diff options
| author | des <des@FreeBSD.org> | 2016-01-19 18:55:44 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | des <des@FreeBSD.org> | 2016-01-19 18:55:44 +0000 |
| commit | b856a4573162fbc9ddf1c38fd82b6c728c310d1b (patch) | |
| tree | b2a4ad7a06e845ba72a87d2beedfbbcbb7aeb5bb /crypto | |
| parent | 76107b08804f309434efce7480edc2bbd15e1bf7 (diff) | |
| parent | f8195792ec11c7b20879183ea72e1495f0870617 (diff) | |
| download | FreeBSD-src-b856a4573162fbc9ddf1c38fd82b6c728c310d1b.zip FreeBSD-src-b856a4573162fbc9ddf1c38fd82b6c728c310d1b.tar.gz | |
Upgrade to OpenSSH 6.9p1.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
115 files changed, 3871 insertions, 2304 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog index 092cc48..c63681f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog +++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,1535 @@ +commit 7de4b03a6e4071d454b72927ffaf52949fa34545 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jul 1 02:32:17 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + twiddle; (this commit marks the openssh-6.9 release) + + Upstream-ID: 78500582819f61dd8adee36ec5cc9b9ac9351234 + +commit 1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jul 1 02:26:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + better refuse ForwardX11Trusted=no connections attempted + after ForwardX11Timeout expires; reported by Jann Horn + + Upstream-ID: bf0fddadc1b46a0334e26c080038313b4b6dea21 + +commit 47aa7a0f8551b471fcae0447c1d78464f6dba869 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jul 1 01:56:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + put back default PermitRootLogin=no + + Upstream-ID: 7bdedd5cead99c57ed5571f3b6b7840922d5f728 + +commit 984b064fe2a23733733262f88d2e1b2a1a501662 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + openssh-6.9 + + Upstream-ID: 6cfe8e1904812531080e6ab6e752d7001b5b2d45 + +commit d921082ed670f516652eeba50705e1e9f6325346 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + reset default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' (momentarily, for + release) + + Upstream-ID: cad8513527066e65dd7a1c16363d6903e8cefa24 + +commit 66295e0e1ba860e527f191b6325d2d77dec4dbce +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Wed Jul 1 11:49:12 2015 +1000 + + crank version numbers for release + +commit 37035c07d4f26bb1fbe000d2acf78efdb008681d +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Wed Jul 1 10:49:37 2015 +1000 + + s/--with-ssh1/--without-ssh1/ + +commit 629df770dbadc2accfbe1c81b3f31f876d0acd84 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Jun 30 05:25:07 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fatal() when a remote window update causes the window + value to overflow. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: ead397a9aceb3bf74ebfa5fcaf259d72e569f351 + +commit f715afebe735d61df3fd30ad72d9ac1c8bd3b5f2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Jun 30 05:23:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix math error in remote window calculations that causes + eventual stalls for datagram channels. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok + markus@ + + Upstream-ID: be54059d11bf64e0d85061f7257f53067842e2ab + +commit 52fb6b9b034fcfd24bf88cc7be313e9c31de9889 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Tue Jun 30 16:05:40 2015 +1000 + + skip IPv6-related portions on hosts without IPv6 + + with Tim Rice + +commit 512caddf590857af6aa12218461b5c0441028cf5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Jun 29 22:35:12 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add getpid to sandbox, reachable by grace_alarm_handler + + reported by Jakub Jelen; bz#2419 + + Upstream-ID: d0da1117c16d4c223954995d35b0f47c8f684cd8 + +commit 78c2a4f883ea9aba866358e2acd9793a7f42ca93 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Jun 26 05:13:20 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix \-escaping bug that caused forward path parsing to skip + two characters and skip past the end of the string. + + Based on patch by Salvador Fandino; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 7b879dc446335677cbe4cb549495636a0535f3bd + +commit bc20205c91c9920361d12b15d253d4997dba494a +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Thu Jun 25 09:51:39 2015 +1000 + + add missing pselect6 + + patch from Jakub Jelen + +commit 9d27fb73b4a4e5e99cb880af790d5b1ce44f720a +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jun 24 23:47:23 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct test to sshkey_sign(); spotted by Albert S. + + Upstream-ID: 5f7347f40f0ca6abdaca2edb3bd62f4776518933 + +commit 7ed01a96a1911d8b4a9ef4f3d064e1923bfad7e3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups + in the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise + inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument + to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in + this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 + +commit 882f8bf94f79528caa65b0ba71c185d705bb7195 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups in + the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise + inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument + to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in + this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 + +commit 9488538a726951e82b3a4374f3c558d72c80a89b +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Jun 22 23:42:16 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't count successful partial authentication as failures + in monitor; this may have caused the monitor to refuse multiple + authentications that would otherwise have successfully completed; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: eb74b8e506714d0f649bd5c300f762a527af04a3 + +commit 63b78d003bd8ca111a736e6cea6333da50f5f09b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Jun 22 12:29:57 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't call setgroups if we have zero groups; there's no + guarantee that it won't try to deref the pointer. Based on a patch from mail + at quitesimple.org, ok djm deraadt + + Upstream-ID: 2fff85e11d7a9a387ef7fddf41fbfaf566708ab1 + +commit 5c15e22c691c79a47747bcf5490126656f97cecd +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Thu Jun 18 15:07:56 2015 +1000 + + fix syntax error + +commit 596dbca82f3f567fb3d2d69af4b4e1d3ba1e6403 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Jun 15 18:44:22 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified, however + AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is not (or is set to "none"), authentication will + potentially fail due to key_cert_check_authority() failing to locate a + principal that matches the username, even though an authorized principal has + already been matched in the output of the subprocess. Fix this by using the + same logic to determine if pw->pw_name should be passed, as is used to + determine if a authorized principal must be matched earlier on. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 43b42302ec846b0ea68aceb40677245391b9409d + +commit aff3e94c0d75d0d0fa84ea392b50ab04f8c57905 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Jun 15 18:42:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make the arguments to match_principals_command() similar + to match_principals_file(), by changing the last argument a struct + sshkey_cert * and dereferencing key->cert in the caller. + + No functional change. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 533f99b844b21b47342b32b62e198dfffcf8651c + +commit 97e2e1596c202a4693468378b16b2353fd2d6c5e +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Wed Jun 17 14:36:54 2015 +1000 + + trivial optimisation for seccomp-bpf + + When doing arg inspection and the syscall doesn't match, skip + past the instruction that reloads the syscall into the accumulator, + since the accumulator hasn't been modified at this point. + +commit 99f33d7304893bd9fa04d227cb6e870171cded19 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Wed Jun 17 10:50:51 2015 +1000 + + aarch64 support for seccomp-bpf sandbox + + Also resort and tidy syscall list. Based on patches by Jakub Jelen + bz#2361; ok dtucker@ + +commit 4ef702e1244633c1025ec7cfe044b9ab267097bf +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Jun 15 01:32:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + return failure on RSA signature error; reported by Albert S + + Upstream-ID: e61bb93dbe0349625807b0810bc213a6822121fa + +commit a170f22baf18af0b1acf2788b8b715605f41a1f9 +Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> +Date: Tue Jun 9 22:41:13 2015 -0700 + + Fix t12 rules for out of tree builds. + +commit ec04dc4a5515c913121bc04ed261857e68fa5c18 +Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Jun 5 15:13:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + For "ssh -L 12345:/tmp/sock" don't fail with "No forward host + name." (we have a path, not a host name). Based on a diff from Jared + Yanovich. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 2846b0a8c7de037e33657f95afbd282837fc213f + +commit 732d61f417a6aea0aa5308b59cb0f563bcd6edd6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Jun 5 03:44:14 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + typo: accidental repetition; bz#2386 + + Upstream-ID: 45e620d99f6bc301e5949d34a54027374991c88b + +commit adfb24c69d1b6f5e758db200866c711e25a2ba73 +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Fri Jun 5 14:51:40 2015 +1000 + + Add Linux powerpc64le and powerpcle entries. + + Stopgap to resolve bz#2409 because we are so close to release and will + update config.guess and friends shortly after the release. ok djm@ + +commit a1195a0fdc9eddddb04d3e9e44c4775431cb77da +Merge: 6397eed d2480bc +Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> +Date: Wed Jun 3 21:43:13 2015 -0700 + + Merge branch 'master' of git.mindrot.org:/var/git/openssh + +commit 6397eedf953b2b973d2d7cbb504ab501a07f8ddc +Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> +Date: Wed Jun 3 21:41:11 2015 -0700 + + Remove unneeded backslashes. Patch from Ángel González + +commit d2480bcac1caf31b03068de877a47d6e1027bf6d +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Thu Jun 4 14:10:55 2015 +1000 + + Remove redundant include of stdarg.h. bz#2410 + +commit 5e67859a623826ccdf2df284cbb37e2d8e2787eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Jun 2 09:10:40 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention CheckHostIP adding addresses to known_hosts; + bz#1993; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: fd44b68440fd0dc29abf9f2d3f703d74a2396cb7 + +commit d7a58bbac6583e33fd5eca8e2c2cc70c57617818 +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Tue Jun 2 20:15:26 2015 +1000 + + Replace strcpy with strlcpy. + + ok djm, sanity check by Corinna Vinschen. + +commit 51a1c2115265c6e80ede8a5c9dccada9aeed7143 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Fri May 29 18:27:21 2015 +1000 + + skip, rather than fatal when run without SUDO set + +commit 599f01142a376645b15cbc9349d7e8975e1cf245 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Fri May 29 18:03:15 2015 +1000 + + fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs + +commit 0c2a81dfc21822f2423edd30751e5ec53467b347 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Fri May 29 17:08:28 2015 +1000 + + re-enable SSH protocol 1 at compile time + +commit db438f9285d64282d3ac9e8c0944f59f037c0151 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 29 03:05:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make this work without SUDO set; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-Regress-ID: bca88217b70bce2fe52b23b8e06bdeb82d98c715 + +commit 1d9a2e2849c9864fe75daabf433436341c968e14 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 28 07:37:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + wrap all moduli-related code in #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. + based on patch from Reuben Hawkins; bz#2388 feedback and ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: d80cfc8be3e6ec65b3fac9e87c4466533b31b7cf + +commit 496aeb25bc2d6c434171292e4714771b594bd00e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 28 05:41:29 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Increase the allowed length of the known host file name + in the log message to be consistent with other cases. Part of bz#1993, ok + deraadt. + + Upstream-ID: a9e97567be49f25daf286721450968251ff78397 + +commit dd2cfeb586c646ff8d70eb93567b2e559ace5b14 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 28 05:09:45 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix typo (keywork->keyword) + + Upstream-ID: 8aacd0f4089c0a244cf43417f4f9045dfaeab534 + +commit 9cc6842493fbf23025ccc1edab064869640d3bec +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 28 04:50:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add error message on ftruncate failure; bz#2176 + + Upstream-ID: cbcc606e0b748520c74a210d8f3cc9718d3148cf + +commit d1958793a0072c22be26d136dbda5ae263e717a0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 28 04:40:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make ssh-keygen default to ed25519 keys when compiled + without OpenSSL; bz#2388, ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 85a471fa6d3fa57a7b8e882d22cfbfc1d84cdc71 + +commit 3ecde664c9fc5fb3667aedf9e6671462600f6496 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed May 27 23:51:10 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Reorder client proposal to prefer + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058 + +commit 40f64292b907afd0a674fdbf3e4c2356d17a7d68 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed May 27 23:39:18 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a stronger (4k bit) fallback group that sshd can use + when the moduli file is missing or broken, sourced from RFC3526. bz#2302, ok + markus@ (earlier version), djm@ + + Upstream-ID: b635215746a25a829d117673d5e5a76d4baee7f4 + +commit 5ab7d5fa03ad55bc438fab45dfb3aeb30a3c237a +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Thu May 28 10:03:40 2015 +1000 + + New moduli file from OpenBSD, removing 1k groups. + + Remove 1k bit groups. ok deraadt@, markus@ + +commit a71ba58adf34e599f30cdda6e9b93ae6e3937eea +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed May 27 05:15:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN entry devices + bz#2240, based on patch from Dirk-Willem van Gulik; feedback and ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 504568992b55a8fc984375242b1bd505ced61b0d + +commit b282fec1aa05246ed3482270eb70fc3ec5f39a00 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue May 26 23:23:40 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Cap DH-GEX group size at 4kbits for Cisco implementations. + Some of them will choke when asked for preferred sizes >4k instead of + returning the 4k group that they do have. bz#2209, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 54b863a19713446b7431f9d06ad0532b4fcfef8d + +commit 3e91b4e8b0dc2b4b7e7d42cf6e8994a32e4cb55e +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Sun May 24 23:39:16 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add missing 'c' option to getopt(), case statement was + already there; from Felix Bolte + + Upstream-ID: 9b19b4e2e0b54d6fefa0dfac707c51cf4bae3081 + +commit 64a89ec07660abba4d0da7c0095b7371c98bab62 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org> +Date: Sat May 23 14:28:37 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix a memory leak in an error path ok markus@ dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: bc1da0f205494944918533d8780fde65dff6c598 + +commit f948737449257d2cb83ffcfe7275eb79b677fd4a +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 22 05:28:45 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention ssh-keygen -E for comparing legacy MD5 + fingerprints; bz#2332 + + Upstream-ID: 079a3669549041dbf10dbc072d9563f0dc3b2859 + +commit 0882332616e4f0272c31cc47bf2018f9cb258a4e +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 22 04:45:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Reorder EscapeChar option parsing to avoid a single-byte + out- of-bounds read. bz#2396 from Jaak Ristioja; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 1dc6b5b63d1c8d9a88619da0b27ade461d79b060 + +commit d7c31da4d42c115843edee2074d7d501f8804420 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 22 03:50:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add knob to relax GSSAPI host credential check for + multihomed hosts bz#928, patch by Simon Wilkinson; ok dtucker + (kerberos/GSSAPI is not compiled by default on OpenBSD) + + Upstream-ID: 15ddf1c6f7fd9d98eea9962f480079ae3637285d + +commit aa72196a00be6e0b666215edcffbc10af234cb0e +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Fri May 22 17:49:46 2015 +1000 + + Include signal.h for sig_atomic_t, used by kex.h. + + bz#2402, from tomas.kuthan at oracle com. + +commit 8b02481143d75e91c49d1bfae0876ac1fbf9511a +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Fri May 22 12:47:24 2015 +1000 + + Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. + +commit 4739e8d5e1c0be49624082bd9f6b077e9e758db9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 21 12:01:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to find search known_hosts + and print key hashes. Already advertised by ssh-keygen(1), but not delivered + by code; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 459e0e2bf39825e41b0811c336db2d56a1c23387 + +commit e97201feca10b5196da35819ae516d0b87cf3a50 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Thu May 21 17:55:15 2015 +1000 + + conditionalise util.h inclusion + +commit 13640798c7dd011ece0a7d02841fe48e94cfa0e0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 21 06:44:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress test for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + + Upstream-Regress-ID: c658fbf1ab6b6011dc83b73402322e396f1e1219 + +commit 84452c5d03c21f9bfb28c234e0dc1dc67dd817b1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 21 06:40:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress test for AuthorizedKeysCommand arguments + + Upstream-Regress-ID: bbd65c13c6b3be9a442ec115800bff9625898f12 + +commit bcc50d816187fa9a03907ac1f3a52f04a52e10d1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 21 06:43:30 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting + authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite + useful in deployments with large userbases + + feedback and ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6 + +commit 24232a3e5ab467678a86aa67968bbb915caffed4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 21 06:38:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand + + bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen + feedback and ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7 + +commit d80fbe41a57c72420c87a628444da16d09d66ca7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu May 21 04:55:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refactor: split base64 encoding of pubkey into its own + sshkey_to_base64() function and out of sshkey_write(); ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 54fc38f5832e9b91028900819bda46c3959a0c1a + +commit 7cc44ef74133a473734bbcbd3484f24d6a7328c5 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon May 18 15:06:05 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + getentropy() and sendsyslog() have been around long + enough. openssh-portable may want the #ifdef's but not base. discussed with + djm few weeks back + + Upstream-ID: 0506a4334de108e3fb6c66f8d6e0f9c112866926 + +commit 9173d0fbe44de7ebcad8a15618e13a8b8d78902e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 15 05:44:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use a salted hash of the lock passphrase instead of plain + text and do constant-time comparisons of it. Should prevent leaking any + information about it via timing, pointed out by Ryan Castellucci. Add a 0.1s + incrementing delay for each failed unlock attempt up to 10s. ok markus@ + (earlier version), djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c599fcc325aa1cc65496b25220b622d22208c85f + +commit d028d5d3a697c71b21e4066d8672cacab3caa0a8 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Tue May 5 19:10:58 2015 +1000 + + upstream commit + + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/12 03:20:04 + [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] + rename blocks to words. bcrypt "blocks" are unrelated to blowfish blocks, + nor are they the same size. + +commit f6391d4e59b058984163ab28f4e317e7a72478f1 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Tue May 5 19:10:23 2015 +1000 + + upstream commit + + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/08 00:30:07 + [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] + declare a local version of MIN(), call it MINIMUM() + +commit 8ac6b13cc9113eb47cd9e86c97d7b26b4b71b77f +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Tue May 5 19:09:46 2015 +1000 + + upstream commit + + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/12/30 01:41:43 + [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] + typo in comment: ouput => output + +commit 1f792489d5cf86a4f4e3003e6e9177654033f0f2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we + only ever use it for strlen(pattern). + + Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read + error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL + and his own tools. + + ok markus@ + +commit 639d6bc57b1942393ed12fb48f00bc05d4e093e4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 07:10:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refactor ssh_dispatch_run_fatal() to use sshpkt_fatal() + to better report error conditions. Teach sshpkt_fatal() about ECONNRESET. + + Improves error messages on TCP connection resets. bz#2257 + + ok dtucker@ + +commit 9559d7de34c572d4d3fd990ca211f8ec99f62c4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 07:08:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + a couple of parse targets were missing activep checks, + causing them to be misapplied in match context; bz#2272 diagnosis and + original patch from Sami Hartikainen ok dtucker@ + +commit 7e8528cad04b2775c3b7db08abf8fb42e47e6b2a +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 04:17:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make handling of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none more + consistent with other =none options; bz#2288 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@ + +commit ca430d4d9cc0f62eca3b1fb1e2928395b7ce80f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 04:03:20 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove failed remote forwards established by muliplexing + from the list of active forwards; bz#2363, patch mostly by Yoann Ricordel; ok + dtucker@ + +commit 8312cfb8ad88657517b3e23ac8c56c8e38eb9792 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 04:01:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + reduce stderr spam when using ssh -S /path/mux -O forward + -R 0:... ok dtucker@ + +commit 179be0f5e62f1f492462571944e45a3da660d82b +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 03:23:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key + tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to + other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@ + +commit a42d67be65b719a430b7fcaba2a4e4118382723a +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 03:20:54 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't make parsing of authorized_keys' environment= + option conditional on PermitUserEnv - always parse it, but only use the + result if the option is enabled. This prevents the syntax of authorized_keys + changing depending on which sshd_config options were enabled. + + bz#2329; based on patch from coladict AT gmail.com, ok dtucker@ + +commit e661a86353e11592c7ed6a847e19a83609f49e77 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we + only ever use it for strlen(pattern). + + Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read + error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL + and his own tools. + + ok markus@ + +commit 0ef1de742be2ee4b10381193fe90730925b7f027 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Apr 23 05:01:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a simple regression test for sshd's configuration + parser. Right now, all it does is run the output of sshd -T back through + itself and ensure the output is valid and invariant. + +commit 368f83c793275faa2c52f60eaa9bdac155c4254b +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Apr 22 01:38:36 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use correct key for nested certificate test + +commit 8d4d1bfddbbd7d21f545dc6997081d1ea1fbc99a +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 1 07:11:47 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention that the user's shell from /etc/passwd is used + for commands too; bz#1459 ok dtucker@ + +commit 5ab283d0016bbc9d4d71e8e5284d011bc5a930cf +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 8 07:29:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b708a3e709d5b7fd37890f874bafdff1f597519 + +commit 8377d5008ad260048192e1e56ad7d15a56d103dd +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 8 07:26:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 9c48911643d5b05173b36a012041bed4080b8554 + +commit c28a3436fa8737709ea88e4437f8f23a6ab50359 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 8 06:45:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + moar whitespace at eol + + Upstream-ID: 64eaf872a3ba52ed41e494287e80d40aaba4b515 + +commit 2b64c490468fd4ca35ac8d5cc31c0520dc1508bb +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 8 06:41:56 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + Upstream-ID: 57bcf67d666c6fc1ad798aee448fdc3f70f7ec2c + +commit 4e636cf201ce6e7e3b9088568218f9d4e2c51712 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 8 03:56:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + +commit 38b8272f823dc1dd4e29dbcee83943ed48bb12fa +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon May 4 01:47:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use diff w/out -u for better portability + +commit 297060f42d5189a4065ea1b6f0afdf6371fb0507 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 8 03:25:07 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use xcalloc for permitted_adm_opens instead of xmalloc to + ensure it's zeroed. Fixes post-auth crash with permitopen=none. bz#2355, ok + djm@ + +commit 63ebf019be863b2d90492a85e248cf55a6e87403 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri May 8 03:17:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't choke on new-format private keys encrypted with an + AEAD cipher; bz#2366, patch from Ron Frederick; ok markus@ + +commit f8484dac678ab3098ae522a5f03bb2530f822987 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed May 6 05:45:17 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and use + "pseudo-terminal" consistently. bz#1716, ok jmc@ "I like it" deraadt@. + +commit ea139507bef8bad26e86ed99a42c7233ad115c38 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed May 6 04:07:18 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Blacklist DH-GEX for specific PuTTY versions known to + send non-RFC4419 DH-GEX messages rather than all versions of PuTTY. + According to Simon Tatham, 0.65 and newer versions will send RFC4419 DH-GEX + messages. ok djm@ + +commit b58234f00ee3872eb84f6e9e572a9a34e902e36e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue May 5 10:17:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + WinSCP doesn't implement RFC4419 DH-GEX so flag it so we + don't offer that KEX method. ok markus@ + +commit d5b1507a207253b39e810e91e68f9598691b7a29 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue May 5 02:48:17 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use the sizeof the struct not the sizeof a pointer to the + struct in ssh_digest_start() + + This file is only used if ssh is built with OPENSSL=no + + ok markus@ + +commit a647b9b8e616c231594b2710c925d31b1b8afea3 +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Fri May 8 11:07:27 2015 +1000 + + Put brackets around mblen() compat constant. + + This might help with the reported problem cross compiling for Android + ("error: expected identifier or '(' before numeric constant") but + shouldn't hurt in any case. + +commit d1680d36e17244d9af3843aeb5025cb8e40d6c07 +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Thu Apr 30 09:18:11 2015 +1000 + + xrealloc -> xreallocarray in portable code too. + +commit 531a57a3893f9fcd4aaaba8c312b612bbbcc021e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Apr 29 03:48:56 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily in any + order. bz#68, ok djm@, jmc@ (for the man page bit). + +commit c1d5bcf1aaf1209af02f79e48ba1cbc76a87b56f +Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Apr 28 13:47:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + enviroment -> environment: apologies to darren for not + spotting that first time round... + +commit 43beea053db191cac47c2cd8d3dc1930158aff1a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Apr 28 10:25:15 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix typo in previous + +commit 85b96ef41374f3ddc9139581f87da09b2cd9199e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Apr 28 10:17:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Document that the TERM environment variable is not + subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv. bz#2386, based loosely on a patch from + jjelen at redhat, help and ok jmc@ + +commit 88a7c598a94ff53f76df228eeaae238d2d467565 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Apr 27 21:42:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make sshd default to PermitRootLogin=no; ok deraadt@ + rpe@ + +commit 734226b4480a6c736096c729fcf6f391400599c7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Apr 27 01:52:30 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix compilation with OPENSSL=no; ok dtucker@ + +commit a4b9d2ce1eb7703eaf0809b0c8a82ded8aa4f1c6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Apr 27 00:37:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Include stdio.h for FILE (used in sshkey.h) so it + compiles with OPENSSL=no. + +commit dbcc652f4ca11fe04e5930c7ef18a219318c6cda +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Apr 27 00:21:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow "sshd -f none" to skip reading the config file, + much like "ssh -F none" does. ok dtucker + +commit b7ca276fca316c952f0b90f5adb1448c8481eedc +Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 24 06:26:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + combine -Dd onto one line and update usage(); + +commit 2ea974630d7017e4c7666d14d9dc939707613e96 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 24 05:26:44 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add ssh-agent -D to leave ssh-agent in foreground + without enabling debug mode; bz#2381 ok dtucker@ + +commit 8ac2ffd7aa06042f6b924c87139f2fea5c5682f7 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:24 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + 2*len -> use xreallocarray() ok djm + +commit 657a5fbc0d0aff309079ff8fb386f17e964963c2 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + rename xrealloc() to xreallocarray() since it follows + that form. ok djm + +commit 1108ae242fdd2c304307b68ddf46aebe43ebffaa +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Apr 23 04:59:10 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Two small fixes for sshd -T: ListenAddress'es are added + to a list head so reverse the order when printing them to ensure the + behaviour remains the same, and print StreamLocalBindMask as octal with + leading zero. ok deraadt@ + +commit bd902b8473e1168f19378d5d0ae68d0c203525df +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Apr 23 04:53:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Check for and reject missing arguments for + VersionAddendum and ForceCommand. bz#2281, patch from plautrba at redhat com, + ok djm@ + +commit ca42c1758575e592239de1d5755140e054b91a0d +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Apr 22 01:24:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unknown certificate extensions are non-fatal, so don't + fatal when they are encountered; bz#2387 reported by Bob Van Zant; ok + dtucker@ + +commit 39bfbf7caad231cc4bda6909fb1af0705bca04d8 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Apr 21 07:01:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so + KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again. + + ok deraadt@ + +commit 6b0d576bb87eca3efd2b309fcfe4edfefc289f9c +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:32:09 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + s/recommended/required/ that private keys be og-r this + wording change was made a while ago but got accidentally reverted + +commit 44a8e7ce6f3ab4c2eb1ae49115c210b98e53c4df +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:25:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't try to cleanup NULL KEX proposals in + kex_prop_free(); found by Jukka Taimisto and Markus Hietava + +commit 3038a191872d2882052306098c1810d14835e704 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:19:22 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use error/logit/fatal instead of fprintf(stderr, ...) + and exit(0), fix a few errors that were being printed to stdout instead of + stderr and a few non-errors that were going to stderr instead of stdout + bz#2325; ok dtucker + +commit a58be33cb6cd24441fa7e634db0e5babdd56f07f +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:16:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + debug log missing DISPLAY environment when X11 + forwarding requested; bz#1682 ok dtucker@ + +commit 17d4d9d9fbc8fb80e322f94d95eecc604588a474 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 17 04:32:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't call record_login() in monitor when UseLogin is + enabled; bz#278 reported by drk AT sgi.com; ok dtucker + +commit 40132ff87b6cbc3dc05fb5df2e9d8e3afa06aafd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 17 04:12:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add some missing options to sshd -T and fix the output + of VersionAddendum HostCertificate. bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat + com, ok djm. + +commit 6cc7cfa936afde2d829e56ee6528c7ea47a42441 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Apr 16 23:25:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Document "none" for PidFile XAuthLocation + TrustedUserCAKeys and RevokedKeys. bz#2382, feedback from jmc@, ok djm@ + +commit 15fdfc9b1c6808b26bc54d4d61a38b54541763ed +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Apr 15 23:23:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Plug leak of address passed to logging. bz#2373, patch + from jjelen at redhat, ok markus@ + +commit bb2289e2a47d465eaaaeff3dee2a6b7777b4c291 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Apr 14 04:17:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Output remote username in debug output since with Host + and Match it's not always obvious what it will be. bz#2368, ok djm@ + +commit 70860b6d07461906730632f9758ff1b7c98c695a +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Fri Apr 17 10:56:13 2015 +1000 + + Format UsePAM setting when using sshd -T. + + Part of bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat com. + +commit ee15d9c9f0720f5a8b0b34e4b10ecf21f9824814 +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Fri Apr 17 10:40:23 2015 +1000 + + Wrap endian.h include inside ifdef (bz#2370). + +commit 408f4c2ad4a4c41baa7b9b2b7423d875abbfa70b +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Fri Apr 17 09:39:58 2015 +1000 + + Look for '${host}-ar' before 'ar'. + + This changes configure.ac to look for '${host}-ar' as set by + AC_CANONICAL_HOST before looking for the unprefixed 'ar'. + Useful when cross-compiling when all your binutils are prefixed. + + Patch from moben at exherbo org via astrand at lysator liu se and + bz#2352. + +commit 673a1c16ad078d41558247ce739fe812c960acc8 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com> +Date: Thu Apr 16 11:40:20 2015 +1000 + + remove dependency on arpa/telnet.h + +commit 202d443eeda1829d336595a3cfc07827e49f45ed +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Wed Apr 15 15:59:49 2015 +1000 + + Remove duplicate include of pwd.h. bz#2337, patch from Mordy Ovits. + +commit 597986493412c499f2bc2209420cb195f97b3668 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@google.com> +Date: Thu Apr 9 10:14:48 2015 +1000 + + platform's with openpty don't need pty_release + +commit 318be28cda1fd9108f2e6f2f86b0b7589ba2aed0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Apr 13 02:04:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + deprecate ancient, pre-RFC4419 and undocumented + SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD message; ok markus@ deraadt@ "seems + reasonable" dtucker@ + +commit d8f391caef62378463a0e6b36f940170dadfe605 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 10 05:16:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't send hostkey advertisments + (hostkeys-00@openssh.com) to current versions of Tera Term as they can't + handle them. Newer versions should be OK. Patch from Bryan Drewery and + IWAMOTO Kouichi, ok djm@ + +commit 2c2cfe1a1c97eb9a08cc9817fd0678209680c636 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 10 00:08:55 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include port number if a non-default one has been + specified; based on patch from Michael Handler + +commit 4492a4f222da4cf1e8eab12689196322e27b08c4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Apr 7 23:00:42 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + treat Protocol=1,2|2,1 as Protocol=2 when compiled + without SSH1 support; ok dtucker@ millert@ + +commit c265e2e6e932efc6d86f6cc885dea33637a67564 +Author: miod@openbsd.org <miod@openbsd.org> +Date: Sun Apr 5 15:43:43 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Do not use int for sig_atomic_t; spotted by + christos@netbsd; ok markus@ + +commit e7bf3a5eda6a1b02bef6096fed78527ee11e54cc +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Tue Apr 7 10:48:04 2015 +1000 + + Use do{}while(0) for no-op functions. + + From FreeBSD. + +commit bb99844abae2b6447272f79e7fa84134802eb4df +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Tue Apr 7 10:47:15 2015 +1000 + + Wrap blf.h include in ifdef. From FreeBSD. + +commit d9b9b43656091cf0ad55c122f08fadb07dad0abd +Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> +Date: Tue Apr 7 09:10:00 2015 +1000 + + Fix misspellings of regress CONFOPTS env variables. + + Patch from Bryan Drewery. + +commit 3f4ea3c9ab1d32d43c9222c4351f58ca11144156 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri Apr 3 22:17:27 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct return value in pubkey parsing, spotted by Ben Hawkes + ok markus@ + +commit 7da2be0cb9601ed25460c83aa4d44052b967ba0f +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:59:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + adapt to recent hostfile.c change: when parsing + known_hosts without fully parsing the keys therein, hostkeys_foreach() will + now correctly identify KEY_RSA1 keys; ok markus@ miod@ + +commit 9e1777a0d1c706714b055811c12ab8cc21033e4a +Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:19:15 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use ${SSH} for -Q instead of installed ssh + +commit ce1b358ea414a2cc88e4430cd5a2ea7fecd9de57 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Mar 16 22:46:14 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make CLEANFILES clean up more of the tests' droppings + +commit 398f9ef192d820b67beba01ec234d66faca65775 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:57:06 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + downgrade error() for known_hosts parse errors to debug() + to quiet warnings from ssh1 keys present when compiled !ssh1. + + also identify ssh1 keys when scanning, even when compiled !ssh1 + + ok markus@ miod@ + +commit 9a47ab80030a31f2d122b8fd95bd48c408b9fcd9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fd leak for !ssh1 case; found by unittests; ok markus@ + +commit c9a0805a6280681901c270755a7cd630d7c5280e +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:24 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't fatal when a !ssh1 sshd is reexeced from a w/ssh1 + listener; reported by miod@; ok miod@ markus@ + +commit 704d8c88988cae38fb755a6243b119731d223222 +Author: tobias@openbsd.org <tobias@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 31 11:06:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys. If a user + tried to add one and entered his passphrase, explicitly clear it before exit. + This is done in all other error paths, too. + + ok djm + +commit 78de1673c05ea2c33e0d4a4b64ecb5186b6ea2e9 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Mar 30 18:28:37 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ssh-askpass(1) is the default, overridden by SSH_ASKPASS; + diff originally from jiri b; + +commit 26e0bcf766fadb4a44fb6199386fb1dcab65ad00 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Mar 30 00:00:29 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix uninitialised memory read when parsing a config file + consisting of a single nul byte. Found by hanno AT hboeck.de using AFL; ok + dtucker + +commit fecede00a76fbb33a349f5121c0b2f9fbc04a777 +Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Mar 26 19:32:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sigp and lenp are not optional in ssh_agent_sign(); ok + djm@ + +commit 1b0ef3813244c78669e6d4d54c624f600945327d +Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Mar 26 12:32:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't try to load .ssh/identity by default if SSH1 is + disabled; ok markus@ + +commit f9b78852379b74a2d14e6fc94fe52af30b7e9c31 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Mar 26 07:00:04 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ban all-zero curve25519 keys as recommended by latest + CFRG curves draft; ok markus + +commit b8afbe2c1aaf573565e4da775261dfafc8b1ba9c +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Thu Mar 26 06:59:28 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + relax bits needed check to allow + diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange to complete for chacha20-poly1305 was + selected as symmetric cipher; ok markus + +commit 47842f71e31da130555353c1d57a1e5a8937f1c0 +Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Mar 25 19:29:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ignore v1 errors on ssh-add -D; only try v2 keys on + -l/-L (unless WITH_SSH1) ok djm@ + +commit 5f57e77f91bf2230c09eca96eb5ecec39e5f2da6 +Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Mar 25 19:21:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak ssh_agent_sign (lenp vs *lenp) + +commit 4daeb67181054f2a377677fac919ee8f9ed3490e +Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:10:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't leak 'setp' on error; noted by Nicholas Lemonias; + ok djm@ + +commit 7d4f96f9de2a18af0d9fa75ea89a4990de0344f5 +Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:09:11 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + consistent check for NULL as noted by Nicholas + Lemonias; ok djm@ + +commit df100be51354e447d9345cf1ec22e6013c0eed50 +Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:03:44 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct fmt-string for size_t as noted by Nicholas + Lemonias; ok djm@ + +commit a22b9ef21285e81775732436f7c84a27bd3f71e0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 24 09:17:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default + cipher; ok markus + +commit 2aa9da1a3b360cf7b13e96fe1521534b91501fb5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 24 01:29:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Compile-time disable SSH protocol 1. You can turn it + back on using the Makefile.inc knob if you need it to talk to ancient + devices. + +commit 53097b2022154edf96b4e8526af5666f979503f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue Mar 24 01:11:12 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix double-negative error message "ssh1 is not + unsupported" + +commit 5c27e3b6ec2db711dfcd40e6359c0bcdd0b62ea9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Mar 23 06:06:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + for ssh-keygen -A, don't try (and fail) to generate ssh + v.1 keys when compiled without SSH1 support RSA/DSA/ECDSA keys when compiled + without OpenSSL based on patch by Mike Frysinger; bz#2369 + +commit 725fd22a8c41db7de73a638539a5157b7e4424ae +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Mar 18 01:44:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + KRL support doesn't need OpenSSL anymore, remove #ifdefs + from around call + +commit b07011c18e0b2e172c5fd09d21fb159a0bf5fcc7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon Mar 16 11:09:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + #if 0 some more arrays used only for decrypting (we don't + use since we only need encrypt for AES-CTR) + +commit 1cb3016635898d287e9d58b50c430995652d5358 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed Mar 11 00:48:39 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add back the changes from rev 1.206, djm reverted this by + mistake in rev 1.207 + +commit 4d24b3b6a4a6383e05e7da26d183b79fa8663697 +Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> +Date: Fri Mar 20 09:11:59 2015 +1100 + + remove error() accidentally inserted for debugging + + pointed out by Christian Hesse + commit 9f82e5a9042f2d872e98f48a876fcab3e25dd9bb Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> Date: Mon Mar 16 22:49:20 2015 -0700 @@ -7401,1184 +8933,3 @@ Date: Tue Jul 2 20:06:46 2013 +1000 the Cygwin README file (which hasn't been updated for ages), drop unsupported OSes from the ssh-host-config help text, and drop an unneeded option from ssh-user-config. Patch from vinschen at redhat com. - -commit b8ae92d08b91beaef34232c6ef34b9941473fdd6 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Tue Jun 11 12:10:02 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent - and add some comments so it's clear what goes where. - -commit 97b62f41adcb0dcbeff142d0540793a7ea17c910 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Tue Jun 11 11:47:24 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have - the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd. - -commit 6d8bd57448b45b42809da32857d7804444349ee7 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Tue Jun 11 11:26:10 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac fixalgorithms] Remove unsupported - algorithms (Ciphers, MACs and HostKeyAlgorithms) from man pages. - -commit 36187093ea0b2d2240c043417b8949611687e105 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Mon Jun 10 13:07:11 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/07 15:37:52 - [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] - Add an "ABANDONED" channel state and use for mux sessions that are - disconnected via the ~. escape sequence. Channels in this state will - be able to close if the server responds, but do not count as active channels. - This means that if you ~. all of the mux clients when using ControlPersist - on a broken network, the backgrounded mux master will exit when the - Control Persist time expires rather than hanging around indefinitely. - bz#1917, also reported and tested by tedu@. ok djm@ markus@. - -commit ae133d4b31af05bb232d797419f498f3ae7e9f2d -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:30:20 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac sftp.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Cater for - platforms that don't have multibyte character support (specifically, - mblen). - -commit 408eaf3ab716096f8faf30f091bd54a2c7a17a09 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:22:46 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 22:00:28 - [readconf.c] - plug another memleak. bz#1967, from Zhenbo Xu, detected by Melton, ok djm - -commit e52a260f16888ca75390f97de4606943e61785e8 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:22:05 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 12:52:38 - [sshconnect2.c] - Fix memory leaks found by Zhenbo Xu and the Melton tool. bz#1967, ok djm - -commit 0cca17fa1819d3a0ba06a6db41ab3eaa8d769587 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:21:14 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:27:50 - [sshd.c] - When running sshd -D, close stderr unless we have explicitly requesting - logging to stderr. From james.hunt at ubuntu.com via bz#1976, djm's patch - so, err, ok dtucker. - -commit 746e9067bd9b3501876e1c86f38f3c510a12f895 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:20:13 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:07:29 - [mux.c] - fix leaks in mux error paths, from Zhenbo Xu, found by Melton. bz#1967, - ok djm - -commit ea64721275a81c4788af36294d94bf4f74012e06 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:19:09 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 20:42:36 - [sftp.c] - Make sftp's libedit interface marginally multibyte aware by building up - the quoted string by character instead of by byte. Prevents failures - when linked against a libedit built with wide character support (bz#1990). - "looks ok" djm - -commit 194454d7a8f8cb8ac55f2b9d0199ef9445788bee -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:16:04 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 19:12:23 - [scp.c] - use MAXPATHLEN for buffer size instead of fixed value. ok markus - -commit 4ac66af091cf6db5a42c18e43738ca9c41e338e5 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:12:37 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/03 00:03:18 - [mac.c] - force the MAC output to be 64-bit aligned so umac won't see unaligned - accesses on strict-alignment architectures. bz#2101, patch from - tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, ok djm@ - -commit ea8342c248ad6c0a4fe1a70de133f954973bd2b2 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:11:40 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 23:36:29 - [clientloop.h clientloop.c mux.c] - No need for the mux cleanup callback to be visible so restore it to static - and call it through the detach_user function pointer. ok djm@ - -commit 5d12b8f05d79ba89d0807910a664fa80f6f3bf8c -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:09:10 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 21:01:51 - [channels.h] - typo in comment - -commit dc62edbf121c41e8b5270904091039450206d98a -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 05:12:35 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] append $CFLAGS to compiler options when building - modpipe in case there's anything in there we need. - -commit 2a22873cd869679415104bc9f6bb154811ee604c -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Jun 6 01:59:13 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/forwarding.sh] For (as yet unknown) reason, the - forwarding test is extremely slow copying data on some machines so switch - back to copying the much smaller ls binary until we can figure out why - this is. - -commit b4e00949f01176cd4fae3e0cef5ffa8dea379042 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Wed Jun 5 22:48:44 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] bz#2117: Use portable operator in test. - Patch from cjwatson at debian. - -commit 2ea9eb77a7fcab3190564ef5a6a5377a600aa391 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Wed Jun 5 15:04:00 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) Enable sha256 kex methods based on the presence of the necessary - functions, not from the openssl version. - -commit 16cac190ebb9b5612cccea63a7c22ac33bc9a07a -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Tue Jun 4 12:55:24 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some other platforms need sys/types.h before - sys/socket.h. - -commit 0b43ffe143a5843703c3755fa040b8684fb04134 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Mon Jun 3 09:30:44 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some platforms need sys/types.h before sys/un.h. - -commit 3f3064c82238c486706471d300217d73dd0f125e -Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> -Date: Sun Jun 2 15:13:09 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [regress/sftp-chroot.sh] skip if no sudo. ok dtucker - -commit 01ec0af301f60fefdd0079647f13ef9abadd2db5 -Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> -Date: Sun Jun 2 14:31:27 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [aclocal.m4] Enhance OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE to check stderr. - feedback and ok dtucker - -commit 5ab9b63468100757479534edeb53f788a61fe08b -Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> -Date: Sun Jun 2 14:05:48 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [configure.ac regress/Makefile] With rev 1.47 of test-exec.sh we - need a shell that can handle "[ file1 -nt file2 ]". Rather than keep - dealing with shell portability issues in regression tests, we let - configure find us a capable shell on those platforms with an old /bin/sh. - -commit 898ac935e56a7ac5d8b686c590fdb8b7aca27e59 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Mon Jun 3 02:03:25 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2111: don't try to use lastlog on Android. - Patch from Nathan Osman. - -commit ef4901c3eb98c7ab1342c3cd8f2638da1f4b0678 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Mon Jun 3 01:59:13 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] sys/un.h needs sys/socket.h on some platforms - to prevent noise from configure. Patch from Nathan Osman. - -commit 073f795bc1c7728c320e5982c0d417376b0907f5 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 23:47:11 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:35:58 - [ssh-agent.c] - Make parent_alive_interval time_t to avoid signed/unsigned comparison - -commit 00e1abb1ebe13ab24e812f68715f46e65e7c5271 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 23:46:24 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:33:05 - [progressmeter.c] - Add misc.h for monotime prototype. (id sync only) - -commit 86211d1738695e63b2a68f0c3a4f60e1a9d9bda3 -Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> -Date: Sat Jun 1 18:38:23 2013 -0700 - - 20130602 - - (tim) [Makefile.in] Make Solaris, UnixWare, & OpenServer linkers happy - linking regress/modpipe. - -commit e9887d1c37940b9d6c72d55cfad7a40de4c6e28d -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 09:17:09 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow clock_gettimeofday. - -commit 65cf74079a2d563c4ede649116a13ca78c8cc2a4 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 09:11:19 2013 +1000 - - fix typo - -commit c9a1991b95a4c9f04f9dcef299a8110d2ec80d3e -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:37:05 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 22:34:50 - [sftp-client.c] - Update progressmeter when data is acked, not when it's sent. bz#2108, from - Debian via Colin Watson, ok djm@ - -commit a710891659202c82545e84725d4e5cd77aef567c -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:18:31 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac misc.c] Look for clock_gettime in librt and fall - back to time(NULL) if we can't find it anywhere. - -commit f60845fde29cead9d75e812db1c04916b4c58ffd -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:07:31 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [M auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-pam.c cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c - groupaccess.c loginrec.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.c sshd.c - sshlogin.c uidswap.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c - openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c - openbsd-compat/port-linux.c] Replace portable-specific instances of xfree - with the equivalent calls to free. - -commit 12f6533215c0a36ab29d11ff52a853fce45573b4 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:01:24 2013 +1000 - - Remove stray '+' accidentally introduced in sync - -commit 3750fce6ac6b287f62584ac55a4406df95c71b92 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:52:21 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 20:59:25 - [scp.c sftp-client.c] - Replace S_IWRITE, which isn't standardized, with S_IWUSR, which is. Patch - from Nathan Osman via bz#2113. ok deraadt. - - (note: corrected bug number from 2085) - -commit b759c9c2efebe7b416ab81093ca8eb17836b6933 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:46:16 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 13:15:52 - [ssh-agent.c clientloop.c misc.h packet.c progressmeter.c misc.c - channels.c sandbox-systrace.c] - Use clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC ...) for ssh timers so that things like - keepalives and rekeying will work properly over clock steps. Suggested by - markus@, "looks good" djm@. - -commit 55119253c64808b0d3b2ab5d2bc67ee9dac3430b -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:43:59 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/31 12:28:10 - [ssh-agent.c] - Use time_t where appropriate. ok djm - -commit 0acca3797d53d958d240c69a5f222f2aa8444858 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:41:51 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:42:42 - [auth.h auth.c key.c monitor.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c auth1.c key.h] - Standardise logging of supplemental information during userauth. Keys - and ruser is now logged in the auth success/failure message alongside - the local username, remote host/port and protocol in use. Certificates - contents and CA are logged too. - Pushing all logging onto a single line simplifies log analysis as it is - no longer necessary to relate information scattered across multiple log - entries. "I like it" markus@ - -commit 74836ae0fabcc1a76b9d9eacd1629c88a054b2d0 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:32:00 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:38:28 - [auth2-pubkey.c] - fix failure to recognise cert-authority keys if a key of a different type - appeared in authorized_keys before it; ok markus@ - -commit a627d42e51ffa71e014d7b2d2c07118122fd3ec3 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:31:17 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13 - [xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c - ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c - gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c - auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c - servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c - auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c - sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c - kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c - kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c - monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c - ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c - sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c - ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c - dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c] - bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@ - -commit c7aad0058c957afeb26a3f703e8cb0eddeb62365 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:18:47 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Test for fd_mask, howmany and NFDBITS - rather than trying to enumerate the plaforms that don't have them. - Based on a patch from Nathan Osman, with help from tim@. - -commit c0c3373216801797053e123b5f62d35bf41b3611 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Sun Jun 2 06:28:03 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] bz#2112: fall back to - using openssl's DES_crpyt function on platorms that don't have a native - one, eg Android. Based on a patch from Nathan Osman. - -commit efdf5342143a887013a1daae583167dadf6752a7 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 30 08:29:08 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] bz#2087: Add a null - implementation of endgrent for platforms that don't have it (eg Android). - Loosely based on a patch from Nathan Osman, ok djm - -commit 9b42d327380e5cd04efde6fb70e1535fecedf0d7 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:48:59 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:35:43 - [regress/scp.sh] - use a file extention that's not special on some platforms. from portable - (id sync only) - -commit 0a404b0ed79ba45ccaf7ed5528a8f5004c3698cb -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:47:29 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:34:30 - [regress/portnum.sh] - use a more portable negated if structure. from portable (id sync only) - -commit 62ee222e6f3f5ee288434f58b5136ae3d56f5164 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:46:00 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:33:09 - [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] - don't redirect stdout from sudo. from portable (id sync only) - -commit 00478d30cb4bcc18dc1ced8144d16b03cdf790f6 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:45:06 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:30:07 - [regress/test-exec.sh] - wait a bit longer for startup and use case for absolute path. - from portable (id sync only) - -commit 98989eb95eef0aefed7e9fb4e65c2f625be946f6 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:44:09 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:28:11 - [regress/sftp.sh] - only compare copied data if sftp succeeds. from portable (id sync only) - -commit 438f60eb9a5f7cd40bb242cfec865e4fde71b07c -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:43:13 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:26:26 - [regress/sftp-badcmds.sh] - remove unused BATCH variable. (id sync only) - -commit 1466bd25a8d1ff7ae455a795d2d7d52dc17d2938 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:42:05 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:24:48 - [localcommand.sh] - use backticks for portability. (id sync only) - -commit 05b5e518c9969d63471f2ccfd85b1de6e724d30b -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:41:07 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:23:52 - [regress/login-timeout.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/test-exec.sh] - Use SUDO when cat'ing pid files and running the sshd log wrapper so that - it works with a restrictive umask and the pid files are not world readable. - Changes from -portable. (id sync only) - -commit dd669173f93ea8c8397e0af758eaf13ab4f1c591 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:39:57 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:16:26 - [regress/try-ciphers.sh] - use expr for math to keep diffs vs portable down - (id sync only) - -commit 044f32f4c6fd342f9f5949bb0ca77624c0db4494 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:12:57 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Remove unneeded sleep renderd obsolete by - rev 1.6 which calls wait. - -commit 9cc8ff7b63f175661c8807006f6d2649d56ac402 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 20:01:52 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/runtests.sh] Remove obsolete test driver script. - -commit f8d5b3451726530a864b172c556c311370c244e1 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 19:53:25 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/stderr-after-eof.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Move the md5 - helper function to the portable part of test-exec.sh. - -commit 6f66981ed3c6bb83b937959f329323975e356c33 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 19:28:51 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/test-exec.sh] Move the portable-specific functions - together and add a couple of missing lines from openbsd. - -commit 5f1a89a3b67264f4aa83e057cd4f74fd60b9ffa4 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 19:17:58 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh regress/krl.sh regress/test-exec.sh] - Move the jot helper function to portable-specific part of test-exec.sh. - -commit 96457a54d05dea81f34ecb4e059d2f8b98382b85 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 19:03:38 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] Resync spaces with openbsd. - -commit 7f193236594e8328ad133ea05eded31f837b45b5 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 19:02:28 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Resync config file setup with openbsd. - -commit 8654dd2d737800d09e7730b3dfc2a54411f4cf90 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 16:03:48 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h] Remove unneeded bits. - -commit 59d928d3b47e8298f4a8b4b3fb37fb8c8ce1b098 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 15:32:29 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 04:29:14 - [regress/sftp.sh regress/putty-ciphers.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh - regress/test-exec.sh regress/sftp-batch.sh regress/dynamic-forward.sh - regress/putty-transfer.sh regress/conch-ciphers.sh regress/sftp-cmds.sh - regress/scp.sh regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh regress/rekey.sh - regress/putty-kex.sh regress/stderr-data.sh regress/stderr-after-eof.sh - regress/sftp-badcmds.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/ssh-com-client.sh - regress/sftp-chroot.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/transfer.sh - regress/multiplex.sh] - Move the setting of DATA and COPY into test-exec.sh - -commit 34035be27b7ddd84706fe95c39d37cba7d5c9572 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 14:47:51 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:32:11 - [regress/integrity.sh] - don't print output from ssh before getting it (it's available in ssh.log) - -commit b8b96b0aa634d440feba4331c80ae4de9dda2081 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 14:46:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:16:09 - [regress/agent-timeout.sh] - Pull back some portability changes from -portable: - - TIMEOUT is a read-only variable in some shells - - not all greps have -q so redirect to /dev/null instead. - (ID sync only) - -commit a40d97ff46831c9081a6a4472036689360847fb1 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 14:44:53 2013 +1000 - - sync missing ID - -commit 56347efe796a0506e846621ae65562b978e45f1d -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 13:28:36 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:37:40 - [regress/agent.sh regress/keytype.sh regress/cfgmatch.sh - regress/forcecommand.sh regress/proto-version.sh regress/test-exec.sh - regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh regress/cert-userkey.sh - regress/ssh-com.sh] - replace 'echo -n' with 'printf' since it's more portable - also remove "echon" hack. - -commit 91af05c5167fe0aa5bd41d2e4a83757d9f627c18 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 13:16:59 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh]. Force fixed Diffie-Hellman key exchange - methods. When the openssl version doesn't support ECDH then next one on - the list is DH group exchange, but that causes a bit more traffic which can - mean that the tests flip bits in the initial exchange rather than the MACed - traffic and we get different errors to what the tests look for. - -commit 6e1e60c3c2e16c32bb7ca0876caaa6182a4e4b2c -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 11:23:41 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/bsd.regress.mk] Remove unused file. We've never used it - in portable and it's long gone in openbsd. - -commit 982b0cbc4c2b5ea14725f4b339393cdf343dd0fe -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:45:12 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 05:48:31 - [regress/rekey.sh] - add tests for RekeyLimit parsing - -commit 14490fe7b0f45b1b19f8a3dc10eb3d214f27f5bd -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:44:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:26:10 - [regress/rekey.sh] - add server-side rekey test - -commit c31c8729c15f83fba14ef9da0d66bda6215ff69a -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:43:33 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 03:33:30 - [regress/rekey.sh] - test rekeying when there's no data being transferred - -commit a8a62fcc46c19997797846197a6256ed9a777a47 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:42:34 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:10:35 - [rekey.sh] - Add test for time-based rekeying - -commit 5e95173715d516e6014485e2b6def1fb3db84036 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:41:33 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:46:14 - [modpipe.c] - sync some portability changes from portable OpenSSH (id sync only) - -commit a4df65b9fc68a555a7d8781700475fb03ed6e694 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:37:31 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 07:28:53 - [multiplex.sh] - Add tests for -Oforward and -Ocancel for local and remote forwards - -commit 40aaff7e4bcb05b05e3d24938b6d34885be817da -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:36:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 07:23:08 - [multiplex.sh] - Write mux master logs to regress.log instead of ssh.log to keep separate - -commit f3568fc62b73b50a0a3c8447e4a00f4892cab25e -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:35:26 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:46:12 - [Makefile regress/sftp-chroot.sh] - test sshd ChrootDirectory+internal-sftp; feedback & ok dtucker@ - -commit dfea3bcdd7c980c2335402464b7dd8d8721e426d -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:31:39 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:16:03 - [regress/Makefile regress/rekey.sh regress/integrity.sh - regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/test-exec.sh] - use -E option for ssh and sshd to write debuging logs to ssh{,d}.log and - save the output from any failing tests. If a test fails the debug output - from ssh and sshd for the failing tests (and only the failing tests) should - be available in failed-ssh{,d}.log. - -commit 75129025a2d504b630d1718fef0da002f5662f63 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:19:10 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 06:00:22 - [regress/rekey.sh regress/test-exec.sh regress/integrity.sh - regress/multiplex.sh Makefile regress/cfgmatch.sh] - Split the regress log into 3 parts: the debug output from ssh, the debug - log from sshd and the output from the client command (ssh, scp or sftp). - Somewhat functional now, will become more useful when ssh/sshd -E is added. - -commit 7c8b1e72331293b4707dc6f7f68a69e975a3fa70 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:10:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/23 11:09:43 - [test-exec.sh] - Only regenerate host keys if they don't exist or if ssh-keygen has changed - since they were. Reduces test runtime by 5-30% depending on machine - speed. - -commit 712de4d1100963b11bc618472f95ce36bf7e2ae3 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 17 09:07:12 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:20:34 - [regress/proxy-connect.sh] - repeat test with a style appended to the username - -commit 09c0f0325b2f538de9a1073e03b8ef26dece4c16 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:48:57 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:44:06 - [servconf.c] - remove another now-unused variable - -commit 9113d0c2381202412c912a20c8083ab7d6824ec9 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:48:14 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:43:34 - [servconf.c readconf.c] - remove now-unused variables - -commit e194ba4111ffd47cd1f4c8be1ddc8a4cb673d005 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:47:31 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac readconf.c servconf.c - openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add compat bits for scan_scaled. - -commit b7ee8521448100e5b268111ff90feb017e657e44 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:33:10 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:12:31 - [readconf.c servconf.c] - switch RekeyLimit traffic volume parsing to scan_scaled. ok djm@ - -commit dbee308253931f8c1aeebf781d7e7730ff6a0dc1 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:32:29 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:08:41 - [log.c scp.c sshd.c serverloop.c schnorr.c sftp.c] - Fix some "unused result" warnings found via clang and -portable. - ok markus@ - -commit 64d22946d664dad8165f1fae9e78b53831ed728d -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:31:29 2013 +1000 - - - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:30:06 - [sshd_config.5] - oops! avoid Xr to self; - -commit 63e0df2b936770baadc8844617b99e5174b476d0 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:30:31 2013 +1000 - - - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:28:45 - [ssh_config.5] - put IgnoreUnknown in the right place; - -commit 0763698f71efef8b3f8460c5700758359219eb7c -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:30:03 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:27:50 - [ssh_config.5 readconf.h readconf.c] - add the ability to ignore specific unrecognised ssh_config options; - bz#866; ok markus@ - -commit 5f96f3b4bee11ae2b9b32ff9b881c3693e210f96 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:29:28 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:09:14 - [sshd_config.5 servconf.c servconf.h packet.c serverloop.c monitor.c sshd_config - sshd.c] Add RekeyLimit to sshd with the same syntax as the client allowing - rekeying based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man - page. - -commit c53c2af173cf67fd1c26f98e7900299b1b65b6ec -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:28:16 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:00:34 - [ssh_config sshconnect2.c packet.c readconf.h readconf.c clientloop.c - ssh_config.5 packet.h] - Add an optional second argument to RekeyLimit in the client to allow - rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic. - with djm@ jmc@, ok djm - -commit 64c6fceecd27e1739040b42de8f3759454260b39 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:27:14 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 10:13:50 - [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c] - remove unused extern optarg. ok markus@ - -commit caf00109346e4ab6bb495b0e22bc5b1e7ee22f26 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:26:18 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 04:08:01 - [key.c] - memleak in cert_free(), wasn't actually freeing the struct; - bz#2096 from shm AT digitalsun.pl - -commit 7e831edbf7a1b0b9aeeb08328b9fceafaad1bf22 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:25:40 2013 +1000 - - add missing attribution - -commit 54da6be320495604ddf65d10ac4cc8cf7849c533 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:25:04 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:40:07 - [sshconnect2.c] - fix bzero(ptr_to_struct, sizeof(ptr_to_struct)); bz#2100 from - -commit 5d8b702d95c0dfc338726fecfbb709695afd1377 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:24:23 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/06 07:35:12 - [sftp-server.8] - Reference the version of the sftp draft we actually implement. ok djm@ - -commit 026d9db3fbe311b5a7e98d62472cb666aa559648 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:23:52 2013 +1000 - - - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/24 16:01:46 - [misc.c] - remove extra parens noticed by nicm - -commit 2ca51bf140ef2c2409fd220778529dc17c11d8fa -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu May 16 20:22:46 2013 +1000 - - - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/23 17:49:45 - [misc.c] - use xasprintf instead of a series of strlcats and strdup. ok djm - -commit 6aa3eacc5e5f39702b6dd5b27970d9fd97bc2383 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Thu May 16 11:10:17 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] Fix bug that could cause "rm *" to be - executed if mktemp failed; bz#2105 ok dtucker@ - -commit c54e3e0741a27119b3badd8ff92b1988b7e9bd50 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 10 18:53:14 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add -Werror to the -Qunused-arguments test so - we don't get a warning on compilers that *don't* support it. Add - -Wno-unknown-warning-option. Move both to the start of the list for - maximum noise suppression. Tested with gcc 4.6.3, gcc 2.95.4 and clang 2.9. - -commit a75d247a18a5099c60226395354eb252c097ac86 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 10 18:11:55 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only include sha256 and ECC key exchange methods when the - underlying libraries support them. - -commit 0abfb559e3f79d1f217773510d7626c3722aa3c1 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 10 18:08:49 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c - openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] pull in getopt.h from openbsd and plumb - in to use it when we're using our own getopt. - -commit ccfdfceacb7e23d1479ed4cc91976c5ac6e23c56 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 10 16:28:55 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/getopt.c - openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c regress/modpipe.c] Remove getopt.c, add - portability code to getopt_long.c and switch over Makefile and the ugly - hack in modpipe.c. Fixes bz#1448. - -commit 39332020078aa8fd4fc28e00b336438dc64b0f5a -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 10 15:38:11 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c] Import from OpenBSD. No - portability changes yet. - -commit 35b2fe99bee4f332d1c1efa49107cdb3c67da07a -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 10 15:35:26 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.c] Factor out portibility changes to - getopt.c. Preprocessed source is identical other than line numbers. - -commit abbc7a7c02e45787d023f50a30f62d7a3e14fe9e -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri May 10 13:54:23 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Enable -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess if the compiler - supports it. Mentioned by Colin Watson in bz#2100, ok djm. - -commit bc02f163f6e882d390abfb925b47b41e13ae523b -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:25:49 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 01:17:18 - [mux.c] - typo in debug output: evitval->exitval - -commit f8b894e31dc3530c7eb6d0a378848260d54f74c4 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:25:29 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 12:07:08 - [kex.c] - remove duplicated list entry pointed out by naddy@ - -commit 34bd20a1e53b63ceb01f06c1654d9112e6784b0a -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:25:00 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 11:10:18 - [ssh.c] - add -Q to usage; reminded by jmc@ - -commit ea11119eee3c5e2429b1f5f8688b25b028fa991a -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:24:32 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:06:50 - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c] - [key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c] - add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX - algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling - to be table-driven; ok markus@ - -commit a56086b9903b62c1c4fdedf01b68338fe4dc90e4 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:24:18 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:03:01 - [session.c] - reintroduce 1.262 without the connection-killing bug: - fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges; - ok markus@ - -commit 0d6771b4648889ae5bc4235f9e3fc6cd82b710bd -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:23:24 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:01:00 - [ssh-keygen.c] - fix some memory leaks; bz#2088 ok dtucker@ - -commit 467b00c38ba244f9966466e57a89d003f3afb159 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:23:07 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:00:10 - [sshd_config.5] - document the requirment that the AuthorizedKeysCommand be owned by root; - ok dtucker@ markus@ - -commit 9303e6527bb5ca7630c765f28624702c212bfd6c -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:22:40 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:16:07 - [sftp.c] - make "sftp -q" do what it says on the sticker: hush everything but errors; - -commit f1a02aea35504e8bef2ed9eef6f9ddeab12bacb3 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:22:13 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/17 09:04:09 - [session.c] - revert rev 1.262; it fails because uid is already set here. ok djm@ - -commit d5edefd27a30768cc7a4817302e964b6cb2f9be7 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:21:39 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/11 02:27:50 - [packet.c] - quiet disconnect notifications on the server from error() back to logit() - if it is a normal client closure; bz#2057 ok+feedback dtucker@ - -commit 6901032b05291fc5d2bd4067fc47904de3506fda -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:21:24 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 09:40:27 - [sshd.8] - clarify -e text. suggested by & ok jmc@ - -commit 03d4d7e60b16f913c75382e32e136ddfa8d6485f -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:21:06 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:10:33 - [log.c log.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8 sshd.c] - Add -E option to ssh and sshd to append debugging logs to a specified file - instead of stderr or syslog. ok markus@, man page help jmc@ - -commit 37f1c08473b1ef2a188ee178ce2e11e841f88563 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:20:43 2013 +1000 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 16:07:00 - [channels.c sshd.c] - handle ECONNABORTED for accept(); ok deraadt some time ago... - -commit 172859cff7df9fd8a29a1f0a4de568f644bbda50 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:19:27 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:58:51 - [mux.c] - cleanup mux-created channels that are in SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING state too - (in addition to ones already in OPEN); bz#2079, ok dtucker@ - -commit 9f12b5dcd5f7772e633fb2786c63bfcbea1f1aea -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:19:11 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:31:49 - [pathnames.h] - use the existing _PATH_SSH_USER_RC define to construct the other - pathnames; bz#2077, ok dtucker@ (no binary change) - -commit d677ad14ff7efedf21745ee1694058350e758e18 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:18:51 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:14:00 - [auth2-gss.c krl.c sshconnect2.c] - hush some {unused, printf type} warnings - -commit 508b6c3d3b95c8ec078fd4801368597ab29b2db9 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:18:28 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/08 06:32:58 - [ssh.c] - allow "ssh -f none ..." ok markus@ - -commit 91a55f28f35431f9000b95815c343b5a18fda712 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:18:10 2013 +1000 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 19:27:25 - [auth.h auth2-chall.c auth2.c monitor.c sshd_config.5] - add submethod support to AuthenticationMethods; ok and freedback djm@ - -commit 4ce189d9108c62090a0dd5dea973d175328440db -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:17:52 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:19:59 - [auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c] - reconstruct the original username that was sent by the client, which may - have included a style (e.g. "root:skey") when checking public key - signatures. Fixes public key and hostbased auth when the client specified - a style; ok markus@ - -commit 5cbec4c25954b184e43bf3d3ac09e65eb474f5f9 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:17:12 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:36:53 - [readconf.c] - g/c unused variable (-Wunused) - -commit 998cc56b65682d490c9bbf5977dceb1aa84a0233 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:16:43 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:35:23 - [session.c] - fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges; - ok markus@ - -commit 62e9c4f9b6027620f9091a2f43328e057bdb33f1 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:15:49 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/05 20:16:09 - [sshconnect2.c] - reset pubkey order on partial success; ok djm@ - -commit 6332da2ae88db623d7da8070dd807efa26d9dfe8 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Tue Apr 23 14:25:52 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) [auth.c configure.ac misc.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] Support - platforms, such as Android, that lack struct passwd.pw_gecos. Report - and initial patch from Nathan Osman bz#2086; feedback tim@ ok dtucker@ - -commit ce1c9574fcfaf753a062276867335c1e237f725c -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu Apr 18 21:36:19 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Use -Qunused-arguments to suppress warnings from - unused argument warnings (in particular, -fno-builtin-memset) from clang. - -commit bc68f2451b836e6a3fa65df8774a8b1f10049ded -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Thu Apr 18 11:26:25 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) [config.guess config.sub] Update to last versions before they switch - to GPL3. ok dtucker@ - -commit 15fd19c4c9943cf02bc6f462d52c86ee6a8f422e -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:22:26 2013 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 22:09:01 - [ssh.c] - Allow IdenityFile=none; ok markus deraadt (and dtucker for an earlier - version) - -commit 5d1d9541a7c83963cd887b6b36e25b46463a05d4 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:20:00 2013 +1100 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 19:13:56 - [sshconnect.c] - support ProxyCommand=- (stdin/out already point to the proxy); ok djm@ - -commit aefa3682431f59cf1ad9a0f624114b135135aa44 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:18:35 2013 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 04:45:09 - [ssh.c readconf.c readconf.h] - Don't complain if IdentityFiles specified in system-wide configs are - missing. ok djm, deraadt - -commit f3c38142435622d056582e851579d8647a233c7f -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:16:52 2013 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:12:47 - [krl.c] - Remove bogus include. ok djm - (id sync only) - -commit 1910478c2d2c3d0e1edacaeff21ed388d70759e9 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:13:08 2013 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:57 - [readconf.c ssh.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c] - Keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and which - were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing. - ok markus@ - -commit c9627cdbc65b25da943f24e6a953da899f08eefc -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Mon Apr 1 12:40:48 2013 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.{c,h}] Don't include windows.h - to avoid conflicting definitions of __int64, adding the required bits. - Patch from Corinna Vinschen. - -commit 75db01d2ce29a85f8e5a2aff2011446896cf3f8a -Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> -Date: Fri Mar 22 10:14:32 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [Makefile.in] remove some duplication introduced in 20130220 commit. - -commit 221b4b2436ac78a65c3b775c25ccd396a1fed208 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri Mar 22 12:51:09 2013 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [includes.h] Check if _GNU_SOURCE is already defined before - defining it again. Prevents warnings if someone, eg, sets it in CFLAGS. - -commit c8a0f27c6d761d1335d13ed84d773e9ddf1d95c8 -Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri Mar 22 12:49:14 2013 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add stdlib.h to zlib check for exit() prototype. - -commit eed8dc261018aea4d6b8606ca3addc9f8cf9ed1e -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Fri Mar 22 10:25:22 2013 +1100 - - - (djm) Release 6.2p1 - -commit 83efe7c86168cc07b8e6cc6df6b54f7ace3b64a3 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Fri Mar 22 10:17:36 2013 +1100 - - - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id contrib/ssh-copy-id.1] Updated to Phil - Hands' greatly revised version. - -commit 63b4bcd04e1c57b77eabb4e4d359508a4b2af685 -Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Wed Mar 20 12:55:14 2013 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c openbsd-compat/vis.c] - [openbsd-compat/vis.h] FreeBSD's strnvis isn't compatible with OpenBSD's - so mark it as broken. Patch from des AT des.no diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL index 91bfe27..85641e6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL +++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ whitelisted to receive this message upon request. OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com" channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets -with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with +with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are requested by the client with the following packet: @@ -453,4 +453,4 @@ respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.27 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.28 2015/05/08 03:56:51 djm Exp $ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent index 3fcaa14..27ec0c1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent +++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ It may be requested using this message: "rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use. "encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably) -been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range +been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range 1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1 session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral key and the session cookie). @@ -557,4 +557,4 @@ Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.7 2013/01/02 00:33:49 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.8 2015/05/08 03:56:51 djm Exp $ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README b/crypto/openssh/README index f1f7e7f..0401d85 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/README +++ b/crypto/openssh/README @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 for the release notes. +See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.9 for the release notes. - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c index 5c26a40..60c9f14 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c @@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> -#include <stdarg.h> - #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c index 4f0da9c..facfc02 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.65 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.67 2015/05/01 03:20:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -209,8 +209,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) goto next_option; } cp = "environment=\""; - if (options.permit_user_env && - strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *s; struct envstring *new_envstring; @@ -236,13 +235,19 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) goto bad_option; } s[i] = '\0'; - auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); - debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); opts++; - new_envstring = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct envstring)); - new_envstring->s = s; - new_envstring->next = custom_environment; - custom_environment = new_envstring; + if (options.permit_user_env) { + auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: " + "%.900s", s); + debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); + new_envstring = xcalloc(1, + sizeof(*new_envstring)); + new_envstring->s = s; + new_envstring->next = custom_environment; + custom_environment = new_envstring; + s = NULL; + } + free(s); goto next_option; } cp = "from=\""; @@ -603,7 +608,7 @@ auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw) &cert_source_address_done) == -1) return -1; if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw, - OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1, + OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0, &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c index d789bad..d94c828 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c @@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: *num = 1; len = plen + mlen + 1; - **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len); + **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, case PAM_TEXT_INFO: /* accumulate messages */ len = plen + mlen + 2; - **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len); + **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c index d569ab6..5f72416 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.110 2015/02/25 17:29:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.111 2015/05/01 04:17:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -401,8 +401,7 @@ expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) char * authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) { - if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL || - strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0) + if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL) return NULL; return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h index db86037..8b27575 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.82 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.84 2015/05/08 06:41:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ struct Authctxt { int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ int attempt; int failures; - int server_caused_failure; + int server_caused_failure; int force_pwchange; char *user; /* username sent by the client */ char *service; @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *); -int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); +int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))); void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c index eebfe8f..e2327cf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.24 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.25 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.hostbased_key_types, - strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) != 1) { + options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto done; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c index d943efa..5aa319c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.47 2015/02/17 00:14:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 18:44:22 jsing Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "match.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ +#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; @@ -127,8 +130,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key)); goto done; } - if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types, - strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) != 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto done; @@ -169,7 +172,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) && PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { authenticated = 1; @@ -191,7 +194,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an * issue? -markus */ - if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) { + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); @@ -248,6 +251,288 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) free(extra); } +/* + * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic + * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector + * and its members. + */ +static int +split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int argc = 0, quote, i, j; + char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); + + *argvp = NULL; + *argcp = 0; + + for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') + continue; + + /* Start of a token */ + quote = 0; + if (s[i] == '\\' && + (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) + i++; + else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') + quote = s[i++]; + + argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); + arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); + argv[argc] = NULL; + + /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ + for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (s[i] == '\\') { + if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || + s[i + 1] == '\"' || + s[i + 1] == '\\') { + i++; /* Skip '\' */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } else { + /* Unrecognised escape */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) + break; /* done */ + else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) + break; /* done */ + else + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + if (s[i] == '\0') { + if (quote != 0) { + /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + break; + } + } + /* Success */ + *argcp = argc; + *argvp = argv; + argc = 0; + argv = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + free(argv[i]); + free(argv); + } + return r; +} + +/* + * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as + * necessary. Caller must free returned string. + */ +static char * +assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j, ws, r; + char c, *ret; + struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + ws = 0; + sshbuf_reset(arg); + for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { + r = 0; + c = argv[i][j]; + switch (c) { + case ' ': + case '\t': + ws = 1; + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + case '\\': + case '\'': + case '"': + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) + break; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + } + if (r != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); + memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; + sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(arg); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the + * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure. + * NB. "command" is only used for logging. + */ +static pid_t +subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, + int ac, char **av, FILE **child) +{ + FILE *f; + struct stat st; + int devnull, p[2], i; + pid_t pid; + char *cp, errmsg[512]; + u_int envsize; + char **child_env; + + *child = NULL; + + debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__, + tag, command, pw->pw_name); + + /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */ + if (*av[0] != '/') { + error("%s path is not absolute", tag); + return 0; + } + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) { + error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, + av[0], strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, + errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { + error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the + * authorized_keys output. + */ + if (pipe(p) != 0) { + error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and + * run cleanup_exit() code. + */ + restore_uid(); + + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: /* error */ + error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); + return 0; + case 0: /* child */ + /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ + envsize = 5; + child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); + if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); + + for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) + signal(i, SIG_DFL); + + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || + dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + + /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ + if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ + if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + + execve(av[0], av, child_env); + error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); + default: /* parent */ + break; + } + + close(p[1]); + if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { + error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + /* Don't leave zombie child */ + kill(pid, SIGTERM); + while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) + ; + return 0; + } + /* Success */ + debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); + *child = f; + return pid; +} + +/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ +static int +exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd) +{ + int status; + + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno != EINTR) { + error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); + return -1; + } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { + error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { @@ -269,19 +554,13 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) } static int -match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) +process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, + struct sshkey_cert *cert) { - FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; u_long linenum = 0; u_int i; - temporarily_use_uid(pw); - debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); - if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { - restore_uid(); - return 0; - } while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) @@ -309,24 +588,128 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) } for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { - debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" " - "from file \"%s\" on line %lu", - cert->principals[i], file, linenum); + debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"", + file == NULL ? "(command)" : file, + linenum, cert->principals[i]); if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, file, linenum) != 1) continue; - fclose(f); - restore_uid(); return 1; } } } + return 0; +} + +static int +match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) +{ + FILE *f; + int success; + + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); + if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert); fclose(f); restore_uid(); - return 0; + return success; } /* + * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. + * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + int ok, found_principal = 0; + struct passwd *pw; + int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; + pid_t pid; + char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; + void (*osigchld)(int); + + if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) + return 0; + if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { + error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " + "skipping"); + return 0; + } + + /* + * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to + * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. + */ + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ + username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, + "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); + pw = getpwnam(username); + if (pw == NULL) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", + username, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ + if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " + "invalid quotes", command); + goto out; + } + if (ac == 0) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", + command); + goto out; + } + for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { + tmp = percent_expand(av[i], + "u", user_pw->pw_name, + "h", user_pw->pw_dir, + (char *)NULL); + if (tmp == NULL) + fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); + free(av[i]); + av[i] = tmp; + } + /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ + command = assemble_argv(ac, av); + + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command, + ac, av, &f)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert); + + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Read completed successfully */ + found_principal = ok; + out: + if (f != NULL) + fclose(f); + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + free(av[i]); + free(av); + if (uid_swapped) + restore_uid(); + free(command); + free(username); + return found_principal; +} +/* * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ @@ -448,7 +831,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) { char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; const char *reason; - int ret = 0; + int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) return 0; @@ -470,17 +853,24 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) * against the username. */ if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { - if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) { - reason = "Certificate does not contain an " - "authorized principal"; + if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) + found_principal = 1; + } + /* Try querying command if specified */ + if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert)) + found_principal = 1; + /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ + use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || + options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; + if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { + reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; fail_reason: - error("%s", reason); - auth_debug_add("%s", reason); - goto out; - } + error("%s", reason); + auth_debug_add("%s", reason); + goto out; } if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, - principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) + use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) goto out; @@ -526,144 +916,117 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) static int user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) { - FILE *f; - int ok, found_key = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + int r, ok, found_key = 0; struct passwd *pw; - struct stat st; - int status, devnull, p[2], i; + int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; pid_t pid; - char *username, errmsg[512]; + char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; + char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; + void (*osigchld)(int); - if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL || - options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/') + if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) return 0; - if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); return 0; } + /* + * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to + * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. + */ + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); pw = getpwnam(username); if (pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); - free(username); - return 0; + goto out; } - free(username); - - temporarily_use_uid(pw); - if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) { - error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s", - options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); + /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ + if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } - if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, - errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { - error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } - if (pipe(p) != 0) { - error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ + if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", + command); goto out; } - - debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"", - options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name); + if (ac == 0) { + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", + command); + goto out; + } + for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { + tmp = percent_expand(av[i], + "u", user_pw->pw_name, + "h", user_pw->pw_dir, + "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), + "f", key_fp, + "k", keytext, + (char *)NULL); + if (tmp == NULL) + fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); + free(av[i]); + av[i] = tmp; + } + /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ + command = assemble_argv(ac, av); /* - * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and - * run cleanup_exit() code. + * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments + * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the + * target username as a single argument. */ - restore_uid(); - - switch ((pid = fork())) { - case -1: /* error */ - error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - close(p[0]); - close(p[1]); - return 0; - case 0: /* child */ - for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) - signal(i, SIG_DFL); - - if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { - error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ - if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || - dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { - error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); - - /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ - if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { - error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { - error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ - if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { - error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - - execl(options.authorized_keys_command, - options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL); - - error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", - options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); - _exit(127); - default: /* parent */ - break; + if (ac == 1) { + av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); + av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); + av[2] = NULL; + /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ + free(command); + xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); } + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command, + ac, av, &f)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(pw); - close(p[1]); - if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { - error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - close(p[0]); - /* Don't leave zombie child */ - kill(pid, SIGTERM); - while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) - ; - goto out; - } ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw); - fclose(f); - while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { - if (errno != EINTR) { - error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - goto out; - } - } - if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { - error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", - options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status)); + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0) goto out; - } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { - error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", - options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status)); - goto out; - } + + /* Read completed successfully */ found_key = ok; out: - restore_uid(); + if (f != NULL) + fclose(f); + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + free(av[i]); + free(av); + if (uid_swapped) + restore_uid(); + free(command); + free(username); + free(key_fp); + free(keytext); return found_key; } @@ -671,7 +1034,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. */ int -user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) +user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt) { u_int success, i; char *file; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c index 5d9414f..82915a4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.94 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.97 2015/03/26 19:32:19 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -438,10 +438,8 @@ ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key, u_int flags = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (sigp != NULL) - *sigp = NULL; - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = 0; + *sigp = NULL; + *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c index 3a81786..728b136 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.111 2015/02/23 16:55:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.114 2015/04/17 13:32:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename); - error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); + error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); error("This private key will be ignored."); return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; } @@ -359,6 +359,8 @@ sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) case 0: return r; } +#else /* WITH_SSH1 */ + close(fd); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* try ssh2 public key */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c index ca33e9a..39bb775 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.341 2015/02/06 23:21:59 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.347 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL; static char *x11_saved_data = NULL; static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0; +/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ +static u_int x11_refuse_time; + /* * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us; * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data. @@ -307,7 +310,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, if (channels_alloc > 10000) fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d " "too big.", channels_alloc); - channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10, + channels = xreallocarray(channels, channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(Channel *)); channels_alloc += 10; debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc); @@ -913,6 +916,13 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; + /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ + if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { + verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " + "expired"); + return -1; + } + /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12) return 0; @@ -1484,6 +1494,12 @@ channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); } +void +channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time) +{ + x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; +} + /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ @@ -2193,8 +2209,8 @@ channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { - *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); - *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + *readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + *writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *nallocp = sz; } *maxfdp = n; @@ -2271,7 +2287,7 @@ channel_output_poll(void) packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_string(data, dlen); packet_send(); - c->remote_window -= dlen + 4; + c->remote_window -= dlen; free(data); } continue; @@ -2642,7 +2658,7 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; int id; - u_int adjust; + u_int adjust, tmp; if (!compat20) return 0; @@ -2658,7 +2674,10 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) adjust = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust); - c->remote_window += adjust; + if ((tmp = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) + fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", + id, adjust, c->remote_window); + c->remote_window = tmp; return 0; } @@ -2806,17 +2825,21 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; in_port_t *lport_p; - host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? - fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); - if (host == NULL) { - error("No forward host name."); - return 0; - } - if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { - error("Forward host name too long."); - return 0; + if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + host = fwd->connect_path; + } else { + host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? + fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; + if (host == NULL) { + error("No forward host name."); + return 0; + } + if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { + error("Forward host name too long."); + return 0; + } } /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ @@ -3238,7 +3261,7 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *fwd) } if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ - permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens, + permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); idx = num_permitted_opens++; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { @@ -3469,7 +3492,7 @@ channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); - permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens, + permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; @@ -3519,7 +3542,7 @@ channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); - permitted_adm_opens = xrealloc(permitted_adm_opens, + permitted_adm_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_adm_opens, num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); @@ -3534,7 +3557,7 @@ void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void) { channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); - permitted_adm_opens = xmalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); + permitted_adm_opens = xcalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens), 1); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL; num_adm_permitted_opens = 1; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h index 36f763a..5301342 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.116 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.118 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ struct Channel { time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */ int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created * channels are delayed until the first call - * to a matching pre-select handler. + * to a matching pre-select handler. * this way post-select handlers are not * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *); /* x11 forwarding */ +void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int); int x11_connect_display(void); int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **); int x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c index defb69f..e6da12a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.272 2015/02/25 19:54:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.274 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ -static int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ +static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ static void client_init_dispatch(void); int session_ident = -1; @@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) return 1; } -#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" +#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" +#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 void client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) @@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i; char *xauthdir, *xauthfile; struct stat st; - u_int now; + u_int now, x11_timeout_real; xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL; *_proto = proto; @@ -345,6 +346,15 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, xauthdir = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); xauthfile = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX); + /* + * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive + * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to + * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. + */ + if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) + x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; + else + x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) { do_unlink = 1; snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile", @@ -352,17 +362,20 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, - xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout); + xauth_path, xauthfile, display, + x11_timeout_real); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); - if (system(cmd) == 0) - generated = 1; if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { now = monotime() + 1; if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; else x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; + channel_set_x11_refuse_time( + x11_refuse_time); } + if (system(cmd) == 0) + generated = 1; } } @@ -1890,7 +1903,7 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) "malicious server."); return NULL; } - if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { + if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return NULL; @@ -2353,8 +2366,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void) /* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.hostkeyalgorithms, - strlen(options.hostkeyalgorithms), 0) != 1) { + options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) { debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c index 86f1260..2d70de2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.87 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.94 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version) "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */ SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, + { "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE }, { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*OSU_0*," @@ -166,15 +167,34 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version) "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, + { "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */ + "PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */ + "PuTTY_Release_0.60*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.61*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.62*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.63*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.64*", + SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "Probe-*", SSH_BUG_PROBE }, + { "TeraTerm SSH*," + "TTSSH/1.5.*," + "TTSSH/2.1*," + "TTSSH/2.2*," + "TTSSH/2.3*," + "TTSSH/2.4*," + "TTSSH/2.5*," + "TTSSH/2.6*," + "TTSSH/2.70*," + "TTSSH/2.71*," + "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, + { "WinSCP*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { NULL, 0 } }; /* process table, return first match */ for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { - if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, - strlen(check[i].pat), 0) == 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) { debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */ @@ -200,9 +220,11 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec) for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) { switch (atoi(p)) { case 1: +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED; ret |= SSH_PROTO_1; +#endif break; case 2: ret |= SSH_PROTO_2; @@ -230,7 +252,7 @@ filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter) buffer_init(&b); tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal); while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { - if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, strlen(cp), 0) != 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) { if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp)); @@ -272,15 +294,20 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) } char * -compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop) +compat_kex_proposal(char *p) { - if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD)) - return kex_prop; - debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); - kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); - debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); - if (*kex_prop == '\0') + if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0) + return p; + debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) + p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); + if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { + p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"); + p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"); + } + debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); + if (*p == '\0') fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); - return kex_prop; + return p; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h index b8d65c2..724538b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/compat.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.46 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.48 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 +#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 +#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 void enable_compat13(void); void enable_compat20(void); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.guess b/crypto/openssh/config.guess index b94cde8..c563628 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/config.guess +++ b/crypto/openssh/config.guess @@ -982,6 +982,12 @@ EOF ppc:Linux:*:*) echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; + ppc64le:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpc64le-unknown-linux-gnu + exit ;; + ppcle:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-linux-gnu + exit ;; s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux exit ;; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure b/crypto/openssh/configure index b352055..e33c33f 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/configure +++ b/crypto/openssh/configure @@ -665,6 +665,7 @@ SED PERL KILL CAT +ac_ct_AR AR INSTALL_DATA INSTALL_SCRIPT @@ -1424,7 +1425,7 @@ Optional Packages: --with-PACKAGE[=ARG] use PACKAGE [ARG=yes] --without-PACKAGE do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no) --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** - --without-ssh1 Disable support for SSH protocol 1 + --without-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1 --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths @@ -1460,8 +1461,8 @@ Optional Packages: --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords --without-shadow Disable shadow password support - --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY - --with-default-path= Specify default \$PATH environment for server + --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY + --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support @@ -4556,26 +4557,27 @@ $as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; } EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP" -# Extract the first word of "ar", so it can be a program name with args. -set dummy ar; ac_word=$2 +if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + for ac_prog in ar + do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } -if ${ac_cv_path_AR+:} false; then : +if ${ac_cv_prog_AR+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else - case $AR in - [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) - ac_cv_path_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test with a path. - ;; - *) - as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR + if test -n "$AR"; then + ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then - ac_cv_path_AR="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi @@ -4583,10 +4585,9 @@ done done IFS=$as_save_IFS - ;; -esac fi -AR=$ac_cv_path_AR +fi +AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR if test -n "$AR"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5 $as_echo "$AR" >&6; } @@ -4596,6 +4597,66 @@ $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi + test -n "$AR" && break + done +fi +if test -z "$AR"; then + ac_ct_AR=$AR + for ac_prog in ar +do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR +if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break +done + + if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then + AR="" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + AR=$ac_ct_AR + fi +fi + # Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy cat; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 @@ -5655,10 +5716,15 @@ fi # Check whether --with-ssh1 was given. if test "${with_ssh1+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_ssh1; - if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + as_fn_error $? "Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + ssh1=yes + elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then ssh1=no - elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then - as_fn_error $? "Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5 + else + as_fn_error $? "unknown --with-ssh1 argument" "$LINENO" 5 fi @@ -7628,9 +7694,12 @@ $as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... " >&6; } i*86-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 ;; - arm*-*) + arm*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM - ;; + ;; + aarch64*-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 + ;; esac if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac index e1b8003..5ab3670 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac +++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_RANLIB AC_PROG_INSTALL AC_PROG_EGREP -AC_PATH_PROG([AR], [ar]) +AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar]) AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat]) AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill]) AC_PATH_PROGS([PERL], [perl5 perl]) @@ -140,12 +140,17 @@ else fi AC_ARG_WITH([ssh1], - [ --without-ssh1 Disable support for SSH protocol 1], + [ --without-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1], [ - if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled]) + fi + ssh1=yes + elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then ssh1=no - elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled]) + else + AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown --with-ssh1 argument]) fi ] ) @@ -782,14 +787,17 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) i*86-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 ;; - arm*-*) + arm*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM - ;; + ;; + aarch64*-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 + ;; esac if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) - AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], - [Specify the system call convention in use]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], + [Specify the system call convention in use]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported]) fi @@ -4413,7 +4421,7 @@ if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then else DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display], - [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY], + [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY]) @@ -4459,7 +4467,7 @@ fi # Whether to mess with the default path SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" AC_ARG_WITH([default-path], - [ --with-default-path= Specify default \$PATH environment for server], + [ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec index 7ac4ed0..b9aaca5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec +++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -%define ver 6.8p1 +%define ver 6.9p1 %define rel 1 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec index 0eb779c..c29c3f7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec +++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh -Version: 6.8p1 +Version: 6.9p1 URL: http://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.c b/crypto/openssh/dh.c index a260240..4c639ac 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dh.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.55 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.57 2015/05/27 23:39:18 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) (f = fopen(_PATH_DH_PRIMES, "r")) == NULL) { logit("WARNING: %s does not exist, using fixed modulus", _PATH_DH_MODULI); - return (dh_new_group14()); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } linenum = 0; @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) if (bestcount == 0) { fclose(f); logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_PRIMES); - return (dh_new_group14()); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } linenum = 0; @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) if (linenum != which+1) { logit("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up", which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES); - return (dh_new_group14()); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p)); @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL || (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 || - need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= pbits) + need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1); if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 || @@ -339,6 +339,45 @@ dh_new_group14(void) } /* + * 4k bit fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read. + * Source: MODP group 16 from RFC3526. + */ +DH * +dh_new_group_fallback(int max) +{ + static char *gen = "2", *group16 = + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" + "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" + "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" + "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" + "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" + "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64" + "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7" + "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B" + "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C" + "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31" + "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7" + "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA" + "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6" + "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED" + "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9" + "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199" + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; + + if (max < 4096) { + debug3("requested max size %d, using 2k bit group 14", max); + return dh_new_group14(); + } + debug3("using 4k bit group 16"); + return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16)); +} + +/* * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.h b/crypto/openssh/dh.h index 63a1b14..6546953 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dh.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.12 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.13 2015/05/27 23:39:18 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *); DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); DH *dh_new_group1(void); DH *dh_new_group14(void); +DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c b/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c index 2564ae7..40db002 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.4 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.5 2015/05/05 02:48:17 jsg Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c index afe6182..aac933e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.26 2015/02/12 20:34:19 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.27 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -137,22 +137,6 @@ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, { int r; - if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0) { - switch (r) { - case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: - logit("Connection closed by %.200s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: - logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while " - "waiting to read", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: - logit("Disconnected from %.200s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - default: - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } - } + if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.h b/crypto/openssh/dns.h index 815f073..30e2b19 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dns.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.14 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.15 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ enum sshfp_types { SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1, SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2, SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3, - SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4 + SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4 }; enum sshfp_hashes { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c index 4fca044..2518c84 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.15 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. * @@ -97,11 +97,9 @@ int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern) { int i, found = 0; - size_t len = strlen(group_pattern); for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { - switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], - group_pattern, len, 0)) { + switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], group_pattern, 0)) { case -1: return 0; /* Negated match wins */ case 0: diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c index 60ac65f..d617d60 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <limits.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include <string.h> +#include <signal.h> #include <unistd.h> #include "xmalloc.h" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c index e7b8c52..53993d6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.28 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. @@ -44,9 +44,12 @@ #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" +extern ServerOptions options; + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; @@ -99,25 +102,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) char lname[NI_MAXHOST]; gss_OID_set oidset; - gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); - if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) { - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (-1); - } + if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (-1); + } + + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, + ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, + NULL, NULL))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); - if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (ctx->major); + } else { + ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; } - - if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, - ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); - - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (ctx->major); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } /* Privileged */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hmac.c b/crypto/openssh/hmac.c index d1c1241..1c87964 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/hmac.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/hmac.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.11 2015/01/15 21:37:14 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.12 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen) if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) { for (i = 0; i < elen; i++) - printf("[%zd] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]); + printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]); printf("mismatch\n"); } else printf("ok\n"); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c index b235795..2850a47 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.64 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.66 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) struct hostkey_entry *tmp; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { - error("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file", + /* XXX make this verbose() in the future */ + debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file", l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } @@ -662,7 +663,7 @@ match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed) return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) && strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0; } - return match_hostname(host, names, nlen) == 1; + return match_hostname(host, names) == 1; } int @@ -810,7 +811,7 @@ hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l); ktype[l] = '\0'; lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + /* * Assume RSA1 if the first component is a short * decimal number. @@ -818,7 +819,7 @@ hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 && strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l) lineinfo.keytype = KEY_RSA1; -#endif + /* * Check that something other than whitespace follows * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c index 8c2b001..dbc55ef 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.105 2015/01/30 00:22:25 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.106 2015/04/17 13:25:52 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ kex_prop_free(char **proposal) { u_int i; + if (proposal == NULL) + return; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) free(proposal[i]); free(proposal); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c index b6e6c40..8d8cd4a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.8 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.9 2015/03/26 07:00:04 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; int r; + /* Check for all-zero public key */ + explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(pub, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c index b2d2c85..2402725 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.8 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.9 2015/04/27 00:37:53 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include "includes.h" #include <sys/types.h> +#include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <signal.h> diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c index e8e059a..71ff133 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.20 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.22 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <openssl/dh.h> @@ -65,25 +66,17 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; kex->nbits = nbits; - if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) { - /* Old GEX request */ - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)) - != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", kex->nbits); - } else { - /* New GEX request */ - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent", - kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); - } + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) + kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096); + /* New GEX request */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent", + kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n", kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c index 9c281d2..ff6c687 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.24 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.25 2015/04/13 02:04:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -60,8 +60,6 @@ static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) { - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD, - &input_kex_dh_gex_request); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &input_kex_dh_gex_request); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST"); @@ -76,36 +74,19 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) int r; u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; - switch (type) { - case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST: - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - kex->nbits = nbits; - kex->min = min; - kex->max = max; - min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); - max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); - nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); - nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); - break; - case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD: - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received"); - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - kex->nbits = nbits; - /* unused for old GEX */ - kex->min = min = DH_GRP_MIN; - kex->max = max = DH_GRP_MAX; - break; - default: - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; - } + kex->nbits = nbits; + kex->min = min; + kex->max = max; + min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); + max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); + nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); + nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || kex->max < kex->nbits) { @@ -131,10 +112,6 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) goto out; - /* old KEX does not use min/max in kexgex_hash() */ - if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD) - kex->min = kex->max = -1; - debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init); r = 0; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/krl.c b/crypto/openssh/krl.c index 4bbaa20..a98252e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/krl.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/krl.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.31 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.32 2015/06/24 23:47:23 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" @@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, goto out; if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, - sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) == -1) + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.c b/crypto/openssh/match.c index c35e328..913b6ba 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/match.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/match.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.29 2013/11/20 20:54:10 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.30 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -115,15 +115,13 @@ match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern) * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. */ - int -match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len, - int dolower) +match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower) { char sub[1024]; int negated; int got_positive; - u_int i, subi; + u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern); got_positive = 0; for (i = 0; i < len;) { @@ -177,9 +175,9 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len, * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. */ int -match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len) +match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern) { - return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, len, 1); + return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, 1); } /* @@ -200,7 +198,7 @@ match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr, return 0; /* negative hostname match */ - if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1) + if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1) return 0; /* no match at all */ if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.h b/crypto/openssh/match.h index 3d7f70f..db97ca8 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/match.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/match.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ #define MATCH_H int match_pattern(const char *, const char *); -int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, u_int, int); -int match_hostname(const char *, const char *, u_int); +int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int); +int match_hostname(const char *, const char *); int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.c b/crypto/openssh/misc.c index e690381..c873a7d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/misc.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.96 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.97 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) nalloc *= 2; - args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); + args->list = xreallocarray(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); args->nalloc = nalloc; args->list[args->num++] = cp; args->list[args->num] = NULL; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli b/crypto/openssh/moduli index dff3c24..6bb25c9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/moduli +++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli @@ -1,34 +1,5 @@ -# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.12 2015/05/22 02:45:42 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.13 2015/05/28 00:03:06 dtucker Exp $ # Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus -20150520233853 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2AC62AF -20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2BCC50F -20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2C241F3 -20150520233855 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2DDF347 -20150520233856 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2E3FDBB -20150520233857 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3006603 -20150520233858 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA31D9C37 -20150520233859 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA333355B -20150520233900 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3428B23 -20150520233902 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA37C9A43 -20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA384B367 -20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3903453 -20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3946C77 -20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA39F6A9B -20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A0E88B -20150520233905 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A37763 -20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 5 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diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c index 7af19b1..a914209 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.145 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.150 2015/06/22 23:42:16 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, auth_method, auth_submethod); - if (!authenticated) + if (!partial && !authenticated) authctxt->failures++; } } @@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) Key *key; char *cuser, *chost; u_char *blob; - u_int bloblen; + u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt; enum mm_keytype type = 0; int allowed = 0; @@ -1195,6 +1195,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); + pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); @@ -1215,19 +1216,19 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) allowed = options.pubkey_authentication && !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.pubkey_key_types, - strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 && - user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key); + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 && + user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, + pubkey_auth_attempt); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); auth_method = "publickey"; - if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1) + if (options.pubkey_authentication && + (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1)) auth_clear_options(); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.hostbased_key_types, - strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 && + options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 && hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, @@ -1474,6 +1475,9 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; + if (options.use_login) + return; + /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c index 6ad27f7..eac421b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.84 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.85 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> @@ -153,10 +153,8 @@ mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m) debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { - if (errno == EPIPE) { - error("%s: socket closed", __func__); + if (errno == EPIPE) cleanup_exit(255); - } fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } msg_len = get_u32(buf); @@ -373,16 +371,17 @@ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) } int -mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) +mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) { - return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key)); + return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key, + pubkey_auth_attempt)); } int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { - return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key)); + return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0)); } int @@ -392,13 +391,14 @@ mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, int ret; key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */ - ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key); + ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0); key->type = KEY_RSA1; return (ret); } int -mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key) +mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key, + int pubkey_auth_attempt) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; @@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key) buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : ""); buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : ""); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); + buffer_put_int(&m, pubkey_auth_attempt); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h index e18784a..de4a08f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.26 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.27 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); -int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *); -int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); +int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *, int); +int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mux.c b/crypto/openssh/mux.c index 52641cb..8ae9cdf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/mux.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/mux.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.50 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.53 2015/05/01 04:03:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org> * @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) free(cp); continue; } - cctx->env = xrealloc(cctx->env, env_len + 2, + cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2, sizeof(*cctx->env)); cctx->env[env_len++] = cp; cctx->env[env_len] = NULL; @@ -594,7 +594,9 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) return; } buffer_init(&out); - if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards) { + if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards || + (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL && + options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) { xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid); goto fail; } @@ -606,7 +608,7 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); - logit("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" + debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); @@ -628,6 +630,17 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) else xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + + debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, " + "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port, + rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + + free(rfwd->listen_host); + free(rfwd->listen_path); + free(rfwd->connect_host); + free(rfwd->connect_path); + memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd)); } fail: error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg); @@ -1723,7 +1736,7 @@ mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) if (cancel_flag) fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__); fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m); - logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", + verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", fwd->allocated_port, fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "", fwd->connect_port); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h index b35b2b8..84b63bc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.41 2014/07/11 13:54:34 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.44 2015/05/27 23:51:10 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ - "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," + ",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" #else # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES #endif @@ -83,14 +83,17 @@ # else # define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "" # endif -#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ +#define KEX_COMMON_KEX \ KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ - KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ - "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" + KEX_SHA256_METHODS -#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX "," \ +#define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \ + +#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ @@ -108,9 +111,9 @@ /* the actual algorithms */ #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ - "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ - AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ - "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \ + AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \ "arcfour256,arcfour128," \ @@ -148,8 +151,8 @@ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-ed25519" #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ - "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ - "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c index 1691257..0a07f9a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.9 2014/07/13 21:21:25 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org> * @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ #endif #define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES +#define MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + /* * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash * @@ -61,8 +63,8 @@ * wise caller could do; we just do it for you. */ -#define BCRYPT_BLOCKS 8 -#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_BLOCKS * 4) +#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8 +#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4) static void bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) @@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) blf_ctx state; u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"; - uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_BLOCKS]; + uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS]; int i; uint16_t j; size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; @@ -85,14 +87,14 @@ bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) /* encryption */ j = 0; - for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) + for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext), &j); for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t)); /* copy out */ - for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) { out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff; @@ -156,9 +158,9 @@ bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t salt } /* - * pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly. + * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly. */ - amt = MIN(amt, keylen); + amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen); for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) { size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1); if (dest >= origkeylen) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c index a2d8212..8672ccf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ cygwin_ssh_privsep_user() if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user, sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0) #endif - strcpy (cyg_privsep_user, "sshd"); + strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user)); } return cyg_privsep_user; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h index e4fa805..ff347a2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ pid_t getpgid(pid_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT -# define endgrent() do { } while (0) +# define endgrent() do { } while(0) #endif #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h index 1cffefe..cb59ccd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); /* multibyte character support */ #ifndef HAVE_MBLEN -# define mblen(x, y) 1 +# define mblen(x, y) (1) #endif #if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c index 2a14dd7..e915141 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #include <sys/types.h> +#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H #include <endian.h> +#endif #include <string.h> #include <rmd160.h> diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c index 7884eeb..aca06d7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.208 2015/02/13 18:57:00 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.212 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) { error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(ssh); return NULL; } state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; @@ -792,7 +793,9 @@ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *ssh, void *ctx, void ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 +#ifndef WITH_SSH1 + fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support"); +#else /* WITH_SSH1 */ struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number); int r; @@ -1280,7 +1283,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) * been sent. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) - return r; + goto out; /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { @@ -1338,15 +1341,20 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) len = roaming_read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); } while (len == 0 && cont); - if (len == 0) - return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; - if (len < 0) - return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if (len == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; + goto out; + } + if (len < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } /* Append it to the buffer. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) - return r; + goto out; } + out: free(setp); return r; } @@ -1913,9 +1921,19 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) logit("Connection closed by %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: - logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while " - "waiting to write", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + logit("Connection to %.200s timed out", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); + case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: + logit("Disconnected from %.200s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + cleanup_exit(255); + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + if (errno == ECONNRESET) { + logit("Connection reset by %.200s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fatal("%s%sConnection to %.200s: %s", tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", @@ -2728,13 +2746,14 @@ sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v) return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } -#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g); } -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int @@ -2744,7 +2763,6 @@ sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) { @@ -2796,13 +2814,14 @@ sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp) return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } -#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g); } -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int @@ -2812,7 +2831,6 @@ sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c index 7c060c6..1e22d5d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.232 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.237 2015/06/26 05:13:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) newfwd->listen_path == NULL) fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root."); #endif - options->local_forwards = xrealloc(options->local_forwards, + options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards, options->num_local_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; - options->remote_forwards = xrealloc(options->remote_forwards, + options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards, options->num_remote_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; @@ -514,7 +514,6 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria; const char *ruser; int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; - size_t len; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; /* @@ -567,25 +566,24 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, result = -1; goto out; } - len = strlen(arg); if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(host); - r = match_hostname(host, arg, len) == 1; + r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(original_host); - r = match_hostname(original_host, arg, len) == 1; + r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(ruser); - r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, len, 0) == 1; + r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); - r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, len, 0) == 1; + r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { @@ -687,8 +685,8 @@ parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) return keywords[i].opcode; - if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, - strlen(ignored_unknown), 1) == 1) + if (ignored_unknown != NULL && + match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1) return oIgnoredUnknownOption; error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); @@ -785,7 +783,9 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, } /* Strip trailing whitespace */ - for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { + if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) + return 0; + for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; @@ -1258,13 +1258,13 @@ parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && + if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) + value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; + else if (arg[1] == '\0') + value = (u_char) arg[0]; + else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; - else if (strlen(arg) == 1) - value = (u_char) arg[0]; - else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) - value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", filename, linenum); @@ -1973,7 +1973,8 @@ parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) switch (*cp) { case '\\': memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); - cp++; + if (*cp == '\0') + return -1; break; case '/': ispath = 1; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile index 99a7d60..cba83f4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.78 2015/01/26 06:12:18 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.81 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $ REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec tests: prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS) @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ LTESTS= connect \ multiplex \ reexec \ brokenkeys \ + cfgparse \ cfgmatch \ addrmatch \ localcommand \ @@ -72,7 +73,8 @@ LTESTS= connect \ limit-keytype \ hostkey-agent \ keygen-knownhosts \ - hostkey-rotate + hostkey-rotate \ + principals-command # dhgex \ @@ -180,10 +182,10 @@ t11: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok -t12.out: - ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $(OBJ)/$@ +$(OBJ)/t12.out: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@ -t12: t12.out +t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress b/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress index 82e4cc7..9b99bda 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts. TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests. TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config before running each test. -TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOTPS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config +TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config before running each test. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..736f389 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.5 2015/05/29 03:05:13 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="config parse" + +# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support. +if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then + SKIP_IPV6=yes +fi + +# We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T +# will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or +# if we are # running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed +# (keys won't exist). + +grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal +SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`" + +verbose "reparse minimal config" +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && + $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config" + +verbose "reparse regress config" +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && + $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config" + +verbose "listenaddress order" +# expected output +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD +listenaddress 1.2.3.4:1234 +listenaddress 1.2.3.4:5678 +EOD +[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD +listenaddress [::1]:1234 +listenaddress [::1]:5678 +EOD + +# test input sets. should all result in the output above. +# test 1: addressfamily and port first +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD +${SSHD_KEYS} +addressfamily any +port 1234 +port 5678 +listenaddress 1.2.3.4 +EOD +[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD +listenaddress ::1 +EOD + +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \ + grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ + fail "listenaddress order 1" +# test 2: listenaddress first +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD +${SSHD_KEYS} +listenaddress 1.2.3.4 +port 1234 +port 5678 +addressfamily any +EOD +[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD +listenaddress ::1 +EOD + +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \ + grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ + fail "listenaddress order 2" + +# cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012] diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh index ad2f9b9..575dc23 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.12 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.13 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="cipher speed" @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do fi done # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored. - if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then break fi n=`expr $n + 1` diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh index b5d542d..cde6008 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.2 2015/03/03 17:53:40 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey rotate" @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ rm $OBJ/known_hosts trace "prepare hostkeys" nkeys=0 all_algs="" -for k in `ssh -Q key-plain` ; do +for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1` @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys" # Check each key type -for k in `ssh -Q key-plain` ; do +for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k" @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" -# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.2 2015/03/03 17:53:40 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey rotate" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh index 2ff8b3f..1d49767 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.15 2015/01/19 20:42:31 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.16 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="integrity" @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ for m in $macs; do cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy # modify output from sshd at offset $off pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1" - if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-c $m" else diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh index 6f952f4..e271899 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.5 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="login with different key exchange algorithms" @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak # Make server accept all key exchanges. -ALLKEX=`ssh -Q kex` +ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex` KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,` echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh index b595a43..700273b 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.2 2012/12/06 06:06:54 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/21 06:40:02 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized keys from command" @@ -9,26 +9,63 @@ if test -z "$SUDO" ; then exit 0 fi +rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args + +touch $OBJ/keys-command-args +chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args + +expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub` +expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` + # Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have # acceptable directory permissions. KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}" -cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" +cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" #!/bin/sh +echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args +echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7 test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 +if test $# -eq 6 ; then + test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2 + test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3 + test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4 + test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5 + test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6 +fi exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}" _EOF $SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND" -cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak -( - grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak - echo AuthorizedKeysFile none - echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND - echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} -) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy - if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + + verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments" + ( + grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + echo AuthorizedKeysFile none + echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah + echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd + env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "connect failed" + fi + + verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments" + # Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed. + ( + grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + echo AuthorizedKeysFile none + echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND + echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd + env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c index 1a9fc87..6234ba0 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ #include <netinet/in.h> #include <netinet/tcp.h> #include <netinet/ip.h> -#include <arpa/telnet.h> #include <errno.h> #include <netdb.h> @@ -63,6 +62,13 @@ # endif #endif +/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */ +#define IAC 255 +#define DONT 254 +#define DO 253 +#define WONT 252 +#define WILL 251 + #ifndef SUN_LEN #define SUN_LEN(su) \ (sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path)) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..9006437 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.1 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="authorized principals command" + +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +if test -z "$SUDO" ; then + echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" + echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" + exit 0 +fi + +# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have +# acceptable directory permissions. +PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}" +cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'" +#!/bin/sh +test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 +test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" && + exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" +_EOF +test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command" +$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" + +# Create a CA key and a user certificate. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ + fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key" + +# Test explicitly-specified principals +for privsep in yes no ; do + _prefix="privsep $privsep" + + # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND %u" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}" + echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # XXX test missing command + # XXX test failing command + + # Empty authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" + echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Wrong authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" + echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" + echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # authorized_principals with bad key option + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" + echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # authorized_principals with command=false + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" + echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + + # authorized_principals with command=true + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" + echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # Setup for principals= key option + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Wrong principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi +done diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh index 6c5cfe8..4371d52 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.8 2013/05/17 00:37:40 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.9 2015/05/08 07:29:00 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect to ssh.com server" @@ -44,14 +44,14 @@ cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config HostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv PublicHostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed - MaxConnections 0 + MaxConnections 0 PermitRootLogin yes VerboseMode no CheckMail no Ssh1Compatibility no EOF -# create client config +# create client config sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \ < $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh index 691db16..bcf83af 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #!/bin/sh -# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.2 2009/10/06 23:51:49 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $ if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key" @@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ else fi public_exponent=` - openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent | + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent | sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//' ` test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 modulus=` - openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= | + openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= | sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z ` test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh index 0f76662..114e129 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh @@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ Host * EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then - trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" + trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh index 4165c7b..889a735 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.24 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.25 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="try ciphers" @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do fi # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they # are ignored. - if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then break fi n=`expr $n + 1` diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c index d81291b..2eaaf06 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.3 2015/03/07 04:41:48 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.4 2015/03/31 22:59:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach() * @@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype; #ifndef WITH_SSH1 - if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 || - expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1) { + if (parse_key && (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 || + expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1)) { expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; parse_key = 0; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c index ad10c9b..4453a85 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.3 2015/01/26 06:11:28 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.4 2015/04/22 01:38:36 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void) ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); - k3 = get_private("ed25519_2"); + k3 = get_private("rsa_1"); build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4), SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c index b352a11..40ab7b1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.19 2014/11/18 22:38:48 mikeb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.20 2015/03/16 11:09:52 djm Exp $ */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.c diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c index b6f6258..2462bcc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <linux/net.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/seccomp.h> @@ -79,6 +80,16 @@ #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) +#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \ + /* load first syscall argument */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ + /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { @@ -90,45 +101,105 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + + /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ +#ifdef __NR_fstat + SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_fstat64 + SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_open SC_DENY(open, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_openat + SC_DENY(openat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_newfstatat + SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat SC_DENY(stat, EACCES), - SC_ALLOW(getpid), - SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat64 + SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES), +#endif + + /* Syscalls to permit */ +#ifdef __NR_brk + SC_ALLOW(brk), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime), -#ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */ - SC_ALLOW(time), #endif - SC_ALLOW(read), - SC_ALLOW(write), +#ifdef __NR_close SC_ALLOW(close), -#ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */ - SC_ALLOW(shutdown), #endif - SC_ALLOW(brk), - SC_ALLOW(poll), -#ifdef __NR__newselect - SC_ALLOW(_newselect), -#else - SC_ALLOW(select), +#ifdef __NR_exit + SC_ALLOW(exit), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_exit_group + SC_ALLOW(exit_group), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpgid + SC_ALLOW(getpgid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpid + SC_ALLOW(getpid), #endif +#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday + SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_madvise SC_ALLOW(madvise), -#ifdef __NR_mmap2 /* EABI ARM only has mmap2() */ - SC_ALLOW(mmap2), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap SC_ALLOW(mmap), #endif -#ifdef __dietlibc__ +#ifdef __NR_mmap2 + SC_ALLOW(mmap2), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mremap SC_ALLOW(mremap), - SC_ALLOW(exit), #endif +#ifdef __NR_munmap SC_ALLOW(munmap), - SC_ALLOW(exit_group), +#endif +#ifdef __NR__newselect + SC_ALLOW(_newselect), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_poll + SC_ALLOW(poll), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_pselect6 + SC_ALLOW(pselect6), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_read + SC_ALLOW(read), +#endif #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask), -#else +#endif +#ifdef __NR_select + SC_ALLOW(select), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_shutdown + SC_ALLOW(shutdown), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask), #endif +#ifdef __NR_time + SC_ALLOW(time), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_write + SC_ALLOW(write), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_socketcall + SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), +#endif + + /* Default deny */ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), }; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c index f30e705..03b0d40 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.14 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.16 2015/06/29 22:35:12 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> * @@ -50,8 +50,9 @@ struct sandbox_policy { /* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = { - { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, - + { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #ifdef SYS_getentropy /* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */ { SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, @@ -59,23 +60,21 @@ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = { /* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */ { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #endif - -#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog - { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, -#endif - { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, + { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog + { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.c b/crypto/openssh/scp.c index 887b014..593fe89 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/scp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.181 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.182 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). @@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) if (bp->buf == NULL) bp->buf = xmalloc(size); else - bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size); + bp->buf = xreallocarray(bp->buf, 1, size); memset(bp->buf, 0, size); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c index 44da294..a997cef 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ - -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.260 2015/02/02 01:57:44 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.274 2015/07/01 02:32:17 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -80,6 +79,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; + options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; + options->num_queued_listens = 0; options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->address_family = -1; options->num_host_key_files = 0; @@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; @@ -161,6 +163,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; @@ -207,6 +211,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->address_family == -1) + options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) @@ -273,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; + if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) + options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 0; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) @@ -351,6 +359,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++) @@ -393,11 +402,13 @@ typedef enum { sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, - sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, + sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, + sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, @@ -464,9 +475,11 @@ static struct { #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -530,6 +543,8 @@ static struct { { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -596,10 +611,6 @@ add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { u_int i; - if (options->num_ports == 0) - options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; - if (options->address_family == -1) - options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (port == 0) for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]); @@ -629,6 +640,51 @@ add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) options->listen_addrs = aitop; } +/* + * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports + * and AddressFamily options. + */ +static void +queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) +{ + options->queued_listen_addrs = xreallocarray( + options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens + 1, + sizeof(addr)); + options->queued_listen_ports = xreallocarray( + options->queued_listen_ports, options->num_queued_listens + 1, + sizeof(port)); + options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens] = + xstrdup(addr); + options->queued_listen_ports[options->num_queued_listens] = port; + options->num_queued_listens++; +} + +/* + * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries. + */ +static void +process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) +{ + u_int i; + + if (options->num_ports == 0) + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->address_family == -1) + options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; + + for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) { + add_listen_addr(options, options->queued_listen_addrs[i], + options->queued_listen_ports[i]); + free(options->queued_listen_addrs[i]); + options->queued_listen_addrs[i] = NULL; + } + free(options->queued_listen_addrs); + options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; + free(options->queued_listen_ports); + options->queued_listen_ports = NULL; + options->num_queued_listens = 0; +} + struct connection_info * get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns) { @@ -714,7 +770,6 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) { int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; - size_t len; if (ci == NULL) debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); @@ -741,13 +796,12 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); return -1; } - len = strlen(arg); if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } - if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, len, 0) != 1) + if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " @@ -768,7 +822,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) result = 0; continue; } - if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg, len) != 1) + if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " @@ -945,9 +999,6 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) return 0; - if (options->listen_addrs != NULL) - fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before " - "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum); if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", filename, linenum); @@ -983,7 +1034,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); - if (*intptr == -1) + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; @@ -999,7 +1050,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { - add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); + queue_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); break; } p = hpdelim(&arg); @@ -1012,16 +1063,13 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum); - add_listen_addr(options, p, port); + queue_listen_addr(options, p, port); break; case sAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; - if (options->listen_addrs != NULL) - fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified " - "before ListenAddress.", filename, linenum); parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') @@ -1175,6 +1223,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; + case sGssStrictAcceptor: + intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; + goto parse_flag; + case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; @@ -1449,7 +1501,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, len = strlen(p) + 1; while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { len += 1 + strlen(arg); - p = xrealloc(p, 1, len); + p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len); strlcat(p, " ", len); strlcat(p, arg, len); } @@ -1564,7 +1616,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/" "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); - if (*intptr == -1) + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; @@ -1617,7 +1669,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, break; case sForceCommand: - if (cp == NULL) + if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); @@ -1662,7 +1714,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, break; case sVersionAddendum: - if (cp == NULL) + if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); @@ -1702,8 +1754,36 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; + case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand: + if (cp == NULL) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (*activep && + options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) { + if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be " + "an absolute path", filename, linenum); + options->authorized_principals_command = + xstrdup(cp + len); + } + return 0; + + case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser: + charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user; + + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + case sAuthenticationMethods: - if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) { + if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_auth_methods >= MAX_AUTH_METHODS) @@ -1714,6 +1794,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, fatal("%s line %d: invalid " "authentication method list.", filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) + continue; options->auth_methods[ options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg); } @@ -1723,13 +1805,14 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, case sStreamLocalBindMask: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') - fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", - filename, linenum); + fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask " + "argument.", filename, linenum); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); - options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; + if (*activep) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: @@ -1956,6 +2039,7 @@ parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf, if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); + process_queued_listen_addrs(options); } static const char * @@ -2033,6 +2117,12 @@ dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) } static void +dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val) +{ + printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); +} + +static void dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); @@ -2061,6 +2151,8 @@ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; + if (count <= 0) + return; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); @@ -2074,6 +2166,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) int ret; struct addrinfo *ai; char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL; + char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL; /* these are usually at the top of the config */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) @@ -2081,7 +2174,11 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); - /* ListenAddress must be after Port */ + /* + * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes + * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to + * print these in reverse order. + */ for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), @@ -2090,16 +2187,22 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) : strerror(errno)); } else { + laddr2 = laddr1; if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) - printf("listenaddress [%s]:%s\n", addr, port); + xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s\n%s", + addr, port, laddr2); else - printf("listenaddress %s:%s\n", addr, port); + xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s\n%s", + addr, port, laddr2); + free(laddr2); } } + printf("%s", laddr1); + free(laddr1); /* integer arguments */ #ifdef USE_PAM - dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); #endif dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits); dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); @@ -2109,6 +2212,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); + dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); @@ -2152,6 +2256,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); @@ -2168,9 +2273,12 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, o->authorized_principals_file); - dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum); + dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' + ? "none" : o->version_addendum); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX); @@ -2188,7 +2296,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) o->authorized_keys_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); - dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_cert_files, + dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files, o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h index 9922f0c..606d80c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.116 2015/01/13 07:39:19 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.119 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -58,7 +58,9 @@ typedef struct { u_int num_ports; u_int ports_from_cmdline; int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */ - char *listen_addr; /* Address on which the server listens. */ + u_int num_queued_listens; + char **queued_listen_addrs; + int *queued_listen_ports; struct addrinfo *listen_addrs; /* Addresses on which the server listens. */ int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */ char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */ @@ -116,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct { * authenticated with Kerberos. */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ + int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ @@ -176,9 +179,11 @@ typedef struct { char *chroot_directory; char *revoked_keys_file; char *trusted_user_ca_keys; - char *authorized_principals_file; char *authorized_keys_command; char *authorized_keys_command_user; + char *authorized_principals_file; + char *authorized_principals_command; + char *authorized_principals_command_user; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; @@ -214,9 +219,11 @@ struct connection_info { M_CP_STROPT(banner); \ M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \ M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \ - M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \ M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c index 42cc981..d99576b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/session.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.277 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.278 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, if (envsize >= 1000) fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); envsize += 50; - env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); + env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); *envsizep = envsize; } /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ @@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ session_new(void) return NULL; debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)", __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); - tmp = xrealloc(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1, + tmp = xreallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); if (tmp == NULL) { error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions", @@ -2253,7 +2253,7 @@ session_env_req(Session *s) for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); - s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1, + s->env = xreallocarray(s->env, s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); s->env[s->num_env].name = name; s->env[s->num_env].val = val; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c index 80f4805..5dbeb47 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.117 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.120 2015/05/28 04:50:53 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org> * @@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", type); sshbuf_free(msg); + free(ret); return(NULL); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0) @@ -621,7 +622,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); } else if (dir) { - *dir = xrealloc(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); + *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); @@ -1384,7 +1385,9 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, "server reordered requests", local_path); } debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); - ftruncate(local_fd, highwater); + if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1) + error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); } if (read_error) { error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s", diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h index 507d763..f814b07 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.26 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.27 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org> @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); /* - * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve + * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int); /* - * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve + * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int, diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c index 4f735cd..d1831bf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.105 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.106 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> -#include <pwd.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdarg.h> @@ -310,7 +309,7 @@ handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp) if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles) return -1; num_handles++; - handles = xrealloc(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); + handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); handle_unused(num_handles - 1); } @@ -1063,7 +1062,7 @@ process_readdir(u_int32_t id) while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (count >= nstats) { nstats *= 2; - stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); + stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); } /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 index 8ee3947..66493f1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ DESCRIPTION -c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed - by the SSH_ASKPASS program mentioned below. Successful - confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the - SSH_ASKPASS program, rather than text entered into the requester. + by ssh-askpass(1). Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero + exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into + the requester. -D Deletes all identities from the agent. @@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ ENVIRONMENT the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by - SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This - is particularly useful when calling ssh-add from a .xsession or - related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary - to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.) + SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to + read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling + ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some + machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null + to make this work.) SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate @@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ EXIT STATUS ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent. SEE ALSO - ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) + ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by @@ -125,4 +126,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 December 21, 2014 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 March 30, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 index 926456f..f02b595 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.61 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.62 2015/03/30 18:28:37 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 30 2015 $ .Dt SSH-ADD 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -88,12 +88,11 @@ The options are as follows: .It Fl c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. -Confirmation is performed by the -.Ev SSH_ASKPASS -program mentioned below. -Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the -.Ev SSH_ASKPASS -program, rather than text entered into the requester. +Confirmation is performed by +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 . +Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 , +rather than text entered into the requester. .It Fl D Deletes all identities from the agent. .It Fl d @@ -156,6 +155,8 @@ and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS +(by default +.Dq ssh-askpass ) and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm @@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ is unable to contact the authentication agent. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c index 98d46d3..9c8da54 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.120 2015/02/21 21:46:57 halex Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.122 2015/03/26 12:32:38 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ static char *default_files[] = { #endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, +#endif NULL }; @@ -164,11 +166,10 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd) { int ret = -1; - if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1) == 0) + if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0) ret = 0; - /* ignore error-code for ssh2 */ - /* XXX revisit */ - ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2); + /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */ + ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1); if (ret == 0) fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); @@ -364,11 +365,16 @@ static int list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp) { char *fp; - int version, r, had_identities = 0; + int r, had_identities = 0; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; size_t i; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + int version = 1; +#else + int version = 2; +#endif - for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) { + for (; version <= 2; version++) { if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, version, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 index 30f4eb3..eb89281 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S authentication agent SYNOPSIS - ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] + ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [command [arg ...]] ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k @@ -32,8 +32,11 @@ DESCRIPTION -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. + -D Foreground mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will + not fork. + -d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not - fork. + fork and will write debug information to standard error. -E fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key @@ -106,4 +109,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 December 21, 2014 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 April 24, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 index ce1f40e..b5e6b0e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.57 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.59 2015/04/24 06:26:49 jmc Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: April 24 2015 $ .Dt SSH-AGENT 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s -.Op Fl dx +.Op Fl Ddx .Op Fl a Ar bind_address .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl t Ar life @@ -93,11 +93,16 @@ Generate C-shell commands on This is the default if .Ev SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. +.It Fl D +Foreground mode. +When this option is specified +.Nm +will not fork. .It Fl d Debug mode. When this option is specified .Nm -will not fork. +will not fork and will write debug information to standard error. .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c index 92315cc..a1938a6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.199 2015/03/04 21:12:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.203 2015/05/15 05:44:21 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <time.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include <util.h> +#endif #include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */ @@ -141,8 +144,12 @@ char socket_name[PATH_MAX]; char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; /* locking */ +#define LOCK_SIZE 32 +#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 +#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1 int locked = 0; -char *lock_passwd = NULL; +char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE]; +char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE]; extern char *__progname; @@ -680,23 +687,45 @@ send: static void process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) { - int r, success = 0; - char *passwd; + int r, success = 0, delay; + char *passwd, passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE]; + static u_int fail_count = 0; + size_t pwlen; - if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, NULL)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) { - locked = 0; - explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd)); - free(lock_passwd); - lock_passwd = NULL; - success = 1; + if (pwlen == 0) { + debug("empty password not supported"); + } else if (locked && !lock) { + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_passwd, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + debug("agent unlocked"); + locked = 0; + fail_count = 0; + explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd)); + success = 1; + } else { + /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */ + if (fail_count < 100) + fail_count++; + delay = 100000 * fail_count; + debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds", + (double)delay/1000000); + usleep(delay); + } + explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash)); } else if (!locked && lock) { + debug("agent locked"); locked = 1; - lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd); + arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt)); + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); success = 1; } - explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); + explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen); free(passwd); send_status(e, success); } @@ -953,7 +982,7 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) } old_alloc = sockets_alloc; new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; - sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); + sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; sockets_alloc = new_alloc; @@ -1161,7 +1190,7 @@ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, - "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" + "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" " [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n" " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -x Exit when the last client disconnects.\n"); @@ -1171,7 +1200,7 @@ usage(void) int main(int ac, char **av) { - int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; + int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno; u_int nalloc; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; @@ -1207,7 +1236,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); seed_rng(); - while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksE:a:t:x")) != -1) { + while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:x")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); @@ -1228,10 +1257,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av) s_flag++; break; case 'd': - if (d_flag) + if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); d_flag++; break; + case 'D': + if (d_flag || D_flag) + usage(); + D_flag++; + break; case 'a': agentsocket = optarg; break; @@ -1251,7 +1285,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) ac -= optind; av += optind; - if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag)) + if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag)) usage(); if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) { @@ -1320,8 +1354,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. */ - if (d_flag) { - log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); + if (D_flag || d_flag) { + log_init(__progname, + d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); @@ -1393,7 +1429,7 @@ skip: parent_alive_interval = 10; idtab_init(); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); - signal(SIGINT, d_flag ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); nalloc = 0; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c index a3c2362..8259d87 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.266 2015/02/26 20:45:47 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.274 2015/05/28 07:37:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" +#else +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" +#endif + /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 @@ -174,23 +180,22 @@ extern char *__progname; char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* moduli.c */ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); +#endif static void type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - u_int maxbits; - int nid; + u_int maxbits, nid; #endif - if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { - fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name); - exit(1); - } + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) + fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); if (*bitsp == 0) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (type == KEY_DSA) @@ -208,10 +213,8 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ? OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS; - if (*bitsp > maxbits) { - fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits); - exit(1); - } + if (*bitsp > maxbits) + fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits); if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits"); else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768) @@ -256,13 +259,13 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; break; default: - fprintf(stderr, "bad key type\n"); - exit(1); - break; + fatal("bad key type"); } } - snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); - fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); + snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), + "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); + printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); + fflush(stdout); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; @@ -308,14 +311,10 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) char comment[61]; int r; - if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) { - fprintf(stderr, "version 1 keys are not supported\n"); - exit(1); - } - if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } + if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) + fatal("version 1 keys are not supported"); + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) + fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", @@ -544,17 +543,13 @@ get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) line[0] = '\0'; while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { - if (pos >= len - 1) { - fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n"); - exit(1); - } + if (pos >= len - 1) + fatal("input line too long."); switch (c) { case '\r': c = fgetc(fp); - if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) { - fprintf(stderr, "unget: %s\n", strerror(errno)); - exit(1); - } + if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) + fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); return pos; case '\n': return pos; @@ -606,16 +601,12 @@ do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) (encoded[len-3] == '=')) encoded[len-3] = '\0'; blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob)); - if (blen < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n"); - exit(1); - } + if (blen < 0) + fatal("uudecode failed."); if (*private) *k = do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen); - else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } + else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0) + fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(fp); } @@ -749,10 +740,8 @@ do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) } } - if (!ok) { - fprintf(stderr, "key write failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + if (!ok) + fatal("key write failed"); sshkey_free(k); exit(0); } @@ -767,13 +756,11 @@ do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); prv = load_identity(identity_file); if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) - fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + error("key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(prv); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); exit(0); @@ -838,10 +825,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &public, &comment)) != 0) debug2("Error loading public key \"%s\": %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); @@ -933,10 +918,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) } fclose(f); - if (invalid) { - printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (invalid) + fatal("%s is not a public key file.", identity_file); exit(0); } @@ -948,12 +931,16 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) char *key_type_display; char *path; } key_types[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE }, +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, -#endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; @@ -969,7 +956,7 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0) continue; if (errno != ENOENT) { - printf("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, + error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); first = 0; continue; @@ -986,8 +973,7 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed: %s\n", - ssh_err(r)); + error("key_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); first = 0; continue; } @@ -997,8 +983,8 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) hostname); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, "", comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n", identity_file, - ssh_err(r)); + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", + identity_file, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(private); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; @@ -1008,7 +994,7 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) { - printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", + error("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; @@ -1016,14 +1002,14 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) } f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { - printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); + error("fdopen %s failed", identity_file); close(fd); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(f); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; @@ -1064,8 +1050,8 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); if (has_wild && !find_host) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: ignoring host name " - "with wildcard: %.64s\n", l->path, + logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name " + "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, l->linenum, l->hosts); } return 0; @@ -1086,7 +1072,7 @@ known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ ctx->invalid = 1; - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: invalid line\n", l->path, l->linenum); + logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); @@ -1100,6 +1086,12 @@ static int known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + char *fp; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (delete_host) { @@ -1128,7 +1120,12 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) } if (hash_hosts) known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); - else + else if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); + printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host, + sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment); + free(fp); + } else fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } @@ -1136,8 +1133,7 @@ known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { ctx->invalid = 1; - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: invalid line\n", - l->path, l->linenum); + logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } @@ -1150,6 +1146,7 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; + u_int foreach_options; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); @@ -1186,26 +1183,26 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) } /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ + foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; + foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, hash_hosts ? known_hosts_hash : known_hosts_find_delete, &ctx, - name, NULL, find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0)) != 0) + name, NULL, foreach_options)) != 0) fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (inplace) fclose(ctx.out); if (ctx.invalid) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid known_hosts file.\n", - identity_file); + error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); if (inplace) { - fprintf(stderr, "Not replacing existing known_hosts " - "file because of errors\n"); + error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " + "file because of errors"); unlink(tmp); } exit(1); } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { - fprintf(stderr, "Host %s not found in %s\n", - name, identity_file); + logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); unlink(tmp); } else if (inplace) { /* Backup existing file */ @@ -1223,13 +1220,12 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) exit(1); } - fprintf(stderr, "%s updated.\n", identity_file); - fprintf(stderr, "Original contents retained as %s\n", old); + printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); + printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); if (ctx.has_unhashed) { - fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: %s contains unhashed " - "entries\n", old); - fprintf(stderr, "Delete this file to ensure privacy " - "of hostnames\n"); + logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); + logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " + "of hostnames"); } } @@ -1251,10 +1247,8 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { @@ -1272,9 +1266,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) goto badkey; } else if (r != 0) { badkey: - fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load key \"%s\": %s\n", - identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); + fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); } if (comment) printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); @@ -1307,7 +1299,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.\n", + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); @@ -1341,14 +1333,11 @@ do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname) if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; - perror(fname); - exit(1); + fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } - if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) { - printf("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.\n", + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.", fname, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); @@ -1370,18 +1359,15 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment)) == 0) passphrase = xstrdup(""); - else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { - printf("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.\n", + else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } else { + else { if (identity_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) @@ -1394,13 +1380,14 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) &private, &comment)) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); - printf("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.\n", + fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); } } + /* XXX what about new-format keys? */ if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) { - fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n"); + error("Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys."); + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } @@ -1422,7 +1409,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n", + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); @@ -1438,17 +1425,13 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); - if (fd == -1) { - printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (fd == -1) + fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); f = fdopen(fd, "w"); - if (f == NULL) { - printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (f == NULL) + fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) - fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(public); fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment); fclose(f); @@ -1608,8 +1591,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: - fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name); - exit(1); + fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); } } @@ -1631,7 +1613,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); plist = NULL; for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { - plist = xrealloc(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); + plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') fatal("Empty principal name"); } @@ -2216,9 +2198,11 @@ usage(void) " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n" " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n" " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n" +#endif " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]\n" " [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" @@ -2236,19 +2220,22 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; - char *checkpoint = NULL; - char out_file[PATH_MAX], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; + char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int r, opt, type, fd; + int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; + FILE *f; + const char *errstr; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL; u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; - int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; - FILE *f; - const char *errstr; +#endif extern int optind; extern char *optarg; @@ -2267,14 +2254,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); - if (!pw) { - printf("No user exists for uid %lu\n", (u_long)getuid()); - exit(1); - } - if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) { - perror("gethostname"); - exit(1); - } + if (!pw) + fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); + if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Remaining characters: UYdw */ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy" @@ -2305,12 +2288,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) case 'I': cert_key_id = optarg; break; - case 'J': - lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); - break; - case 'j': - start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); - break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; @@ -2352,8 +2329,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) change_comment = 1; break; case 'f': - if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >= - sizeof(identity_file)) + if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, + sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Identity filename too long"); have_identity = 1; break; @@ -2425,20 +2402,31 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) case 'r': rr_hostname = optarg; break; - case 'W': - generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, - UINT_MAX, &errstr); - if (errstr) - fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)", - optarg, errstr); - break; case 'a': rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; + case 'V': + parse_cert_times(optarg); + break; + case 'z': + errno = 0; + cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); + if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || + (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) + fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); + break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + case 'W': + generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, + UINT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)", + optarg, errstr); + break; case 'M': memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) @@ -2467,16 +2455,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) fatal("Invalid start point."); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - case 'V': - parse_cert_times(optarg); - break; - case 'z': - errno = 0; - cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); - if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || - (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) - fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); - break; case '?': default: usage(); @@ -2491,19 +2469,19 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { - printf("Too few arguments.\n"); + error("Too few arguments."); usage(); } } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) { - printf("Too many arguments.\n"); + error("Too many arguments."); usage(); } if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { - printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n"); + error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); usage(); } if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { - printf("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.\n"); + error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); usage(); } if (gen_krl) { @@ -2545,10 +2523,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) if (have_identity) { n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, rr_hostname); - if (n == 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (n == 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); exit(0); } else { @@ -2566,6 +2542,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (do_gen_candidates) { FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w"); @@ -2605,6 +2582,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) fatal("modulus screening failed"); return (0); } +#endif if (gen_all_hostkeys) { do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); @@ -2612,7 +2590,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } if (key_type_name == NULL) - key_type_name = "rsa"; + key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); @@ -2620,14 +2598,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); - if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n"); - exit(1); - } - if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) + fatal("key_generate failed"); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal("key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); @@ -2697,7 +2671,7 @@ passphrase_again: /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n", + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); @@ -2714,18 +2688,13 @@ passphrase_again: printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); - fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); - if (fd == -1) { - printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } - f = fdopen(fd, "w"); - if (f == NULL) { - printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) + fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s", + identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) + fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) - fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c index c5fb3b5..57d8842 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.99 2015/01/30 10:44:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.101 2015/04/10 00:08:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>. * @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ typedef struct Connection { int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */ - int c_done; /* SSH2 done */ + sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ @@ -299,15 +299,18 @@ static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key) { char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; + char *hostport = NULL; if (!key) return; if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("host_hash failed"); - fprintf(stdout, "%s ", host); + hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port); + fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport); sshkey_write(key, stdout); fputs("\n", stdout); + free(hostport); } static int @@ -488,7 +491,7 @@ congreet(int s) confree(s); return; } - fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf)); + fprintf(stderr, "# %s:%d %s\n", c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf)); n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c index bcf897a..5688202 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.47 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.48 2015/03/24 20:09:11 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, if (fail && key != NULL) sshkey_free(key); - else + else if (ret != NULL) *ret = key; return (fail ? -1 : 0); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c index c3a112f..e074175 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.17 2015/02/03 08:07:20 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.19 2015/05/27 05:15:02 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) } }; - char *pin, prompt[1024]; + char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; int rval = -1; key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; @@ -255,22 +255,30 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { if (!pkcs11_interactive) { - error("need pin"); + error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & + CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? + " on reader keypad" : ""); return (-1); } - snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", - si->token.label); - pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); - if (pin == NULL) - return (-1); /* bail out */ - rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, - (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin)); - if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { + if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) + verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); + else { + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); + pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); + if (pin == NULL) + return (-1); /* bail out */ + } + rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, + (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); + if (pin != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin)); free(pin); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } - free(pin); si->logged_in = 1; } key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; @@ -527,7 +535,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ - *keysp = xrealloc(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, + *keysp = xreallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c index aef798d..cdc18a4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.52 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 01:32:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> * @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, } if (b != NULL) sshbuf_free(b); - return 0; + return ret; } int diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 index 5e5f3b5..5aaeb8d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 @@ -354,9 +354,9 @@ DESCRIPTION applications (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the remote command. - -T Disable pseudo-tty allocation. + -T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. - -t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute + -t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty. @@ -510,17 +510,22 @@ AUTHENTICATION whose host key is not known or has changed. When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server - either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the - user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the + either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no + command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a + normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. - If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user - may use the escape characters noted below. + If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a + pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. + The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour. - If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can - be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the - escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent even if - a tty is used. + If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape + characters noted below. + + If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and + can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting + the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent + even if a tty is used. The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. @@ -638,16 +643,20 @@ VERIFYING HOST KEYS $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be - accepted or rejected. Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys - just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare - host keys visually, using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey - option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a - server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By - learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out - that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is - displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern - that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good - probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. + accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server + are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the + fingerprint algorithm to match. + + Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at + fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, + using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small + ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the + session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known + server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed + when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns + are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern + remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, + not guaranteed proof. To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: @@ -948,4 +957,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 March 3, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 May 22, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 index a57341777..9158fda 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.356 2015/03/03 06:48:58 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.358 2015/05/22 05:28:45 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: March 3 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 22 2015 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -586,9 +586,9 @@ of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg.\& .Xr sftp 1 ) . The subsystem is specified as the remote command. .It Fl T -Disable pseudo-tty allocation. +Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. .It Fl t -Force pseudo-tty allocation. +Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. @@ -878,15 +878,26 @@ option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. .Pp When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server -either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives -the user a normal shell on the remote machine. +either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, +if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives +the user a normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. .Pp -If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the +If an interactive session is requested +.Nm +by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive +sessions when the client has one. +The flags +.Fl T +and +.Fl t +can be used to override this behaviour. +.Pp +If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape characters noted below. .Pp -If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, +If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to .Dq none @@ -1097,6 +1108,11 @@ Fingerprints can be determined using .Pp If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. +If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +.Fl E +option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. +.Pp Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c index ae7bfee..19abc06 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.416 2015/03/03 06:48:58 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.418 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -357,10 +357,8 @@ check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname) debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname); for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; - if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, - strlen(rule->source_list), 1) != 1 || - match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, - strlen(rule->target_list), 1) != 1) + if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 || + match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1) continue; verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); @@ -1685,6 +1683,8 @@ ssh_session(void) } /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) + debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ @@ -1786,6 +1786,8 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) + debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 index 3bdd752..b0a614b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ DESCRIPTION require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). - The canonical keywork matches only when the configuration file is + The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the CanonicalizeHostname option.) This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. The exec @@ -165,9 +165,11 @@ DESCRIPTION CheckHostIP If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will additionally check the host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows ssh to - detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. If the option - is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed. The default is - M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. + detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add + addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the + process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If + the option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed. The + default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in protocol version 1. Currently, M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^] are @@ -252,9 +254,8 @@ DESCRIPTION or is not listening. Setting this to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh to listen for control - connections, but require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS - program before they are accepted (see ssh-add(1) for details). - If the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without + connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1). If + the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance. X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these @@ -552,8 +553,8 @@ DESCRIPTION curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, - diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, + diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be @@ -768,12 +769,15 @@ DESCRIPTION Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent to the server. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server - must be configured to accept these environment variables. Refer - to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the server. - Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard - characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by - whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives. The - default is not to send any environment variables. + must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note + that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a + pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. + Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the + server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain + wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be + separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv + directives. The default is not to send any environment + variables. See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. @@ -978,4 +982,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 February 20, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 June 2, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 index 16769a4..9812072 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.205 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.211 2015/06/02 09:10:40 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 20 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 2 2015 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark .Pp The .Cm canonical -keywork matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed +keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option.) @@ -341,7 +341,11 @@ If this flag is set to will additionally check the host IP address in the .Pa known_hosts file. -This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. +This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing +and will add addresses of destination hosts to +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +in the process, regardless of the setting of +.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking . If the option is set to .Dq no , the check will not be executed. @@ -485,11 +489,8 @@ if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. Setting this to .Dq ask will cause ssh -to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the -.Ev SSH_ASKPASS -program before they are accepted (see -.Xr ssh-add 1 -for details). +to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 . If the .Cm ControlPath cannot be opened, @@ -979,8 +980,8 @@ The default is: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, -diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, +diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .Ed .Pp @@ -1337,6 +1338,10 @@ should be sent to the server. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. +Note that the +.Ev TERM +environment variable is always sent whenever a +pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. Refer to .Cm AcceptEnv in diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h index cfaa7f5..b593fd9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Namespace munging inspired by an equivalent hack in NetBSD's tree: add - * the "ssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have + * the "Fssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have * it. This prevents collisions between symbols in libssh and symbols in * other libraries or applications which link with libssh, either directly * or indirectly (e.g. through PAM loading pam_ssh). @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ #define channel_send_window_changes Fssh_channel_send_window_changes #define channel_set_af Fssh_channel_set_af #define channel_set_fds Fssh_channel_set_fds +#define channel_set_x11_refuse_time Fssh_channel_set_x11_refuse_time #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip #define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener @@ -314,6 +315,7 @@ #define dh_new_group1 Fssh_dh_new_group1 #define dh_new_group14 Fssh_dh_new_group14 #define dh_new_group_asc Fssh_dh_new_group_asc +#define dh_new_group_fallback Fssh_dh_new_group_fallback #define dh_pub_is_valid Fssh_dh_pub_is_valid #define dispatch_protocol_error Fssh_dispatch_protocol_error #define dispatch_protocol_ignore Fssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore @@ -846,6 +848,7 @@ #define sshkey_size Fssh_sshkey_size #define sshkey_ssh_name Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name #define sshkey_ssh_name_plain Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name_plain +#define sshkey_to_base64 Fssh_sshkey_to_base64 #define sshkey_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_to_blob #define sshkey_to_certified Fssh_sshkey_to_certified #define sshkey_try_load_public Fssh_sshkey_try_load_public @@ -928,4 +931,5 @@ #define xmalloc Fssh_xmalloc #define xmmap Fssh_xmmap #define xrealloc Fssh_xrealloc +#define xreallocarray Fssh_xreallocarray #define xstrdup Fssh_xstrdup diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c index f1c2d03..d022065 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.3 2015/02/05 12:59:57 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.4 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f) const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { - fprintf(f, "%.4zd: ", i); + fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i); for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { if (j < len) fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c index 44bfa2d..cc0413f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.259 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.262 2015/05/28 05:41:29 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " "address '%.128s' to the list of known " - "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, + "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip, user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " @@ -1351,6 +1351,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, /* key exchange */ /* authenticate user */ + debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); if (compat20) { ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port); ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); @@ -1359,7 +1360,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, ssh_kex(host, hostaddr); ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); #else - fatal("ssh1 is not unsupported"); + fatal("ssh1 is not supported"); #endif } free(local_user); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c index ba56f64..fcaed6b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.223 2015/01/30 11:43:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.224 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -1610,8 +1610,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) continue; if (match_pattern_list( sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]), - authctxt->active_ktype, - strlen(authctxt->active_ktype), 0) != 1) + authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1) continue; /* we take and free the key */ private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 index be6c98e..616ae32 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 @@ -233,7 +233,9 @@ LOGIN PROCESS authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See SSHRC, below. - 9. Runs user's shell or command. + 9. Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the + user's login shell as specified in the system password + database. SSHRC If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment @@ -636,4 +638,4 @@ AUTHORS versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -OpenBSD 5.7 November 15, 2014 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 May 1, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 index affe25c..c2a4aaa 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.278 2014/11/15 14:41:03 bentley Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.279 2015/05/01 07:11:47 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 1 2015 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -427,6 +427,8 @@ See below. .It Runs user's shell or command. +All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the +system password database. .El .Sh SSHRC If the file diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c index 7bdf84c..faeb7a6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.444 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.450 2015/05/24 23:39:16 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -946,6 +946,10 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) int i, nkeys, r; char *fp; + /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) + return; + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { @@ -1109,8 +1113,6 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf) sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters " "error", __func__); -#else - fatal("ssh1 not supported"); #endif } @@ -1476,7 +1478,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip; int remote_port; - char *fp, *line, *logfile = NULL; + char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL; int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; u_int n; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; @@ -1516,7 +1518,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ - while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:C:dDeE:iqrtQRT46")) != -1) { + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, + "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; @@ -1698,7 +1701,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) buffer_init(&cfg); if (rexeced_flag) recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg); - else + else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg); parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, @@ -1719,6 +1722,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); + if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL && + (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0)) + fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser"); /* * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. @@ -2196,9 +2204,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) #endif /* LIBWRAP */ /* Log the connection. */ + laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in); verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d", - remote_ip, remote_port, - get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port()); + remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port()); + free(laddr); /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config index 49018cb..4210b91 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.94 2015/02/02 01:57:44 deraadt Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.95 2015/04/27 21:42:48 djm Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 index be48e13..6410418 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 @@ -20,14 +20,16 @@ DESCRIPTION Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv in ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. Note that - environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. Variables - are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters - M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be separated by - whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv directives. Be - warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass - restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be - taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept - any environment variables. + environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, and that + the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever the client + requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. + Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard + characters M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be + separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv + directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be + used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, + care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default + is not to accept any environment variables. AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid @@ -122,15 +124,25 @@ DESCRIPTION AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. - The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or - others. It will be invoked with a single argument of the - username being authenticated, and should produce on standard - output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see - AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a key supplied by - AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and - authorize the user then public key authentication continues using - the usual AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no - AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. + The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or + others and specified by an absolute path. + + Arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand may be provided using the + following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is + replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being + authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory of the user + being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type offered for + authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of the key, + and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication. + If no arguments are specified then the username of the target + user will be supplied. + + The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines + of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a + key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully + authenticate and authorize the user then public key + authentication continues using the usual AuthorizedKeysFile + files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand @@ -153,6 +165,33 @@ DESCRIPTION listed, separated by whitespace. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\.ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2M-bM-^@M-^]. + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed + certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile. The + program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others + and specified by an absolute path. + + Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand may be provided using + the following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is + replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being + authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory of the + user being authenticated. + + The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines + of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is + specified, then certificates offered by the client for + authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By + default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. + + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser + Specifies the user under whose account the + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a + dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running + authorized principals commands. If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then + sshd(8) will refuse to start. + AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a @@ -344,6 +383,15 @@ DESCRIPTION cache on logout. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck + Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI + acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] then + the client must authenticate against the host service on the + current hostname. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] then the client may + authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's + default store. This facility is provided to assist with + operation on multi homed machines. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. + HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. The default @@ -484,10 +532,8 @@ DESCRIPTION ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all - prior Port options specified. The default is to listen on all - local addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted. - Additionally, any Port options must precede this option for non- - port qualified addresses. + Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local + addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted. LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not @@ -628,7 +674,7 @@ DESCRIPTION PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or - M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. + M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password authentication is disabled for root. @@ -667,7 +713,8 @@ DESCRIPTION PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH - daemon. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid. + daemon, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not write one. The default is + /var/run/sshd.pid. Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also @@ -718,13 +765,14 @@ DESCRIPTION applies to protocol version 2 only. RevokedKeys - Specifies revoked public keys. Keys listed in this file will be - refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is - not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for - all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one - public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) - as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see - the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). + Specifies revoked public keys file, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not use one. + Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key + authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then + public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys + may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, + or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by + ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY + REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication @@ -810,14 +858,15 @@ DESCRIPTION TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for - authentication. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and - comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. If a certificate is - presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in - this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user - listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that - certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted - for authentication using TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on - certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1). + authentication, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not use one. Keys are listed one + per line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. + If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its + signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for + authentication for any user listed in the certificate's + principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of + principals will not be permitted for authentication using + TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the + CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1). UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name and check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps @@ -901,8 +950,8 @@ DESCRIPTION default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. XAuthLocation - Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default - is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. + Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to + not use one. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. TIME FORMATS sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that @@ -943,4 +992,4 @@ AUTHORS versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -OpenBSD 5.7 February 20, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 June 5, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 index ca976e4..2c0d946 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.194 2015/02/20 23:46:01 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.204 2015/06/05 03:44:14 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 20 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2015 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -71,7 +71,11 @@ See in .Xr ssh_config 5 for how to configure the client. -Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. +Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, and +that the +.Ev TERM +environment variable is always sent whenever the client +requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters .Ql * and @@ -231,9 +235,21 @@ The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion of a single authentication method is sufficient. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. -The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others. -It will be invoked with a single argument of the username -being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or +The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and +specified by an absolute path. +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded +at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the +username being authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory +of the user being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type +offered for authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of +the key, and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication. +If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user +will be supplied. +.Pp +The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in .Xr sshd 8 ) . If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate @@ -272,6 +288,42 @@ directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. The default is .Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . +.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed +certificate principals as per +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile . +The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and +specified by an absolute path. +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded +at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the +username being authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory +of the user being authenticated. +.Pp +The program should produce on standard output zero or +more lines of +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +output. +If either +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +or +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication +must contain a principal that is listed. +By default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. +.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser +Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. +It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host +than running authorized principals commands. +If +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +is specified but +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser +is not, then +.Xr sshd 8 +will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. @@ -571,6 +623,21 @@ on logout. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck +Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor +a client authenticates against. +If set to +.Dq yes +then the client must authenticate against the +.Pa host +service on the current hostname. +If set to +.Dq no +then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the +machine's default store. +This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. +The default is +.Dq yes . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. @@ -827,16 +894,13 @@ The following forms may be used: If .Ar port is not specified, -sshd will listen on the address and all prior +sshd will listen on the address and all .Cm Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses. Multiple .Cm ListenAddress options are permitted. -Additionally, any -.Cm Port -options must precede this option for non-port qualified addresses. .It Cm LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. @@ -1173,7 +1237,9 @@ The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the -SSH daemon. +SSH daemon, or +.Dq none +to not write one. The default is .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . .It Cm Port @@ -1263,7 +1329,9 @@ which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RevokedKeys -Specifies revoked public keys. +Specifies revoked public keys file, or +.Dq none +to not use one. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. @@ -1378,7 +1446,9 @@ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are -trusted to sign user certificates for authentication. +trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or +.Dq none +to not use one. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are allowed. @@ -1534,7 +1604,9 @@ The default is .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 -program. +program, or +.Dq none +to not use one. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c index 4768790..cfe5980 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.15 2015/03/06 01:40:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.19 2015/05/21 04:55:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard) if (kt->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (match_pattern_list(kt->name, - p, strlen(p), 0) != 0) + p, 0) != 0) break; } if (kt->type != -1) @@ -761,6 +761,12 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain) if (key == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if (key->cert == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; + } type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type; typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid); @@ -1409,98 +1415,116 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) } int -sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) +sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p) { - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *uu = NULL; + + if (b64p != NULL) + *b64p = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* Success */ + if (b64p != NULL) { + *b64p = uu; + uu = NULL; + } + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + free(uu); + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 u_int bits = 0; char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL; -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { - if (key->cert == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; - if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; + if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL || + key->rsa->n == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; } - if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - switch (key->type) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case KEY_RSA1: - if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL || - key->rsa->n == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } - if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL || - (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - /* size of modulus 'n' */ - if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) { - ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } - if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0) - goto out; + if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL || + (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* size of modulus 'n' */ + if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Success */ + r = 0; + out: + if (dec_e != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(dec_e); + if (dec_n != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(dec_n); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - break; -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - if ((ret = sshkey_putb(key, bb)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(bb)) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + char *uu = NULL; + + if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { + if ((r = sshkey_format_rsa1(key, b)) != 0) goto out; - } - if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s ", sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) + } else { + /* Unsupported key types handled in sshkey_to_base64() */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0) goto out; - if ((ret = sshbuf_put(b, uu, strlen(uu))) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0) goto out; - break; - default: - ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; - goto out; } + r = 0; + out: + free(uu); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0) + goto out; if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) { if (feof(f)) errno = EPIPE; - ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } - ret = 0; + /* Success */ + r = 0; out: - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); - if (bb != NULL) - sshbuf_free(bb); - if (uu != NULL) - free(uu); -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - if (dec_e != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(dec_e); - if (dec_n != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(dec_n); -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - return ret; + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; } const char * @@ -2013,8 +2037,8 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } - if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) == -1) { + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } @@ -2035,10 +2059,10 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } - if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) { + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } @@ -3201,7 +3225,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, const u_char *cp; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t encoded_len; - size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, slen = 0; + size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL; struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; @@ -3311,6 +3335,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, /* setup key */ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; @@ -3326,19 +3351,25 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, } } + /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */ + if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* decrypt private portion of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded), - sshbuf_len(decoded), 0, cipher_authlen(cipher))) != 0) { + encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) { /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */ if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* there should be no trailing data */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) { diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h index 62c1c3e..cdac0e2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.5 2015/01/26 02:59:11 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.6 2015/05/21 04:55:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); +int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **); int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c index d2ff8c1..7bb7641 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c @@ -85,12 +85,12 @@ pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) void pty_release(const char *tty) { -#ifndef __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ +#if !defined(__APPLE_PRIVPTY__) && !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0) error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0) error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); -#endif /* __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ */ +#endif /* !__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ && !HAVE_OPENPTY */ } /* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c index c339283..0702e1d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.37 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.39 2015/06/24 01:49:19 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) if (saved_egroupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (saved_egroupslen > 0) { - saved_egroups = xrealloc(saved_egroups, + saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups, saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) if (user_groupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (user_groupslen > 0) { - user_groups = xrealloc(user_groups, + user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups, user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c index 294c743..7fc867a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.27 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.28 2015/04/24 01:36:24 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ dump_base64(FILE *fp, const u_char *data, u_int len) fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n"); return; } - buf = xmalloc(2*len); + buf = xreallocarray(NULL, 2, len); n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h index fe0609a..88e313b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/version.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.72 2015/03/04 18:53:53 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.73 2015/07/01 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.8" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.9" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c index cd59dc2..98cbf87 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.31 2015/02/06 23:21:59 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.32 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -56,22 +56,14 @@ xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) } void * -xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) +xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *new_ptr; - size_t new_size = nmemb * size; - if (new_size == 0) - fatal("xrealloc: zero size"); - if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) - fatal("xrealloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX"); - if (ptr == NULL) - new_ptr = malloc(new_size); - else - new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size); + new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size); if (new_ptr == NULL) - fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %zu bytes)", - new_size); + fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", + nmemb, size); return new_ptr; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h index 261dfd6..2bec77b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.14 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.15 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ void *xmalloc(size_t); void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t); -void *xrealloc(void *, size_t, size_t); +void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); char *xstrdup(const char *); int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) |
