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authorroberto <roberto@FreeBSD.org>2000-01-28 15:02:35 +0000
committerroberto <roberto@FreeBSD.org>2000-01-28 15:02:35 +0000
commit20bb478963082276819617a82e4dbd5c2add8a8d (patch)
treeb15d75cb6347a34405eee5cc1d85b0122243ea6a /contrib/ntp
parent51214ec4a3c747c3b7f197b81d19b985b7dfd738 (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-20bb478963082276819617a82e4dbd5c2add8a8d.zip
FreeBSD-src-20bb478963082276819617a82e4dbd5c2add8a8d.tar.gz
Merge conflicts with the import of 4.0.99b.
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/ntp')
-rw-r--r--contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c498
1 files changed, 269 insertions, 229 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
index 7439b5a..fd59a6b 100644
--- a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
+++ b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static double clock_combine P((struct peer **, int));
static void peer_xmit P((struct peer *));
static void fast_xmit P((struct recvbuf *, int, u_long));
static void clock_update P((void));
+int default_get_precision P((void));
#ifdef MD5
static void make_keylist P((struct peer *));
#endif /* MD5 */
@@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ transmit(
peer->valid++;
if (oreach & 0x80)
peer->valid--;
- if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) &&
- peer->valid > NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) &&
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->valid >
+ NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) &&
peer->status < CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND)
peer->reach = 0;
peer->reach <<= 1;
@@ -261,8 +262,8 @@ receive(
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_PRIVATE) {
if (restrict_mask & RES_NOQUERY)
return;
- process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask & RES_NOMODIFY) ==
- 0));
+ process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask &
+ RES_NOMODIFY) == 0));
return;
}
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_CONTROL) {
@@ -291,17 +292,18 @@ receive(
/*
* If we are not a broadcast client, ignore broadcast packets.
*/
- if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST && !sys_bclient))
+ if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST &&
+ !sys_bclient))
return;
/*
* This is really awful ugly. We figure out whether an extension
* field is present and then measure the MAC size. If the number
* of words following the packet header is less than or equal to
- * 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute the
- * MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an extension
- * field is present and the first word contains the length of
- * the extension field and the MAC follows that.
+ * 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute
+ * the MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an
+ * extension field is present and the first word contains the
+ * length of the extension field and the MAC follows that.
*/
has_mac = 0;
/* pkeyid = 0; */
@@ -323,7 +325,8 @@ receive(
* MAC itself.
*/
/* pkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid2) & 0xffffffff; */
- skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) & 0xffffffff;
+ skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) &
+ 0xffffffff;
}
/*
@@ -366,11 +369,12 @@ receive(
/*
* For multicast mode, generate the session key
- * and install in the key cache. For client mode,
- * generate the session key for the unicast
- * address. For server mode, the session key should
- * already be in the key cache, since it was
- * generated when the last request was sent.
+ * and install in the key cache. For client
+ * mode, generate the session key for the
+ * unicast address. For server mode, the session
+ * key should already be in the key cache, since
+ * it was generated when the last request was
+ * sent.
*/
if (hismode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
tkeyid = session_key(
@@ -391,7 +395,8 @@ receive(
* Compute the cryptosum. Note a clogging attack may
* succceed in bloating the key cache.
*/
- if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen, has_mac))
+ if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen,
+ has_mac))
is_authentic = 1;
else
sys_badauth++;
@@ -411,137 +416,148 @@ receive(
peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd,
hismode, &retcode);
/*
- * The new association matching rules are driven by a table specified
- * in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour of replying
- * to bogus packets in server mode in this version.
- * A packet must now match an association in order to be processed.
- * In the event that no association exists, then an association is
- * mobilized if need be. Two different associations can be mobilized
- * a) passive associations
- * b) client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts.
+ * The new association matching rules are driven by a table
+ * specified in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour
+ * of replying to bogus packets in server mode in this version.
+ * A packet must now match an association in order to be
+ * processed. In the event that no association exists, then an
+ * association is mobilized if need be. Two different
+ * associations can be mobilized a) passive associations b)
+ * client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts.
*/
is_error = 0;
switch (retcode) {
case AM_FXMIT:
- /*
- * If the client is configured purely as a broadcast client and
- * not as an manycast server, it has no business being a server.
- * Simply go home. Otherwise, send a MODE_SERVER response and go
- * home. Note that we don't do a authentication check here,
- * since we can't set the system clock; but, we do set the
- * key ID to zero to tell the caller about this.
- */
- if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) {
- if (is_authentic)
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid);
- else
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0);
- }
-
- /*
- * We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so just
- * toss the key, if appropriate.
- */
- if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
- authtrust(skeyid, 0);
- return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the client is configured purely as a broadcast
+ * client and not as an manycast server, it has no
+ * business being a server. Simply go home. Otherwise,
+ * send a MODE_SERVER response and go home. Note that we
+ * don't do a authentication check here, since we can't
+ * set the system clock; but, we do set the key ID to
+ * zero to tell the caller about this.
+ */
+ if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) {
+ if (is_authentic)
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid);
+ else
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so
+ * just toss the key, if appropriate.
+ */
+ if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(skeyid, 0);
+ return;
case AM_MANYCAST:
- /*
- * This could be in response to a multicast packet sent by
- * the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based on the
- * originate timestamp in the packet. Note that we don't
- * mobilize a new association, unless the packet is properly
- * authenticated. The response must be properly authenticated
- * and it's darn funny of the manycaster isn't around now.
- */
- if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
- peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org);
- if (peer2 == 0) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Create a new association and copy the peer variables to it.
- * If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new association
- * away and return its marbles to the candy store.
- */
- peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
- rbufp->dstadr, MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
- NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
- if (peer == 0) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
- peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer);
- break;
+
+ /*
+ * This could be in response to a multicast packet sent
+ * by the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based
+ * on the originate timestamp in the packet. Note that
+ * we don't mobilize a new association, unless the
+ * packet is properly authenticated. The response must
+ * be properly authenticated and it's darn funny of the
+ * manycaster isn't around now.
+ */
+ if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org);
+ if (peer2 == 0) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new association and copy the peer variables
+ * to it. If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new
+ * association away and return its marbles to the candy
+ * store.
+ */
+ peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
+ MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+ NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
+ if (peer == 0) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer);
+ break;
case AM_ERR:
- /*
- * Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by the
- * code at the end of this adventure.
- */
- is_error = 1;
- break;
+
+ /*
+ * Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by
+ * the code at the end of this adventure.
+ */
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
case AM_NEWPASS:
- /*
- * Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him some
- * memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is properly
- * authenticated.
- */
- if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
- peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
- rbufp->dstadr, MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
- NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
- break;
+
+ /*
+ * Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him
+ * some memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is
+ * properly authenticated.
+ */
+ if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
+ MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+ NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
+ break;
case AM_NEWBCL:
- /*
- * Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if the
- * packet is properly authenticated.
- */
- if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient ||
- (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
- peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
- rbufp->dstadr, MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
- NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
- if (peer == 0)
- break;
- peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST;
- peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
- break;
+
+ /*
+ * Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if
+ * the packet is properly authenticated.
+ */
+ if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient ||
+ (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
+ MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+ NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
+ if (peer == 0)
+ break;
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST;
+ peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
+ break;
case AM_POSSBCL:
case AM_PROCPKT:
- /*
- * It seems like it is okay to process the packet now
- */
- break;
+
+ /*
+ * It seems like it is okay to process the packet now
+ */
+ break;
default:
- /*
- * shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway!
- */
- is_error = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway!
+ */
+ is_error = 1;
}
if (is_error) {
/*
- * Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We scuttle
- * the autokey if necessary and sink the ship. This can
- * occur only upon mobilization, so we can throw the
- * structure away without fear of breaking anything.
+ * Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We
+ * scuttle the autokey if necessary and sink the ship.
+ * This can occur only upon mobilization, so we can
+ * throw the structure away without fear of breaking
+ * anything.
*/
if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
authtrust(skeyid, 0);
@@ -550,8 +566,8 @@ receive(
unpeer(peer);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n", retcode,
- peer_associations);
+ printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n",
+ retcode, peer_associations);
#endif
return;
}
@@ -574,22 +590,23 @@ receive(
/*
* Determine if this guy is basically trustable. If not, flush
- * the bugger. If this is the first packet that is authenticated,
- * flush the clock filter. This is to foil clogging attacks that
- * might starve the poor dear.
+ * the bugger. If this is the first packet that is
+ * authenticated, flush the clock filter. This is to foil
+ * clogging attacks that might starve the poor dear.
*/
peer->flash = 0;
if (is_authentic)
peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
else
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
- if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST))
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask &
+ RES_DONTTRUST))
peer->flash |= TEST10; /* access denied */
if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) {
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENTIC))
- peer->flash |= TEST5; /* authentication failed */
+ peer->flash |= TEST5; /* auth failed */
else if (skeyid == 0)
- peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not authenticated */
+ peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not auth */
else if (!(oflags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)) {
peer_clear(peer);
report_event(EVNT_PEERAUTH, peer);
@@ -598,10 +615,10 @@ receive(
if ((peer->flash & ~(u_int)TEST9) != 0) {
/*
- * The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before becoming
- * a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw the current
- * association away if it is configured or if it has prior
- * reachable friends.
+ * The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before
+ * becoming a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw
+ * the current association away if it is configured or
+ * if it has prior reachable friends.
*/
if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
authtrust(skeyid, 0);
@@ -619,8 +636,8 @@ receive(
#ifdef MD5
/*
* The autokey dance. The cha-cha requires that the hash of the
- * current session key matches the previous key identifier. Heaps
- * of trouble if the steps falter.
+ * current session key matches the previous key identifier.
+ * Heaps of trouble if the steps falter.
*/
if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
int i;
@@ -635,7 +652,8 @@ receive(
} else if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid;
+ i++) {
tkeyid = session_key(
ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr),
@@ -644,7 +662,8 @@ receive(
} else {
if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid;
+ i++) {
tkeyid = session_key(
ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
@@ -660,9 +679,10 @@ receive(
#endif /* MD5 */
/*
- * Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If something
- * breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live, toss it.
- * Be careful in active mode and return a packet anyway.
+ * Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If
+ * something breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live,
+ * toss it. Be careful in active mode and return a packet
+ * anyway.
*/
process_packet(peer, pkt, &(rbufp->recv_time));
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->reach == 0) {
@@ -812,15 +832,15 @@ process_packet(
p_disp = CLOCK_PHI * (peer->rec.l_ui - p_org.l_ui);
/*
- * If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is (t1
- * - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't measure
- * that directly; therefore, we start up in client/server mode,
- * calculate the clock offset, using the engineered refinement
- * algorithms, while also receiving broadcasts. When a broadcast
- * is received in client/server mode, we calculate a correction
- * factor to use after switching back to broadcast mode. We know
- * NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which accounts for the simplified ei
- * calculation.
+ * If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is
+ * (t1 - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't
+ * measure that directly; therefore, we start up in
+ * client/server mode, calculate the clock offset, using the
+ * engineered refinement algorithms, while also receiving
+ * broadcasts. When a broadcast is received in client/server
+ * mode, we calculate a correction factor to use after switching
+ * back to broadcast mode. We know NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which
+ * accounts for the simplified ei calculation.
*
* If FLAG_MCAST2 is set, we are a broadcast/multicast client.
* If FLAG_MCAST1 is set, we haven't calculated the propagation
@@ -870,7 +890,8 @@ process_packet(
clock_filter(peer, p_offset, p_del, fabs(p_disp));
clock_select();
record_peer_stats(&peer->srcadr, ctlpeerstatus(peer),
- peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp, SQRT(peer->variance));
+ peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp,
+ SQRT(peer->variance));
return(1);
}
@@ -943,7 +964,8 @@ clock_update(void)
else
sys_refid = sys_peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr;
sys_reftime = sys_peer->rec;
- sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay + fabs(sys_peer->delay);
+ sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay +
+ fabs(sys_peer->delay);
sys_leap = leap_consensus;
}
if (oleap != sys_leap)
@@ -994,14 +1016,15 @@ poll_update(
else
peer->nextdate += RANDPOLL(BURST_INTERVAL1);
} else {
- update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll), peer->minpoll);
+ update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll),
+ peer->minpoll);
peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(update);
}
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug > 1)
printf("poll_update: at %lu %s poll %d burst %d last %lu next %lu\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll, peer->burst,
- peer->outdate, peer->nextdate);
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll,
+ peer->burst, peer->outdate, peer->nextdate);
#endif
}
@@ -1081,7 +1104,8 @@ clock_filter(
*/
peer->filter_offset[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_offset;
peer->filter_delay[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_delay;
- x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) + sample_disp;
+ x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) +
+ sample_disp;
peer->filter_disp[peer->filter_nextpt] = min(x, MAXDISPERSE);
peer->filter_epoch[peer->filter_nextpt] = current_time;
distance[0] = min(x + fabs(sample_delay) / 2, MAXDISTANCE);
@@ -1117,7 +1141,8 @@ clock_filter(
x = NTP_FWEIGHT * (x + peer->filter_disp[ord[i]]);
if (i < n) {
z += 1. / distance[i];
- off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] / distance[i];
+ off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] /
+ distance[i];
y += DIFF(peer->filter_offset[ord[i]],
peer->filter_offset[ord[0]]);
}
@@ -1241,7 +1266,7 @@ clock_select(void)
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_SYSPEER;
peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_REJECT;
if (peer->flags & FLAG_NOSELECT)
- continue; /* noselect (survey only) */
+ continue; /* noselect (survey) */
if (peer->reach == 0)
continue; /* unreachable */
if (peer->stratum > 1 && peer->refid ==
@@ -1250,7 +1275,7 @@ clock_select(void)
if (root_distance(peer) >= MAXDISTANCE + 2 *
CLOCK_PHI * ULOGTOD(sys_poll)) {
peer->seldisptoolarge++;
- continue; /* too noisy or broken */
+ continue; /* noisy or broken */
}
/*
@@ -1323,7 +1348,7 @@ clock_select(void)
if (debug > 1)
for (i = 0; i < nl3; i++)
printf("select: endpoint %2d %.6f\n",
- endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val);
+ endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val);
#endif
i = 0;
j = nl3 - 1;
@@ -1369,9 +1394,10 @@ clock_select(void)
} else {
if (sys_peer != 0) {
report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG,
- (struct peer *)0);
+ (struct peer *)0);
NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
- msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronisation lost");
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "synchronisation lost");
}
sys_peer = 0;
return;
@@ -1418,7 +1444,7 @@ clock_select(void)
if (debug > 1)
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
printf("select: %s distance %.6f\n",
- ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]);
+ ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]);
#endif
/*
@@ -1508,7 +1534,8 @@ clock_select(void)
typesystem = peer_list[i];
if (peer_list[i]->flags & FLAG_PREFER) {
typeprefer = peer_list[i];
- if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) < clock_max)
+ if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) <
+ clock_max)
pps_update = 1;
}
} else {
@@ -1521,24 +1548,26 @@ clock_select(void)
* Mitigation rules of the game. There are several types of
* peers that make a difference here: (1) prefer local peers
* (type REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK with FLAG_PREFER) or prefer modem
- * peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM etc with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps peers
- * (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers (flag
- * FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5) the
- * head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be
+ * peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM etc with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps
+ * peers (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers
+ * (flag FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5)
+ * the head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be
* declared prefer. The order of preference is in the order
* stated. Note that all of these must be at the lowest stratum,
* i.e., the stratum of the head of the survivor list.
*/
osys_peer = sys_peer;
- if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK ||
- typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE || !typepps)) {
+ if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK
+ || typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE ||
+ !typepps)) {
sys_peer = typeprefer;
sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYSPEER;
sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug > 1)
- printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n", sys_offset);
+ printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n",
+ sys_offset);
#endif
} else if (typepps && pps_update) {
sys_peer = typepps;
@@ -1652,15 +1681,18 @@ peer_xmit(
if (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY) {
/*
- * In SKEY mode, allocate and initialize a key list if
- * not already done. Then, use the list in inverse
- * order, discarding keys once used. Keep the latest
- * key around until the next one, so clients can use
- * client/server packets to compute propagation delay.
- * Note we have to wait until the receive side of the
- * socket is bound and the server address confirmed.
+ * In autokey mode, allocate and initialize a
+ * key list if not already done. Then, use the
+ * list in inverse order, discarding keys once
+ * used. Keep the latest key around until the
+ * next one, so clients can use client/server
+ * packets to compute propagation delay. Note we
+ * have to wait until the receive side of the
+ * socket is bound and the server address
+ * confirmed.
*/
- if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0 &&
+ if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) ==
+ 0 &&
ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0)
peer->keyid = 0;
else {
@@ -1688,13 +1720,13 @@ peer_xmit(
get_systime(&peer->xmt);
L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay);
HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
- sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen);
get_systime(&xmt_tx);
sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, find_rtt ? any_interface :
- peer->dstadr,
- ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
- ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -7,
- &xpkt, sendlen);
+ peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
+ !find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 :
+ peer->ttl) : -7, &xpkt, sendlen);
/*
* Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
@@ -1712,9 +1744,9 @@ peer_xmit(
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
printf(
- "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
- peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber);
+ "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
+ peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber);
#endif
} else {
/*
@@ -1723,10 +1755,9 @@ peer_xmit(
get_systime(&(peer->xmt));
HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
sendpkt(&(peer->srcadr), find_rtt ? any_interface :
- peer->dstadr,
- ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
- ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -8,
- &xpkt, sendlen);
+ peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
+ !find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 :
+ peer->ttl) : -8, &xpkt, sendlen);
peer->sent++;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
@@ -1785,10 +1816,11 @@ fast_xmit(
get_systime(&xmt_ts);
L_ADD(&xmt_ts, &sys_authdelay);
HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
- sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen);
get_systime(&xmt_tx);
sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -9, &xpkt,
- sendlen);
+ sendlen);
/*
* Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
@@ -1805,9 +1837,9 @@ fast_xmit(
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
printf(
- "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
- xmode, xkeyid);
+ "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
+ xmode, xkeyid);
#endif
} else {
@@ -1870,15 +1902,14 @@ make_keylist(
peer->keylist[i] = keyid;
peer->keynumber = i;
keyid = session_key(
- ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
- (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags &
- FLAG_MCAST2)) ?
- ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr):
- ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr),
- keyid, ltemp);
+ ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
+ (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags &
+ FLAG_MCAST2)) ?
+ ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr):
+ ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr), keyid, ltemp);
ltemp -= 1 << peer->hpoll;
if (auth_havekey(keyid) || keyid <= NTP_MAXKEY ||
- ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1)))
+ ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1)))
break;
}
}
@@ -1933,17 +1964,15 @@ default_get_precision(void)
* which drives our timekeeping
*/
j = sizeof freq;
- i = sysctlbyname("kern.timecounter.frequency",
- &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ i = sysctlbyname("kern.timecounter.frequency", &freq, &j , 0,
+ 0);
if (i)
- i = sysctlbyname("machdep.tsc_freq",
- &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ i = sysctlbyname("machdep.tsc_freq", &freq, &j , 0, 0);
if (i)
- i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i586_freq",
- &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i586_freq", &freq, &j , 0, 0);
if (i)
- i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i8254_freq",
- &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i8254_freq", &freq, &j , 0,
+ 0);
if (!i) {
for (i = 1; freq ; i--)
freq >>= 1;
@@ -1979,7 +2008,7 @@ default_get_precision(void)
val = diff;
}
}
- NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO) /* conditional if clause for conditional syslog */
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO)
msyslog(LOG_INFO, "precision = %ld usec", val);
if (usec >= HUSECS)
val = MINSTEP; /* val <= MINSTEP; fast machine */
@@ -2044,9 +2073,9 @@ init_proto(void)
* Some system clocks should only be adjusted in 10ms increments.
*/
#if defined RELIANTUNIX_CLOCK
- systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */
+ systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */
#elif defined SCO5_CLOCK
- if (sys_precision >= (s_char)-10) /* pre- SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 */
+ if (sys_precision >= (s_char)-10) /* pre-SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 */
systime_10ms_ticks = 1;
#endif
if (systime_10ms_ticks)
@@ -2068,21 +2097,24 @@ proto_config(
* Figure out what he wants to change, then do it
*/
switch (item) {
- case PROTO_KERNEL:
+ case PROTO_KERNEL:
+
/*
* Turn on/off kernel discipline
*/
kern_enable = (int)value;
break;
- case PROTO_NTP:
+ case PROTO_NTP:
+
/*
* Turn on/off clock discipline
*/
ntp_enable = (int)value;
break;
- case PROTO_MONITOR:
+ case PROTO_MONITOR:
+
/*
* Turn on/off monitoring
*/
@@ -2092,14 +2124,16 @@ proto_config(
mon_stop(MON_ON);
break;
- case PROTO_FILEGEN:
+ case PROTO_FILEGEN:
+
/*
* Turn on/off statistics
*/
stats_control = (int)value;
break;
- case PROTO_BROADCLIENT:
+ case PROTO_BROADCLIENT:
+
/*
* Turn on/off facility to listen to broadcasts
*/
@@ -2110,39 +2144,45 @@ proto_config(
io_unsetbclient();
break;
- case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD:
+ case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD:
+
/*
* Add muliticast group address
*/
io_multicast_add(value);
break;
- case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL:
+ case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL:
+
/*
* Delete multicast group address
*/
io_multicast_del(value);
break;
- case PROTO_BROADDELAY:
+ case PROTO_BROADDELAY:
+
/*
* Set default broadcast delay
*/
sys_bdelay = dvalue;
break;
- case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE:
+ case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE:
+
/*
* Specify the use of authenticated data
*/
sys_authenticate = (int)value;
break;
- default:
+ default:
+
/*
* Log this error
*/
- msyslog(LOG_ERR, "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld",
+ msyslog(LOG_ERR,
+ "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld",
item, value);
break;
}
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