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author | joerg <joerg@FreeBSD.org> | 1997-08-27 17:18:30 +0000 |
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committer | joerg <joerg@FreeBSD.org> | 1997-08-27 17:18:30 +0000 |
commit | 1fa2fafd210a0a94505d20066e2c109207101d32 (patch) | |
tree | e75a4469673416387d4119506d3de04905b481cd | |
parent | dbbb9f298faa7b02bf158d5d4402f1a3b5739632 (diff) | |
download | FreeBSD-src-1fa2fafd210a0a94505d20066e2c109207101d32.zip FreeBSD-src-1fa2fafd210a0a94505d20066e2c109207101d32.tar.gz |
Major Ooops. I've overlooked a few calls to scanident() in my last commit.
Submitted by: rbezuide@oskar.nanoteq.co.za (Reinier Bezuidenhout)
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/toke.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/toke.c b/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/toke.c index 78cd195..d654066 100644 --- a/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/toke.c +++ b/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/toke.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $RCSfile: toke.c,v $$Revision: 1.2 $$Date: 1995/05/30 05:03:26 $ +/* $RCSfile: toke.c,v $$Revision: 1.3 $$Date: 1997/08/08 20:53:59 $ * * Copyright (c) 1991, Larry Wall * @@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ * License or the Artistic License, as specified in the README file. * * $Log: toke.c,v $ + * Revision 1.3 1997/08/08 20:53:59 joerg + * Fix a buffer overflow condition (that causes a security hole in suidperl). + * + * Closes: CERT Advisory CA-97.17 - Vulnerability in suidperl + * Obtained from: (partly) the fix in CA-97.17 + * * Revision 1.2 1995/05/30 05:03:26 rgrimes * Remove trailing whitespace. * @@ -1767,17 +1773,17 @@ register char *s; arg->arg_type = O_ITEM; arg[1].arg_type = A_DOUBLE; arg[1].arg_ptr.arg_str = str_smake(str); - d = scanident(d,bufend,buf); + d = scanident(d,bufend,buf,sizeof buf); (void)stabent(buf,TRUE); /* make sure it's created */ for (; d < e; d++) { if (*d == '\\') d++; else if (*d == '$' && d[1] && d[1] != '|' && d[1] != ')') { - d = scanident(d,bufend,buf); + d = scanident(d,bufend,buf,sizeof buf); (void)stabent(buf,TRUE); } else if (*d == '@') { - d = scanident(d,bufend,buf); + d = scanident(d,bufend,buf,sizeof buf); if (strEQ(buf,"ARGV") || strEQ(buf,"ENV") || strEQ(buf,"SIG") || strEQ(buf,"INC")) (void)stabent(buf,TRUE); @@ -1851,15 +1857,15 @@ char *start; arg->arg_type = O_ITEM; arg[1].arg_type = A_DOUBLE; arg[1].arg_ptr.arg_str = str_smake(str); - d = scanident(d,e,buf); + d = scanident(d,e,buf,sizeof buf); (void)stabent(buf,TRUE); /* make sure it's created */ for (; *d; d++) { if (*d == '$' && d[1] && d[-1] != '\\' && d[1] != '|') { - d = scanident(d,e,buf); + d = scanident(d,e,buf,sizeof buf); (void)stabent(buf,TRUE); } else if (*d == '@' && d[-1] != '\\') { - d = scanident(d,e,buf); + d = scanident(d,e,buf,sizeof buf); if (strEQ(buf,"ARGV") || strEQ(buf,"ENV") || strEQ(buf,"SIG") || strEQ(buf,"INC")) (void)stabent(buf,TRUE); @@ -2454,7 +2460,7 @@ int in_what; (*s == '@' && s+1 < send) ) { if (s[1] == '#' && (isALPHA(s[2]) || s[2] == '_')) *d++ = *s++; - len = scanident(s,send,tokenbuf) - s; + len = scanident(s,send,tokenbuf,sizeof tokenbuf) - s; if (*s == '$' || strEQ(tokenbuf,"ARGV") || strEQ(tokenbuf,"ENV") || strEQ(tokenbuf,"SIG") @@ -2736,7 +2742,7 @@ load_format() case '$': str_ncat(str, t, s - t); t = s; - s = scanident(s,eol,tokenbuf); + s = scanident(s,eol,tokenbuf,sizeof tokenbuf); str_ncat(str, t, s - t); t = s; if (s < eol && *s && index("$'\"",*s)) |