Flatten the OpenSSH vendor tree for 3.x and newer.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 581 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d23343..0000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,581 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.75 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h>
-#endif
-#include <pwd.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-#include <login.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-#include <shadow.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-#include <libgen.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "groupaccess.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "loginrec.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern int use_privsep;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
-extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
-
-/* Debugging messages */
-Buffer auth_debug;
-int auth_debug_init;
-
-/*
- * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
- * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
- * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
- * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
- * listed there, false will be returned.
- * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
- * Otherwise true is returned.
- */
-int
-allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
-	char *shell;
-	u_int i;
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
-#endif
-
-	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
-	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
-		return 0;
-
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-	if (!options.use_pam)
-		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
-#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
-	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
-		return 0;
-#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
-#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
-
-	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
-#ifdef USE_SHADOW
-	if (spw != NULL)
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
-		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
-#else
-		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF  && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
-#else
-	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
-#endif
-
-	/* check for locked account */
-	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
-		int locked = 0;
-
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
-		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
-			 locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
-		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
-		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
-			 locked = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
-		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
-			locked = 1;
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
-		free(passwd);
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF  && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
-		if (locked) {
-			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
-			    pw->pw_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
-	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
-	 */
-	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
-
-	/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
-	if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
-		logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
-		    pw->pw_name, shell);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
-	    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
-		logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
-		    pw->pw_name, shell);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
-	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
-		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
-		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-	}
-
-	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
-	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.deny_users[i])) {
-				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
-				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
-				return 0;
-			}
-	}
-	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
-	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.allow_users[i]))
-				break;
-		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
-		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
-			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
-			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
-		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
-		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
-			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
-			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
-		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
-			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
-			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
-				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
-				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
-				return 0;
-			}
-		/*
-		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
-		 * isn't listed there
-		 */
-		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
-			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
-			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
-				ga_free();
-				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
-				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
-				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
-				return 0;
-			}
-		ga_free();
-	}
-
-#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
-	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
-		return 0;
-#endif
-
-	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
-	return 1;
-}
-
-void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
-{
-	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
-	char *authmsg;
-
-	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
-		return;
-
-	/* Raise logging level */
-	if (authenticated == 1 ||
-	    !authctxt->valid ||
-	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
-	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-		authlog = logit;
-
-	if (authctxt->postponed)
-		authmsg = "Postponed";
-	else
-		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
-
-	authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
-	    authmsg,
-	    method,
-	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
-	    authctxt->user,
-	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
-	    get_remote_port(),
-	    info);
-
-#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
-	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
-	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
-		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
-		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
-# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	if (authenticated)
-		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
-		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
-		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
- */
-int
-auth_root_allowed(char *method)
-{
-	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
-	case PERMIT_YES:
-		return 1;
-	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
-		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
-			return 1;
-		break;
-	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-		if (forced_command) {
-			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
-			return 1;
-		}
-		break;
-	}
-	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
- * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
- * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
- *
- * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
- */
-static char *
-expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
-	int i;
-
-	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
-	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-
-	/*
-	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
-	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
-	 */
-	if (*file == '/')
-		return (file);
-
-	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
-	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
-		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
-	xfree(file);
-	return (xstrdup(ret));
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
-}
-
-/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
-    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
-{
-	Key *found;
-	char *user_hostfile;
-	struct stat st;
-	HostStatus host_status;
-
-	/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
-	found = key_new(key->type);
-	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
-
-	if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
-		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
-		if (options.strict_modes &&
-		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
-		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
-			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
-			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
-		} else {
-			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-			host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
-			    host, key, found, NULL);
-			restore_uid();
-		}
-		xfree(user_hostfile);
-	}
-	key_free(found);
-
-	debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
-	    "ok" : "not found", host);
-	return host_status;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
- * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
- * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
- *
- * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
- *
- * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
- * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-    char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
-	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
-	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
-	char *cp;
-	int comparehome = 0;
-	struct stat st;
-
-	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
-		    strerror(errno));
-		return -1;
-	}
-	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
-		comparehome = 1;
-
-	/* check the open file to avoid races */
-	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
-	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
-		    buf);
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
-	for (;;) {
-		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
-			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
-			return -1;
-		}
-		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-
-		debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
-		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
-		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-			snprintf(err, errlen,
-			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
-		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
-			debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
-			    buf);
-			break;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
-		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
-		 */
-		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
-			break;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-getpwnamallow(const char *user)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	extern login_cap_t *lc;
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	auth_session_t *as;
-#endif
-#endif
-	struct passwd *pw;
-
-	parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
-	    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
-
-	pw = getpwnam(user);
-	if (pw == NULL) {
-		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
-		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
-#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
-		record_failed_login(user,
-		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	if (!allowed_user(pw))
-		return (NULL);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
-		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
-	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
-		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
-		pw = NULL;
-	}
-	if (as != NULL)
-		auth_close(as);
-#endif
-#endif
-	if (pw != NULL)
-		return (pwcopy(pw));
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
-{
-	char buf[1024];
-	va_list args;
-
-	if (!auth_debug_init)
-		return;
-
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
-	va_end(args);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_send(void)
-{
-	char *msg;
-
-	if (!auth_debug_init)
-		return;
-	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
-		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
-		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
-		xfree(msg);
-	}
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_reset(void)
-{
-	if (auth_debug_init)
-		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
-	else {
-		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
-		auth_debug_init = 1;
-	}
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-fakepw(void)
-{
-	static struct passwd fake;
-
-	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
-	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
-	fake.pw_passwd =
-	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
-	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
-	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw->pw_uid;
-	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
-#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
-	fake.pw_class = "";
-#endif
-	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
-	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
-
-	return (&fake);
-}