Prevent user from breaking his limits and restrictions or

abusing sendmail by any other way via MAILTO tag (since sendmail is running
from daemon). Now run sendmail from user, as any other cron user command.

Obtained from:	Inspired by OpenBSD, but implementation is different

3 files changed, 61 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/usr.sbin/cron/cron/cron.h b/usr.sbin/cron/cron/cron.h
index c125874..1effde4 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/cron/cron/cron.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/cron/cron/cron.h
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ user		*load_user __P((int, struct passwd *, char *)),
 entry		*load_entry __P((FILE *, void (*)(),
 				 struct passwd *, char **));
 
-FILE		*cron_popen __P((char *, char *));
+FILE		*cron_popen __P((char *, char *, entry *));
 
 
 				/* in the C tradition, we only create
diff --git a/usr.sbin/cron/cron/do_command.c b/usr.sbin/cron/cron/do_command.c
index 009d21b..1e65b41 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/cron/cron/do_command.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/cron/cron/do_command.c
@@ -418,11 +418,11 @@ child_process(e, u)
 				(void) gethostname(hostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
 				(void) snprintf(mailcmd, sizeof(mailcmd),
 					       MAILARGS, MAILCMD);
-				if (!(mail = cron_popen(mailcmd, "w"))) {
+				if (!(mail = cron_popen(mailcmd, "w", e))) {
 					warn("%s", MAILCMD);
 					(void) _exit(ERROR_EXIT);
 				}
-				fprintf(mail, "From: root (Cron Daemon)\n");
+				fprintf(mail, "From: %s (Cron Daemon)\n", usernm);
 				fprintf(mail, "To: %s\n", mailto);
 				fprintf(mail, "Subject: Cron <%s@%s> %s\n",
 					usernm, first_word(hostname, "."),
diff --git a/usr.sbin/cron/cron/popen.c b/usr.sbin/cron/cron/popen.c
index e0861f5..56f85e7 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/cron/cron/popen.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/cron/cron/popen.c
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ static const char rcsid[] =
 #include "cron.h"
 #include <sys/signal.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#if defined(SYSLOG)
+# include <syslog.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(LOGIN_CAP)
+# include <login_cap.h>
+#endif
 
 
 #define MAX_ARGS 100
@@ -48,14 +54,20 @@ static PID_T *pids;
 static int fds;
 
 FILE *
-cron_popen(program, type)
+cron_popen(program, type, e)
 	char *program, *type;
+	entry *e;
 {
 	register char *cp;
 	FILE *iop;
 	int argc, pdes[2];
 	PID_T pid;
+	char *usernm;
 	char *argv[MAX_ARGS + 1];
+# if defined(LOGIN_CAP)
+	struct passwd	*pwd;
+	login_cap_t *lc;
+# endif
 #if WANT_GLOBBING
 	char **pop, *vv[2];
 	int gargc;
@@ -106,6 +118,15 @@ cron_popen(program, type)
 		goto pfree;
 		/* NOTREACHED */
 	case 0:				/* child */
+		if (e != NULL) {
+#ifdef SYSLOG
+			closelog();
+#endif
+
+			/* get new pgrp, void tty, etc.
+			 */
+			(void) setsid();
+		}
 		if (*type == 'r') {
 			/* Do not share our parent's stdin */
 			(void)close(0);
@@ -128,6 +149,42 @@ cron_popen(program, type)
 			(void)open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
 			(void)close(pdes[1]);
 		}
+# if defined(LOGIN_CAP)
+		if (e != NULL) {
+			/* Set user's entire context, but skip the environment
+			 * as cron provides a separate interface for this
+			 */
+			usernm = env_get("LOGNAME", e->envp);
+			if ((pwd = getpwnam(usernm)) == NULL)
+				pwd = getpwuid(e->uid);
+			lc = NULL;
+			if (pwd != NULL) {
+				pwd->pw_gid = e->gid;
+				if (e->class != NULL)
+					lc = login_getclass(e->class);
+			}
+			if (pwd &&
+			    setusercontext(lc, pwd, e->uid,
+				    LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV)) == 0)
+				(void) endpwent();
+			else {
+				/* fall back to the old method */
+				(void) endpwent();
+# endif
+				/* set our directory, uid and gid.  Set gid first,
+				 * since once we set uid, we've lost root privledges.
+				 */
+				setgid(e->gid);
+# if defined(BSD)
+				initgroups(usernm, e->gid);
+# endif
+				setlogin(usernm);
+				setuid(e->uid);         /* we aren't root after this..*/
+#if defined(LOGIN_CAP)
+			}
+#endif
+			chdir(env_get("HOME", e->envp));
+		}
 #if WANT_GLOBBING
 		execvp(gargv[0], gargv);
 #else