- Security Fix:

http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt

4 files changed, 108 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/security/openssl-beta/Makefile b/security/openssl-beta/Makefile
index 66166c5..90bee2a 100644
--- a/security/openssl-beta/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl-beta/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ PORTNAME=	openssl
 PORTREVISION!=	date -v-1d +%Y%m%d
 .else
 PORTVERSION=	0.9.7a
-PORTREVISION=	1
+PORTREVISION=	2
 .endif
 CATEGORIES=	security devel
 .ifdef OPENSSL_SNAPSHOT
diff --git a/security/openssl-beta/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c b/security/openssl-beta/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5277735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl-beta/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+--- ssl/s3_srvr.c	29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000	1.85.2.14
++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c	19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000
+@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
+ 		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 			{
+ 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
++			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+ 			}
+ 
+ 		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@
+ 				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ 				{
+ 				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+-				goto f_err;
++				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
++
++				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
++				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
++				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
++				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
++				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
++				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
++				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
++				p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 
+ 		if (al != -1)
+ 			{
+-#if 0
+-			goto f_err;
+-#else
+ 			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+ 			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+-			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+-			 * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
+-			 * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
+-			 * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+-			 * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
+-			 */
++			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+ 			ERR_clear_error();
+ 			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ 			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ 			RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+-#endif
+ 			}
+ 	
+ 		s->session->master_key_length=
diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile
index 1a4cd85..270e2f3 100644
--- a/security/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	openssl
 PORTVERSION=	0.9.7a
-PORTREVISION=	1
+PORTREVISION=	2
 CATEGORIES=	security devel
 MASTER_SITES=	http://www.openssl.org/source/ \
 		ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ \
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5277735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+--- ssl/s3_srvr.c	29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000	1.85.2.14
++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c	19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000
+@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
+ 		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 			{
+ 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
++			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+ 			}
+ 
+ 		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@
+ 				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ 				{
+ 				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+-				goto f_err;
++				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
++
++				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
++				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
++				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
++				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
++				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
++				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
++				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
++				p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 
+ 		if (al != -1)
+ 			{
+-#if 0
+-			goto f_err;
+-#else
+ 			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+ 			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+-			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+-			 * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
+-			 * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
+-			 * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+-			 * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
+-			 */
++			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+ 			ERR_clear_error();
+ 			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ 			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ 			RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+-#endif
+ 			}
+ 	
+ 		s->session->master_key_length=