From 624d93001f28e236c027516d88282351eb7bffbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: des Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 17:13:05 +0000 Subject: Flatten the OpenSSH vendor tree for 3.x and newer. --- crypto/openssh/auth.c | 581 -------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 581 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 crypto/openssh/auth.c (limited to 'crypto/openssh/auth.c') diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5d23343..0000000 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,581 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.75 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include -#include -#include - -#include - -#include -#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H -# include -#endif -#include -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H -#include -#endif -#ifdef USE_SHADOW -#include -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H -#include -#endif -#include -#include -#include - -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "match.h" -#include "groupaccess.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "servconf.h" -#include "key.h" -#include "hostfile.h" -#include "auth.h" -#include "auth-options.h" -#include "canohost.h" -#include "uidswap.h" -#include "misc.h" -#include "packet.h" -#include "loginrec.h" -#ifdef GSSAPI -#include "ssh-gss.h" -#endif -#include "monitor_wrap.h" - -/* import */ -extern ServerOptions options; -extern int use_privsep; -extern Buffer loginmsg; -extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; - -/* Debugging messages */ -Buffer auth_debug; -int auth_debug_init; - -/* - * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed - * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false - * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed - * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't - * listed there, false will be returned. - * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. - * Otherwise true is returned. - */ -int -allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) -{ - struct stat st; - const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; - char *shell; - u_int i; -#ifdef USE_SHADOW - struct spwd *spw = NULL; -#endif - - /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ - if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) - return 0; - -#ifdef USE_SHADOW - if (!options.use_pam) - spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); -#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE - if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) - return 0; -#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ -#endif /* USE_SHADOW */ - - /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ -#ifdef USE_SHADOW - if (spw != NULL) -#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF) - passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); -#else - passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; -#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */ -#else - passwd = pw->pw_passwd; -#endif - - /* check for locked account */ - if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { - int locked = 0; - -#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING - if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) - locked = 1; -#endif -#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX - if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, - strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) - locked = 1; -#endif -#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR - if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) - locked = 1; -#endif -#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF) - free(passwd); -#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */ - if (locked) { - logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", - pw->pw_name); - return 0; - } - } - - /* - * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is - * legal, and means /bin/sh. - */ - shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; - - /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */ - if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { - logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist", - pw->pw_name, shell); - return 0; - } - if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || - (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { - logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable", - pw->pw_name, shell); - return 0; - } - - if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || - options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { - hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); - ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); - } - - /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ - if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) - if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, - options.deny_users[i])) { - logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " - "because listed in DenyUsers", - pw->pw_name, hostname); - return 0; - } - } - /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ - if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) - if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, - options.allow_users[i])) - break; - /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ - if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { - logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " - "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); - return 0; - } - } - if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { - /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ - if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { - logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " - "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); - return 0; - } - - /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ - if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) - if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, - options.num_deny_groups)) { - ga_free(); - logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " - "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", - pw->pw_name, hostname); - return 0; - } - /* - * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups - * isn't listed there - */ - if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) - if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, - options.num_allow_groups)) { - ga_free(); - logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " - "because none of user's groups are listed " - "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); - return 0; - } - ga_free(); - } - -#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER - if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg)) - return 0; -#endif - - /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ - return 1; -} - -void -auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info) -{ - void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; - char *authmsg; - - if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) - return; - - /* Raise logging level */ - if (authenticated == 1 || - !authctxt->valid || - authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || - strcmp(method, "password") == 0) - authlog = logit; - - if (authctxt->postponed) - authmsg = "Postponed"; - else - authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; - - authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", - authmsg, - method, - authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", - authctxt->user, - get_remote_ipaddr(), - get_remote_port(), - info); - -#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN - if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && - (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || - strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || - strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) - record_failed_login(authctxt->user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); -# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE - if (authenticated) - sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg); -# endif -#endif -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) - audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); -#endif -} - -/* - * Check whether root logins are disallowed. - */ -int -auth_root_allowed(char *method) -{ - switch (options.permit_root_login) { - case PERMIT_YES: - return 1; - case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: - if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) - return 1; - break; - case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: - if (forced_command) { - logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); - return 1; - } - break; - } - logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); - return 0; -} - - -/* - * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename - * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', - * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. - * - * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. - */ -static char * -expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) -{ - char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN]; - int i; - - file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, - "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); - - /* - * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward - * compatible and prepend the '%h/' - */ - if (*file == '/') - return (file); - - i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); - if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) - fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); - xfree(file); - return (xstrdup(ret)); -} - -char * -authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw) -{ - return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw); -} - -char * -authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw) -{ - return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw); -} - -/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ -HostStatus -check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, - const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) -{ - Key *found; - char *user_hostfile; - struct stat st; - HostStatus host_status; - - /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */ - found = key_new(key->type); - host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL); - - if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) { - user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); - if (options.strict_modes && - (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && - ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { - logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " - "bad owner or modes for %.200s", - pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); - } else { - temporarily_use_uid(pw); - host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, - host, key, found, NULL); - restore_uid(); - } - xfree(user_hostfile); - } - key_free(found); - - debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ? - "ok" : "not found", host); - return host_status; -} - - -/* - * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components - * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of - * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. - * - * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? - * - * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and - * error buffer plus max size as arguments. - * - * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure - */ -int -secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, - char *err, size_t errlen) -{ - uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid; - char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; - char *cp; - int comparehome = 0; - struct stat st; - - if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file, - strerror(errno)); - return -1; - } - if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) - comparehome = 1; - - /* check the open file to avoid races */ - if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 || - (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", - buf); - return -1; - } - - /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ - for (;;) { - if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); - return -1; - } - strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); - - debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); - if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || - (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { - snprintf(err, errlen, - "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); - return -1; - } - - /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */ - if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) { - debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", - buf); - break; - } - /* - * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, - * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too - */ - if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) - break; - } - return 0; -} - -struct passwd * -getpwnamallow(const char *user) -{ -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP - extern login_cap_t *lc; -#ifdef BSD_AUTH - auth_session_t *as; -#endif -#endif - struct passwd *pw; - - parse_server_match_config(&options, user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr()); - - pw = getpwnam(user); - if (pw == NULL) { - logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", - user, get_remote_ipaddr()); -#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN - record_failed_login(user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); -#endif -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); -#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ - return (NULL); - } - if (!allowed_user(pw)) - return (NULL); -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP - if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { - debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); - return (NULL); - } -#ifdef BSD_AUTH - if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || - auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { - debug("Approval failure for %s", user); - pw = NULL; - } - if (as != NULL) - auth_close(as); -#endif -#endif - if (pw != NULL) - return (pwcopy(pw)); - return (NULL); -} - -void -auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) -{ - char buf[1024]; - va_list args; - - if (!auth_debug_init) - return; - - va_start(args, fmt); - vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); - va_end(args); - buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf); -} - -void -auth_debug_send(void) -{ - char *msg; - - if (!auth_debug_init) - return; - while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { - msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL); - packet_send_debug("%s", msg); - xfree(msg); - } -} - -void -auth_debug_reset(void) -{ - if (auth_debug_init) - buffer_clear(&auth_debug); - else { - buffer_init(&auth_debug); - auth_debug_init = 1; - } -} - -struct passwd * -fakepw(void) -{ - static struct passwd fake; - - memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); - fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; - fake.pw_passwd = - "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; - fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; - fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw->pw_uid; - fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw->pw_gid; -#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD - fake.pw_class = ""; -#endif - fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; - fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; - - return (&fake); -} -- cgit v1.1