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authorroberto <roberto@FreeBSD.org>2001-08-29 15:15:59 +0000
committerroberto <roberto@FreeBSD.org>2001-08-29 15:15:59 +0000
commit8a8eed52b94c1c59ad62c02c7e70ba4e63cc78c7 (patch)
treeca798f4ed69eefb14332a8e0512c80c7cdae06ec /contrib/ntp/ntpd
parent198cad9f46ab7adb5602203485beaea56cc32de1 (diff)
downloadFreeBSD-src-8a8eed52b94c1c59ad62c02c7e70ba4e63cc78c7.zip
FreeBSD-src-8a8eed52b94c1c59ad62c02c7e70ba4e63cc78c7.tar.gz
Merge after 4.1.0 import.
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/ntp/ntpd')
-rw-r--r--contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c2559
1 files changed, 1573 insertions, 986 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
index fd59a6b..2374afa 100644
--- a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
+++ b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
@@ -7,15 +7,14 @@
#include <config.h>
#endif
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-
#include "ntpd.h"
#include "ntp_stdlib.h"
#include "ntp_unixtime.h"
#include "ntp_control.h"
#include "ntp_string.h"
+#include "ntp_crypto.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
#if defined(VMS) && defined(VMS_LOCALUNIT) /*wjm*/
#include "ntp_refclock.h"
@@ -26,19 +25,22 @@
#endif
/*
- * System variables are declared here. See Section 3.2 of the
+ * System variables are declared here. See Section 3.2 of the
* specification.
*/
u_char sys_leap; /* system leap indicator */
u_char sys_stratum; /* stratum of system */
s_char sys_precision; /* local clock precision */
-double sys_rootdelay; /* distance to current sync source */
-double sys_rootdispersion; /* dispersion of system clock */
+double sys_rootdelay; /* roundtrip delay to primary source */
+double sys_rootdispersion; /* dispersion to primary source */
u_int32 sys_refid; /* reference source for local clock */
static double sys_offset; /* current local clock offset */
l_fp sys_reftime; /* time we were last updated */
struct peer *sys_peer; /* our current peer */
+struct peer *sys_prefer; /* our cherished peer */
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
u_long sys_automax; /* maximum session key lifetime */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
/*
* Nonspecified system state variables.
@@ -49,10 +51,15 @@ int sys_authenticate; /* requre authentication for config */
l_fp sys_authdelay; /* authentication delay */
static u_long sys_authdly[2]; /* authentication delay shift reg */
static u_char leap_consensus; /* consensus of survivor leap bits */
-static double sys_maxd; /* select error (squares) */
-static double sys_epsil; /* system error (squares) */
-u_long sys_private; /* private value for session seed */
-int sys_manycastserver; /* 1 => respond to manycast client pkts */
+static double sys_selerr; /* select error (squares) */
+static double sys_syserr; /* system error (squares) */
+keyid_t sys_private; /* private value for session seed */
+int sys_manycastserver; /* respond to manycast client pkts */
+u_int sys_survivors; /* truest of the truechimers */
+int peer_ntpdate; /* active peers in ntpdate mode */
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+char *sys_hostname; /* gethostname() name */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
/*
* Statistics counters
@@ -70,12 +77,10 @@ u_long sys_limitrejected; /* pkts rejected due to client count per net */
static double root_distance P((struct peer *));
static double clock_combine P((struct peer **, int));
static void peer_xmit P((struct peer *));
-static void fast_xmit P((struct recvbuf *, int, u_long));
+static void fast_xmit P((struct recvbuf *, int, keyid_t, int));
static void clock_update P((void));
int default_get_precision P((void));
-#ifdef MD5
-static void make_keylist P((struct peer *));
-#endif /* MD5 */
+
/*
* transmit - Transmit Procedure. See Section 3.4.2 of the
@@ -93,116 +98,173 @@ transmit(
u_char oreach;
/*
- * Determine reachability and diddle things if we
- * haven't heard from the host for a while. If the peer
- * is not configured and not likely to stay around,
- * we exhaust it.
+ * The polling state machine. There are two kinds of
+ * machines, those that never expect a reply (broadcast
+ * and manycast server modes) and those that do (all
+ * other modes). The dance is intricate...
*/
+ if (peer->cast_flags & (MDF_BCAST | MDF_MCAST)) {
+
+ /*
+ * In broadcast mode the poll interval is fixed
+ * at minpoll and the ttl at ttlmax.
+ */
+ hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ peer->ttl = peer->ttlmax;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ } else if (peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) {
+
+ /*
+ * In manycast mode we start with the minpoll
+ * interval and ttl. However, the actual poll
+ * interval is eight times the nominal poll
+ * interval shown here. If fewer than three
+ * servers are found, the ttl is increased by
+ * one and we try again. If this continues to
+ * the max ttl, the poll interval is bumped by
+ * one and we try again. If at least three
+ * servers are found, the poll interval
+ * increases with the system poll interval to
+ * the max and we continue indefinately.
+ * However, about once per day when the
+ * agreement parameters are refreshed, the
+ * manycast clients are reset and we start from
+ * the beginning. This is to catch and clamp the
+ * ttl to the lowest practical value and avoid
+ * knocking on spurious doors.
+ */
+ if (sys_survivors < NTP_MINCLOCK && peer->ttl <
+ peer->ttlmax)
+ peer->ttl++;
+ hpoll = sys_poll;
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * For associations expecting a reply, the
+ * watchdog counter is bumped by one if the peer
+ * has not been heard since the previous poll.
+ * If the counter reaches the max, the peer is
+ * demobilized if not configured and just
+ * cleared if it is, but in this case the poll
+ * interval is bumped by one.
+ */
+ if (peer->unreach < NTP_UNREACH) {
+ peer->unreach++;
+ } else if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)) {
+ unpeer(peer);
+ clock_select();
+ return;
+
+ } else {
+ peer_clear(peer);
+ hpoll++;
+ }
+ }
oreach = peer->reach;
- if (oreach & 0x01)
- peer->valid++;
- if (oreach & 0x80)
- peer->valid--;
- if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->valid >
- NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) &&
- peer->status < CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND)
- peer->reach = 0;
peer->reach <<= 1;
if (peer->reach == 0) {
/*
- * If this is an uncofigured association and
- * has become unreachable, demobilize it.
+ * If this association has become unreachable,
+ * clear it and raise a trap.
*/
if (oreach != 0) {
report_event(EVNT_UNREACH, peer);
peer->timereachable = current_time;
- peer_clear(peer);
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)) {
unpeer(peer);
+ clock_select();
return;
+ } else {
+ peer_clear(peer);
+ hpoll = peer->minpoll;
}
}
-
- /*
- * We would like to respond quickly when the
- * peer comes back to life. If the probes since
- * becoming unreachable are less than
- * NTP_UNREACH, clamp the poll interval to the
- * minimum. In order to minimize the network
- * traffic, the interval gradually ramps up the
- * the maximum after that.
- */
- peer->ppoll = peer->maxpoll;
- if (peer->unreach < NTP_UNREACH) {
- if (peer->hmode == MODE_CLIENT)
- peer->unreach++;
- hpoll = peer->minpoll;
- } else {
- hpoll++;
- }
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST)
- peer->burst = 2;
-
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_IBURST)
+ peer->burst = NTP_SHIFT;
} else {
/*
- * Here the peer is reachable. If there is no
- * system peer or if the stratum of the system
- * peer is greater than this peer, clamp the
- * poll interval to the minimum. If less than
- * two samples are in the reachability register,
- * reduce the interval; if more than six samples
- * are in the register, increase the interval.
+ * Here the peer is reachable. If it has not
+ * been heard for three consecutive polls, stuff
+ * the clock filter. Next, determine the poll
+ * interval. If the peer is a synchronization
+ * candidate, use the system poll interval. If
+ * the peer is not sane, increase it by one. If
+ * the number of valid updates is not greater
+ * than half the register size, clamp it to the
+ * minimum. This is to quickly recover the time
+ * variables when a noisy peer shows life.
*/
- peer->unreach = 0;
- if (sys_peer == 0)
- hpoll = peer->minpoll;
- else if (sys_peer->stratum > peer->stratum)
- hpoll = peer->minpoll;
- if ((peer->reach & 0x03) == 0) {
+ if (!(peer->reach & 0x07)) {
clock_filter(peer, 0., 0., MAXDISPERSE);
clock_select();
}
- if (peer->valid <= 2)
- hpoll--;
- else if (peer->valid >= NTP_SHIFT - 2)
+ if ((peer->stratum > 1 && peer->refid ==
+ peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
+ peer->stratum >= STRATUM_UNSPEC)
hpoll++;
+ else
+ hpoll = sys_poll;
if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST)
peer->burst = NTP_SHIFT;
}
} else {
peer->burst--;
if (peer->burst == 0) {
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
- peer->flags &= ~FLAG_BURST;
+
+ /*
+ * If a broadcast client at this point, the
+ * burst has concluded, so we switch to client
+ * mode and purge the keylist, since no further
+ * transmissions will be made.
+ */
+ if (peer->cast_flags & MDF_BCLNT) {
peer->hmode = MODE_BCLIENT;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ key_expire(peer);
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
}
- clock_select();
poll_update(peer, hpoll);
+ clock_select();
+
+ /*
+ * If ntpdate mode and the clock has not been
+ * set and all peers have completed the burst,
+ * we declare a successful failure.
+ */
+ if (mode_ntpdate) {
+ peer_ntpdate--;
+ if (peer_ntpdate > 0)
+ return;
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYNCEVENT | NLOG_SYSEVENT)
+ msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "no reply; clock not set");
+ printf(
+ "ntpd: no reply; clock not set\n");
+ exit(0);
+ }
return;
+
}
}
+ peer->outdate = current_time;
+ poll_update(peer, hpoll);
/*
- * We need to be very careful about honking uncivilized time. If
- * not operating in broadcast mode, honk in all except broadcast
- * client mode. If operating in broadcast mode and synchronized
- * to a real source, honk except when the peer is the local-
- * clock driver and the prefer flag is not set. In other words,
- * in broadcast mode we never honk unless known to be
- * synchronized to real time.
+ * We need to be very careful about honking uncivilized time.
+ * Never transmit if in broadcast client mode or access denied.
+ * If in broadcast mode, transmit only if synchronized to a
+ * valid source.
*/
- if (peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST) {
- if (peer->hmode != MODE_BCLIENT)
- peer_xmit(peer);
- } else if (sys_peer != 0 && sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC) {
- if (!(sys_peer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK &&
- !(sys_peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER)))
- peer_xmit(peer);
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT || peer->flash & TEST4) {
+ return;
+ } else if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
+ if (sys_peer == NULL)
+ return;
}
- peer->outdate = current_time;
- poll_update(peer, hpoll);
+ peer_xmit(peer);
}
/*
@@ -218,482 +280,552 @@ receive(
int hismode;
int oflags;
int restrict_mask;
- int has_mac; /* has MAC field */
- int authlen; /* length of MAC field */
+ int has_mac; /* length of MAC field */
+ int authlen; /* offset of MAC field */
int is_authentic; /* cryptosum ok */
- int is_mystic; /* session key exists */
- int is_error; /* parse error */
-/* u_long pkeyid; */
- u_long skeyid, tkeyid;
+ keyid_t skeyid; /* cryptographic keys */
+ struct sockaddr_in *dstadr_sin; /* active runway */
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ keyid_t pkeyid, tkeyid; /* cryptographic keys */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
struct peer *peer2;
int retcode = AM_NOMATCH;
/*
- * Monitor the packet and get restrictions
+ * Monitor the packet and get restrictions. Note that the packet
+ * length for control and private mode packets must be checked
+ * by the service routines. Note that no statistics counters are
+ * recorded for restrict violations, since these counters are in
+ * the restriction routine. Note the careful distinctions here
+ * between a packet with a format error and a packet that is
+ * simply discarded without prejudice. Some restrictions have to
+ * be handled later in order to generate a kiss-of-death packet.
*/
ntp_monitor(rbufp);
restrict_mask = restrictions(&rbufp->recv_srcadr);
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug > 1)
- printf("receive: from %s restrict %02x\n",
+ if (debug > 2)
+ printf("receive: at %ld %s<-%s restrict %02x\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->dstadr->sin),
ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), restrict_mask);
#endif
if (restrict_mask & RES_IGNORE)
- return;
-
- /*
- * Discard packets with invalid version number.
- */
+ return; /* no anything */
+ if (!(SRCPORT(&rbufp->recv_srcadr) == NTP_PORT ||
+ SRCPORT(&rbufp->recv_srcadr) >= IPPORT_RESERVED)) {
+ sys_badlength++;
+ return; /* invalid port */
+ }
pkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
- if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) >= NTP_VERSION)
- sys_newversionpkt++;
- else if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) >= NTP_OLDVERSION)
- sys_oldversionpkt++;
- else {
+ if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) == NTP_VERSION) {
+ sys_newversionpkt++; /* new version */
+ } else if (!(restrict_mask & RES_VERSION) &&
+ PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) >= NTP_OLDVERSION) {
+ sys_oldversionpkt++; /* old version */
+ } else {
sys_unknownversion++;
- return;
+ return; /* invalid version */
}
-
- /*
- * Restrict control/private mode packets. Note that packet
- * length has to be checked in the control/private mode protocol
- * module.
- */
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_PRIVATE) {
if (restrict_mask & RES_NOQUERY)
- return;
+ return; /* no query private */
process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask &
RES_NOMODIFY) == 0));
return;
}
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_CONTROL) {
if (restrict_mask & RES_NOQUERY)
- return;
+ return; /* no query control */
process_control(rbufp, restrict_mask);
return;
}
+ if (rbufp->recv_length < LEN_PKT_NOMAC) {
+ sys_badlength++;
+ return; /* runt packet */
+ }
/*
- * Restrict revenue packets.
- */
- if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTSERVE)
- return;
-
- /*
- * See if we only accept limited number of clients from the net
- * this guy is from. Note: the flag is determined dynamically
- * within restrictions()
+ * Validate mode. Note that NTPv1 is no longer supported.
*/
- if (restrict_mask & RES_LIMITED) {
- sys_limitrejected++;
- return;
- }
+ hismode = (int)PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
+ if (hismode == MODE_UNSPEC) {
+ sys_badlength++;
+ return; /* invalid mode */
+ }
/*
- * If we are not a broadcast client, ignore broadcast packets.
+ * Discard broadcast packets received on the wildcard interface
+ * or if not enabled as broadcast client.
*/
- if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST &&
- !sys_bclient))
+ if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST &&
+ (rbufp->dstadr == any_interface || !sys_bclient))
return;
/*
- * This is really awful ugly. We figure out whether an extension
- * field is present and then measure the MAC size. If the number
- * of words following the packet header is less than or equal to
- * 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute
- * the MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an
- * extension field is present and the first word contains the
- * length of the extension field and the MAC follows that.
+ * Parse the extension field if present. We figure out whether
+ * an extension field is present by measuring the MAC size. If
+ * the number of words following the packet header is 0 or 1, no
+ * MAC is present and the packet is not authenticated. If 1, the
+ * packet is a reply to a previous request that failed to
+ * authenticate. If 3, the packet is authenticated with DES; if
+ * 5, the packet is authenticated with MD5. If greater than 5,
+ * an extension field is present. If 2 or 4, the packet is a
+ * runt and goes poof! with a brilliant flash.
*/
- has_mac = 0;
-/* pkeyid = 0; */
- skeyid = tkeyid = 0;
+ skeyid = 0;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ pkeyid = tkeyid = 0;
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
authlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
- has_mac = rbufp->recv_length - authlen;
- if (has_mac <= 5 * sizeof(u_int32)) {
- skeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid1) & 0xffffffff;
- } else {
- authlen += (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid1) & 0xffffffff;
- has_mac = rbufp->recv_length - authlen;
- if (authlen <= 0) {
+ while ((has_mac = rbufp->recv_length - authlen) > 0) {
+ int temp;
+
+ if (has_mac % 4 != 0 || has_mac < 0) {
sys_badlength++;
return;
}
+ if (has_mac == 1 * 4 || has_mac == 3 * 4 || has_mac ==
+ MAX_MAC_LEN) {
+ skeyid = ntohl(((u_int32 *)pkt)[authlen / 4]);
+ break;
- /*
- * Note that keyid3 is actually the key ident of the
- * MAC itself.
- */
-/* pkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid2) & 0xffffffff; */
- skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) &
- 0xffffffff;
- }
-
- /*
- * Figure out his mode and validate it.
- */
- hismode = (int)PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
- if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) == NTP_OLDVERSION && hismode ==
- 0) {
- /*
- * Easy. If it is from the NTP port it is
- * a sym act, else client.
- */
- if (SRCPORT(&rbufp->recv_srcadr) == NTP_PORT)
- hismode = MODE_ACTIVE;
- else
- hismode = MODE_CLIENT;
- } else {
- if (hismode != MODE_ACTIVE && hismode != MODE_PASSIVE &&
- hismode != MODE_SERVER && hismode != MODE_CLIENT &&
- hismode != MODE_BROADCAST)
+ } else if (has_mac > MAX_MAC_LEN) {
+ temp = ntohl(((u_int32 *)pkt)[authlen / 4]) &
+ 0xffff;
+ if (temp < 4 || temp % 4 != 0) {
+ sys_badlength++;
+ return;
+ }
+ authlen += temp;
+ } else {
+ sys_badlength++;
return;
+ }
}
/*
- * If he included a mac field, decrypt it to see if it is
- * authentic.
+ * We have tossed out as many buggy packets as possible early in
+ * the game to reduce the exposure to a clogging attack. Now we
+ * have to burn some cycles to find the association and
+ * authenticate the packet if required. Note that we burn only
+ * MD5 or DES cycles, again to reduce exposure. There may be no
+ * matching association and that's okay.
+ *
+ * More on the autokey mambo. Normally the local interface is
+ * found when the association was mobilized with respect to a
+ * designated remote address. We assume packets arriving from
+ * the remote address arrive via this interface and the local
+ * address used to construct the autokey is the unicast address
+ * of the interface. However, if the sender is a broadcaster,
+ * the interface broadcast address is used instead.
+ * Notwithstanding this technobabble, if the sender is a
+ * multicaster, the broadcast address is null, so we use the
+ * unicast address anyway. Don't ask.
*/
- is_authentic = is_mystic = 0;
+ peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd,
+ hismode, &retcode);
+ is_authentic = 0;
+ dstadr_sin = &rbufp->dstadr->sin;
if (has_mac == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf("receive: at %ld from %s mode %d\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
- hismode);
+ printf("receive: at %ld %s<-%s mode %d code %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->dstadr->sin),
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), hismode, retcode);
#endif
} else {
- is_mystic = authistrusted(skeyid);
-#ifdef MD5
- if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY && !is_mystic) {
-
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ /*
+ * For autokey modes, generate the session key
+ * and install in the key cache. Use the socket
+ * broadcast or unicast address as appropriate.
+ */
+ if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
+
/*
- * For multicast mode, generate the session key
- * and install in the key cache. For client
- * mode, generate the session key for the
- * unicast address. For server mode, the session
- * key should already be in the key cache, since
- * it was generated when the last request was
- * sent.
+ * More on the autokey dance (AKD). A cookie is
+ * constructed from public and private values.
+ * For broadcast packets, the cookie is public
+ * (zero). For packets that match no
+ * association, the cookie is hashed from the
+ * addresses and private value. For server
+ * packets, the cookie was previously obtained
+ * from the server. For symmetric modes, the
+ * cookie was previously constructed using an
+ * agreement protocol; however, should PKI be
+ * unavailable, we construct a fake agreement as
+ * the EXOR of the peer and host cookies.
+ *
+ * hismode ephemeral persistent
+ * =======================================
+ * active 0 cookie#
+ * passive 0% cookie#
+ * client sys cookie 0%
+ * server 0% sys cookie
+ * broadcast 0 0
+ *
+ * # if unsync, 0
+ * % can't happen
*/
if (hismode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
+
+ /*
+ * For broadcaster, use the interface
+ * broadcast address when available;
+ * otherwise, use the unicast address
+ * found when the association was
+ * mobilized.
+ */
+ pkeyid = 0;
+ if (rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr
+ != 0)
+ dstadr_sin =
+ &rbufp->dstadr->bcast;
+ } else if (peer == NULL) {
+ pkeyid = session_key(
+ &rbufp->recv_srcadr, dstadr_sin, 0,
+ sys_private, 0);
+ } else {
+ pkeyid = peer->pcookie.key;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The session key includes both the public
+ * values and cookie. In case of an extension
+ * field, the cookie used for authentication
+ * purposes is zero. Note the hash is saved for
+ * use later in the autokey mambo.
+ */
+ if (authlen > LEN_PKT_NOMAC && pkeyid != 0) {
+ session_key(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
+ dstadr_sin, skeyid, 0, 2);
tkeyid = session_key(
- ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
- ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr),
- skeyid, (u_long)(4 * (1 << pkt->ppoll)));
- } else if (hismode != MODE_SERVER) {
+ &rbufp->recv_srcadr, dstadr_sin,
+ skeyid, pkeyid, 0);
+ } else {
tkeyid = session_key(
- ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
- ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
- skeyid, (u_long)(4 * (1 << pkt->ppoll)));
+ &rbufp->recv_srcadr, dstadr_sin,
+ skeyid, pkeyid, 2);
}
}
-#endif /* MD5 */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
/*
* Compute the cryptosum. Note a clogging attack may
- * succceed in bloating the key cache.
+ * succeed in bloating the key cache. If an autokey,
+ * purge it immediately, since we won't be needing it
+ * again.
*/
if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen,
has_mac))
is_authentic = 1;
else
sys_badauth++;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(skeyid, 0);
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
printf(
- "receive: at %ld %s mode %d keyid %08lx mac %d auth %d\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
- hismode, skeyid, has_mac, is_authentic);
+ "receive: at %ld %s<-%s mode %d code %d keyid %08x len %d mac %d auth %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(dstadr_sin),
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), hismode, retcode,
+ skeyid, authlen, has_mac,
+ is_authentic);
#endif
}
/*
- * Find the peer. This will return a null if this guy isn't in
- * the database.
+ * The association matching rules are implemented by a set of
+ * routines and a table in ntp_peer.c. A packet matching an
+ * association is processed by that association. If not and
+ * certain conditions prevail, then an ephemeral association is
+ * mobilized: a broadcast packet mobilizes a broadcast client
+ * aassociation; a server packet mobilizes a client association;
+ * a symmetric active packet mobilizes a symmetric passive
+ * association. And, the adventure continues...
*/
- peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd,
- hismode, &retcode);
- /*
- * The new association matching rules are driven by a table
- * specified in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour
- * of replying to bogus packets in server mode in this version.
- * A packet must now match an association in order to be
- * processed. In the event that no association exists, then an
- * association is mobilized if need be. Two different
- * associations can be mobilized a) passive associations b)
- * client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts.
- */
- is_error = 0;
switch (retcode) {
case AM_FXMIT:
/*
- * If the client is configured purely as a broadcast
- * client and not as an manycast server, it has no
- * business being a server. Simply go home. Otherwise,
- * send a MODE_SERVER response and go home. Note that we
- * don't do a authentication check here, since we can't
- * set the system clock; but, we do set the key ID to
- * zero to tell the caller about this.
+ * This is a client mode packet not matching a known
+ * association. If from a manycast client we run a few
+ * sanity checks before deciding to send a unicast
+ * server response. Otherwise, it must be a client
+ * request, so send a server response and go home.
*/
- if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) {
- if (is_authentic)
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid);
- else
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0);
+ if (sys_manycastserver && (rbufp->dstadr->flags &
+ INT_MULTICAST)) {
+
+ /*
+ * We are picky about responding to a
+ * manycaster. There is no reason to respond to
+ * a request if our time is worse than the
+ * manycaster. We certainly don't reply if not
+ * synchronized to proventic time.
+ */
+ if (sys_peer == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't reply if the our stratum is greater
+ * than the manycaster.
+ */
+ if (PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) < sys_stratum)
+ return;
}
/*
- * We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so
- * just toss the key, if appropriate.
+ * Note that we don't require an authentication check
+ * here, since we can't set the system clock; but, we do
+ * set the key ID to zero to tell the caller about this.
*/
- if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
- authtrust(skeyid, 0);
- return;
+ if (is_authentic)
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid,
+ restrict_mask);
+ else
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0, restrict_mask);
+ return;
case AM_MANYCAST:
/*
- * This could be in response to a multicast packet sent
- * by the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based
- * on the originate timestamp in the packet. Note that
- * we don't mobilize a new association, unless the
- * packet is properly authenticated. The response must
- * be properly authenticated and it's darn funny of the
- * manycaster isn't around now.
+ * This is a server mode packet returned in response to
+ * a client mode packet sent to a multicast group
+ * address. The originate timestamp is a good nonce to
+ * reliably associate the reply with what was sent. If
+ * there is no match, that's curious and could be an
+ * intruder attempting to clog, so we just ignore it.
+ *
+ * First, make sure the packet is authentic. If so and
+ * the manycast association is found, we mobilize a
+ * client mode association, copy pertinent variables
+ * from the manycast to the client mode association and
+ * wind up the spring.
+ *
+ * There is an implosion hazard at the manycast client,
+ * since the manycast servers send the server packet
+ * immediately.
*/
- if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
- peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org);
- if (peer2 == 0) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
+ if ((restrict_mask & (RES_DONTSERVE | RES_LIMITED |
+ RES_NOPEER)) || (sys_authenticate &&
+ !is_authentic))
+ return;
+
+ peer2 = findmanycastpeer(rbufp);
+ if (peer2 == 0)
+ return;
- /*
- * Create a new association and copy the peer variables
- * to it. If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new
- * association away and return its marbles to the candy
- * store.
- */
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
- NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
- if (peer == 0) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
- peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer);
- break;
-
- case AM_ERR:
-
- /*
- * Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by
- * the code at the end of this adventure.
- */
- is_error = 1;
+ sys_minpoll, NTP_MAXDPOLL, FLAG_IBURST |
+ (peer2->flags & (FLAG_AUTHENABLE | FLAG_SKEY)),
+ MDF_UCAST, 0, skeyid);
+ if (peer == NULL)
+ return;
break;
case AM_NEWPASS:
/*
- * Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him
- * some memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is
- * properly authenticated.
+ * This is the first packet received from a symmetric
+ * active peer. First, make sure the packet is
+ * authentic. If so, mobilize a symmetric passive
+ * association.
*/
- if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
+ if ((restrict_mask & (RES_DONTSERVE | RES_LIMITED |
+ RES_NOPEER)) || (sys_authenticate &&
+ !is_authentic)) {
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, 0,
+ restrict_mask);
+ return;
}
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
- NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
+ sys_minpoll, NTP_MAXDPOLL, sys_authenticate ?
+ FLAG_AUTHENABLE : 0, MDF_UCAST, 0, skeyid);
+ if (peer == NULL)
+ return;
break;
case AM_NEWBCL:
/*
- * Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if
- * the packet is properly authenticated.
+ * This is the first packet received from a broadcast
+ * server. First, make sure the packet is authentic, not
+ * restricted and that we are a broadcast or multicast
+ * client. If so, mobilize a broadcast client
+ * association.
*/
- if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient ||
- (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
- is_error = 1;
- break;
- }
+ if ((restrict_mask & (RES_DONTSERVE | RES_LIMITED |
+ RES_NOPEER)) || (sys_authenticate &&
+ !is_authentic) || !sys_bclient)
+ return;
+
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
- MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
- NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
- if (peer == 0)
- break;
- peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST;
- peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
- break;
+ MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+ sys_minpoll, NTP_MAXDPOLL, FLAG_MCAST |
+ FLAG_IBURST | (sys_authenticate ?
+ FLAG_AUTHENABLE : 0), MDF_BCLNT, 0, skeyid);
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+#ifdef PUBKEY
+ if (peer == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY)
+ crypto_recv(peer, rbufp);
+#endif /* PUBKEY */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ return;
case AM_POSSBCL:
case AM_PROCPKT:
/*
- * It seems like it is okay to process the packet now
+ * Happiness and nothing broke. Earn some revenue.
*/
break;
default:
/*
- * shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway!
+ * Invalid mode combination. Leave the island
+ * immediately.
*/
- is_error = 1;
- }
- if (is_error) {
-
- /*
- * Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We
- * scuttle the autokey if necessary and sink the ship.
- * This can occur only upon mobilization, so we can
- * throw the structure away without fear of breaking
- * anything.
- */
- if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
- authtrust(skeyid, 0);
- if (peer != 0)
- if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG))
- unpeer(peer);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n",
- retcode, peer_associations);
+ printf("receive: bad protocol %d\n", retcode);
#endif
return;
}
/*
- * If the peer isn't configured, set his keyid and authenable
- * status based on the packet.
+ * If the peer isn't configured, set his authenable and autokey
+ * status based on the packet. Once the status is set, it can't
+ * be unset. It seems like a silly idea to do this here, rather
+ * in the configuration routine, but in some goofy cases the
+ * first packet sent cannot be authenticated and we need a way
+ * for the dude to change his mind.
*/
oflags = peer->flags;
peer->timereceived = current_time;
+ peer->received++;
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && has_mac) {
peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENABLE;
- if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2)
- peer->keyid = skeyid;
- else
- peer->flags |= FLAG_SKEY;
- }
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_SKEY;
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
}
/*
- * Determine if this guy is basically trustable. If not, flush
- * the bugger. If this is the first packet that is
- * authenticated, flush the clock filter. This is to foil
- * clogging attacks that might starve the poor dear.
+ * A valid packet must be from an authentic and allowed source.
+ * All packets must pass the authentication allowed tests.
+ * Autokey authenticated packets must pass additional tests and
+ * public-key authenticated packets must have the credentials
+ * verified. If all tests are passed, the packet is forwarded
+ * for processing. If not, the packet is discarded and the
+ * association demobilized if appropriate.
*/
peer->flash = 0;
- if (is_authentic)
+ if (is_authentic) {
peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
- else
+ } else {
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
- if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask &
- RES_DONTTRUST))
- peer->flash |= TEST10; /* access denied */
+ }
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST &&
+ (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST)) /* test 4 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST4; /* access denied */
if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) {
- if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENTIC))
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENTIC)) /* test 5 */
peer->flash |= TEST5; /* auth failed */
- else if (skeyid == 0)
- peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not auth */
- else if (!(oflags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)) {
- peer_clear(peer);
+ else if (!(oflags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE))
report_event(EVNT_PEERAUTH, peer);
- }
}
- if ((peer->flash & ~(u_int)TEST9) != 0) {
-
- /*
- * The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before
- * becoming a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw
- * the current association away if it is configured or
- * if it has prior reachable friends.
- */
- if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
- authtrust(skeyid, 0);
- if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->reach == 0)
- unpeer(peer);
+ if (peer->flash) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf(
- "invalid packet 0x%02x code %d assoc %d\n",
- peer->flash, retcode, peer_associations);
+ printf("receive: bad auth %03x\n", peer->flash);
#endif
return;
}
-#ifdef MD5
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
/*
- * The autokey dance. The cha-cha requires that the hash of the
- * current session key matches the previous key identifier.
- * Heaps of trouble if the steps falter.
+ * More autokey dance. The rules of the cha-cha are as follows:
+ *
+ * 1. If there is no key or the key is not auto, do nothing.
+ *
+ * 2. If an extension field contains a verified signature, it is
+ * self-authenticated and we sit the dance.
+ *
+ * 3. If this is a server reply, check only to see that the
+ * transmitted key ID matches the received key ID.
+ *
+ * 4. Check to see that one or more hashes of the current key ID
+ * matches the previous key ID or ultimate original key ID
+ * obtained from the broadcaster or symmetric peer. If no
+ * match, sit the dance and wait for timeout.
*/
- if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
- int i;
-
- /*
- * In the case of a new autokey, verify the hash matches
- * one of the previous four hashes. If not, raise the
- * authentication flasher and hope the next one works.
- */
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY) {
+ peer->flash |= TEST10;
+ crypto_recv(peer, rbufp);
+ poll_update(peer, peer->hpoll);
if (hismode == MODE_SERVER) {
- peer->pkeyid = peer->keyid;
- } else if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
- if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
- authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid;
- i++) {
- tkeyid = session_key(
- ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
- ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr),
- tkeyid, 0);
- }
+ if (skeyid == peer->keyid)
+ peer->flash &= ~TEST10;
+ } else if (!peer->flash & TEST10) {
+ peer->pkeyid = skeyid;
} else {
- if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
- authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid;
- i++) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; ; i++) {
+ if (tkeyid == peer->pkeyid ||
+ tkeyid == peer->recauto.key) {
+ peer->flash &= ~TEST10;
+ peer->pkeyid = skeyid;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i > peer->recauto.seq)
+ break;
tkeyid = session_key(
- ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
- ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
- tkeyid, 0);
+ &rbufp->recv_srcadr, dstadr_sin,
+ tkeyid, pkeyid, 0);
}
}
-#ifdef XXX /* temp until certificate code is mplemented */
- if (tkeyid != peer->pkeyid)
- peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not authentic */
+#ifdef PUBKEY
+
+ /*
+ * This is delicious. Ordinarily, we kick out all errors
+ * at this point; however, in symmetric mode and just
+ * warming up, an unsynchronized peer must inject the
+ * timestamps, even if it fails further up the road. So,
+ * let the dude by here, but only if the jerk is not yet
+ * reachable. After that, he's on his own.
+ */
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_PROVEN))
+ peer->flash |= TEST11;
+ if (peer->flash && peer->reach) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("packet: bad autokey %03x\n",
+ peer->flash);
#endif
- peer->pkeyid = skeyid;
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* PUBKEY */
}
-#endif /* MD5 */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
/*
- * Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If
- * something breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live,
- * toss it. Be careful in active mode and return a packet
- * anyway.
+ * We have survived the gaunt. Forward to the packet routine. If
+ * a symmetric passive association has been mobilized and the
+ * association doesn't deserve to live, it will die in the
+ * transmit routine if not reachable after timeout.
*/
- process_packet(peer, pkt, &(rbufp->recv_time));
- if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->reach == 0) {
- if (peer->hmode == MODE_PASSIVE) {
- if (is_authentic)
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, skeyid);
- else
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, 0);
- }
- unpeer(peer);
- }
+ process_packet(peer, pkt, &rbufp->recv_time);
}
@@ -703,7 +835,7 @@ receive(
* reasonable expectation that we will be having a long term
* relationship with this host.
*/
-int
+void
process_packet(
register struct peer *peer,
register struct pkt *pkt,
@@ -715,10 +847,13 @@ process_packet(
double dtemp;
l_fp p_rec, p_xmt, p_org, p_reftime;
l_fp ci;
- int pmode;
+ int pmode, pleap, pstratum;
/*
- * Swap header fields and keep the books.
+ * Swap header fields and keep the books. The books amount to
+ * the receive timestamp and poll interval in the header. We
+ * need these even if there are other problems in order to crank
+ * up the state machine.
*/
sys_processed++;
peer->processed++;
@@ -731,84 +866,115 @@ process_packet(
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->org, &p_org);
else
p_org = peer->rec;
- peer->rec = *recv_ts;
- peer->ppoll = pkt->ppoll;
- pmode = PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
/*
- * Test for old or duplicate packets (tests 1 through 3).
+ * Test for old, duplicate or unsynch packets (tests 1-3).
*/
+ peer->rec = *recv_ts;
+ pmode = PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
+ pleap = PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode);
+ pstratum = PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum);
if (L_ISHIS(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) /* count old packets */
peer->oldpkt++;
- if (L_ISEQU(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) /* test 1 */
- peer->flash |= TEST1; /* duplicate packet */
- if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_BROADCAST) {
- if (!L_ISEQU(&peer->xmt, &p_org)) { /* test 2 */
- peer->bogusorg++;
- peer->flash |= TEST2; /* bogus packet */
- }
- if (L_ISZERO(&p_rec) || L_ISZERO(&p_org))
- peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynchronized */
- } else {
- if (L_ISZERO(&p_org))
- peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynchronized */
+ if (L_ISEQU(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) /* 1 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST1; /* dupe */
+ if (pmode != MODE_BROADCAST) {
+ if (!L_ISEQU(&peer->xmt, &p_org)) /* 2 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST2; /* bogus */
+ if (L_ISZERO(&p_rec) || L_ISZERO(&p_org)) /* test 3 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynch */
}
+ if (L_ISZERO(&p_xmt)) /* 3 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynch */
peer->org = p_xmt;
/*
- * Test for valid header (tests 5 through 10)
+ * If tests 1-3 fail, the packet is discarded leaving only the
+ * receive and origin timestamps and poll interval, which is
+ * enough to get the protocol started.
+ */
+ if (peer->flash) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("packet: bad data %03x\n",
+ peer->flash);
+#endif
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A kiss-of-death (kod) packet is returned by a server in case
+ * the client is denied access. It consists of the client
+ * request packet with the leap bits indicating never
+ * synchronized, stratum zero and reference ID field the ASCII
+ * string "DENY". If the packet originate timestamp matches the
+ * association transmit timestamp the kod is legitimate. If the
+ * peer leap bits indicate never synchronized, this must be
+ * access deny and the association is disabled; otherwise this
+ * must be a limit reject. In either case a naughty message is
+ * forced to the system log.
+ */
+ if (pleap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC && pstratum >= STRATUM_UNSPEC &&
+ memcmp(&pkt->refid, "DENY", 4) == 0) {
+ if (peer->leap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC) {
+ peer->stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
+ peer->flash |= TEST4;
+ memcpy(&peer->refid, &pkt->refid, 4);
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "access denied");
+ } else {
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "limit reject");
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Test for valid peer data (tests 6-8)
*/
ci = p_xmt;
L_SUB(&ci, &p_reftime);
LFPTOD(&ci, dtemp);
- if (PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode) == LEAP_NOTINSYNC || /* test 6 */
- PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) >= NTP_MAXSTRATUM ||
- dtemp < 0)
- peer->flash |= TEST6; /* peer clock unsynchronized */
- if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && sys_peer != 0) { /* test 7 */
- if (PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) > sys_stratum) {
- peer->flash |= TEST7; /* peer stratum too high */
+ if (pleap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC || /* 6 */
+ pstratum >= STRATUM_UNSPEC || dtemp < 0)
+ peer->flash |= TEST6; /* bad synch */
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && sys_peer != NULL) { /* 7 */
+ if (pstratum > sys_stratum && pmode != MODE_ACTIVE) {
+ peer->flash |= TEST7; /* bad stratum */
sys_badstratum++;
}
}
- if (fabs(p_del) >= MAXDISPERSE /* test 8 */
- || p_disp >= MAXDISPERSE)
- peer->flash |= TEST8; /* delay/dispersion too high */
-
- /*
- * If the packet header is invalid (tests 5 through 10), exit.
- * XXX we let TEST9 sneak by until the certificate code is
- * implemented, but only to mobilize the association.
- */
- if (peer->flash & (TEST5 | TEST6 | TEST7 | TEST8 | TEST10)) {
+ if (p_del < 0 || p_disp < 0 || p_del / /* 8 */
+ 2 + p_disp >= MAXDISPERSE)
+ peer->flash |= TEST8; /* bad peer distance */
+ if (peer->flash) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf(
- "invalid packet header 0x%02x mode %d\n",
- peer->flash, pmode);
+ printf("packet: bad header %03x\n",
+ peer->flash);
#endif
- return (0);
+ return;
}
/*
- * Valid header; update our state.
+ * The header is valid. Capture the remaining header values and
+ * mark as reachable.
*/
- record_raw_stats(&peer->srcadr, &peer->dstadr->sin,
- &p_org, &p_rec, &p_xmt, &peer->rec);
-
- peer->leap = PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode);
- peer->pmode = pmode; /* unspec */
- peer->stratum = PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum);
+ record_raw_stats(&peer->srcadr, &peer->dstadr->sin, &p_org,
+ &p_rec, &p_xmt, &peer->rec);
+ peer->leap = pleap;
+ peer->pmode = pmode;
+ peer->stratum = pstratum;
+ peer->ppoll = pkt->ppoll;
peer->precision = pkt->precision;
peer->rootdelay = p_del;
peer->rootdispersion = p_disp;
peer->refid = pkt->refid;
peer->reftime = p_reftime;
- if (peer->reach == 0) {
+ if (!(peer->reach)) {
report_event(EVNT_REACH, peer);
peer->timereachable = current_time;
}
peer->reach |= 1;
+ peer->unreach = 0;
poll_update(peer, peer->hpoll);
/*
@@ -829,34 +995,25 @@ process_packet(
t23 = p_rec; /* compute t2 - t3 */
L_SUB(&t23, &p_org);
ci = t10;
- p_disp = CLOCK_PHI * (peer->rec.l_ui - p_org.l_ui);
+ p_disp = clock_phi * (peer->rec.l_ui - p_org.l_ui);
/*
* If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is
* (t1 - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't
- * measure that directly; therefore, we start up in
- * client/server mode, calculate the clock offset, using the
- * engineered refinement algorithms, while also receiving
- * broadcasts. When a broadcast is received in client/server
- * mode, we calculate a correction factor to use after switching
- * back to broadcast mode. We know NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which
- * accounts for the simplified ei calculation.
- *
- * If FLAG_MCAST2 is set, we are a broadcast/multicast client.
- * If FLAG_MCAST1 is set, we haven't calculated the propagation
- * delay. If hmode is MODE_CLIENT, we haven't set the local
- * clock in client/server mode. Initially, we come up
- * MODE_CLIENT. When the clock is first updated and FLAG_MCAST2
- * is set, we switch from MODE_CLIENT to MODE_BCLIENT.
+ * measure that directly. Therefore, we start up in MODE_CLIENT
+ * mode, set FLAG_MCAST and exchange eight messages to determine
+ * the clock offset. When the last message is sent, we switch to
+ * MODE_BCLIENT mode. The next broadcast message after that
+ * computes the broadcast offset and clears FLAG_MCAST.
*/
if (pmode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST1) {
- if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT)
- peer->flags &= ~FLAG_MCAST1;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST) {
LFPTOD(&ci, p_offset);
peer->estbdelay = peer->offset - p_offset;
- return (1);
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_CLIENT)
+ return;
+ peer->flags &= ~FLAG_MCAST;
}
DTOLFP(peer->estbdelay, &t10);
L_ADD(&ci, &t10);
@@ -867,32 +1024,29 @@ process_packet(
L_SUB(&t23, &t10);
LFPTOD(&t23, p_del);
}
+ p_del = max(p_del, LOGTOD(sys_precision));
LFPTOD(&ci, p_offset);
- if (fabs(p_del) >= MAXDISPERSE || p_disp >= MAXDISPERSE) /* test 4 */
- peer->flash |= TEST4; /* delay/dispersion too big */
+ if ((peer->rootdelay + p_del) / 2. + peer->rootdispersion +
+ p_disp >= MAXDISPERSE) /* 9 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST9; /* bad peer distance */
/*
- * If the packet data are invalid (tests 1 through 4), exit.
+ * If any flasher bits remain set at this point, abandon ship.
+ * Otherwise, forward to the clock filter.
*/
if (peer->flash) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf("invalid packet data 0x%02x mode %d\n",
- peer->flash, pmode);
+ printf("packet: bad packet data %03x\n",
+ peer->flash);
#endif
- return(1);
+ return;
}
-
-
- /*
- * This one is valid. Mark it so, give it to clock_filter().
- */
- clock_filter(peer, p_offset, p_del, fabs(p_disp));
+ clock_filter(peer, p_offset, p_del, p_disp);
clock_select();
record_peer_stats(&peer->srcadr, ctlpeerstatus(peer),
peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp,
- SQRT(peer->variance));
- return(1);
+ SQRT(peer->jitter));
}
@@ -904,15 +1058,13 @@ clock_update(void)
{
u_char oleap;
u_char ostratum;
- int i;
- struct peer *peer;
/*
* Reset/adjust the system clock. Do this only if there is a
* system peer and we haven't seen that peer lately. Watch for
* timewarps here.
*/
- if (sys_peer == 0)
+ if (sys_peer == NULL)
return;
if (sys_peer->pollsw == FALSE || sys_peer->burst > 0)
return;
@@ -924,60 +1076,58 @@ clock_update(void)
#endif
oleap = sys_leap;
ostratum = sys_stratum;
- switch (local_clock(sys_peer, sys_offset, sys_epsil)) {
+ switch (local_clock(sys_peer, sys_offset, sys_syserr)) {
- case -1:
- /*
- * Clock is too screwed up. Just exit for now.
- */
+ /*
+ * Clock is too screwed up. Just exit for now.
+ */
+ case -1:
report_event(EVNT_SYSFAULT, (struct peer *)0);
exit(1);
/*NOTREACHED*/
- case 1:
- /*
- * Clock was stepped. Clear filter registers
- * of all peers.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < HASH_SIZE; i++) {
- for (peer = peer_hash[i]; peer != 0;
- peer =peer->next)
- peer_clear(peer);
- }
- NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
- msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronisation lost");
- sys_peer = 0;
+ /*
+ * Clock was stepped. Flush all time values of all peers.
+ */
+ case 1:
+ clear_all();
+ sys_peer = NULL;
sys_stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
+ sys_poll = NTP_MINPOLL;
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronisation lost");
report_event(EVNT_CLOCKRESET, (struct peer *)0);
break;
- default:
- /*
- * Update the system stratum, leap bits, root delay,
- * root dispersion, reference ID and reference time. We
- * also update select dispersion and max frequency
- * error.
- */
+ /*
+ * Update the system stratum, leap bits, root delay, root
+ * dispersion, reference ID and reference time. We also update
+ * select dispersion and max frequency error. If the leap
+ * changes, we gotta reroll the keys.
+ */
+ default:
sys_stratum = sys_peer->stratum + 1;
if (sys_stratum == 1)
sys_refid = sys_peer->refid;
else
sys_refid = sys_peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr;
sys_reftime = sys_peer->rec;
- sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay +
- fabs(sys_peer->delay);
+ sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay + sys_peer->delay;
sys_leap = leap_consensus;
}
- if (oleap != sys_leap)
+ if (oleap == LEAP_NOTINSYNC) {
report_event(EVNT_SYNCCHG, (struct peer *)0);
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ expire_all();
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ }
if (ostratum != sys_stratum)
report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG, (struct peer *)0);
}
/*
- * poll_update - update peer poll interval. See Section 3.4.9 of the
- * spec.
+ * poll_update - update peer poll interval
*/
void
poll_update(
@@ -985,46 +1135,83 @@ poll_update(
int hpoll
)
{
- long update;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ int oldpoll;
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
/*
- * The wiggle-the-poll-interval dance. Broadcasters dance only
- * the minpoll beat. Reference clock partners sit this one out.
- * Dancers surviving the clustering algorithm beat to the system
- * clock. Broadcast clients are usually lead by their broadcast
- * partner, but faster in the initial mating dance.
+ * A little foxtrot to determine what controls the poll
+ * interval. If the peer is reachable, but the last four polls
+ * have not been answered, use the minimum. If declared
+ * truechimer, use the system poll interval. This allows each
+ * association to ramp up the poll interval for useless sources
+ * and to clamp it to the minimum when first starting up.
*/
- if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ oldpoll = peer->kpoll;
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ if (hpoll > peer->maxpoll)
+ peer->hpoll = peer->maxpoll;
+ else if (hpoll < peer->minpoll)
peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
- } else if (peer->flags & FLAG_SYSPEER) {
- peer->hpoll = sys_poll;
- } else {
- if (hpoll > peer->maxpoll)
- peer->hpoll = peer->maxpoll;
- else if (hpoll < peer->minpoll)
- peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
- else
- peer->hpoll = hpoll;
- }
+ else
+ peer->hpoll = hpoll;
+
+ /*
+ * Bit of adventure here. If during a burst and not timeout,
+ * just slink away. If timeout, figure what the next timeout
+ * should be. If IBURST or a reference clock, use one second. If
+ * not and the dude was reachable during the previous poll
+ * interval, randomize over 1-4 seconds; otherwise, randomize
+ * over 15-18 seconds. This is to give time for a modem to
+ * complete the call, for example. If not during a burst,
+ * randomize over the poll interval -1 to +2 seconds.
+ *
+ * In case of manycast server, make the poll interval, which is
+ * axtually the manycast beacon interval, eight times the system
+ * poll interval. Normally when the host poll interval settles
+ * up to 17.1 s, the beacon interval settles up to 2.3 hours.
+ */
if (peer->burst > 0) {
if (peer->nextdate != current_time)
return;
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_REFCLOCK)
+#ifdef REFCLOCK
+ else if (peer->flags & FLAG_REFCLOCK)
peer->nextdate++;
+#endif
else if (peer->reach & 0x1)
peer->nextdate += RANDPOLL(BURST_INTERVAL2);
else
peer->nextdate += RANDPOLL(BURST_INTERVAL1);
+ } else if (peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) {
+ if (sys_survivors < NTP_MINCLOCK)
+ peer->kpoll = peer->hpoll;
+ else
+ peer->kpoll = peer->hpoll + 3;
+ peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(peer->kpoll);
} else {
- update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll),
+ peer->kpoll = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll),
peer->minpoll);
- peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(update);
+ peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(peer->kpoll);
}
+ if (peer->nextdate < current_time)
+ peer->nextdate = current_time;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ /*
+ * Bit of crass arrogance at this point. If the poll interval
+ * has changed and we have a keylist, the lifetimes in the
+ * keylist are probably bogus. In this case purge the keylist
+ * and regenerate it later.
+ */
+ if (peer->kpoll != oldpoll)
+ key_expire(peer);
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug > 1)
- printf("poll_update: at %lu %s poll %d burst %d last %lu next %lu\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll,
- peer->burst, peer->outdate, peer->nextdate);
+ printf("poll_update: at %lu %s flags %04x poll %d burst %d last %lu next %lu\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->flags,
+ peer->kpoll, peer->burst, peer->outdate,
+ peer->nextdate);
#endif
}
@@ -1038,28 +1225,72 @@ peer_clear(
)
{
register int i;
+ u_long u_rand;
+ /*
+ * If cryptographic credentials have been acquired, toss them to
+ * Valhalla. Note that autokeys are ephemeral, in that they are
+ * tossed immediately upon use. Therefore, the keylist can be
+ * purged anytime without needing to preserve random keys. Note
+ * that, if the peer is purged, the cryptographic variables are
+ * purged, too. This makes it much harder to sneak in some
+ * unauthenticated data in the clock filter.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("peer_clear: at %ld assoc ID %d\n", current_time,
+ peer->associd);
+#endif
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ key_expire(peer);
+#ifdef PUBKEY
+ if (peer->keystr != NULL)
+ free(peer->keystr);
+ if (peer->pubkey.ptr != NULL)
+ free(peer->pubkey.ptr);
+ if (peer->certif.ptr != NULL)
+ free(peer->certif.ptr);
+#endif /* PUBKEY */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
memset(CLEAR_TO_ZERO(peer), 0, LEN_CLEAR_TO_ZERO);
+
+ /*
+ * If he dies as a broadcast client, he comes back to life as
+ * a broadcast client in client mode in order to recover the
+ * initial autokey values. Note that there is no need to call
+ * clock_select(), since the perp has already been voted off
+ * the island at this point.
+ */
+ if (peer->cast_flags & MDF_BCLNT) {
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST;
+ peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
+ }
+ peer->flags &= ~(FLAG_AUTOKEY | FLAG_ASSOC);
peer->estbdelay = sys_bdelay;
- peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ peer->hpoll = peer->kpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ peer->ppoll = peer->maxpoll;
peer->pollsw = FALSE;
- peer->variance = MAXDISPERSE;
+ peer->jitter = MAXDISPERSE;
peer->epoch = current_time;
+#ifdef REFCLOCK
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_REFCLOCK)) {
+ peer->leap = LEAP_NOTINSYNC;
+ peer->stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
+ }
+#endif
for (i = 0; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++) {
peer->filter_order[i] = i;
peer->filter_disp[i] = MAXDISPERSE;
peer->filter_epoch[i] = current_time;
}
- poll_update(peer, peer->minpoll);
/*
- * Since we have a chance to correct possible funniness in
- * our selection of interfaces on a multihomed host, do so
- * by setting us to no particular interface.
- * WARNING: do so only in non-broadcast mode!
+ * Randomize the first poll over 1-16s to avoid bunching.
*/
- if (peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST)
- peer->dstadr = any_interface;
+ peer->update = peer->outdate = current_time;
+ u_rand = RANDOM;
+ peer->nextdate = current_time + (u_rand & ((1 <<
+ BURST_INTERVAL1) - 1)) + 1;
}
@@ -1069,130 +1300,172 @@ peer_clear(
*/
void
clock_filter(
- register struct peer *peer,
- double sample_offset,
- double sample_delay,
- double sample_disp
+ register struct peer *peer, /* peer structure pointer */
+ double sample_offset, /* clock offset */
+ double sample_delay, /* roundtrip delay */
+ double sample_disp /* dispersion */
)
{
- register int i, j, k, n = 0;
- register u_char *ord;
- double distance[NTP_SHIFT];
- double x, y, z, off;
+ double dst[NTP_SHIFT]; /* distance vector */
+ int ord[NTP_SHIFT]; /* index vector */
+ register int i, j, k, m;
+ double dsp, jit, dtemp, etemp;
/*
- * Update error bounds and calculate distances. Also initialize
- * sort index vector.
+ * Shift the new sample into the register and discard the oldest
+ * one. The new offset and delay come directly from the
+ * timestamp calculations. The dispersion grows from the last
+ * outbound packet or reference clock update to the present time
+ * and increased by the sum of the peer precision and the system
+ * precision. The delay can sometimes swing negative due to
+ * frequency skew, so it is clamped non-negative.
*/
- x = CLOCK_PHI * (current_time - peer->update);
- peer->update = current_time;
- ord = peer->filter_order;
+ dsp = min(LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) +
+ sample_disp, MAXDISPERSE);
j = peer->filter_nextpt;
- for (i = 0; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++) {
- peer->filter_disp[j] += x;
- if (peer->filter_disp[j] > MAXDISPERSE)
- peer->filter_disp[j] = MAXDISPERSE;
- distance[i] = fabs(peer->filter_delay[j]) / 2 +
- peer->filter_disp[j];
- ord[i] = j;
- if (--j < 0)
- j += NTP_SHIFT;
- }
+ peer->filter_offset[j] = sample_offset;
+ peer->filter_delay[j] = max(0, sample_delay);
+ peer->filter_disp[j] = dsp;
+ peer->filter_epoch[j] = current_time;
+ j++; j %=NTP_SHIFT;
+ peer->filter_nextpt = j;
/*
- * Insert the new sample at the beginning of the register.
+ * Update dispersions since the last update and at the same
+ * time initialize the distance and index lists. The distance
+ * list uses a compound metric. If the sample is valid and
+ * younger than the minimum Allan intercept, use delay;
+ * otherwise, use biased dispersion.
*/
- peer->filter_offset[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_offset;
- peer->filter_delay[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_delay;
- x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) +
- sample_disp;
- peer->filter_disp[peer->filter_nextpt] = min(x, MAXDISPERSE);
- peer->filter_epoch[peer->filter_nextpt] = current_time;
- distance[0] = min(x + fabs(sample_delay) / 2, MAXDISTANCE);
- peer->filter_nextpt++;
- if (peer->filter_nextpt >= NTP_SHIFT)
- peer->filter_nextpt = 0;
+ dtemp = clock_phi * (current_time - peer->update);
+ peer->update = current_time;
+ for (i = NTP_SHIFT - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (i != 0) {
+ peer->filter_disp[j] += dtemp;
+ if (peer->filter_disp[j] > MAXDISPERSE)
+ peer->filter_disp[j] = MAXDISPERSE;
+ }
+ if (peer->filter_disp[j] >= MAXDISPERSE)
+ dst[i] = MAXDISPERSE;
+ else if (peer->update - peer->filter_epoch[j] >
+ allan_xpt)
+ dst[i] = MAXDISTANCE + peer->filter_disp[j];
+ else
+ dst[i] = peer->filter_delay[j];
+ ord[i] = j;
+ j++; j %= NTP_SHIFT;
+ }
- /*
- * Sort the samples in the register by distance. The winning
- * sample will be in ord[0]. Sort the samples only if they
- * are younger than the Allen intercept.
+ /*
+ * Sort the samples in both lists by distance.
*/
- y = min(allan_xpt, NTP_SHIFT * ULOGTOD(sys_poll));
- for (n = 0; n < NTP_SHIFT && current_time -
- peer->filter_epoch[ord[n]] <= y; n++) {
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
- if (distance[j] > distance[n]) {
- x = distance[j];
+ for (i = 1; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ if (dst[j] > dst[i]) {
k = ord[j];
- distance[j] = distance[n];
- ord[j] = ord[n];
- distance[n] = x;
- ord[n] = k;
+ ord[j] = ord[i];
+ ord[i] = k;
+ etemp = dst[j];
+ dst[j] = dst[i];
+ dst[i] = etemp;
}
}
- }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the index list to the association structure so ntpq
+ * can see it later. Prune the distance list to samples less
+ * than MAXDISTANCE, but keep at least two valid samples for
+ * jitter calculation.
+ */
+ m = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++) {
+ peer->filter_order[i] = ord[i];
+ if (dst[i] >= MAXDISPERSE || (m >= 2 && dst[i] >=
+ MAXDISTANCE))
+ continue;
+ m++;
+ }
/*
- * Compute the error bound and standard error.
+ * Compute the dispersion and jitter squares. The dispersion
+ * is weighted exponentially by NTP_FWEIGHT (0.5) so it is
+ * normalized close to 1.0. The jitter is the mean of the square
+ * differences relative to the lowest delay sample. If no
+ * acceptable samples remain in the shift register, quietly
+ * tiptoe home leaving only the
+ * dispersion.
*/
- x = y = z = off = 0.;
+ jit = 0;
+ peer->disp = 0;
+ k = ord[0];
for (i = NTP_SHIFT - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- x = NTP_FWEIGHT * (x + peer->filter_disp[ord[i]]);
- if (i < n) {
- z += 1. / distance[i];
- off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] /
- distance[i];
- y += DIFF(peer->filter_offset[ord[i]],
- peer->filter_offset[ord[0]]);
- }
+
+ j = ord[i];
+ peer->disp = NTP_FWEIGHT * (peer->disp +
+ peer->filter_disp[j]);
+ if (i < m)
+ jit += DIFF(peer->filter_offset[j],
+ peer->filter_offset[k]);
}
- peer->delay = peer->filter_delay[ord[0]];
- peer->variance = min(y / n, MAXDISPERSE);
- peer->disp = min(x, MAXDISPERSE);
- peer->epoch = current_time;
- x = peer->offset;
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST)
- peer->offset = off / z;
- else
- peer->offset = peer->filter_offset[ord[0]];
+
+ /*
+ * If no acceptable samples remain in the shift register,
+ * quietly tiptoe home leaving only the dispersion. Otherwise,
+ * save the offset, delay and jitter average. Note the jitter
+ * must not be less than the system precision.
+ */
+ if (m == 0)
+ return;
+ etemp = peer->offset;
+ peer->offset = peer->filter_offset[k];
+ peer->delay = peer->filter_delay[k];
+ if (m > 1)
+ jit /= m - 1;
+ peer->jitter = max(jit, SQUARE(LOGTOD(sys_precision)));
/*
* A new sample is useful only if it is younger than the last
* one used.
*/
- if (peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]] > peer->epoch) {
+ if (peer->filter_epoch[k] <= peer->epoch) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
printf("clock_filter: discard %lu\n",
- peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]] - peer->epoch);
+ peer->epoch - peer->filter_epoch[k]);
#endif
return;
}
/*
- * If the offset exceeds the dispersion by CLOCK_SGATE and the
- * interval since the last update is less than twice the system
- * poll interval, consider the update a popcorn spike and ignore
- * it.
+ * If the difference between the last offset and the current one
+ * exceeds the jitter by CLOCK_SGATE (4) and the interval since
+ * the last update is less than twice the system poll interval,
+ * consider the update a popcorn spike and ignore it.
*/
- if (fabs(x - peer->offset) > CLOCK_SGATE &&
- peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]] - peer->epoch < (1 <<
- (sys_poll + 1))) {
+ if (m > 1 && fabs(peer->offset - etemp) > SQRT(peer->jitter) *
+ CLOCK_SGATE && peer->filter_epoch[k] - peer->epoch <
+ (1 << (sys_poll + 1))) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf("clock_filter: popcorn spike %.6f\n", x);
+ printf("clock_filter: n %d popcorn spike %.6f jitter %.6f\n",
+ m, peer->offset, SQRT(peer->jitter));
#endif
return;
}
- peer->epoch = peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]];
+
+ /*
+ * The mitigated sample statistics are saved for later
+ * processing, but can be processed only once.
+ */
+ peer->epoch = peer->filter_epoch[k];
peer->pollsw = TRUE;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
printf(
- "clock_filter: offset %.6f delay %.6f disp %.6f std %.6f, age %lu\n",
- peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp,
- SQRT(peer->variance), current_time - peer->epoch);
+ "clock_filter: n %d off %.6f del %.6f dsp %.6f jit %.6f, age %lu\n",
+ m, peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp,
+ SQRT(peer->jitter), peer->update - peer->epoch);
#endif
}
@@ -1204,35 +1477,34 @@ void
clock_select(void)
{
register struct peer *peer;
- int i;
- int nlist, nl3;
+ int i, j, k, n;
+ int nreach, nlist, nl3;
double d, e, f;
- int j;
- int n;
- int allow, found, k;
+ int allow, found, sw;
double high, low;
double synch[NTP_MAXCLOCK], error[NTP_MAXCLOCK];
struct peer *osys_peer;
- struct peer *typeacts = 0;
- struct peer *typelocal = 0;
- struct peer *typepps = 0;
- struct peer *typeprefer = 0;
- struct peer *typesystem = 0;
+ struct peer *typeacts = NULL;
+ struct peer *typelocal = NULL;
+ struct peer *typepps = NULL;
+ struct peer *typesystem = NULL;
static int list_alloc = 0;
static struct endpoint *endpoint = NULL;
- static int *index = NULL;
+ static int *indx = NULL;
static struct peer **peer_list = NULL;
static u_int endpoint_size = 0;
- static u_int index_size = 0;
+ static u_int indx_size = 0;
static u_int peer_list_size = 0;
/*
- * Initialize. If a prefer peer does not survive this thing,
- * the pps_update switch will remain zero.
+ * Initialize and create endpoint, index and peer lists big
+ * enough to handle all associations.
*/
- pps_update = 0;
- nlist = 0;
+ osys_peer = sys_peer;
+ sys_peer = NULL;
+ sys_prefer = NULL;
+ nreach = nlist = 0;
low = 1e9;
high = -1e9;
for (n = 0; n < HASH_SIZE; n++)
@@ -1240,49 +1512,58 @@ clock_select(void)
if (nlist > list_alloc) {
if (list_alloc > 0) {
free(endpoint);
- free(index);
+ free(indx);
free(peer_list);
}
while (list_alloc < nlist) {
list_alloc += 5;
- endpoint_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof *endpoint;
- index_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof *index;
- peer_list_size += 5 * sizeof *peer_list;
+ endpoint_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof(*endpoint);
+ indx_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof(*indx);
+ peer_list_size += 5 * sizeof(*peer_list);
}
endpoint = (struct endpoint *)emalloc(endpoint_size);
- index = (int *)emalloc(index_size);
+ indx = (int *)emalloc(indx_size);
peer_list = (struct peer **)emalloc(peer_list_size);
}
/*
- * This first chunk of code is supposed to go through all
- * peers we know about to find the peers which are most likely
- * to succeed. We run through the list doing the sanity checks
- * and trying to insert anyone who looks okay.
+ * Initially, we populate the island with all the rifraff peers
+ * that happen to be lying around. Those with seriously
+ * defective clocks are immediately booted off the island. Then,
+ * the falsetickers are culled and put to sea. The truechimers
+ * remaining are subject to repeated rounds where the most
+ * unpopular at each round is kicked off. When the population
+ * has dwindled to NTP_MINCLOCK (3), the survivors split a
+ * million bucks and collectively crank the chimes.
*/
nlist = nl3 = 0; /* none yet */
for (n = 0; n < HASH_SIZE; n++) {
- for (peer = peer_hash[n]; peer != 0; peer = peer->next) {
+ for (peer = peer_hash[n]; peer != NULL; peer =
+ peer->next) {
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_SYSPEER;
peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_REJECT;
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_NOSELECT)
- continue; /* noselect (survey) */
- if (peer->reach == 0)
- continue; /* unreachable */
- if (peer->stratum > 1 && peer->refid ==
- peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr)
- continue; /* sync loop */
- if (root_distance(peer) >= MAXDISTANCE + 2 *
- CLOCK_PHI * ULOGTOD(sys_poll)) {
- peer->seldisptoolarge++;
- continue; /* noisy or broken */
- }
/*
- * Don't allow the local-clock or acts drivers
+ * A peer leaves the island immediately if
+ * unreachable, synchronized to us or suffers
+ * excessive root distance. Careful with the
+ * root distance, since the poll interval can
+ * increase to a day and a half.
+ */
+ if (!peer->reach || (peer->stratum > 1 &&
+ peer->refid ==
+ peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
+ peer->stratum >= STRATUM_UNSPEC ||
+ (root_distance(peer) >= MAXDISTANCE + 2 *
+ clock_phi * ULOGTOD(sys_poll)))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the local clock or modem drivers
* in the kitchen at this point, unless the
* prefer peer. Do that later, but only if
- * nobody else is around.
+ * nobody else is around. These guys are all
+ * configured, so we never throw them away.
*/
if (peer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK
#if defined(VMS) && defined(VMS_LOCALUNIT)
@@ -1301,9 +1582,11 @@ clock_select(void)
}
/*
- * If we get this far, we assume the peer is
- * acceptable.
+ * If we get this far, the peer can stay on the
+ * island, but does not yet have the immunity
+ * idol.
*/
+ nreach++;
peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SANE;
peer_list[nlist++] = peer;
@@ -1315,40 +1598,41 @@ clock_select(void)
f = root_distance(peer);
e = e + f;
for (i = nl3 - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
+ if (e >= endpoint[indx[i]].val)
break;
- index[i + 3] = index[i];
+ indx[i + 3] = indx[i];
}
- index[i + 3] = nl3;
+ indx[i + 3] = nl3;
endpoint[nl3].type = 1;
endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
e = e - f; /* Center point */
for ( ; i >= 0; i--) {
- if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
+ if (e >= endpoint[indx[i]].val)
break;
- index[i + 2] = index[i];
+ indx[i + 2] = indx[i];
}
- index[i + 2] = nl3;
+ indx[i + 2] = nl3;
endpoint[nl3].type = 0;
endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
e = e - f; /* Lower end */
for ( ; i >= 0; i--) {
- if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
+ if (e >= endpoint[indx[i]].val)
break;
- index[i + 1] = index[i];
+ indx[i + 1] = indx[i];
}
- index[i + 1] = nl3;
+ indx[i + 1] = nl3;
endpoint[nl3].type = -1;
endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug > 1)
+ if (debug > 2)
for (i = 0; i < nl3; i++)
- printf("select: endpoint %2d %.6f\n",
- endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val);
+ printf("select: endpoint %2d %.6f\n",
+ endpoint[indx[i]].type,
+ endpoint[indx[i]].val);
#endif
i = 0;
j = nl3 - 1;
@@ -1357,30 +1641,30 @@ clock_select(void)
while (allow > 0) {
allow--;
for (n = 0; i <= j; i++) {
- n += endpoint[index[i]].type;
+ n += endpoint[indx[i]].type;
if (n < 0)
break;
- if (endpoint[index[i]].type == 0)
+ if (endpoint[indx[i]].type == 0)
found++;
}
for (n = 0; i <= j; j--) {
- n += endpoint[index[j]].type;
+ n += endpoint[indx[j]].type;
if (n > 0)
break;
- if (endpoint[index[j]].type == 0)
+ if (endpoint[indx[j]].type == 0)
found++;
}
if (found > allow)
break;
- low = endpoint[index[i++]].val;
- high = endpoint[index[j--]].val;
+ low = endpoint[indx[i++]].val;
+ high = endpoint[indx[j--]].val;
}
/*
- * If no survivors remain at this point, check if the acts or
- * local clock drivers have been found. If so, nominate one of
- * them as the only survivor. Otherwise, give up and declare us
- * unsynchronized.
+ * If no survivors remain at this point, check if the local
+ * clock or modem drivers have been found. If so, nominate one
+ * of them as the only survivor. Otherwise, give up and declare
+ * us unsynchronized.
*/
if ((allow << 1) >= nlist) {
if (typeacts != 0) {
@@ -1392,35 +1676,45 @@ clock_select(void)
peer_list[0] = typelocal;
nlist = 1;
} else {
- if (sys_peer != 0) {
- report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG,
- (struct peer *)0);
+ if (osys_peer != NULL) {
+ sys_poll = NTP_MINPOLL;
NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
- msyslog(LOG_INFO,
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO,
"synchronisation lost");
+ report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG,
+ (struct peer *)0);
}
- sys_peer = 0;
+ sys_survivors = 0;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ resetmanycast();
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
return;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug > 1)
+ if (debug > 2)
printf("select: low %.6f high %.6f\n", low, high);
#endif
/*
- * Clustering algorithm. Process intersection list to discard
- * outlyers. Construct candidate list in cluster order
- * determined by the sum of peer synchronization distance plus
- * scaled stratum. We must find at least one peer.
+ * Clustering algorithm. Construct candidate list in order first
+ * by stratum then by root distance. If we have more than
+ * MAXCLOCK peers, keep only the best MAXCLOCK of them. Scan the
+ * list to find falsetickers, who leave the island immediately.
+ * If a falseticker is not configured, his association raft is
+ * drowned as well. We must leave at least one peer to collect
+ * the million bucks.
*/
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
peer = peer_list[i];
- if (nlist > 1 && (low >= peer->offset ||
- peer->offset >= high))
+ if (nlist > 1 && (low >= peer->offset || peer->offset >=
+ high)) {
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG))
+ unpeer(peer);
continue;
- peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_CORRECT;
+ }
+ peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_DISTSYSPEER;
d = root_distance(peer) + peer->stratum * MAXDISPERSE;
if (j >= NTP_MAXCLOCK) {
if (d >= synch[j - 1])
@@ -1431,77 +1725,98 @@ clock_select(void)
for (k = j; k > 0; k--) {
if (d >= synch[k - 1])
break;
- synch[k] = synch[k - 1];
peer_list[k] = peer_list[k - 1];
+ error[k] = error[k - 1];
+ synch[k] = synch[k - 1];
}
peer_list[k] = peer;
+ error[k] = peer->jitter;
synch[k] = d;
j++;
}
nlist = j;
+ for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
+ peer_list[i]->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SELCAND;
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug > 1)
- for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
+ if (debug > 2)
printf("select: %s distance %.6f\n",
ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]);
#endif
+ }
/*
- * Now, prune outlyers by root dispersion. Continue as long as
- * there are more than NTP_MINCLOCK survivors and the minimum
- * select dispersion is greater than the maximum peer
- * dispersion. Stop if we are about to discard a prefer peer.
+ * Now, vote outlyers off the island by select jitter weighted
+ * by root dispersion. Continue voting as long as there are more
+ * than NTP_MINCLOCK survivors and the minimum select jitter
+ * squared is greater than the maximum peer jitter squared. Stop
+ * if we are about to discard a prefer peer, who of course has
+ * the immunity idol.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
- peer = peer_list[i];
- error[i] = peer->variance;
- if (i < NTP_CANCLOCK)
- peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SELCAND;
- else
- peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_DISTSYSPEER;
- }
while (1) {
- sys_maxd = 0;
- d = error[0];
- for (k = i = nlist - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- double sdisp = 0;
-
- for (j = nlist - 1; j > 0; j--) {
- sdisp = NTP_SWEIGHT * (sdisp +
- DIFF(peer_list[i]->offset,
- peer_list[j]->offset));
+ d = 1e9;
+ e = -1e9;
+ k = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
+
+ if (error[i] < d)
+ d = error[i];
+ f = 0;
+ if (nlist > 1) {
+ for (j = 0; j < nlist; j++)
+ f += DIFF(peer_list[j]->offset,
+ peer_list[i]->offset);
+ f /= nlist - 1;
}
- if (sdisp > sys_maxd) {
- sys_maxd = sdisp;
+ f = max(f, SQUARE(LOGTOD(sys_precision)));
+ if (f * synch[i] > e) {
+ sys_selerr = f;
+ e = f * synch[i];
k = i;
}
- if (error[i] < d)
- d = error[i];
}
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug > 1)
+ if (debug > 2)
printf(
"select: survivors %d select %.6f peer %.6f\n",
- nlist, SQRT(sys_maxd), SQRT(d));
+ k, SQRT(sys_selerr), SQRT(d));
#endif
- if (nlist <= NTP_MINCLOCK || sys_maxd <= d ||
- peer_list[k]->flags & FLAG_PREFER)
+ if (nlist <= NTP_MINCLOCK || sys_selerr <= d ||
+ peer_list[k]->flags & FLAG_PREFER)
break;
+ if (!(peer_list[k]->flags & FLAG_CONFIG))
+ unpeer(peer_list[k]);
for (j = k + 1; j < nlist; j++) {
peer_list[j - 1] = peer_list[j];
error[j - 1] = error[j];
}
nlist--;
}
+
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ /*
+ * In manycast client mode we may have spooked a sizeable number
+ * of servers that we don't need. If there are at least
+ * NTP_MINCLOCK of them, the manycast message will be turned
+ * off. By the time we get here we nay be ready to prune some of
+ * them back, but we want to make sure all the candicates have
+ * had a chance. If they didn't pass the sanity and intersection
+ * tests, they have already been voted off the island.
+ */
+ if (sys_survivors >= NTP_MINCLOCK && nlist < NTP_MINCLOCK)
+ resetmanycast();
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ sys_survivors = nlist;
+
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug > 1) {
+ if (debug > 2) {
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
printf(
"select: %s offset %.6f, distance %.6f poll %d\n",
- ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), peer_list[i]->offset,
- synch[i], peer_list[i]->pollsw);
+ ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr),
+ peer_list[i]->offset, synch[i],
+ peer_list[i]->pollsw);
}
#endif
@@ -1520,27 +1835,30 @@ clock_select(void)
* him. We note that the head of the list is at the lowest
* stratum and that unsynchronized peers cannot survive this
* far.
+ *
+ * Note that we go no further, unless the number of survivors is
+ * a majority of the suckers that have been found reachable and
+ * no prior source is available. This avoids the transient when
+ * one of a flock of sources is out to lunch and just happens
+ * to be the first survivor.
*/
+ if (osys_peer == NULL && 2 * nlist < min(nreach, NTP_MINCLOCK))
+ return;
leap_consensus = 0;
for (i = nlist - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- peer_list[i]->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND;
- peer_list[i]->flags |= FLAG_SYSPEER;
- poll_update(peer_list[i], peer_list[i]->hpoll);
- if (peer_list[i]->stratum == peer_list[0]->stratum) {
- leap_consensus |= peer_list[i]->leap;
- if (peer_list[i]->refclktype == REFCLK_ATOM_PPS)
- typepps = peer_list[i];
- if (peer_list[i] == sys_peer)
- typesystem = peer_list[i];
- if (peer_list[i]->flags & FLAG_PREFER) {
- typeprefer = peer_list[i];
- if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) <
- clock_max)
- pps_update = 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (peer_list[i] == sys_peer)
- sys_peer = 0;
+ peer = peer_list[i];
+ peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND;
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_SYSPEER;
+ poll_update(peer, peer->hpoll);
+ if (peer->stratum == peer_list[0]->stratum) {
+ leap_consensus |= peer->leap;
+ if (peer->refclktype == REFCLK_ATOM_PPS &&
+ peer->stratum < STRATUM_UNSPEC)
+ typepps = peer;
+ if (peer == osys_peer)
+ typesystem = peer;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER)
+ sys_prefer = peer;
}
}
@@ -1556,38 +1874,45 @@ clock_select(void)
* stated. Note that all of these must be at the lowest stratum,
* i.e., the stratum of the head of the survivor list.
*/
- osys_peer = sys_peer;
- if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK
- || typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE ||
- !typepps)) {
- sys_peer = typeprefer;
+ if (sys_prefer)
+ sw = sys_prefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK ||
+ sys_prefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE ||
+ !typepps;
+ else
+ sw = 0;
+ if (sw) {
+ sys_peer = sys_prefer;
sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYSPEER;
sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
- sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance;
+ sys_syserr = sys_peer->jitter;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug > 1)
printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n",
sys_offset);
#endif
- } else if (typepps && pps_update) {
+ } else if (typepps) {
sys_peer = typepps;
sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_PPS;
sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
- sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance;
+ sys_syserr = sys_peer->jitter;
if (!pps_control)
- NLOG(NLOG_SYSEVENT) /* conditional syslog */
- msyslog(LOG_INFO, "pps sync enabled");
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYSEVENT)
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "pps sync enabled");
pps_control = current_time;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug > 1)
- printf("select: pps offset %.6f\n", sys_offset);
+ printf("select: pps offset %.6f\n",
+ sys_offset);
#endif
} else {
- if (!typesystem)
+ if (typesystem)
+ sys_peer = osys_peer;
+ else
sys_peer = peer_list[0];
sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYSPEER;
sys_offset = clock_combine(peer_list, nlist);
- sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance + sys_maxd;
+ sys_syserr = sys_peer->jitter + sys_selerr;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug > 1)
printf("select: combine offset %.6f\n",
@@ -1627,10 +1952,14 @@ root_distance(
struct peer *peer
)
{
- return ((fabs(peer->delay) + peer->rootdelay) / 2 +
- peer->rootdispersion + peer->disp +
- SQRT(peer->variance) + CLOCK_PHI * (current_time -
- peer->update));
+ /*
+ * Careful squeak here. The value returned must be greater than
+ * zero blamed on the peer jitter, which must be at least the
+ * square of sys_precision.
+ */
+ return ((peer->rootdelay + peer->delay) / 2 +
+ peer->rootdispersion + peer->disp + clock_phi *
+ (current_time - peer->update) + SQRT(peer->jitter));
}
/*
@@ -1641,279 +1970,518 @@ peer_xmit(
struct peer *peer /* peer structure pointer */
)
{
- struct pkt xpkt;
- int find_rtt = (peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
- peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST;
- int sendlen;
+ struct pkt xpkt; /* transmit packet */
+ int sendlen, authlen;
+ keyid_t xkeyid; /* transmit key ID */
+ l_fp xmt_tx;
/*
- * Initialize protocol fields.
+ * Initialize transmit packet header fields.
*/
- xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap,
- peer->version, peer->hmode);
+ xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap, peer->version,
+ peer->hmode);
xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_TO_PKT(sys_stratum);
xpkt.ppoll = peer->hpoll;
xpkt.precision = sys_precision;
xpkt.rootdelay = HTONS_FP(DTOFP(sys_rootdelay));
- xpkt.rootdispersion = HTONS_FP(DTOUFP(sys_rootdispersion +
- LOGTOD(sys_precision)));
+ xpkt.rootdispersion = HTONS_FP(DTOUFP(sys_rootdispersion));
xpkt.refid = sys_refid;
HTONL_FP(&sys_reftime, &xpkt.reftime);
HTONL_FP(&peer->org, &xpkt.org);
HTONL_FP(&peer->rec, &xpkt.rec);
/*
- * Authenticate the packet if enabled and either configured or
- * the previous packet was authenticated. If for some reason the
- * key associated with the key identifier is not in the key
- * cache, then honk key zero.
+ * If the received packet contains a MAC, the transmitted packet
+ * is authenticated and contains a MAC. If not, the transmitted
+ * packet is not authenticated.
+ *
+ * In the current I/O semantics the default interface is set
+ * until after receiving a packet and setting the right
+ * interface. So, the first packet goes out unauthenticated.
+ * That's why the really icky test next is here.
*/
sendlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) {
- u_long xkeyid;
- l_fp xmt_tx;
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)) {
+ get_systime(&peer->xmt);
+ HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
+ sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, peer->dstadr, peer->ttl, &xpkt,
+ sendlen);
+ peer->sent++;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->dstadr->sin),
+ ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->hmode);
+#endif
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The received packet contains a MAC, so the transmitted packet
+ * must be authenticated. If autokey is enabled, fuss with the
+ * various modes; otherwise, private key cryptography is used.
+ */
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ if ((peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY)) {
+ u_int cmmd;
/*
- * Transmit encrypted packet compensated for the
- * encryption delay.
+ * The Public Key Dance (PKD): Cryptographic credentials
+ * are contained in extension fields, each including a
+ * 4-octet length/code word followed by a 4-octet
+ * association ID and optional additional data. Optional
+ * data includes a 4-octet data length field followed by
+ * the data itself. Request messages are sent from a
+ * configured association; response messages can be sent
+ * from a configured association or can take the fast
+ * path without ever matching an association. Response
+ * messages have the same code as the request, but have
+ * a response bit and possibly an error bit set. In this
+ * implementation, a message may contain no more than
+ * one command and no more than one response.
+ *
+ * Cryptographic session keys include both a public and
+ * a private componet. Request and response messages
+ * using extension fields are always sent with the
+ * private component set to zero. Packets without
+ * extension fields indlude the private component when
+ * the session key is generated.
*/
-#ifdef MD5
- if (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY) {
-
+ while (1) {
+
/*
- * In autokey mode, allocate and initialize a
- * key list if not already done. Then, use the
- * list in inverse order, discarding keys once
- * used. Keep the latest key around until the
- * next one, so clients can use client/server
- * packets to compute propagation delay. Note we
- * have to wait until the receive side of the
- * socket is bound and the server address
- * confirmed.
+ * Allocate and initialize a keylist if not
+ * already done. Then, use the list in inverse
+ * order, discarding keys once used. Keep the
+ * latest key around until the next one, so
+ * clients can use client/server packets to
+ * compute propagation delay.
+ *
+ * Note that once a key is used from the list,
+ * it is retained in the key cache until the
+ * next key is used. This is to allow a client
+ * to retrieve the encrypted session key
+ * identifier to verify authenticity.
+ *
+ * If for some reason a key is no longer in the
+ * key cache, a birthday has happened and the
+ * pseudo-random sequence is probably broken. In
+ * that case, purge the keylist and regenerate
+ * it.
*/
- if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) ==
- 0 &&
- ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0)
- peer->keyid = 0;
- else {
- if (peer->keylist == 0) {
- make_keylist(peer);
- } else {
- authtrust(peer->keylist[peer->keynumber], 0);
- if (peer->keynumber == 0)
- make_keylist(peer);
- else {
- peer->keynumber--;
- xkeyid = peer->keylist[peer->keynumber];
- if (!authistrusted(xkeyid))
- make_keylist(peer);
- }
- }
- peer->keyid = peer->keylist[peer->keynumber];
- xpkt.keyid1 = htonl(2 * sizeof(u_int32));
- xpkt.keyid2 = htonl(sys_private);
- sendlen += 2 * sizeof(u_int32);
- }
+ if (peer->keynumber == 0)
+ make_keylist(peer, peer->dstadr);
+ else
+ peer->keynumber--;
+ xkeyid = peer->keylist[peer->keynumber];
+ if (authistrusted(xkeyid))
+ break;
+ else
+ key_expire(peer);
}
-#endif /* MD5 */
- xkeyid = peer->keyid;
- get_systime(&peer->xmt);
- L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay);
- HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
- sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
- sendlen);
- get_systime(&xmt_tx);
- sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, find_rtt ? any_interface :
- peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
- !find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 :
- peer->ttl) : -7, &xpkt, sendlen);
+ peer->keyid = xkeyid;
+ switch (peer->hmode) {
/*
- * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
- * the latest two samples.
+ * In broadcast mode the autokey values are required.
+ * Send them when a new keylist is generated; otherwise,
+ * send the association ID so the client can request
+ * them at other times.
*/
- L_SUB(&xmt_tx, &peer->xmt);
- L_ADD(&xmt_tx, &sys_authdelay);
- sys_authdly[1] = sys_authdly[0];
- sys_authdly[0] = xmt_tx.l_uf;
- if (sys_authdly[0] < sys_authdly[1])
- sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[0];
- else
- sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[1];
- peer->sent++;
-#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug)
- printf(
- "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
- peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber);
-#endif
- } else {
+ case MODE_BROADCAST:
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_ASSOC)
+ cmmd = CRYPTO_AUTO | CRYPTO_RESP;
+ else
+ cmmd = CRYPTO_ASSOC | CRYPTO_RESP;
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, cmmd, 0, peer->associd);
+ break;
+
/*
- * Transmit non-authenticated packet.
+ * In symmetric modes the public key, leapsecond table,
+ * agreement parameters and autokey values are required.
+ *
+ * 1. If a response is pending, always send it first.
+ *
+ * 2. Don't send anything except a public-key request
+ * until the public key has been stored.
+ *
+ * 3. Once the public key has been stored, don't send
+ * anything except an agreement parameter request
+ * until the agreement parameters have been stored.
+ *
+ * 4. Once the argeement parameters have been stored,
+ * don't send anything except a public value request
+ * until the agreed key has been stored.
+ *
+ * 5. When the agreed key has been stored and the key
+ * list is regenerated, send the autokey values
+ * gratis unless they have already been sent.
*/
- get_systime(&(peer->xmt));
- HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
- sendpkt(&(peer->srcadr), find_rtt ? any_interface :
- peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
- !find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 :
- peer->ttl) : -8, &xpkt, sendlen);
- peer->sent++;
+ case MODE_ACTIVE:
+ case MODE_PASSIVE:
+#ifdef PUBKEY
+ if (peer->cmmd != 0)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, (peer->cmmd >> 16) |
+ CRYPTO_RESP, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->associd);
+ if (!peer->crypto)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_ASSOC,
+ peer->hcookie, peer->assoc);
+ else if (!crypto_flags &&
+ peer->pcookie.tstamp == 0 && sys_leap !=
+ LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_PRIV, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+ else if (crypto_flags && peer->pubkey.ptr ==
+ NULL)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_NAME, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+ else if (peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_CERT)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_CERT, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+ else if (crypto_flags && peer->crypto &
+ CRYPTO_FLAG_DH && sys_leap !=
+ LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_DHPAR,
+ peer->hcookie, peer->assoc);
+ else if (crypto_flags && peer->pcookie.tstamp ==
+ 0 && sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_DH, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+#else
+ if (peer->cmmd != 0)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, (peer->cmmd >> 16) |
+ CRYPTO_RESP, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->associd);
+ if (peer->pcookie.tstamp == 0 && sys_leap !=
+ LEAP_NOTINSYNC)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_PRIV, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+#endif /* PUBKEY */
+ else if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTOKEY))
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_AUTO, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+ else if ((peer->flags & FLAG_ASSOC) &&
+ (peer->cmmd >> 16) != CRYPTO_AUTO)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_AUTO | CRYPTO_RESP,
+ peer->hcookie, peer->associd);
+#ifdef PUBKEY
+ else if (peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_TAI)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_TAI, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+#endif /* PUBKEY */
+ peer->cmmd = 0;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * In client mode, the public key, host cookie and
+ * autokey values are required. In broadcast client
+ * mode, these values must be acquired during the
+ * client/server exchange to avoid having to wait until
+ * the next key list regeneration. Otherwise, the poor
+ * dude may die a lingering death until becoming
+ * unreachable and attempting rebirth. Note that we ask
+ * for the cookie at each key list regeneration anyway.
+ */
+ case MODE_CLIENT:
+ if (peer->cmmd != 0)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, (peer->cmmd >> 16) |
+ CRYPTO_RESP, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->associd);
+ if (!peer->crypto)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_ASSOC,
+ peer->hcookie, peer->assoc);
+#ifdef PUBKEY
+ else if (crypto_flags && peer->pubkey.ptr ==
+ NULL)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_NAME, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+ else if (peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_CERT)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_CERT, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+#endif /* PUBKEY */
+ else if (peer->pcookie.tstamp == 0)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_PRIV, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+ else if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTOKEY) &&
+ (peer->cast_flags & MDF_BCLNT))
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_AUTO, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+#ifdef PUBKEY
+ else if (peer->crypto & CRYPTO_FLAG_TAI)
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, CRYPTO_TAI, peer->hcookie,
+ peer->assoc);
+#endif /* PUBKEY */
+ peer->cmmd = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If extension fields are present, we must use a
+ * private value of zero and force min poll interval.
+ * Most intricate.
+ */
+ if (sendlen > LEN_PKT_NOMAC)
+ session_key(&peer->dstadr->sin, &peer->srcadr,
+ xkeyid, 0, 2);
+ }
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ xkeyid = peer->keyid;
+ get_systime(&peer->xmt);
+ L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay);
+ HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
+ authlen = authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ if (authlen == 0) {
+ msyslog(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "transmit: no encryption key found");
+ peer->flash |= TEST4 | TEST5;
+ return;
+ }
+ sendlen += authlen;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(xkeyid, 0);
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ get_systime(&xmt_tx);
+ if (sendlen > sizeof(xpkt)) {
+ msyslog(LOG_ERR, "buffer overflow %u", sendlen);
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+ sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, peer->dstadr, peer->ttl, &xpkt, sendlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
+ * the latest two samples.
+ */
+ L_SUB(&xmt_tx, &peer->xmt);
+ L_ADD(&xmt_tx, &sys_authdelay);
+ sys_authdly[1] = sys_authdly[0];
+ sys_authdly[0] = xmt_tx.l_uf;
+ if (sys_authdly[0] < sys_authdly[1])
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[0];
+ else
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[1];
+ peer->sent++;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug)
- printf("transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
- peer->hmode);
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d keyid %08x len %d mac %d index %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->dstadr->sin),
+ ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->hmode, xkeyid, sendlen,
+ authlen, peer->keynumber);
#endif
- }
+#else
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d keyid %08x len %d mac %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->dstadr->sin),
+ ntoa(&peer->srcadr), peer->hmode, xkeyid, sendlen,
+ authlen);
+#endif
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
}
+
/*
- * fast_xmit - Send packet for nonpersistent association.
+ * fast_xmit - Send packet for nonpersistent association. Note that
+ * neither the source or destination can be a broadcast address.
*/
static void
fast_xmit(
struct recvbuf *rbufp, /* receive packet pointer */
int xmode, /* transmit mode */
- u_long xkeyid /* transmit key ID */
+ keyid_t xkeyid, /* transmit key ID */
+ int mask /* restrict mask */
)
{
- struct pkt xpkt;
- struct pkt *rpkt;
- int sendlen;
- l_fp xmt_ts;
+ struct pkt xpkt; /* transmit packet structure */
+ struct pkt *rpkt; /* receive packet structure */
+ l_fp xmt_ts; /* transmit timestamp */
+ l_fp xmt_tx; /* transmit timestamp after authent */
+ int sendlen, authlen;
/*
- * Initialize transmit packet header fields in the receive
- * buffer provided. We leave some fields intact as received.
+ * Initialize transmit packet header fields from the receive
+ * buffer provided. We leave some fields intact as received. If
+ * the gazinta was from a multicast address, the gazouta must go
+ * out another way.
*/
rpkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
- xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap,
- PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode), xmode);
- xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_TO_PKT(sys_stratum);
+ if (rbufp->dstadr->flags & INT_MULTICAST)
+ rbufp->dstadr = findinterface(&rbufp->recv_srcadr);
+
+ /*
+ * If the caller is restricted, return a kiss-of-death packet;
+ * otherwise, smooch politely.
+ */
+ if (mask & (RES_DONTSERVE | RES_LIMITED)) {
+ if (!(mask & RES_DEMOBILIZE)) {
+ return;
+ } else {
+ xpkt.li_vn_mode =
+ PKT_LI_VN_MODE(LEAP_NOTINSYNC,
+ PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode), xmode);
+ xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
+ memcpy(&xpkt.refid, "DENY", 4);
+ }
+ } else {
+ xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap,
+ PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode), xmode);
+ xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_TO_PKT(sys_stratum);
+ xpkt.refid = sys_refid;
+ }
xpkt.ppoll = rpkt->ppoll;
xpkt.precision = sys_precision;
xpkt.rootdelay = HTONS_FP(DTOFP(sys_rootdelay));
- xpkt.rootdispersion = HTONS_FP(DTOUFP(sys_rootdispersion +
- LOGTOD(sys_precision)));
- xpkt.refid = sys_refid;
+ xpkt.rootdispersion =
+ HTONS_FP(DTOUFP(sys_rootdispersion));
HTONL_FP(&sys_reftime, &xpkt.reftime);
xpkt.org = rpkt->xmt;
HTONL_FP(&rbufp->recv_time, &xpkt.rec);
- sendlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
- if (rbufp->recv_length > sendlen) {
- l_fp xmt_tx;
- /*
- * Transmit encrypted packet compensated for the
- * encryption delay.
- */
- if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
- xpkt.keyid1 = htonl(2 * sizeof(u_int32));
- xpkt.keyid2 = htonl(sys_private);
- sendlen += 2 * sizeof(u_int32);
- }
+ /*
+ * If the received packet contains a MAC, the transmitted packet
+ * is authenticated and contains a MAC. If not, the transmitted
+ * packet is not authenticated.
+ */
+ sendlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
+ if (rbufp->recv_length == sendlen) {
get_systime(&xmt_ts);
- L_ADD(&xmt_ts, &sys_authdelay);
HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
- sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, 0, &xpkt,
sendlen);
- get_systime(&xmt_tx);
- sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -9, &xpkt,
- sendlen);
-
- /*
- * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
- * the latest two samples.
- */
- L_SUB(&xmt_tx, &xmt_ts);
- L_ADD(&xmt_tx, &sys_authdelay);
- sys_authdly[1] = sys_authdly[0];
- sys_authdly[0] = xmt_tx.l_uf;
- if (sys_authdly[0] < sys_authdly[1])
- sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[0];
- else
- sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[1];
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug)
- printf(
- "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
- xmode, xkeyid);
+ printf("transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->dstadr->sin),
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), xmode);
#endif
- } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The received packet contains a MAC, so the transmitted packet
+ * must be authenticated. For private-key cryptography, use the
+ * predefined private keys to generate the cryptosum. For
+ * autokey cryptography, use the server private value to
+ * generate the cookie, which is unique for every source-
+ * destination-key ID combination.
+ */
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
+ keyid_t cookie;
+ u_int code, associd;
/*
- * Transmit non-authenticated packet.
+ * The only way to get here is a reply to a legitimate
+ * client request message, so the mode must be
+ * MODE_SERVER. If an extension field is present, there
+ * can be only one and that must be a command. Do what
+ * needs, but with private value of zero so the poor
+ * jerk can decode it. If no extension field is present,
+ * use the cookie to generate the session key.
*/
- get_systime(&xmt_ts);
- HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
- sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -10, &xpkt,
- sendlen);
+ code = (htonl(rpkt->exten[0]) >> 16) | CRYPTO_RESP;
+ cookie = session_key(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
+ &rbufp->dstadr->sin, 0, sys_private, 0);
+ associd = htonl(rpkt->exten[1]);
+ if (rbufp->recv_length >= sendlen + MAX_MAC_LEN + 2 *
+ sizeof(u_int32)) {
+ session_key(&rbufp->dstadr->sin,
+ &rbufp->recv_srcadr, xkeyid, 0, 2);
+ sendlen += crypto_xmit((u_int32 *)&xpkt,
+ sendlen, code, cookie, associd);
+ } else {
+ session_key(&rbufp->dstadr->sin,
+ &rbufp->recv_srcadr, xkeyid, cookie, 2);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ get_systime(&xmt_ts);
+ L_ADD(&xmt_ts, &sys_authdelay);
+ HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
+ authlen = authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ sendlen += authlen;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
+ if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(xkeyid, 0);
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
+ get_systime(&xmt_tx);
+ if (sendlen > sizeof(xpkt)) {
+ msyslog(LOG_ERR, "buffer overflow %u", sendlen);
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+ sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, 0, &xpkt, sendlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over the
+ * latest two samples.
+ */
+ L_SUB(&xmt_tx, &xmt_ts);
+ L_ADD(&xmt_tx, &sys_authdelay);
+ sys_authdly[1] = sys_authdly[0];
+ sys_authdly[0] = xmt_tx.l_uf;
+ if (sys_authdly[0] < sys_authdly[1])
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[0];
+ else
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[1];
#ifdef DEBUG
- if (debug)
- printf("transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d\n",
- current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
- xmode);
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "transmit: at %ld %s->%s mode %d keyid %08x len %d mac %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->dstadr->sin),
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), xmode, xkeyid, sendlen,
+ authlen);
#endif
- }
}
-#ifdef MD5
+
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
/*
- * Compute key list
+ * key_expire - purge the key list
*/
-static void
-make_keylist(
- struct peer *peer
+void
+key_expire(
+ struct peer *peer /* peer structure pointer */
)
{
int i;
- u_long keyid;
- u_long ltemp;
- /*
- * Allocate the key list if necessary.
- */
- if (peer->keylist == 0)
- peer->keylist = (u_long *)emalloc(sizeof(u_long) *
- NTP_MAXSESSION);
-
- /*
- * Generate an initial key ID which is unique and greater than
- * NTP_MAXKEY.
- */
- while (1) {
- keyid = (u_long)RANDOM & 0xffffffff;
- if (keyid <= NTP_MAXKEY)
- continue;
- if (authhavekey(keyid))
- continue;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Generate up to NTP_MAXSESSION session keys. Stop if the
- * next one would not be unique or not a session key ID or if
- * it would expire before the next poll.
- */
- ltemp = sys_automax;
- for (i = 0; i < NTP_MAXSESSION; i++) {
- peer->keylist[i] = keyid;
- peer->keynumber = i;
- keyid = session_key(
- ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
- (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags &
- FLAG_MCAST2)) ?
- ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr):
- ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr), keyid, ltemp);
- ltemp -= 1 << peer->hpoll;
- if (auth_havekey(keyid) || keyid <= NTP_MAXKEY ||
- ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1)))
- break;
+ if (peer->keylist != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i <= peer->keynumber; i++)
+ authtrust(peer->keylist[i], 0);
+ free(peer->keylist);
+ peer->keylist = NULL;
}
+ peer->keynumber = peer->sndauto.seq = 0;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("key_expire: at %lu\n", current_time);
+#endif
}
-#endif /* MD5 */
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
/*
* Find the precision of this particular machine
@@ -2033,19 +2601,17 @@ init_proto(void)
sys_leap = LEAP_NOTINSYNC;
sys_stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
sys_precision = (s_char)default_get_precision();
+ sys_jitter = LOGTOD(sys_precision);
sys_rootdelay = 0;
sys_rootdispersion = 0;
sys_refid = 0;
L_CLR(&sys_reftime);
- sys_peer = 0;
+ sys_peer = NULL;
+ sys_survivors = 0;
get_systime(&dummy);
sys_bclient = 0;
sys_bdelay = DEFBROADDELAY;
-#if defined(DES) || defined(MD5)
sys_authenticate = 1;
-#else
- sys_authenticate = 0;
-#endif
L_CLR(&sys_authdelay);
sys_authdly[0] = sys_authdly[1] = 0;
sys_stattime = 0;
@@ -2057,7 +2623,9 @@ init_proto(void)
sys_processed = 0;
sys_badauth = 0;
sys_manycastserver = 0;
+#ifdef AUTOKEY
sys_automax = 1 << NTP_AUTOMAX;
+#endif /* AUTOKEY */
/*
* Default these to enable
@@ -2066,11 +2634,12 @@ init_proto(void)
#ifndef KERNEL_FLL_BUG
kern_enable = 1;
#endif
- msyslog(LOG_DEBUG, "kern_enable is %d", kern_enable);
+ pps_enable = 0;
stats_control = 1;
/*
- * Some system clocks should only be adjusted in 10ms increments.
+ * Some system clocks should only be adjusted in 10ms
+ * increments.
*/
#if defined RELIANTUNIX_CLOCK
systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */
@@ -2176,6 +2745,24 @@ proto_config(
sys_authenticate = (int)value;
break;
+ case PROTO_PPS:
+
+ /*
+ * Turn on/off PPS discipline
+ */
+ pps_enable = (int)value;
+ break;
+
+#ifdef REFCLOCK
+ case PROTO_CAL:
+
+ /*
+ * Turn on/off refclock calibrate
+ */
+ cal_enable = (int)value;
+ break;
+#endif
+
default:
/*
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