changes to Makefile.in
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/12 20:43:22
+     [monitor.c packet.c]
+     Fix warnings found by chl@ and djm@ and change roaming_atomicio's
+     return type to match atomicio's
+     Diff from djm@, ok markus@
+   - andreas@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/12 20:58:32
+     [packet.c]
+     Move some more statics into session_state
+     ok markus@ djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/21 07:37:15
+     [kexdhs.c kexgexs.c]
+     abort if key_sign fails, preventing possible null deref.  Based on report
+     from Paolo Ganci, ok markus@ djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/06/21 09:04:03
+     [roaming.h roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c]
+     Add  tags for the benefit of the sync scripts
+     Also: pull in the changes for 1.1->1.2 missed in the previous sync.
+ - (dtucker) [auth2-jpake.c auth2.c canohost.h session.c] Whitespace and
+   header-order changes to reduce diff vs OpenBSD.
+ - (dtucker) [servconf.c sshd.c] More whitespace sync.
+ - (dtucker) [roaming_common.c roaming_dummy.c] Wrap #include <inttypes.h> in
+   ifdef.
+
+20090616
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Bug #1607: handle the case where fsid_t
+   is a struct with a __val member.  Fixes build on, eg, Redhat 6.2.
+
+20090504
+ - (dtucker) [sshlogin.c] Move the NO_SSH_LASTLOG #ifndef line to include
+   variable declarations.  Should prevent unused warnings anywhere it's set
+   (only Crays as far as I can tell) and be a no-op everywhere else.
+
+20090318
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Remove setting IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN for Cygwin. The problem
+   that setsockopt(IP_TOS) doesn't work on Cygwin has been fixed since 2005.
+   Based on patch from vinschen at redhat com.
+
+20090308
+ - (dtucker) [auth-passwd.c auth1.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c
+   auth2-pubkey.c session.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.{c,h}
+   openbsd-compat/daemon.c] Remove support for Windows 95/98/ME and very old
+   version of Cygwin.  Patch from vinschen at redhat com.
+
+20090307
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/aix/buildbff.sh] Only try to rename ssh_prng_cmds if it
+   exists (it's not created if OpenSSL's PRNG is self-seeded, eg if the OS
+   has a /dev/random).
+ - (dtucker) [schnorr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Add
+   EVP_DigestUpdate to the OLD_EVP compatibility functions and tell schnorr.c
+   to use them.  Allows building with older OpenSSL versions.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Check for in_port_t and typedef if needed.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Missing comma in type list.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}]
+   EVP_DigestUpdate does not exactly match the other OLD_EVP functions (eg
+   in openssl 0.9.6) so add an explicit test for it.
+
+20090306
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/05 07:18:19
+     [auth2-jpake.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h schnorr.c]
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     refactor the (disabled) Schnorr proof code to make it a little more
+     generally useful
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/03/05 11:30:50
+     [uuencode.c]
+     document what these functions do so I don't ever have to recuse into
+     b64_pton/ntop to remember their return values
+
 20090223
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/02/22 23:50:57
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README b/crypto/openssh/README
index 9de00c0..8538e8c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.2 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.3 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ References -
 [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
 
-$Id: README,v 1.70 2009/02/23 00:11:57 djm Exp $
+$Id: README,v 1.70.4.1 2009/09/26 04:11:47 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.platform b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
index 3d7db14..d198232 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README.platform
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
@@ -56,6 +56,18 @@ using a third party driver. More information is available at:
 	http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
 
 
+Linux
+-----
+
+Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
+headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
+binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
+missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
+development packages.  On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
+zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
+libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
+
+
 Solaris
 -------
 If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
@@ -81,4 +93,4 @@ account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
 return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
 
 
-$Id: README.platform,v 1.9 2007/08/09 04:31:53 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: README.platform,v 1.10 2009/08/28 23:14:48 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
index bbfafa6..fc79dee 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
@@ -602,16 +602,16 @@ sshpam_cleanup(void)
 		return;
 	debug("PAM: cleanup");
 	pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
-	if (sshpam_cred_established) {
-		debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
-		pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
-		sshpam_cred_established = 0;
-	}
 	if (sshpam_session_open) {
 		debug("PAM: closing session");
 		pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
 		sshpam_session_open = 0;
 	}
+	if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+		debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
+		pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+		sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+	}
 	sshpam_authenticated = 0;
 	pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
 	sshpam_handle = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
index bdfced0..b1c6ce0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	}
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (is_winnt) {
+	{
 		HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
 
 		if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
index debf302..a9e1c25 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
@@ -34,10 +34,6 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/security.h>
-#include <prot.h>
-#include <time.h>
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "key.h"
@@ -53,52 +49,6 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 extern int saved_argc;
 extern char **saved_argv;
 
-static int
-sia_password_change_required(const char *user)
-{
-	struct es_passwd *acct;
-	time_t pw_life;
-	time_t pw_date;
-
-	set_auth_parameters(saved_argc, saved_argv);
-
-	if ((acct = getespwnam(user)) == NULL) {
-		error("Couldn't access protected database entry for %s", user);
-		endprpwent();
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* If forced password change flag is set, honor it */
-	if (acct->uflg->fg_psw_chg_reqd && acct->ufld->fd_psw_chg_reqd) {
-		endprpwent();
-		return (1);
-	}
-
-	/* Obtain password lifetime; if none, it can't have expired */
-	if (acct->uflg->fg_expire)
-		pw_life = acct->ufld->fd_expire;
-	else if (acct->sflg->fg_expire)
-		pw_life = acct->sfld->fd_expire;
-	else {
-		endprpwent();
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	/* Offset from last change; if none, it must be expired */
-	if (acct->uflg->fg_schange)
-		pw_date = acct->ufld->fd_schange + pw_life;
-	else {
-		endprpwent();
-		return (1);
-	}
-
-	endprpwent();
-
-	/* If expiration date is prior to now, change password */
-	
-	return (pw_date <= time((time_t *) NULL));
-}
-
 int
 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *pass)
 {
@@ -126,9 +76,6 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *pass)
 
 	sia_ses_release(&ent);
 
-	authctxt->force_pwchange = sia_password_change_required(
-		authctxt->user);
-
 	return (1);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
index b8a2558..1801661 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
@@ -318,15 +318,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		}
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
 
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-		if (authenticated &&
-		    !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,
-		    authctxt->pw)) {
-			packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.",
-			    authctxt->pw == NULL ? -1 : authctxt->pw->pw_uid);
-			authenticated = 0;
-		}
-#else
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
 		/* Special handling for root */
 		if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
 		    !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c
index efe7ff2..5de5506 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-jpake.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.2 2008/11/07 23:34:48 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
+#include "schnorr.h"
 #include "jpake.h"
 
 /*
@@ -359,7 +360,7 @@ auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
 }
 
 /*
- * Being authentication attempt.
+ * Begin authentication attempt.
  * Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
  */
 static int
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
index a4fc9e6..fae67da 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
@@ -58,10 +58,6 @@ userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	xfree(devs);
 	xfree(lang);
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw) == 0)
-		authenticated = 0;
-#endif
 	return authenticated;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
index 10accfe..08f2f93 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
@@ -61,10 +61,6 @@ userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	none_enabled = 0;
 	packet_check_eom();
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw) == 0)
-		return (0);
-#endif
 	if (options.password_authentication)
 		return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
 	return (0);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
index 421c5c2..5f1f363 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
@@ -68,10 +68,6 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		logit("password change not supported");
 	else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1)
 		authenticated = 1;
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw) == 0)
-		authenticated = 0;
-#endif
 	memset(password, 0, len);
 	xfree(password);
 	return authenticated;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
index b1e38e5..2886f12 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -170,10 +170,6 @@ done:
 		key_free(key);
 	xfree(pkalg);
 	xfree(pkblob);
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw) == 0)
-		authenticated = 0;
-#endif
 	return authenticated;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
index 1c44bb5..50fb339 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.120 2008/11/04 08:22:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.121 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
index 7138f48..22b19bb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.64 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.65 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 
 static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
+static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
+static int cached_port = -1;
 
 /*
  * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
@@ -304,6 +306,16 @@ get_local_name(int sock)
 	return get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
 }
 
+void
+clear_cached_addr(void)
+{
+	if (canonical_host_ip != NULL) {
+		xfree(canonical_host_ip);
+		canonical_host_ip = NULL;
+	}
+	cached_port = -1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
  * string must not be freed.
@@ -312,8 +324,6 @@ get_local_name(int sock)
 const char *
 get_remote_ipaddr(void)
 {
-	static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
-
 	/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
 	if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
 		if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
@@ -402,13 +412,11 @@ get_peer_port(int sock)
 int
 get_remote_port(void)
 {
-	static int port = -1;
-
 	/* Cache to avoid getpeername() on a dead connection */
-	if (port == -1)
-		port = get_port(0);
+	if (cached_port == -1)
+		cached_port = get_port(0);
 
-	return port;
+	return cached_port;
 }
 
 int
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.h b/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
index d9b41ff..4c8636f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.10 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.11 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -24,6 +24,6 @@ char		*get_local_name(int);
 int		 get_remote_port(void);
 int		 get_local_port(void);
 int		 get_sock_port(int, int);
-
+void		 clear_cached_addr(void);
 
 void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
index dea60ba..e8b8aa0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.295 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.296 2009/05/25 06:48:00 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1653,6 +1653,7 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 			}
 			return -1;
 		}
+#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
 		if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
 			if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
 			    !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
@@ -1666,6 +1667,7 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 				packet_send();
 			}
 		}
+#endif
 		buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
 		if (compat20 && len > 0) {
 			c->local_consumed += len;
@@ -2431,7 +2433,7 @@ channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	int id;
 
 	/* Reset keepalive timeout */
-	keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+	packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
 
 	id = packet_get_int();
 	packet_check_eom();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
index a2d2d1d..9a7dc0a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.209 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.213 2009/07/05 19:28:33 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "msg.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
 
 /* import options */
 extern Options options;
@@ -491,13 +492,13 @@ client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		xfree(gc);
 	}
 
-	keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+	packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
 }
 
 static void
 server_alive_check(void)
 {
-	if (++keep_alive_timeouts > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+	if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
 		logit("Timeout, server not responding.");
 		cleanup_exit(255);
 	}
@@ -634,8 +635,8 @@ client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr)
 static void
 client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
 {
-	int len;
-	char buf[8192];
+	int len, cont = 0;
+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
 
 	/*
 	 * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
@@ -643,8 +644,8 @@ client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
 	 */
 	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
 		/* Read as much as possible. */
-		len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		if (len == 0) {
+		len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
+		if (len == 0 && cont == 0) {
 			/*
 			 * Received EOF.  The remote host has closed the
 			 * connection.
@@ -1128,7 +1129,7 @@ static void
 client_process_input(fd_set *readset)
 {
 	int len;
-	char buf[8192];
+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
 
 	/* Read input from stdin. */
 	if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) {
@@ -1476,6 +1477,14 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
 	/* Stop watching for window change. */
 	signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
 
+	if (compat20) {
+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+		packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION);
+		packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user");
+		packet_send();
+		packet_write_wait();
+	}
+
 	channel_free_all();
 
 	if (have_pty)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h b/crypto/openssh/config.h
index d07ee69..5430244 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@
 /* Define if your snprintf is busted */
 /* #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF */
 
+/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
+/* #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
+
 /* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
 /* #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX */
 
@@ -123,9 +126,12 @@
 /* Builtin PRNG command timeout */
 #define ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC 200
 
-/* f_fsid has members */
+/* fsid_t has member val */
 /* #undef FSID_HAS_VAL */
 
+/* fsid_t has member __val */
+/* #undef FSID_HAS___VAL */
+
 /* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */
 #define GETPGRP_VOID 1
 
@@ -519,6 +525,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
 #define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
 
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
+#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
 /* #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H */
 
@@ -1227,6 +1236,9 @@
 /* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
 /* #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS */
 
+/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+/* #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID */
+
 /* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
 /* #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES */
 
@@ -1310,6 +1322,9 @@
 /* Use audit debugging module */
 /* #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 
+/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
+/* #undef SSH_IOBUFSZ */
+
 /* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
 #define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
 
@@ -1398,9 +1413,13 @@
 /* Define if you want SELinux support. */
 /* #undef WITH_SELINUX */
 
-/* Define to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte
-   first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
-/* #undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
+   significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
+#if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
+# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
+#elif ! defined __LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+/* # undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif
 
 /* Define if xauth is found in your path */
 /* #undef XAUTH_PATH */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h.in b/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
index 84967a4..fc195ba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h.in
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 /* config.h.in.  Generated from configure.ac by autoheader.  */
 
+/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */
+#undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
+
 /* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
    */
 #undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK
@@ -68,6 +71,9 @@
 /* Define if your snprintf is busted */
 #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
 
+/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
+#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
+
 /* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
 #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
 
@@ -122,9 +128,12 @@
 /* Builtin PRNG command timeout */
 #undef ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC
 
-/* f_fsid has members */
+/* fsid_t has member val */
 #undef FSID_HAS_VAL
 
+/* fsid_t has member __val */
+#undef FSID_HAS___VAL
+
 /* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */
 #undef GETPGRP_VOID
 
@@ -518,6 +527,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
 #undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
 
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
 
@@ -1226,6 +1238,9 @@
 /* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
 #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
 
+/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+
 /* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
 #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
 
@@ -1309,6 +1324,9 @@
 /* Use audit debugging module */
 #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 
+/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
+#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+
 /* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
 #undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
 
@@ -1397,9 +1415,17 @@
 /* Define if you want SELinux support. */
 #undef WITH_SELINUX
 
-/* Define to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte
-   first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
-#undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
+   significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
+#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
+# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
+#  define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
+# endif
+#else
+# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+#  undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+# endif
+#endif
 
 /* Define if xauth is found in your path */
 #undef XAUTH_PATH
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/defines.h b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
index 536ec49..2ddfd96 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/defines.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.153 2009/02/01 11:19:54 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.156 2009/08/28 01:21:07 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ struct	sockaddr_un {
 #ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
 typedef u_int32_t	in_addr_t;
 #endif
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+typedef u_int16_t	in_port_t;
+#endif
 
 #if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
 #define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
@@ -591,6 +594,10 @@ struct winsize {
 #define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
 	((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
 	    ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+	((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+	    ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
 #else
 # define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
 #endif
@@ -742,4 +749,8 @@ struct winsize {
 #define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
 #endif
 
+#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
index e919057..842f385 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.19 2007/06/12 11:56:15 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/includes.h b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
index f1b47f6..6bb9878 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/includes.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
     defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && \
-    defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) &&  HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0
+    defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) &&  HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
+    !defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
 # include <glob.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/jpake.c b/crypto/openssh/jpake.c
index 565f2e2..1306610 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/jpake.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/jpake.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.1 2008/11/04 08:22:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 #include "log.h"
 
 #include "jpake.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
 
 #ifdef JPAKE
 
@@ -60,165 +61,10 @@
 	"98DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB" \
 	"9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
 
-struct jpake_group *
+struct modp_group *
 jpake_default_group(void)
 {
-	struct jpake_group *ret;
-
-	ret = xmalloc(sizeof(*ret));
-	ret->p = ret->q = ret->g = NULL;
-	if (BN_hex2bn(&ret->p, JPAKE_GROUP_P) == 0 ||
-	    BN_hex2bn(&ret->g, JPAKE_GROUP_G) == 0)
-		fatal("%s: BN_hex2bn", __func__);
-	/* Subgroup order is p/2 (p is a safe prime) */
-	if ((ret->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-	if (BN_rshift1(ret->q, ret->p) != 1)
-		fatal("%s: BN_rshift1", __func__);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate uniformly distributed random number in range (1, high).
- * Return number on success, NULL on failure.
- */
-BIGNUM *
-bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high)
-{
-	BIGNUM *r, *tmp;
-	int success = -1;
-
-	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-		error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
-		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (BN_sub(tmp, high, tmp) == -1) {
-		error("%s: BN_sub failed (tmp = high - 2)", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (BN_rand_range(r, tmp) == -1) {
-		error("%s: BN_rand_range failed", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
-		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (BN_add(r, r, tmp) == -1) {
-		error("%s: BN_add failed (r = r + 2)", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	success = 0;
- out:
-	BN_clear_free(tmp);
-	if (success == 0)
-		return r;
-	BN_clear_free(r);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Hash contents of buffer 'b' with hash 'md'. Returns 0 on success,
- * with digest via 'digestp' (caller to free) and length via 'lenp'.
- * Returns -1 on failure.
- */
-int
-hash_buffer(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const EVP_MD *md,
-    u_char **digestp, u_int *lenp)
-{
-	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	u_int digest_len;
-	EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
-	int success = -1;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
-
-	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&evp_md_ctx, md, NULL) != 1) {
-		error("%s: EVP_DigestInit_ex", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&evp_md_ctx, buf, len) != 1) {
-		error("%s: EVP_DigestUpdate", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&evp_md_ctx, digest, &digest_len) != 1) {
-		error("%s: EVP_DigestFinal_ex", __func__);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	*digestp = xmalloc(digest_len);
-	*lenp = digest_len;
-	memcpy(*digestp, digest, *lenp);
-	success = 0;
- out:
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
-	bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-	digest_len = 0;
-	return success;
-}
-
-/* print formatted string followed by bignum */
-void
-jpake_debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *n, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-	char *out, *h;
-	va_list args;
-
-	out = NULL;
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
-	va_end(args);
-	if (out == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
-
-	if (n == NULL)
-		debug3("%s(null)", out);
-	else {
-		h = BN_bn2hex(n);
-		debug3("%s0x%s", out, h);
-		free(h);
-	}
-	free(out);
-}
-
-/* print formatted string followed by buffer contents in hex */
-void
-jpake_debug3_buf(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-	char *out, h[65];
-	u_int i, j;
-	va_list args;
-
-	out = NULL;
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
-	va_end(args);
-	if (out == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
-
-	debug3("%s length %u%s", out, len, buf == NULL ? " (null)" : "");
-	free(out);
-	if (buf == NULL)
-		return;
-
-	*h = '\0';
-	for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
-		snprintf(h + j, sizeof(h) - j, "%02x", buf[i]);
-		j += 2;
-		if (j >= sizeof(h) - 1 || i == len - 1) {
-			debug3("    %s", h);
-			*h = '\0';
-			j = 0;
-		}
-	}
+	return modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(JPAKE_GROUP_G, JPAKE_GROUP_P);
 }
 
 struct jpake_ctx *
@@ -243,7 +89,6 @@ jpake_new(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-
 void
 jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *pctx)
 {
@@ -344,7 +189,7 @@ jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *pctx, const char *fmt, ...)
 
 /* Shared parts of step 1 exchange calculation */
 void
-jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
+jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
     u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
     BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
     u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
@@ -383,11 +228,11 @@ jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
 		fatal("%s: BN_mod_exp", __func__);
 
 	/* Generate proofs for holding x1/x3 and x2/x4 */
-	if (schnorr_sign(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
 	    *priv1, *g_priv1, *id, *id_len,
 	    priv1_proof, priv1_proof_len) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
-	if (schnorr_sign(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g,
 	    *priv2, *g_priv2, *id, *id_len,
 	    priv2_proof, priv2_proof_len) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
@@ -397,7 +242,7 @@ jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
 
 /* Shared parts of step 2 exchange calculation */
 void
-jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
+jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
     BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
     const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
     const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
@@ -415,10 +260,10 @@ jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
 	if (BN_cmp(theirpub2, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
 		fatal("%s: theirpub2 <= 1", __func__);
 
-	if (schnorr_verify(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub1,
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub1,
 	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub1_proof, theirpub1_proof_len) != 1)
 		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub1 failed", __func__);
-	if (schnorr_verify(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub2,
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, grp->g, theirpub2,
 	    theirid, theirid_len, theirpub2_proof, theirpub2_proof_len) != 1)
 		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpub2 failed", __func__);
 
@@ -459,7 +304,7 @@ jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
 	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((exponent, "%s: exponent = ", __func__));
 
 	/* Note the generator here is 'tmp', not g */
-	if (schnorr_sign(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, exponent, *newpub,
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, exponent, *newpub,
 	    myid, myid_len,
 	    newpub_exponent_proof, newpub_exponent_proof_len) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign newpub", __func__);
@@ -496,7 +341,7 @@ jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *k,
 
 /* Shared parts of key derivation and confirmation calculation */
 void
-jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
+jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
     BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
     BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
     const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
@@ -531,7 +376,7 @@ jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
 
 	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((tmp, "%s: tmp = ", __func__));
 
-	if (schnorr_verify(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, step2_val, 
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp->p, grp->q, tmp, step2_val, 
 	    their_id, their_id_len,
 	    theirpriv2_s_proof, theirpriv2_s_proof_len) != 1)
 		fatal("%s: schnorr_verify theirpriv2_s_proof failed", __func__);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/jpake.h b/crypto/openssh/jpake.h
index a3d800c..a3f2cf0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/jpake.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/jpake.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: jpake.h,v 1.1 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: jpake.h,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -28,20 +28,16 @@
 # define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)
 # define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)
 #else
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)	jpake_debug3_bn a
-# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)	jpake_debug3_buf a
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BN(a)	debug3_bn a
+# define JPAKE_DEBUG_BUF(a)	debug3_buf a
 # define JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX(a)	jpake_dump a
-#endif /* SCHNORR_DEBUG */
-
-struct jpake_group {
-	BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
-};
+#endif /* JPAKE_DEBUG */
 
 #define KZP_ID_LEN	16	/* Length of client and server IDs */
 
 struct jpake_ctx {
 	/* Parameters */
-	struct jpake_group *grp;
+	struct modp_group *grp;
 
 	/* Private values shared by client and server */
 	BIGNUM *s;			/* Secret (salted, crypted password) */
@@ -83,26 +79,18 @@ struct jpake_ctx {
 };
 
 /* jpake.c */
-struct jpake_group *jpake_default_group(void);
-BIGNUM *bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high);
-int hash_buffer(const u_char *, u_int, const EVP_MD *, u_char **, u_int *);
-void jpake_debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *, const char *, ...)
-    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
-    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-void jpake_debug3_buf(const u_char *, u_int, const char *, ...)
-    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)))
-    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+struct modp_group *jpake_default_group(void);
 void jpake_dump(struct jpake_ctx *, const char *, ...)
     __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
     __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
 struct jpake_ctx *jpake_new(void);
 void jpake_free(struct jpake_ctx *);
 
-void jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
+void jpake_step1(struct modp_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
     BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
     u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
 
-void jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *,
+void jpake_step2(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
@@ -113,7 +101,7 @@ void jpake_confirm_hash(const BIGNUM *,
     const u_char *, u_int,
     u_char **, u_int *);
 
-void jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+void jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
@@ -122,13 +110,5 @@ void jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
 int jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
 
-/* schnorr.c */
-int schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
-    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int ,
-    u_char **, u_int *);
-int schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, 
-    const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, u_int,
-    const u_char *, u_int);
-
 #endif /* JPAKE_H */
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
index 48b54f5..f4f44f0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.80 2008/09/06 12:24:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.81 2009/05/27 06:34:36 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -49,8 +49,6 @@
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "monitor.h"
 
-#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN	16
-
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
 # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
 # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
index 8e29c90..68c80c5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.46 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.47 2009/05/27 06:34:36 andreas Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 
+#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN	16
+
 #define	KEX_DH1			"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
 #define	KEX_DH14		"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
 #define	KEX_DHGEX_SHA1		"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
index 8617088..a6719f6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.9 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.10 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
 	}
 
 	/* sign H */
-	PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen));
+	if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash,
+	    hashlen)) < 0)
+		fatal("kexdh_server: key_sign failed");
 
 	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
index 76a0f8c..8515568 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.11 2009/01/01 21:17:36 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.12 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -179,7 +179,9 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
 	}
 
 	/* sign H */
-	PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen));
+	if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash,
+	    hashlen)) < 0)
+		fatal("kexgex_server: key_sign failed");
 
 	/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
index f57e74b..ace25c4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.101 2009/02/12 03:26:22 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.104 2009/06/12 20:43:22 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "jpake.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
@@ -100,7 +101,6 @@ extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
 extern z_stream incoming_stream;
 extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
 extern u_char session_id[];
-extern Buffer input, output;
 extern Buffer auth_debug;
 extern int auth_debug_init;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ struct {
 	u_int ilen;
 	u_char *output;
 	u_int olen;
+	u_int64_t sent_bytes;
+	u_int64_t recv_bytes;
 } child_state;
 
 /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
@@ -1670,15 +1672,20 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
 	/* Network I/O buffers */
 	/* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
-	buffer_clear(&input);
-	buffer_append(&input, child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
+	buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
+	buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
 	memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
 	xfree(child_state.input);
 
-	buffer_clear(&output);
-	buffer_append(&output, child_state.output, child_state.olen);
+	buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
+	buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
+		      child_state.olen);
 	memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
 	xfree(child_state.output);
+
+	/* Roaming */
+	if (compat20)
+		roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
 }
 
 static Kex *
@@ -1794,6 +1801,12 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 	child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
 	child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
 
+	/* Roaming */
+	if (compat20) {
+		child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+		child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+	}
+
 	buffer_free(&m);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
index dab7475..faf9f3d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.16 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
index 0986fc5..b8e8710 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.64 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.68 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -71,19 +71,19 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
 #include "jpake.h"
 
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
 
 /* Imports */
 extern int compat20;
-extern Newkeys *newkeys[];
 extern z_stream incoming_stream;
 extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
 extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
-extern Buffer input, output;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
 	Enc *enc;
 	Mac *mac;
 	Comp *comp;
-	Newkeys *newkey = newkeys[mode];
+	Newkeys *newkey = (Newkeys *)packet_get_newkeys(mode);
 
 	debug3("%s: converting %p", __func__, newkey);
 
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex)
 void
 mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
 {
-	Buffer m;
+	Buffer m, *input, *output;
 	u_char *blob, *p;
 	u_int bloblen, plen;
 	u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
@@ -608,7 +608,8 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
 	}
 
 	debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
-	    __func__, newkeys[MODE_OUT], newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+	    __func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
+	    packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
 
 	/* Keys from Kex */
 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
@@ -655,8 +656,16 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
 	buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream));
 
 	/* Network I/O buffers */
-	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&input), buffer_len(&input));
-	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&output), buffer_len(&output));
+	input = (Buffer *)packet_get_input();
+	output = (Buffer *)packet_get_output();
+	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(input), buffer_len(input));
+	buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(output), buffer_len(output));
+
+	/* Roaming */
+	if (compat20) {
+		buffer_put_int64(&m, get_sent_bytes());
+		buffer_put_int64(&m, get_recv_bytes());
+	}
 
 	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
 	debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
@@ -1282,7 +1291,7 @@ mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
 }
 
 void
-mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
+mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
     u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
     BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
     u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
@@ -1317,7 +1326,7 @@ mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
 }
 
 void
-mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
+mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
     BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
     const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
     const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
@@ -1357,7 +1366,7 @@ mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
 }
 
 void
-mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
+mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
     BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
     BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
     const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
index 55c4b99..de2d16f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.21 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.22 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -102,17 +102,17 @@ int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
 int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 
 /* jpake */
-struct jpake_group;
+struct modp_group;
 void mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(struct Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
-void mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
+void mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
     BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
     u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
-void mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *,
+void mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
     BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
-void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
     const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
index 38be7e3..e90c159 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
@@ -39,9 +39,6 @@
 #endif
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/utsname.h>
-#include <sys/vfs.h>
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -49,11 +46,6 @@
 #include <windows.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#define is_winnt       (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
-
-#define ntsec_on(c)	((c) && strstr((c),"ntsec") && !strstr((c),"nontsec"))
-#define ntsec_off(c)	((c) && strstr((c),"nontsec"))
-#define ntea_on(c)	((c) && strstr((c),"ntea") && !strstr((c),"nontea"))
 
 int 
 binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
@@ -79,128 +71,12 @@ binary_pipe(int fd[2])
 	return (ret);
 }
 
-#define HAS_CREATE_TOKEN 1
-#define HAS_NTSEC_BY_DEFAULT 2
-#define HAS_CREATE_TOKEN_WO_NTSEC 3
-
-static int 
-has_capability(int what)
-{
-	static int inited;
-	static int has_create_token;
-	static int has_ntsec_by_default;
-	static int has_create_token_wo_ntsec;
-
-	/* 
-	 * has_capability() basically calls uname() and checks if
-	 * specific capabilities of Cygwin can be evaluated from that.
-	 * This simplifies the calling functions which only have to ask
-	 * for a capability using has_capability() instead of having
-	 * to figure that out by themselves.
-	 */
-	if (!inited) {
-		struct utsname uts;
-		
-		if (!uname(&uts)) {
-			int major_high = 0, major_low = 0, minor = 0;
-			int api_major_version = 0, api_minor_version = 0;
-			char *c;
-
-			sscanf(uts.release, "%d.%d.%d", &major_high,
-			    &major_low, &minor);
-			if ((c = strchr(uts.release, '(')) != NULL) {
-				sscanf(c + 1, "%d.%d", &api_major_version,
-				    &api_minor_version);
-			}
-			if (major_high > 1 ||
-			    (major_high == 1 && (major_low > 3 ||
-			    (major_low == 3 && minor >= 2))))
-				has_create_token = 1;
-			if (api_major_version > 0 || api_minor_version >= 56)
-				has_ntsec_by_default = 1;
-			if (major_high > 1 ||
-			    (major_high == 1 && major_low >= 5))
-				has_create_token_wo_ntsec = 1;
-			inited = 1;
-		}
-	}
-	switch (what) {
-	case HAS_CREATE_TOKEN:
-		return (has_create_token);
-	case HAS_NTSEC_BY_DEFAULT:
-		return (has_ntsec_by_default);
-	case HAS_CREATE_TOKEN_WO_NTSEC:
-		return (has_create_token_wo_ntsec);
-	}
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-check_nt_auth(int pwd_authenticated, struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	/*
-	* The only authentication which is able to change the user
-	* context on NT systems is the password authentication. So
-	* we deny all requsts for changing the user context if another
-	* authentication method is used.
-	*
-	* This doesn't apply to Cygwin versions >= 1.3.2 anymore which
-	* uses the undocumented NtCreateToken() call to create a user
-	* token if the process has the appropriate privileges and if
-	* CYGWIN ntsec setting is on.
-	*/
-	static int has_create_token = -1;
-
-	if (pw == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	if (is_winnt) {
-		if (has_create_token < 0) {
-			char *cygwin = getenv("CYGWIN");
-
-			has_create_token = 0;
-			if (has_capability(HAS_CREATE_TOKEN) &&
-			    (ntsec_on(cygwin) ||
-			    (has_capability(HAS_NTSEC_BY_DEFAULT) &&
-			     !ntsec_off(cygwin)) ||
-			     has_capability(HAS_CREATE_TOKEN_WO_NTSEC)))
-				has_create_token = 1;
-		}
-		if (has_create_token < 1 &&
-		    !pwd_authenticated && geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
-			return (0);
-	}
-	return (1);
-}
-
 int
 check_ntsec(const char *filename)
 {
 	return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
 }
 
-void
-register_9x_service(void)
-{
-        HINSTANCE kerneldll;
-        DWORD (*RegisterServiceProcess)(DWORD, DWORD);
-
-	/* The service register mechanism in 9x/Me is pretty different from
-	 * NT/2K/XP.  In NT/2K/XP we're using a special service starter
-	 * application to register and control sshd as service.  This method
-	 * doesn't play nicely with 9x/Me.  For that reason we register here
-	 * as service when running under 9x/Me.  This function is only called
-	 * by the child sshd when it's going to daemonize.
-	 */
-	if (is_winnt)
-		return;
-	if (!(kerneldll = LoadLibrary("KERNEL32.DLL")))
-		return;
-	if (!(RegisterServiceProcess = (DWORD (*)(DWORD, DWORD))
-		GetProcAddress(kerneldll, "RegisterServiceProcess")))
-		return;
-	RegisterServiceProcess(0, 1);
-}
-
 #define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
 #define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
index 6719b8a..39b8eb7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.11 2004/08/30 10:42:08 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.12 2009/03/08 00:40:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 
 #undef ERROR
-#define is_winnt       (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
 
 #include <windows.h>
 #include <sys/cygwin.h>
@@ -43,9 +42,7 @@
 
 int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
 int binary_pipe(int fd[2]);
-int check_nt_auth(int, struct passwd *);
 int check_ntsec(const char *);
-void register_9x_service(void);
 char **fetch_windows_environment(void);
 void free_windows_environment(char **);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
index e3a6886..3efe14c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
@@ -57,18 +57,8 @@ daemon(int nochdir, int noclose)
 	case -1:
 		return (-1);
 	case 0:
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-		register_9x_service();
-#endif
 		break;
 	default:
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-		/*
-		 * This sleep avoids a race condition which kills the
-		 * child process if parent is started by a NT/W2K service.
-		 */
-		sleep(1);
-#endif
 		_exit(0);
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
index 785b225..9887667 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ u_int32_t _getlong(register const u_char *);
 
 /* ************** */
 
-#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 1024*64
+#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff
 
 struct dns_query {
 	char			*name;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
index 49238ba..dd326c0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.6 2008/02/28 08:13:52 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.8 2009/03/07 11:22:35 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@ ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+int
+ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt)
+{
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, d, cnt);
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef	USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
 void
 ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(void)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index 6a1bed5..fcc7628 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.12 2008/02/28 08:22:04 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.14 2009/03/07 11:22:35 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_acss(void);
 #  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(a)	ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup((a))
 # endif /* SSH_OLD_EVP */
 
+# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+#  define EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)	ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate((a),(b),(c))
+#  endif
+
 # ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
 #  ifdef SSLeay_add_all_algorithms
 #   undef SSLeay_add_all_algorithms
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
index 5b1cb73..d9c0876 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@
 
 #include "port-aix.h"
 
+static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+
 # ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
 static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
 # endif
@@ -276,23 +278,30 @@ sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
     Buffer *loginmsg)
 {
 	char *msg = NULL;
-	static int msg_done = 0;
 	int success = 0;
 
 	aix_setauthdb(user);
 	if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
 		success = 1;
-		if (msg != NULL && loginmsg != NULL && !msg_done) {
+		if (msg != NULL) {
 			debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
-			buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
-			xfree(msg);
-			msg_done = 1;
+			if (lastlogin_msg == NULL)
+				lastlogin_msg = msg;
 		}
 	}
 	aix_restoreauthdb();
 	return (success);
 }
 
+char *
+sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char *msg = lastlogin_msg;
+
+	lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+	return msg;
+}
+
 #  ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
 /*
  * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
index ecb9fea..3ac76ae 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.29 2008/03/09 05:36:55 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.31 2009/08/20 06:20:50 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  *
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ int passwdexpired(char *, char **);
 # include <sys/timers.h>
 #endif
 
+/* for setpcred and friends */
+#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
 /*
  * According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15
  * chars or less plus terminating NUL.
@@ -87,6 +92,8 @@ void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *);
 int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, Buffer *);
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
 int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *, Buffer *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t);
 # define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
 #endif
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
index 5afc84c..994e35b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.160 2009/02/13 11:50:21 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.166 2009/06/27 09:29:06 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 #define DBG(x) x
@@ -86,92 +87,126 @@
 
 #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
 
-/*
- * This variable contains the file descriptors used for communicating with
- * the other side.  connection_in is used for reading; connection_out for
- * writing.  These can be the same descriptor, in which case it is assumed to
- * be a socket.
- */
-static int connection_in = -1;
-static int connection_out = -1;
+struct packet_state {
+	u_int32_t seqnr;
+	u_int32_t packets;
+	u_int64_t blocks;
+	u_int64_t bytes;
+};
 
-/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
-static u_int remote_protocol_flags = 0;
+struct packet {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
+	u_char type;
+	Buffer payload;
+};
 
-/* Encryption context for receiving data.  This is only used for decryption. */
-static CipherContext receive_context;
+struct session_state {
+	/*
+	 * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
+	 * communicating with the other side.  connection_in is used for
+	 * reading; connection_out for writing.  These can be the same
+	 * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
+	 */
+	int connection_in;
+	int connection_out;
 
-/* Encryption context for sending data.  This is only used for encryption. */
-static CipherContext send_context;
+	/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
+	u_int remote_protocol_flags;
 
-/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
-Buffer input;
+	/* Encryption context for receiving data.  Only used for decryption. */
+	CipherContext receive_context;
 
-/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
-Buffer output;
+	/* Encryption context for sending data.  Only used for encryption. */
+	CipherContext send_context;
 
-/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
-static Buffer outgoing_packet;
+	/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
+	Buffer input;
 
-/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
-static Buffer incoming_packet;
+	/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
+	Buffer output;
 
-/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
-static Buffer compression_buffer;
-static int compression_buffer_ready = 0;
+	/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
+	Buffer outgoing_packet;
 
-/* Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is enabled. */
-static int packet_compression = 0;
+	/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
+	Buffer incoming_packet;
 
-/* default maximum packet size */
-u_int max_packet_size = 32768;
+	/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
+	Buffer compression_buffer;
+	int compression_buffer_ready;
 
-/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
-static int initialized = 0;
+	/*
+	 * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is
+	 * enabled.
+	 */
+	int packet_compression;
 
-/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
-static int interactive_mode = 0;
+	/* default maximum packet size */
+	u_int max_packet_size;
 
-/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
-static int server_side = 0;
+	/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
+	int initialized;
 
-/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
-static int after_authentication = 0;
+	/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
+	int interactive_mode;
 
-int keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+	/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
+	int server_side;
 
-/* Set to the maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
-static int packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+	/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
+	int after_authentication;
 
-/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
-Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
-static struct packet_state {
-	u_int32_t seqnr;
-	u_int32_t packets;
-	u_int64_t blocks;
-	u_int64_t bytes;
-} p_read, p_send;
+	int keep_alive_timeouts;
 
-static u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out;
-static u_int32_t rekey_limit;
+	/* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
+	int packet_timeout_ms;
 
-/* Session key for protocol v1 */
-static u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
-static u_int ssh1_keylen;
+	/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
+	Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+	struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
 
-/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
-static u_char extra_pad = 0;
+	u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out;
+	u_int32_t rekey_limit;
 
-/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
-static u_int packet_discard = 0;
-static Mac *packet_discard_mac = NULL;
+	/* Session key for protocol v1 */
+	u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+	u_int ssh1_keylen;
 
-struct packet {
-	TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
-	u_char type;
-	Buffer payload;
+	/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
+	u_char extra_pad;
+
+	/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
+	u_int packet_discard;
+	Mac *packet_discard_mac;
+
+	/* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
+	u_int packlen;
+
+	/* Used in packet_send2 */
+	int rekeying;
+
+	/* Used in packet_set_interactive */
+	int set_interactive_called;
+
+	/* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
+	int set_maxsize_called;
+
+	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
 };
-TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+
+static struct session_state *active_state, *backup_state;
+
+static struct session_state *
+alloc_session_state(void)
+{
+    struct session_state *s = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*s));
+
+    s->connection_in = -1;
+    s->connection_out = -1;
+    s->max_packet_size = 32768;
+    s->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+    return s;
+}
 
 /*
  * Sets the descriptors used for communication.  Disables encryption until
@@ -184,21 +219,23 @@ packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
 
 	if (none == NULL)
 		fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
-	connection_in = fd_in;
-	connection_out = fd_out;
-	cipher_init(&send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
+	if (active_state == NULL)
+		active_state = alloc_session_state();
+	active_state->connection_in = fd_in;
+	active_state->connection_out = fd_out;
+	cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
 	    0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-	cipher_init(&receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
+	cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
 	    0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
-	newkeys[MODE_IN] = newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
-	if (!initialized) {
-		initialized = 1;
-		buffer_init(&input);
-		buffer_init(&output);
-		buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
-		buffer_init(&incoming_packet);
-		TAILQ_INIT(&outgoing);
-		p_send.packets = p_read.packets = 0;
+	active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+	if (!active_state->initialized) {
+		active_state->initialized = 1;
+		buffer_init(&active_state->input);
+		buffer_init(&active_state->output);
+		buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		buffer_init(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		TAILQ_INIT(&active_state->outgoing);
+		active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_read.packets = 0;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -206,27 +243,29 @@ void
 packet_set_timeout(int timeout, int count)
 {
 	if (timeout == 0 || count == 0) {
-		packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+		active_state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
 		return;
 	}
 	if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
-		packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+		active_state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
 	else
-		packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
+		active_state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
 }
 
 static void
 packet_stop_discard(void)
 {
-	if (packet_discard_mac) {
+	if (active_state->packet_discard_mac) {
 		char buf[1024];
 		
 		memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
-		while (buffer_len(&incoming_packet) < PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
-			buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		(void) mac_compute(packet_discard_mac,
-		    p_read.seqnr,
-		    buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
+		while (buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) <
+		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+			buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf));
+		(void) mac_compute(active_state->packet_discard_mac,
+		    active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
 		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
 	}
 	logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
@@ -239,10 +278,11 @@ packet_start_discard(Enc *enc, Mac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard)
 	if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher))
 		packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
 	if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled)
-		packet_discard_mac = mac;
-	if (buffer_len(&input) >= discard)
+		active_state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) >= discard)
 		packet_stop_discard();
-	packet_discard = discard - buffer_len(&input);
+	active_state->packet_discard = discard -
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->input);
 }
 
 /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
@@ -254,15 +294,17 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
 
 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
-	if (connection_in == connection_out)
+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
 		return 1;
 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
-	if (getpeername(connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
+	if (getpeername(active_state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+	    &fromlen) < 0)
 		return 0;
 	tolen = sizeof(to);
 	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
-	if (getpeername(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
+	if (getpeername(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+	    &tolen) < 0)
 		return 0;
 	if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
 		return 0;
@@ -283,9 +325,9 @@ packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 	CipherContext *cc;
 
 	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
-		cc = &send_context;
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
 	else
-		cc = &receive_context;
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 
 	cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
 }
@@ -296,9 +338,9 @@ packet_get_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
 	CipherContext *cc;
 
 	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
-		cc = &send_context;
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
 	else
-		cc = &receive_context;
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 
 	return (cipher_get_keycontext(cc, dat));
 }
@@ -309,9 +351,9 @@ packet_set_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
 	CipherContext *cc;
 
 	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
-		cc = &send_context;
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
 	else
-		cc = &receive_context;
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 
 	cipher_set_keycontext(cc, dat);
 }
@@ -322,9 +364,9 @@ packet_get_keyiv_len(int mode)
 	CipherContext *cc;
 
 	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
-		cc = &send_context;
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
 	else
-		cc = &receive_context;
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 
 	return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
 }
@@ -335,9 +377,9 @@ packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
 	CipherContext *cc;
 
 	if (mode == MODE_OUT)
-		cc = &send_context;
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
 	else
-		cc = &receive_context;
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 
 	cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
 }
@@ -345,7 +387,7 @@ packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
 int
 packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void)
 {
-	return (cipher_get_number(receive_context.cipher));
+	return (cipher_get_number(active_state->receive_context.cipher));
 }
 
 void
@@ -354,7 +396,8 @@ packet_get_state(int mode, u_int32_t *seqnr, u_int64_t *blocks, u_int32_t *packe
 {
 	struct packet_state *state;
 
-	state = (mode == MODE_IN) ? &p_read : &p_send;
+	state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
+	    &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
 	if (seqnr)
 		*seqnr = state->seqnr;
 	if (blocks)
@@ -371,7 +414,8 @@ packet_set_state(int mode, u_int32_t seqnr, u_int64_t blocks, u_int32_t packets,
 {
 	struct packet_state *state;
 
-	state = (mode == MODE_IN) ? &p_read : &p_send;
+	state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
+	    &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
 	state->seqnr = seqnr;
 	state->blocks = blocks;
 	state->packets = packets;
@@ -387,7 +431,8 @@ packet_connection_is_ipv4(void)
 	socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
 
 	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
-	if (getsockname(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
+	if (getsockname(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+	    &tolen) < 0)
 		return 0;
 	if (to.ss_family == AF_INET)
 		return 1;
@@ -405,10 +450,10 @@ void
 packet_set_nonblocking(void)
 {
 	/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
-	set_nonblock(connection_in);
+	set_nonblock(active_state->connection_in);
 
-	if (connection_out != connection_in)
-		set_nonblock(connection_out);
+	if (active_state->connection_out != active_state->connection_in)
+		set_nonblock(active_state->connection_out);
 }
 
 /* Returns the socket used for reading. */
@@ -416,7 +461,7 @@ packet_set_nonblocking(void)
 int
 packet_get_connection_in(void)
 {
-	return connection_in;
+	return active_state->connection_in;
 }
 
 /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
@@ -424,7 +469,7 @@ packet_get_connection_in(void)
 int
 packet_get_connection_out(void)
 {
-	return connection_out;
+	return active_state->connection_out;
 }
 
 /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
@@ -432,26 +477,26 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
 void
 packet_close(void)
 {
-	if (!initialized)
+	if (!active_state->initialized)
 		return;
-	initialized = 0;
-	if (connection_in == connection_out) {
-		shutdown(connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
-		close(connection_out);
+	active_state->initialized = 0;
+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+		close(active_state->connection_out);
 	} else {
-		close(connection_in);
-		close(connection_out);
+		close(active_state->connection_in);
+		close(active_state->connection_out);
 	}
-	buffer_free(&input);
-	buffer_free(&output);
-	buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
-	buffer_free(&incoming_packet);
-	if (compression_buffer_ready) {
-		buffer_free(&compression_buffer);
+	buffer_free(&active_state->input);
+	buffer_free(&active_state->output);
+	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+	if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) {
+		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
 		buffer_compress_uninit();
 	}
-	cipher_cleanup(&send_context);
-	cipher_cleanup(&receive_context);
+	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
 }
 
 /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
@@ -459,7 +504,7 @@ packet_close(void)
 void
 packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
 {
-	remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
+	active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
 }
 
 /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
@@ -467,7 +512,7 @@ packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
 u_int
 packet_get_protocol_flags(void)
 {
-	return remote_protocol_flags;
+	return active_state->remote_protocol_flags;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -478,18 +523,18 @@ packet_get_protocol_flags(void)
 static void
 packet_init_compression(void)
 {
-	if (compression_buffer_ready == 1)
+	if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready == 1)
 		return;
-	compression_buffer_ready = 1;
-	buffer_init(&compression_buffer);
+	active_state->compression_buffer_ready = 1;
+	buffer_init(&active_state->compression_buffer);
 }
 
 void
 packet_start_compression(int level)
 {
-	if (packet_compression && !compat20)
+	if (active_state->packet_compression && !compat20)
 		fatal("Compression already enabled.");
-	packet_compression = 1;
+	active_state->packet_compression = 1;
 	packet_init_compression();
 	buffer_compress_init_send(level);
 	buffer_compress_init_recv();
@@ -513,19 +558,21 @@ packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen,
 		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen);
 	if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
 		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
-	memcpy(ssh1_key, key, keylen);
-	ssh1_keylen = keylen;
-	cipher_init(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-	cipher_init(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
+	memcpy(active_state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
+	active_state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
+	cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
+	    0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
+	cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
+	    0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
 }
 
 u_int
 packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *key)
 {
 	if (key == NULL)
-		return (ssh1_keylen);
-	memcpy(key, ssh1_key, ssh1_keylen);
-	return (ssh1_keylen);
+		return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
+	memcpy(key, active_state->ssh1_key, active_state->ssh1_keylen);
+	return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
 }
 
 /* Start constructing a packet to send. */
@@ -539,8 +586,8 @@ packet_start(u_char type)
 	len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
 	memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
 	buf[len - 1] = type;
-	buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
 
 /* Append payload. */
@@ -549,43 +596,49 @@ packet_put_char(int value)
 {
 	char ch = value;
 
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
 }
 
 void
 packet_put_int(u_int value)
 {
-	buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
+	buffer_put_int(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value)
+{
+	buffer_put_int64(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
 }
 
 void
 packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
 {
-	buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+	buffer_put_string(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
 
 void
 packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
 {
-	buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&active_state->outgoing_packet, str);
 }
 
 void
 packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
 {
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
 
 void
 packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
 {
-	buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
+	buffer_put_bignum(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
 }
 
 void
 packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
 {
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&outgoing_packet, value);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -605,24 +658,27 @@ packet_send1(void)
 	 * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
 	 * packet.
 	 */
-	if (packet_compression) {
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
+	if (active_state->packet_compression) {
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
 		/* Skip padding. */
-		buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8);
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8);
 		/* padding */
-		buffer_append(&compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
-		buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-		buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+		buffer_append(&active_state->compression_buffer,
+		    "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
+		buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
 	}
 	/* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
-	len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
+	len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
 
 	/* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
 	padding = 8 - len % 8;
-	if (!send_context.plaintext) {
-		cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+	if (!active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
+		cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 		for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
 			if (i % 4 == 0)
 				rnd = arc4random();
@@ -630,33 +686,36 @@ packet_send1(void)
 			rnd >>= 8;
 		}
 	}
-	buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
 
 	/* Add check bytes. */
-	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
 	put_u32(buf, checksum);
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
-	buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 #endif
 
 	/* Append to output. */
 	put_u32(buf, len);
-	buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+	buffer_append(&active_state->output, buf, 4);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
-	buffer_dump(&output);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
 #endif
-	p_send.packets++;
-	p_send.bytes += len + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
-	buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+	active_state->p_send.packets++;
+	active_state->p_send.bytes += len +
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 
 	/*
 	 * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output.  It won't be
@@ -678,22 +737,22 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 	debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
 
 	if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
-		cc = &send_context;
+		cc = &active_state->send_context;
 		crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
-		p_send.packets = p_send.blocks = 0;
-		max_blocks = &max_blocks_out;
+		active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_send.blocks = 0;
+		max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_out;
 	} else {
-		cc = &receive_context;
+		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 		crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
-		p_read.packets = p_read.blocks = 0;
-		max_blocks = &max_blocks_in;
+		active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0;
+		max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in;
 	}
-	if (newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
 		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
 		cipher_cleanup(cc);
-		enc  = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
-		mac  = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
-		comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
 		mac_clear(mac);
 		xfree(enc->name);
 		xfree(enc->iv);
@@ -701,14 +760,14 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 		xfree(mac->name);
 		xfree(mac->key);
 		xfree(comp->name);
-		xfree(newkeys[mode]);
+		xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
 	}
-	newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
-	if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
+	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
 		fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
-	enc  = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
-	mac  = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
-	comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+	enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+	mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+	comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
 	if (mac_init(mac) == 0)
 		mac->enabled = 1;
 	DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
@@ -719,8 +778,8 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 	   memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
 	   memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); */
 	if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
-	    (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && after_authentication)) &&
-	    comp->enabled == 0) {
+	    (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
+	     active_state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
 		packet_init_compression();
 		if (mode == MODE_OUT)
 			buffer_compress_init_send(6);
@@ -736,8 +795,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
 	else
 		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
-	if (rekey_limit)
-		*max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+	if (active_state->rekey_limit)
+		*max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks,
+		    active_state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -755,12 +815,12 @@ packet_enable_delayed_compress(void)
 	 * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
 	 * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
 	 */
-	after_authentication = 1;
+	active_state->after_authentication = 1;
 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
 		/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
-		if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+		if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
 			continue;
-		comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
 		if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
 			packet_init_compression();
 			if (mode == MODE_OUT)
@@ -788,37 +848,39 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 	Comp *comp = NULL;
 	int block_size;
 
-	if (newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
-		enc  = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
-		mac  = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
-		comp = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
+	if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
+		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
+		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
 	}
 	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
 
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 	type = cp[5];
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "plain:     ");
-	buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 #endif
 
 	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
-		len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
+		len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 		/* skip header, compress only payload */
-		buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 5);
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
-		buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-		buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
-		buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 5);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
 		DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len,
-		    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)));
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet)));
 	}
 
 	/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
-	len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
+	len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 
 	/*
 	 * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
@@ -827,17 +889,19 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 	padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
 	if (padlen < 4)
 		padlen += block_size;
-	if (extra_pad) {
+	if (active_state->extra_pad) {
 		/* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
-		extra_pad  = roundup(extra_pad, block_size);
-		pad = extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % extra_pad);
+		active_state->extra_pad =
+		    roundup(active_state->extra_pad, block_size);
+		pad = active_state->extra_pad -
+		    ((len + padlen) % active_state->extra_pad);
 		debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
-		    pad, len, padlen, extra_pad);
+		    pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad);
 		padlen += pad;
-		extra_pad = 0;
+		active_state->extra_pad = 0;
 	}
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&outgoing_packet, padlen);
-	if (enc && !send_context.plaintext) {
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->outgoing_packet, padlen);
+	if (enc && !active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
 		/* random padding */
 		for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
 			if (i % 4 == 0)
@@ -850,86 +914,88 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 		memset(cp, 0, padlen);
 	}
 	/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
-	packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+	packet_length = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) - 4;
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 	put_u32(cp, packet_length);
 	cp[4] = padlen;
 	DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
 
 	/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
 	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
-		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, p_send.seqnr,
-		    buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-		    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-		DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", p_send.seqnr));
+		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_send.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+		DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr));
 	}
 	/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
 	/* append unencrypted MAC */
 	if (mac && mac->enabled)
-		buffer_append(&output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
-	buffer_dump(&output);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
 #endif
 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
-	if (++p_send.seqnr == 0)
+	if (++active_state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
-	if (++p_send.packets == 0)
+	if (++active_state->p_send.packets == 0)
 		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
 			fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
-	p_send.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
-	p_send.bytes += packet_length + 4;
-	buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+	active_state->p_send.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
+	active_state->p_send.bytes += packet_length + 4;
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
 		set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
-	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && server_side)
+	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && active_state->server_side)
 		packet_enable_delayed_compress();
 }
 
 static void
 packet_send2(void)
 {
-	static int rekeying = 0;
 	struct packet *p;
 	u_char type, *cp;
 
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
 	type = cp[5];
 
 	/* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */
-	if (rekeying) {
+	if (active_state->rekeying) {
 		if (!((type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) &&
 		    (type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX))) {
 			debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
 			p = xmalloc(sizeof(*p));
 			p->type = type;
-			memcpy(&p->payload, &outgoing_packet, sizeof(Buffer));
-			buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
-			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&outgoing, p, next);
+			memcpy(&p->payload, &active_state->outgoing_packet,
+			    sizeof(Buffer));
+			buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
 			return;
 		}
 	}
 
 	/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
-		rekeying = 1;
+		active_state->rekeying = 1;
 
 	packet_send2_wrapped();
 
 	/* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
-		rekeying = 0;
-		while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&outgoing))) {
+		active_state->rekeying = 0;
+		while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&active_state->outgoing))) {
 			type = p->type;
 			debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
-			buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
-			memcpy(&outgoing_packet, &p->payload,
+			buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+			memcpy(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &p->payload,
 			    sizeof(Buffer));
-			TAILQ_REMOVE(&outgoing, p, next);
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
 			xfree(p);
 			packet_send2_wrapped();
 		}
@@ -955,15 +1021,15 @@ packet_send(void)
 int
 packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 {
-	int type, len, ret, ms_remain;
+	int type, len, ret, ms_remain, cont;
 	fd_set *setp;
 	char buf[8192];
 	struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
 
 	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
 
-	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS),
-	    sizeof(fd_mask));
+	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
+	    NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
 
 	/* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
 	packet_write_wait();
@@ -987,27 +1053,27 @@ packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		 * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
 		 * buffer, and try again.
 		 */
-		memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) *
-		    sizeof(fd_mask));
-		FD_SET(connection_in, setp);
+		memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
+		    NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+		FD_SET(active_state->connection_in, setp);
 
-		if (packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
-			ms_remain = packet_timeout_ms;
+		if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+			ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
 			timeoutp = &timeout;
 		}
 		/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
 		for (;;) {
-			if (packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
 				ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
 				gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
 			}
-			if ((ret = select(connection_in + 1, setp, NULL,
-			    NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+			if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_in + 1, setp,
+			    NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
 				break;
-		   	if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+			if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
 			    errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
 				break;
-			if (packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
 				continue;
 			ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
 			if (ms_remain <= 0) {
@@ -1021,7 +1087,11 @@ packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			cleanup_exit(255);
 		}
 		/* Read data from the socket. */
-		len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		do {
+			cont = 0;
+			len = roaming_read(active_state->connection_in, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf), &cont);
+		} while (len == 0 && cont);
 		if (len == 0) {
 			logit("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
 			cleanup_exit(255);
@@ -1073,31 +1143,32 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 	u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
 
 	/* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
-	if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + 8)
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + 8)
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 	/* Get length of incoming packet. */
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->input);
 	len = get_u32(cp);
 	if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
 		packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
 	padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
 
 	/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
-	if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + padded_len)
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 
 	/* The entire packet is in buffer. */
 
 	/* Consume packet length. */
-	buffer_consume(&input, 4);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, 4);
 
 	/*
 	 * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
 	 * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
 	 * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
 	 */
-	if (!receive_context.plaintext) {
-		switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len)) {
+	if (!active_state->receive_context.plaintext) {
+		switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
+		    padded_len)) {
 		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
 			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
 			    "network attack detected");
@@ -1108,45 +1179,48 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 	}
 
 	/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
-	buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, padded_len);
-	cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len);
+	buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, padded_len);
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len);
 
-	buffer_consume(&input, padded_len);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, padded_len);
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
-	buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 #endif
 
 	/* Compute packet checksum. */
-	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&incoming_packet) - 4);
+	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) - 4);
 
 	/* Skip padding. */
-	buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
 
 	/* Test check bytes. */
-	if (len != buffer_len(&incoming_packet))
+	if (len != buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet))
 		packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll1: len %d != buffer_len %d.",
-		    len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
+		    len, buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
 
-	cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
+	cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
 	stored_checksum = get_u32(cp);
 	if (checksum != stored_checksum)
 		packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
-	buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
-
-	if (packet_compression) {
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
-		buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-		buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+	buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4);
+
+	if (active_state->packet_compression) {
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
 	}
-	p_read.packets++;
-	p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
-	type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
+	active_state->p_read.packets++;
+	active_state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
+	type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 	if (type < SSH_MSG_MIN || type > SSH_MSG_MAX)
 		packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", type);
 	return type;
@@ -1155,7 +1229,6 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 static int
 packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 {
-	static u_int packet_length = 0;
 	u_int padlen, need;
 	u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
 	u_int maclen, block_size;
@@ -1163,50 +1236,52 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	Mac *mac   = NULL;
 	Comp *comp = NULL;
 
-	if (packet_discard)
+	if (active_state->packet_discard)
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 
-	if (newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
-		enc  = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
-		mac  = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
-		comp = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
+	if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
+		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
+		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
+		comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
 	}
 	maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
 	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
 
-	if (packet_length == 0) {
+	if (active_state->packlen == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
 		 * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
 		 */
-		if (buffer_len(&input) < block_size)
+		if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < block_size)
 			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-		buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-		cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, block_size);
-		cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet,
 		    block_size);
-		cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
-		packet_length = get_u32(cp);
-		if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+		cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size);
+		cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp);
+		if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+		    active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-			buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+			buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 #endif
-			logit("Bad packet length %u.", packet_length);
-			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+			logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen);
+			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
 			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
 			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 		}
-		DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", packet_length+4));
-		buffer_consume(&input, block_size);
+		DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", active_state->packlen+4));
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->input, block_size);
 	}
 	/* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
-	need = 4 + packet_length - block_size;
+	need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size;
 	DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
 	    need, maclen));
 	if (need % block_size != 0) {
 		logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
 		    need, block_size, need % block_size);
-		packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+		packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
 		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 	}
@@ -1214,84 +1289,90 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
 	 * decrypt into incoming_packet
 	 */
-	if (buffer_len(&input) < need + maclen)
+	if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < need + maclen)
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
-	buffer_dump(&input);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->input);
 #endif
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, need);
-	cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), need);
-	buffer_consume(&input, need);
+	cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, need);
+	cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+	    buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->input, need);
 	/*
 	 * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
 	 * increment sequence number for incoming packet
 	 */
 	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
-		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, p_read.seqnr,
-		    buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
-		    buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
-		if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0) {
+		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
+		if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
+		    mac->mac_len) != 0) {
 			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
 			if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
 				fatal("internal error need %d", need);
-			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+			packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
 			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
 			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 		}
 				
-		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", p_read.seqnr));
-		buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len);
+		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", active_state->p_read.seqnr));
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->input, mac->mac_len);
 	}
 	/* XXX now it's safe to use fatal/packet_disconnect */
 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
-		*seqnr_p = p_read.seqnr;
-	if (++p_read.seqnr == 0)
+		*seqnr_p = active_state->p_read.seqnr;
+	if (++active_state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
-	if (++p_read.packets == 0)
+	if (++active_state->p_read.packets == 0)
 		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
 			fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
-	p_read.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
-	p_read.bytes += packet_length + 4;
+	active_state->p_read.blocks += (active_state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
+	active_state->p_read.bytes += active_state->packlen + 4;
 
 	/* get padlen */
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
+	cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 	padlen = cp[4];
 	DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
 	if (padlen < 4)
 		packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen);
 
 	/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
-	buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
-	buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, padlen);
+	buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
+	buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, padlen);
 
-	DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
+	DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d",
+	    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
 	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
-		buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-		buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    &active_state->compression_buffer);
+		buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
 		DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d",
-		    buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
+		    buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
 	}
 	/*
 	 * get packet type, implies consume.
 	 * return length of payload (without type field)
 	 */
-	type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 	if (type < SSH2_MSG_MIN || type >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN)
 		packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", type);
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
 		set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
-	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !server_side)
+	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS &&
+	    !active_state->server_side)
 		packet_enable_delayed_compress();
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
-	buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+	buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 #endif
 	/* reset for next packet */
-	packet_length = 0;
+	active_state->packlen = 0;
 	return type;
 }
 
@@ -1306,7 +1387,7 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		if (compat20) {
 			type = packet_read_poll2(seqnr_p);
 			if (type) {
-				keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+				active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
 				DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
 			}
 			switch (type) {
@@ -1376,14 +1457,14 @@ packet_read_poll(void)
 void
 packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
 {
-	if (packet_discard) {
-		keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
-		if (len >= packet_discard)
+	if (active_state->packet_discard) {
+		active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
+		if (len >= active_state->packet_discard)
 			packet_stop_discard();
-		packet_discard -= len;
+		active_state->packet_discard -= len;
 		return;
 	}
-	buffer_append(&input, buf, len);
+	buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
 }
 
 /* Returns a character from the packet. */
@@ -1393,7 +1474,7 @@ packet_get_char(void)
 {
 	char ch;
 
-	buffer_get(&incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
+	buffer_get(&active_state->incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
 	return (u_char) ch;
 }
 
@@ -1402,7 +1483,15 @@ packet_get_char(void)
 u_int
 packet_get_int(void)
 {
-	return buffer_get_int(&incoming_packet);
+	return buffer_get_int(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/* Returns an 64 bit integer from the packet data. */
+
+u_int64_t
+packet_get_int64(void)
+{
+	return buffer_get_int64(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1413,29 +1502,29 @@ packet_get_int(void)
 void
 packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
 {
-	buffer_get_bignum(&incoming_packet, value);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
 }
 
 void
 packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
 {
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&incoming_packet, value);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
 }
 
 void *
 packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
 {
-	u_int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+	u_int bytes = buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 
 	if (length_ptr != NULL)
 		*length_ptr = bytes;
-	return buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
+	return buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 }
 
 int
 packet_remaining(void)
 {
-	return buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+	return buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1448,13 +1537,13 @@ packet_remaining(void)
 void *
 packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
 {
-	return buffer_get_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr);
+	return buffer_get_string(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
 }
 
 void *
 packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr)
 {
-	return buffer_get_string_ptr(&incoming_packet, length_ptr);
+	return buffer_get_string_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1547,23 +1636,25 @@ packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...)
 void
 packet_write_poll(void)
 {
-	int len = buffer_len(&output);
+	int len = buffer_len(&active_state->output);
+	int cont;
 
 	if (len > 0) {
-		len = write(connection_out, buffer_ptr(&output), len);
+		cont = 0;
+		len = roaming_write(active_state->connection_out,
+		    buffer_ptr(&active_state->output), len, &cont);
 		if (len == -1) {
 			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
 			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
 				return;
 			fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		}
-		if (len == 0)
+		if (len == 0 && !cont)
 			fatal("Write connection closed");
-		buffer_consume(&output, len);
+		buffer_consume(&active_state->output, len);
 	}
 }
 
-
 /*
  * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
  * written.
@@ -1576,30 +1667,30 @@ packet_write_wait(void)
 	int ret, ms_remain;
 	struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
 
-	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS),
-	    sizeof(fd_mask));
+	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+	    NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
 	packet_write_poll();
 	while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
-		memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
-		    sizeof(fd_mask));
-		FD_SET(connection_out, setp);
+		memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+		    NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+		FD_SET(active_state->connection_out, setp);
 
-		if (packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
-			ms_remain = packet_timeout_ms;
+		if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+			ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
 			timeoutp = &timeout;
 		}
 		for (;;) {
-			if (packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
 				ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
 				gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
 			}
-			if ((ret = select(connection_out + 1, NULL, setp,
-			    NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+			if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+			    NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
 				break;
-		   	if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+			if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
 			    errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
 				break;
-			if (packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+			if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
 				continue;
 			ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
 			if (ms_remain <= 0) {
@@ -1622,7 +1713,7 @@ packet_write_wait(void)
 int
 packet_have_data_to_write(void)
 {
-	return buffer_len(&output) != 0;
+	return buffer_len(&active_state->output) != 0;
 }
 
 /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
@@ -1630,13 +1721,12 @@ packet_have_data_to_write(void)
 int
 packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void)
 {
-	if (interactive_mode)
-		return buffer_len(&output) < 16384;
+	if (active_state->interactive_mode)
+		return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 16384;
 	else
-		return buffer_len(&output) < 128 * 1024;
+		return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 128 * 1024;
 }
 
-
 static void
 packet_set_tos(int interactive)
 {
@@ -1646,7 +1736,7 @@ packet_set_tos(int interactive)
 	if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket() ||
 	    !packet_connection_is_ipv4())
 		return;
-	if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
+	if (setsockopt(active_state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
 	    sizeof(tos)) < 0)
 		error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
 		    tos, strerror(errno));
@@ -1658,19 +1748,17 @@ packet_set_tos(int interactive)
 void
 packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
 {
-	static int called = 0;
-
-	if (called)
+	if (active_state->set_interactive_called)
 		return;
-	called = 1;
+	active_state->set_interactive_called = 1;
 
 	/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
-	interactive_mode = interactive;
+	active_state->interactive_mode = interactive;
 
 	/* Only set socket options if using a socket.  */
 	if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
 		return;
-	set_nodelay(connection_in);
+	set_nodelay(active_state->connection_in);
 	packet_set_tos(interactive);
 }
 
@@ -1679,34 +1767,50 @@ packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
 int
 packet_is_interactive(void)
 {
-	return interactive_mode;
+	return active_state->interactive_mode;
 }
 
 int
 packet_set_maxsize(u_int s)
 {
-	static int called = 0;
-
-	if (called) {
+	if (active_state->set_maxsize_called) {
 		logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
-		    max_packet_size, s);
+		    active_state->max_packet_size, s);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
 		logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	called = 1;
+	active_state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
 	debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
-	max_packet_size = s;
+	active_state->max_packet_size = s;
 	return s;
 }
 
+int
+packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void)
+{
+	return ++active_state->keep_alive_timeouts;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_alive_timeouts(int ka)
+{
+	active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
+}
+
+u_int
+packet_get_maxsize(void)
+{
+	return active_state->max_packet_size;
+}
+
 /* roundup current message to pad bytes */
 void
 packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
 {
-	extra_pad = pad;
+	active_state->extra_pad = pad;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1743,26 +1847,93 @@ packet_need_rekeying(void)
 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
 		return 0;
 	return
-	    (p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
-	    (p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
-	    (max_blocks_out && (p_send.blocks > max_blocks_out)) ||
-	    (max_blocks_in  && (p_read.blocks > max_blocks_in));
+	    (active_state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+	    (active_state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+	    (active_state->max_blocks_out &&
+	        (active_state->p_send.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_out)) ||
+	    (active_state->max_blocks_in &&
+	        (active_state->p_read.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_in));
 }
 
 void
 packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t bytes)
 {
-	rekey_limit = bytes;
+	active_state->rekey_limit = bytes;
 }
 
 void
 packet_set_server(void)
 {
-	server_side = 1;
+	active_state->server_side = 1;
 }
 
 void
 packet_set_authenticated(void)
 {
-	after_authentication = 1;
+	active_state->after_authentication = 1;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_input(void)
+{
+	return (void *)&active_state->input;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_output(void)
+{
+	return (void *)&active_state->output;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
+{
+	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
+ * resuming a suspended connection.
+ */
+void
+packet_backup_state(void)
+{
+	struct session_state *tmp;
+
+	close(active_state->connection_in);
+	active_state->connection_in = -1;
+	close(active_state->connection_out);
+	active_state->connection_out = -1;
+	if (backup_state)
+		tmp = backup_state;
+	else
+		tmp = alloc_session_state();
+	backup_state = active_state;
+	active_state = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion.
+ */
+void
+packet_restore_state(void)
+{
+	struct session_state *tmp;
+	void *buf;
+	u_int len;
+
+	tmp = backup_state;
+	backup_state = active_state;
+	active_state = tmp;
+	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
+	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
+	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
+	if (len > 0) {
+		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
+		buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
+		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
+		add_recv_bytes(len);
+	}
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.h b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
index 03bb87c..33523d7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.49 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.52 2009/06/27 09:29:06 andreas Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ void     packet_set_authenticated(void);
 void     packet_start(u_char);
 void     packet_put_char(int ch);
 void     packet_put_int(u_int value);
+void     packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value);
 void     packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
 void     packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
 void     packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len);
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ int      packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
 
 u_int	 packet_get_char(void);
 u_int	 packet_get_int(void);
+u_int64_t packet_get_int64(void);
 void     packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
 void     packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
 void	*packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
@@ -72,6 +74,7 @@ void	 packet_get_state(int, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *);
 void	 packet_set_state(int, u_int32_t, u_int64_t, u_int32_t, u_int64_t);
 int	 packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void);
 void	 packet_set_iv(int, u_char *);
+void	*packet_get_newkeys(int);
 
 void     packet_write_poll(void);
 void     packet_write_wait(void);
@@ -87,10 +90,10 @@ void	 packet_add_padding(u_char);
 void	 tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *);
 void	 tty_parse_modes(int, int *);
 
-extern u_int max_packet_size;
-extern int keep_alive_timeouts;
+void	 packet_set_alive_timeouts(int);
+int	 packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void);
 int	 packet_set_maxsize(u_int);
-#define  packet_get_maxsize() max_packet_size
+u_int	 packet_get_maxsize(void);
 
 /* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */
 #define packet_check_eom() \
@@ -106,4 +109,10 @@ do { \
 int	 packet_need_rekeying(void);
 void	 packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t);
 
+void	 packet_backup_state(void);
+void	 packet_restore_state(void);
+
+void	*packet_get_input(void);
+void	*packet_get_output(void);
+
 #endif				/* PACKET_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
index 8b810a1..8d3fc40 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.176 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.177 2009/06/27 09:35:06 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
-	oVisualHostKey, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
 	oVersionAddendum,
 	oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
 	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+	{ "useroaming", oUseRoaming },
 #ifdef JPAKE
 	{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication",
 	    oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication },
@@ -931,6 +932,10 @@ parse_int:
 		intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case oUseRoaming:
+		intptr = &options->use_roaming;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case oVersionAddendum:
 		ssh_version_set_addendum(strtok(s, "\n"));
 		do {
@@ -1087,6 +1092,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->tun_remote = -1;
 	options->local_command = NULL;
 	options->permit_local_command = -1;
+	options->use_roaming = -1;
 	options->visual_host_key = -1;
 	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
 }
@@ -1223,6 +1229,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
 	if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
 		options->permit_local_command = 0;
+	if (options->use_roaming == -1)
+		options->use_roaming = 1;
 	if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
 		options->visual_host_key = 0;
 	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
index 8fb3a85..2ebfebe 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.78 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.79 2009/06/27 09:35:06 andreas Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
 	int	permit_local_command;
 	int	visual_host_key;
 
+	int	use_roaming;
+
 }       Options;
 
 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO	0
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/roaming.h b/crypto/openssh/roaming.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e517161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/roaming.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: roaming.h,v 1.4 2009/06/27 09:32:43 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ROAMING_H
+#define ROAMING_H
+
+#define DEFAULT_ROAMBUF 65536
+
+extern int resume_in_progress;
+
+int	get_snd_buf_size(void);
+int	get_recv_buf_size(void);
+void	add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t);
+void	set_out_buffer_size(size_t);
+ssize_t	roaming_write(int, const void *, size_t, int *);
+ssize_t	roaming_read(int, void *, size_t, int *);
+size_t	roaming_atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
+u_int64_t	get_recv_bytes(void);
+u_int64_t	get_sent_bytes(void);
+void	roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t, u_int64_t);
+void	resend_bytes(int, u_int64_t *);
+int	resume_kex(void);
+
+#endif /* ROAMING */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c b/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73db09d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: roaming_common.c,v 1.5 2009/06/27 09:32:43 andreas Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+static size_t out_buf_size = 0;
+static char *out_buf = NULL;
+static size_t out_start;
+static size_t out_last;
+
+static u_int64_t write_bytes = 0;
+static u_int64_t read_bytes = 0;
+
+int roaming_enabled = 0;
+int resume_in_progress = 0;
+
+int
+get_snd_buf_size()
+{
+	int fd = packet_get_connection_out();
+	int optval, optvallen;
+
+	optvallen = sizeof(optval);
+	if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0)
+		optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF;
+	return optval;
+}
+
+int
+get_recv_buf_size()
+{
+	int fd = packet_get_connection_in();
+	int optval, optvallen;
+
+	optvallen = sizeof(optval);
+	if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0)
+		optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF;
+	return optval;
+}
+
+void
+set_out_buffer_size(size_t size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The buffer size can only be set once and the buffer will live
+	 * as long as the session lives.
+	 */
+	if (out_buf == NULL) {
+		out_buf_size = size;
+		out_buf = xmalloc(size);
+		out_start = 0;
+		out_last = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+get_recv_bytes(void)
+{
+	return read_bytes;
+}
+
+void
+add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num)
+{
+	read_bytes += num;
+}
+
+u_int64_t
+get_sent_bytes(void)
+{
+	return write_bytes;
+}
+
+void
+roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t sent, u_int64_t recvd)
+{
+	read_bytes = recvd;
+	write_bytes = sent;
+}
+
+static void
+buf_append(const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	if (count > out_buf_size) {
+		buf += count - out_buf_size;
+		count = out_buf_size;
+	}
+	if (count < out_buf_size - out_last) {
+		memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, count);
+		if (out_start > out_last)
+			out_start += count;
+		out_last += count;
+	} else {
+		/* data will wrap */
+		size_t chunk = out_buf_size - out_last;
+		memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, chunk);
+		memcpy(out_buf, buf + chunk, count - chunk);
+		out_last = count - chunk;
+		out_start = out_last + 1;
+	}
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	ret = write(fd, buf, count);
+	if (ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
+		write_bytes += ret;
+		if (out_buf_size > 0)
+			buf_append(buf, ret);
+	}
+	debug3("Wrote %ld bytes for a total of %llu", (long)ret,
+	    (unsigned long long)write_bytes);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	ssize_t ret = read(fd, buf, count);
+	if (ret > 0) {
+		if (!resume_in_progress) {
+			read_bytes += ret;
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+size_t
+roaming_atomicio(ssize_t(*f)(int, void*, size_t), int fd, void *buf,
+    size_t count)
+{
+	size_t ret = atomicio(f, fd, buf, count);
+
+	if (f == vwrite && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
+		write_bytes += ret;
+	} else if (f == read && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) {
+		read_bytes += ret;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+resend_bytes(int fd, u_int64_t *offset)
+{
+	size_t available, needed;
+
+	if (out_start < out_last)
+		available = out_last - out_start;
+	else
+		available = out_buf_size;
+	needed = write_bytes - *offset;
+	debug3("resend_bytes: resend %lu bytes from %llu",
+	    (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long long)*offset);
+	if (needed > available)
+		fatal("Needed to resend more data than in the cache");
+	if (out_last < needed) {
+		int chunkend = needed - out_last;
+		atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + out_buf_size - chunkend,
+		    chunkend);
+		atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf, out_last);
+	} else {
+		atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + (out_last - needed), needed);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c b/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45c4008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: roaming_dummy.c,v 1.3 2009/06/21 09:04:03 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file is included in the client programs which should not
+ * support roaming.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+int resume_in_progress = 0;
+
+u_int64_t
+get_recv_bytes(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	return write(fd, buf, count);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont)
+{
+	if (cont)
+		*cont = 0;
+	return read(fd, buf, count);
+}
+
+void
+add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num)
+{
+}
+
+int
+resume_kex(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/schnorr.c b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.c
index 61ba68a..daeec06 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/schnorr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.c,v 1.2 2009/02/18 04:31:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -41,38 +41,36 @@
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
-#include "jpake.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
 
 #ifdef JPAKE
 
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
 /* #define SCHNORR_DEBUG */		/* Privacy-violating debugging */
 /* #define SCHNORR_MAIN */		/* Include main() selftest */
 
-/* XXX */
-/* Parametise signature hash? (sha256, sha1, etc.) */
-/* Signature format - include type name, hash type, group params? */
-
 #ifndef SCHNORR_DEBUG
 # define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)
 # define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)
 #else
-# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)	jpake_debug3_bn a
-# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)	jpake_debug3_buf a
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)	debug3_bn a
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)	debug3_buf a
 #endif /* SCHNORR_DEBUG */
 
 /*
  * Calculate hash component of Schnorr signature H(g || g^v || g^x || id)
- * using SHA1. Returns signature as bignum or NULL on error.
+ * using the hash function defined by "evp_md". Returns signature as
+ * bignum or NULL on error.
  */
 static BIGNUM *
 schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
-    const BIGNUM *g_v, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_v, const BIGNUM *g_x,
     const u_char *id, u_int idlen)
 {
 	u_char *digest;
 	u_int digest_len;
 	BIGNUM *h;
-	EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
 	Buffer b;
 	int success = -1;
 
@@ -82,7 +80,6 @@ schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
 	}
 
 	buffer_init(&b);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
 
 	/* h = H(g || p || q || g^v || g^x || id) */
 	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g);
@@ -94,7 +91,7 @@ schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
 
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
 	    "%s: hashblob", __func__));
-	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
+	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), evp_md,
 	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0) {
 		error("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
 		goto out;
@@ -107,7 +104,6 @@ schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((h, "%s: h = ", __func__));
  out:
 	buffer_free(&b);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
 	bzero(digest, digest_len);
 	xfree(digest);
 	digest_len = 0;
@@ -120,18 +116,20 @@ schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
 /*
  * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
  * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
+ * using the hash function "evp_md".
  * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
  * replay salt.
- * On success, 0 is returned and *siglen bytes of signature are returned in
- * *sig (caller to free). Returns -1 on failure.
+ * 
+ * On success, 0 is returned. The signature values are returned as *e_p
+ * (g^v mod p) and *r_p (v - xh mod q). The caller must free these values.
+ * On failure, -1 is returned.
  */
 int
 schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
-    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
-    u_char **sig, u_int *siglen)
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+    const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p)
 {
 	int success = -1;
-	Buffer b;
 	BIGNUM *h, *tmp, *v, *g_v, *r;
 	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
 
@@ -174,7 +172,7 @@ schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));
 
 	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
-	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_v, g_x,
+	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, evp_md, g_v, g_x,
 	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
 		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
 		goto out;
@@ -189,12 +187,49 @@ schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
 		error("%s: BN_mod_mul (r = v - tmp)", __func__);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: e = ", __func__));
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
 
-	/* Signature is (g_v, r) */
+	*e_p = g_v;
+	*r_p = r;
+
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	if (h != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(h);
+	if (v != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(v);
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
+ * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
+ * using a SHA256 hash.
+ * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
+ * replay salt.
+ * On success, 0 is returned and *siglen bytes of signature are returned in
+ * *sig (caller to free). Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_sign_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    u_char **sig, u_int *siglen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	BIGNUM *r, *e;
+
+	if (schnorr_sign(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, EVP_sha256(),
+	    x, g_x, id, idlen, &r, &e) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Signature is (e, r) */
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	/* XXX sigtype-hash as string? */
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g_v);
+	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, e);
 	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, r);
 	*siglen = buffer_len(&b);
 	*sig = xmalloc(*siglen);
@@ -202,36 +237,28 @@ schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
 	    "%s: sigblob", __func__));
 	buffer_free(&b);
-	success = 0;
- out:
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	if (h != NULL)
-		BN_clear_free(h);
-	if (v != NULL)
-		BN_clear_free(v);
+
 	BN_clear_free(r);
-	BN_clear_free(g_v);
-	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+	BN_clear_free(e);
 
-	return success;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * Verify Schnorr signature 'sig' of length 'siglen' against public exponent
- * g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'.
+ * Verify Schnorr signature { r (v - xh mod q), e (g^v mod p) } against
+ * public exponent g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and
+ * 'grp_g' using hash "evp_md".
  * Signature hash will be salted with 'idlen' bytes from 'id'.
  * Returns -1 on failure, 0 on incorrect signature or 1 on matching signature.
  */
 int
 schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
-    const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
-    const u_char *sig, u_int siglen)
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *e)
 {
 	int success = -1;
-	Buffer b;
-	BIGNUM *g_v, *h, *r, *g_xh, *g_r, *expected;
+	BIGNUM *h, *g_xh, *g_r, *expected;
 	BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
-	u_int rlen;
 
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));
 
@@ -241,39 +268,23 @@ schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	g_v = h = r = g_xh = g_r = expected = NULL;
+	h = g_xh = g_r = expected = NULL;
 	if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
 		error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((g_v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (g_xh = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	if ((g_xh = BN_new()) == NULL ||
 	    (g_r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
 	    (expected = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	/* Extract g^v and r from signature blob */
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_append(&b, sig, siglen);
-	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
-	    "%s: sigblob", __func__));
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, g_v);
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, r);
-	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	if (rlen != 0) {
-		error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((e, "%s: e = ", __func__));
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
 
 	/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
-	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_v, g_x,
+	if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, evp_md, e, g_x,
 	    id, idlen)) == NULL) {
 		error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
 		goto out;
@@ -300,20 +311,248 @@ schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
 	}
 	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((expected, "%s: expected = ", __func__));
 
-	/* Check g_v == expected */
-	success = BN_cmp(expected, g_v) == 0;
+	/* Check e == expected */
+	success = BN_cmp(expected, e) == 0;
  out:
 	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 	if (h != NULL)
 		BN_clear_free(h);
-	BN_clear_free(g_v);
-	BN_clear_free(r);
 	BN_clear_free(g_xh);
 	BN_clear_free(g_r);
 	BN_clear_free(expected);
 	return success;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Verify Schnorr signature 'sig' of length 'siglen' against public exponent
+ * g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g' using a
+ * SHA256 hash.
+ * Signature hash will be salted with 'idlen' bytes from 'id'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure, 0 on incorrect signature or 1 on matching signature.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_verify_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
+    const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const u_char *sig, u_int siglen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	int ret = -1;
+	u_int rlen;
+	BIGNUM *r, *e;
+
+	e = r = NULL;
+	if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract g^v and r from signature blob */
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_append(&b, sig, siglen);
+	SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+	    "%s: sigblob", __func__));
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, e);
+	buffer_get_bignum2(&b, r);
+	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (rlen != 0) {
+		error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, EVP_sha256(),
+	    g_x, id, idlen, r, e);
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(e);
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Helper functions */
+
+/*
+ * Generate uniformly distributed random number in range (1, high).
+ * Return number on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+BIGNUM *
+bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high)
+{
+	BIGNUM *r, *tmp;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_sub(tmp, high, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_sub failed (tmp = high - 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_rand_range(r, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_rand_range failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+		error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_add(r, r, tmp) == -1) {
+		error("%s: BN_add failed (r = r + 2)", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+	if (success == 0)
+		return r;
+	BN_clear_free(r);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hash contents of buffer 'b' with hash 'md'. Returns 0 on success,
+ * with digest via 'digestp' (caller to free) and length via 'lenp'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+hash_buffer(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const EVP_MD *md,
+    u_char **digestp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	u_int digest_len;
+	EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
+	int success = -1;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
+
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&evp_md_ctx, md, NULL) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestInit_ex", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&evp_md_ctx, buf, len) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestUpdate", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&evp_md_ctx, digest, &digest_len) != 1) {
+		error("%s: EVP_DigestFinal_ex", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*digestp = xmalloc(digest_len);
+	*lenp = digest_len;
+	memcpy(*digestp, digest, *lenp);
+	success = 0;
+ out:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
+	bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	digest_len = 0;
+	return success;
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by bignum */
+void
+debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *n, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out, *h;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	if (n == NULL)
+		debug3("%s(null)", out);
+	else {
+		h = BN_bn2hex(n);
+		debug3("%s0x%s", out, h);
+		free(h);
+	}
+	free(out);
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by buffer contents in hex */
+void
+debug3_buf(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *out, h[65];
+	u_int i, j;
+	va_list args;
+
+	out = NULL;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (out == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+	debug3("%s length %u%s", out, len, buf == NULL ? " (null)" : "");
+	free(out);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	*h = '\0';
+	for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		snprintf(h + j, sizeof(h) - j, "%02x", buf[i]);
+		j += 2;
+		if (j >= sizeof(h) - 1 || i == len - 1) {
+			debug3("    %s", h);
+			*h = '\0';
+			j = 0;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a MODP group from hex strings p (which must be a safe
+ * prime) and g, automatically calculating subgroup q as (p / 2)
+ */
+struct modp_group *
+modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(const char *grp_g, const char *grp_p)
+{
+	struct modp_group *ret;
+
+	ret = xmalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+	ret->p = ret->q = ret->g = NULL;
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&ret->p, grp_p) == 0 ||
+	    BN_hex2bn(&ret->g, grp_g) == 0)
+		fatal("%s: BN_hex2bn", __func__);
+	/* Subgroup order is p/2 (p is a safe prime) */
+	if ((ret->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+	if (BN_rshift1(ret->q, ret->p) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: BN_rshift1", __func__);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+modp_group_free(struct modp_group *grp)
+{
+	if (grp->g != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(grp->g);
+	if (grp->p != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(grp->p);
+	if (grp->q != NULL)
+		BN_clear_free(grp->q);
+	bzero(grp, sizeof(*grp));
+	xfree(grp);
+}
+
+/* main() function for self-test */
+
 #ifdef SCHNORR_MAIN
 static void
 schnorr_selftest_one(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
@@ -331,16 +570,17 @@ schnorr_selftest_one(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
 
 	if (BN_mod_exp(g_x, grp_g, x, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: g_x", __func__);
-	if (schnorr_sign(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, x, g_x, "junk", 4, &sig, &siglen))
+	if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, x, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	    &sig, &siglen))
 		fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
-	if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
 	    sig, siglen) != 1)
 		fatal("%s: verify fail", __func__);
-	if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "JUNK", 4,
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "JUNK", 4,
 	    sig, siglen) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bad ID)", __func__);
 	sig[4] ^= 1;
-	if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+	if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
 	    sig, siglen) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bit error)", __func__);
 	xfree(sig);
@@ -352,7 +592,7 @@ static void
 schnorr_selftest(void)
 {
 	BIGNUM *x;
-	struct jpake_group *grp;
+	struct modp_group *grp;
 	u_int i;
 	char *hh;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9730b47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/schnorr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.h,v 1.1 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SCHNORR_H
+#define SCHNORR_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+struct modp_group {
+	BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
+};
+
+BIGNUM *bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high);
+int hash_buffer(const u_char *, u_int, const EVP_MD *, u_char **, u_int *);
+void debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void debug3_buf(const u_char *, u_int, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+struct modp_group *modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(const char *, const char *);
+void modp_group_free(struct modp_group *);
+
+/* Signature and verification functions */
+int
+schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+    const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p);
+int
+schnorr_sign_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    u_char **sig, u_int *siglen);
+int
+schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *e);
+int
+schnorr_verify_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
+    const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+    const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+    const u_char *sig, u_int siglen);
+
+#endif /* JPAKE_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
index 4744688..ad25fef 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.194 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.195 2009/04/14 21:10:54 jj Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },	/* alias */
+	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
 #ifdef KRB5
 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -419,10 +419,10 @@ static struct {
 	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
 	{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *user,
 /*
  * Copy any supported values that are set.
  *
- * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the the string or
+ * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
  * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
  * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
  */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
index 81cafe6..8be01c5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.157 2009/02/12 03:16:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.159 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "serverloop.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
 
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ client_alive_check(void)
 	int channel_id;
 
 	/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
-	if (++keep_alive_timeouts > options.client_alive_count_max) {
+	if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) {
 		logit("Timeout, client not responding.");
 		cleanup_exit(255);
 	}
@@ -391,8 +392,11 @@ process_input(fd_set *readset)
 
 	/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
 	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
-		len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		int cont = 0;
+		len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
 		if (len == 0) {
+			if (cont)
+				return;
 			verbose("Connection closed by %.100s",
 			    get_remote_ipaddr());
 			connection_closed = 1;
@@ -890,7 +894,7 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	 * even if this was generated by something other than
 	 * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
 	 */
-	keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+	packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1120,7 +1124,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		    no_port_forwarding_flag ||
 		    (!want_reply && listen_port == 0)
 #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
-		    || (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0)
+		    || (listen_port != 0 && listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED &&
+                    pw->pw_uid != 0)
 #endif
 		    ) {
 			success = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index 16cc4ae..51cca49 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.245 2009/01/22 09:46:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.246 2009/04/17 19:23:06 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -572,8 +572,7 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 	signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (is_winnt)
-		cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
 #endif
 
 	s->pid = pid;
@@ -717,8 +716,8 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 		 * Do common processing for the child, such as execing
 		 * the command.
 		 */
- 		do_child(s, command);
- 		/* NOTREACHED */
+		do_child(s, command);
+		/* NOTREACHED */
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -727,8 +726,7 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 	signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
 #endif /* _UNICOS */
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (is_winnt)
-		cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
 #endif
 
 	s->pid = pid;
@@ -848,7 +846,7 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
 		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
-		    (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
 			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 			cleanup_exit(255);
 		}
@@ -1135,7 +1133,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 	u_int i, envsize;
 	char **env, *laddr;
 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
-#ifndef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
 	char *path = NULL;
 #else
 	extern char **environ;
@@ -1498,11 +1496,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
 #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
 	{
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
-		if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, (char **)NULL) == -1)
-			fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
-#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 # ifdef __bsdi__
 		setpgid(0, 0);
@@ -1570,6 +1563,10 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 			free(chroot_path);
 		}
 
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
+		if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, (char **)NULL) == -1)
+			fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
 			perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
@@ -1581,9 +1578,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 #endif
 	}
 
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-	if (is_winnt)
-#endif
 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
 		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
 
@@ -1824,7 +1818,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 		int i;
 		char *p, *args;
 
-		setproctitle("%s@internal-sftp-server", s->pw->pw_name);
+		setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
 		args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
 		for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
 			if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
index 5e39aa7..0990b79 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.86 2008/06/26 06:10:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.87 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8 b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
index 03e58cb..0201d4b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.14 2008/07/18 22:51:01 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.15 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 .\"
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd July 18 2008
+.Dd March 26 2009
 .Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ must be able to access
 .Pa /dev/log .
 Use of
 .Nm
-in a chroot configuation therefore requires that
+in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
 .Xr syslogd 8
 establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
index 24c4ff7..d984e60 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.84 2008/06/26 06:10:09 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.85 2009/04/14 16:33:42 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ process_rename(void)
 	else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
 		/* Race-free rename of regular files */
 		if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
-			if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP
+			if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS
 #ifdef EXDEV
 			    || errno == EXDEV
 #endif
@@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
 
-	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "C:f:l:che")) != -1) {
+	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "f:l:che")) != -1) {
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'c':
 			/*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
index 7ce9dc2..bc38900 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.46 2007/09/09 11:38:01 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.47 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $FreeBSD$
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd June 5 2007
+.Dd March 26 2009
 .Dt SSH-AGENT 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either
 .Xr sh 1
 or
 .Xr csh 1
-syntax can be generated) which can be evalled in the calling shell, eg
+syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg
 .Cm eval `ssh-agent -s`
 for Bourne-type shells such as
 .Xr sh 1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
index ef62f19..1fdf529 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.159 2008/06/28 14:05:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.161 2009/03/23 19:38:04 tobias Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1062,6 +1062,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	pid_t pid;
 	char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
 	struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
+	size_t len;
 
 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
 	sanitise_stdfd();
@@ -1123,8 +1124,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
 		shell = getenv("SHELL");
-		if (shell != NULL &&
-		    strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+		if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+		    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
 			c_flag = 1;
 	}
 	if (k_flag) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
index 5765cff..da5db98 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.173 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.174 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
index 0ea4c49..e88cfe3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.282 2009/02/12 03:44:25 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.283 2009/03/19 15:15:09 jmc Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd February 12 2009
+.Dd March 19 2009
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -192,26 +192,9 @@ For protocol version 2,
 .Ar cipher_spec
 is a comma-separated list of ciphers
 listed in order of preference.
-The supported ciphers are:
-3des-cbc,
-aes128-cbc,
-aes192-cbc,
-aes256-cbc,
-aes128-ctr,
-aes192-ctr,
-aes256-ctr,
-arcfour128,
-arcfour256,
-arcfour,
-blowfish-cbc,
-and
-cast128-cbc.
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
-arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
-aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
-.Ed
+See the
+.Cm Ciphers
+keyword for more information.
 .It Fl D Xo
 .Sm off
 .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
index cd3449a..25dd863 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.324 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.326 2009/07/02 02:11:47 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #endif
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 
 #include <ctype.h>
@@ -204,8 +205,8 @@ void muxserver_listen(void);
 int
 main(int ac, char **av)
 {
-	int i, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
-	char *p, *cp, *line, buf[256];
+	int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
+	char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[MAXPATHLEN];
 	struct stat st;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	int dummy, timeout_ms;
@@ -271,6 +272,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
 	host = NULL;
 	use_syslog = 0;
+	argv0 = av[0];
 
  again:
 	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
@@ -601,7 +603,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
 	 * actually goes to stderr.
 	 */
-	log_init(av[0],
+	log_init(argv0,
 	    options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
 
@@ -614,9 +616,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
 			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
 	} else {
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
 		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
-		(void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+			(void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
 
 		/* Read systemwide configuration file after use config. */
 		(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host,
@@ -629,7 +632,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
 
 	/* reinit */
-	log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
+	log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
 
 	seed_rng();
 
@@ -784,9 +787,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
 	 * directory if it doesn't already exist.
 	 */
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s%s%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
+	r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
 	    strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
-	if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+	if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0)
 		if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
 			error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
index 1549e06..e5045a5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@@ -45,4 +45,4 @@
 #   TunnelDevice any:any
 #   PermitLocalCommand no
 #   VisualHostKey no
-#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20090522
+#   VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20091001
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
index e5e020e..b0497d1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
@@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ in
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20090522 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20091001 .
 .It Cm VisualHostKey
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq yes ,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
index 8fdf708..108a0a4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@
 #define ciphers_valid				ssh_ciphers_valid
 #define cleanhostname				ssh_cleanhostname
 #define cleanup_exit				ssh_cleanup_exit
+#define clear_cached_addr			ssh_clear_cached_addr
 #define colon					ssh_colon
 #define compat_cipher_proposal			ssh_compat_cipher_proposal
 #define compat_datafellows			ssh_compat_datafellows
@@ -279,6 +280,7 @@
 #define ms_to_timeval				ssh_ms_to_timeval
 #define mysignal				ssh_mysignal
 #define packet_add_padding			ssh_packet_add_padding
+#define packet_backup_state			ssh_packet_backup_state
 #define packet_close				ssh_packet_close
 #define packet_connection_is_ipv4		ssh_packet_connection_is_ipv4
 #define packet_connection_is_on_socket		ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket
@@ -289,10 +291,15 @@
 #define packet_get_connection_in		ssh_packet_get_connection_in
 #define packet_get_connection_out		ssh_packet_get_connection_out
 #define packet_get_encryption_key		ssh_packet_get_encryption_key
+#define packet_get_input			ssh_packet_get_input
 #define packet_get_int				ssh_packet_get_int
+#define packet_get_int64			ssh_packet_get_int64
 #define packet_get_keycontext			ssh_packet_get_keycontext
 #define packet_get_keyiv			ssh_packet_get_keyiv
 #define packet_get_keyiv_len			ssh_packet_get_keyiv_len
+#define packet_get_maxsize			ssh_packet_get_maxsize
+#define packet_get_newkeys			ssh_packet_get_newkeys
+#define packet_get_output			ssh_packet_get_output
 #define packet_get_protocol_flags		ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags
 #define packet_get_raw				ssh_packet_get_raw
 #define packet_get_ssh1_cipher			ssh_packet_get_ssh1_cipher
@@ -300,6 +307,7 @@
 #define packet_get_string			ssh_packet_get_string
 #define packet_get_string_ptr			ssh_packet_get_string_ptr
 #define packet_have_data_to_write		ssh_packet_have_data_to_write
+#define packet_inc_alive_timeouts		ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts
 #define packet_is_interactive			ssh_packet_is_interactive
 #define packet_need_rekeying			ssh_packet_need_rekeying
 #define packet_not_very_much_data_to_write	ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write
@@ -309,6 +317,7 @@
 #define packet_put_char				ssh_packet_put_char
 #define packet_put_cstring			ssh_packet_put_cstring
 #define packet_put_int				ssh_packet_put_int
+#define packet_put_int64			ssh_packet_put_int64
 #define packet_put_raw				ssh_packet_put_raw
 #define packet_put_string			ssh_packet_put_string
 #define packet_read				ssh_packet_read
@@ -317,9 +326,11 @@
 #define packet_read_poll_seqnr			ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr
 #define packet_read_seqnr			ssh_packet_read_seqnr
 #define packet_remaining			ssh_packet_remaining
+#define packet_restore_state			ssh_packet_restore_state
 #define packet_send				ssh_packet_send
 #define packet_send_debug			ssh_packet_send_debug
 #define packet_send_ignore			ssh_packet_send_ignore
+#define packet_set_alive_timeouts		ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts
 #define packet_set_authenticated		ssh_packet_set_authenticated
 #define packet_set_connection			ssh_packet_set_connection
 #define packet_set_encryption_key		ssh_packet_set_encryption_key
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index cc21471..19009cd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.212 2008/10/14 18:11:33 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.214 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "dns.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
 #include "version.h"
 
 char *client_version_string = NULL;
@@ -414,7 +415,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
  * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
  * identification string.
  */
-static void
+void
 ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
 {
 	char buf[256], remote_version[256];	/* must be same size! */
@@ -453,7 +454,7 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
 				}
 			}
 
-			len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+			len = roaming_atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
 
 			if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
 				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
@@ -538,7 +539,8 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
 	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
 	    compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
 	    SSH_VERSION, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n");
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
+	if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf))
+	    != strlen(buf))
 		fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 	client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
 	chop(client_version_string);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
index 75bde1a..c59a097 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.24 2007/09/04 11:15:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.25 2009/05/27 06:38:16 andreas Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ ssh_connect(const char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int,
 void
 ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct passwd *, int);
 
+void	 ssh_exchange_identification(int);
+
 int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
 
 void	 ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index a762eec..260c630 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.170 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.171 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
 #include "jpake.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
index f74decf..2e3c0a5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.247 2008/10/03 13:08:12 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.248 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd October 3 2008
+.Dd March 26 2009
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ for more information on patterns.
 In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
 addresses, a
 .Cm from
-stanza may match IP addressess using CIDR address/masklen notation.
+stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
 .Pp
 The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
 authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
index 75ab86c..249e20f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.366 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.367 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
 #include "version.h"
 
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
@@ -430,7 +431,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
 
 	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
+	if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
 	    strlen(server_version_string))
 	    != strlen(server_version_string)) {
 		logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
@@ -440,7 +441,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	/* Read other sides version identification. */
 	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
-		if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
+		if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
 			logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
 			    get_remote_ipaddr());
 			cleanup_exit(255);
@@ -588,7 +589,7 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
 static void
 privsep_preauth_child(void)
 {
- 	u_int32_t rnd[256];
+	u_int32_t rnd[256];
 	gid_t gidset[1];
 
 	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
index c2c0884..78e51ab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and
 # FreeBSD has a few additional options.
 
-#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20090522
+#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20091001
 
 #Port 22
 #Protocol 2
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
index 6779f0a..84b0ae8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.102 2009/02/22 23:59:25 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.106 2009/04/21 15:13:17 stevesk Exp $
 .\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd February 22 2009
+.Dd April 21 2009
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -177,9 +177,9 @@ then no banner is displayed.
 This option is only available for protocol version 2.
 By default, no banner is displayed.
 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed.
-See also
-.Cm UsePAM .
+Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+PAM or though authentication styles supported in
+.Xr login.conf 5 )
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm ChrootDirectory
@@ -188,6 +188,9 @@ Specifies a path to
 to after authentication.
 This path, and all its components, must be root-owned directories that are
 not writable by any other user or group.
+After the chroot,
+.Xr sshd 8
+changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
 .Pp
 The path may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once
 the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
 The
 .Cm ChrootDirectory
 must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
-users' session.
+user's session.
 For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
 .Xr sh 1 ,
 and basic
@@ -215,8 +218,11 @@ devices.
 For file transfer sessions using
 .Dq sftp ,
 no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
-in-process sftp server is used (see
-.Cm Subsystem
+in-process sftp server is used,
+though sessions which use logging do require
+.Pa /dev/log
+inside the chroot directory (see
+.Xr sftp-server 8
 for details).
 .Pp
 The default is not to
@@ -949,7 +955,7 @@ The default is
 Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
 OS- or site-specific modifications.
 The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20090522 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20091001 .
 .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
 Specifies the first display number available for
 .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
index cc35d60..33bd652 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
@@ -86,13 +86,20 @@ get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
 static void
 store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
 {
+#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
 	char *time_string, hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = "", buf[512];
 	time_t last_login_time;
 
-#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
 	if (!options.print_lastlog)
 		return;
 
+# ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+	time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid);
+	if (time_string != NULL) {
+		buffer_append(&loginmsg, time_string, strlen(time_string));
+		xfree(time_string);
+	}
+# else
 	last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname,
 	    sizeof(hostname));
 
@@ -107,6 +114,7 @@ store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
 			    time_string, hostname);
 		buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
 	}
+# endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */
 #endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
index a139495..b9e57e9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.24 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.25 2009/03/05 11:30:50 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "uuencode.h"
 
+/*
+ * Encode binary 'src' of length 'srclength', writing base64-encoded text
+ * to 'target' of size 'targsize'. Will always nul-terminate 'target'.
+ * Returns the number of bytes stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc.
+ * 'targsize' too small).
+ */
 int
 uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength,
     char *target, size_t targsize)
@@ -40,6 +46,11 @@ uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength,
 	return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Decode base64-encoded 'src' into buffer 'target' of 'targsize' bytes.
+ * Will skip leading and trailing whitespace. Returns the number of bytes
+ * stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. targsize too small).
+ */
 int
 uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
index ff87b92..581decf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.55 2009/02/23 00:06:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.56 2009/06/30 14:54:40 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 #ifndef SSH_VERSION
 
 #define SSH_VERSION             (ssh_version_get())
 #define SSH_RELEASE             (ssh_version_get())
-#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_5.2p1"
-#define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20090522"
+#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_5.3p1"
+#define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20091001"
 
 const char *ssh_version_get(void);
 void ssh_version_set_addendum(const char *);