From 12b29f34558b9b45a2c6eabd4f3c6be939a3980f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Wed, 7 May 2008 13:03:20 -0400 Subject: selinux: support deferred mapping of contexts Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this support to save the context information in the SID table and later recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context again. This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy. With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to specific program domains such as the package manager. # rmdir baz # rm bar # touch bar # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # cat setundefined.te policy_module(setundefined, 1.0) require { type unconfined_t; type unlabeled_t; } files_type(unlabeled_t) allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin; # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp # semodule -i setundefined.pp # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # cat foo.te policy_module(foo, 1.0) type foo_exec_t; files_type(foo_exec_t) # make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp # semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r foo # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz # semodule -i foo.pp # ls -Zd bar baz -rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz # semodule -r setundefined foo # chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument # rmdir baz # mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 5 + security/selinux/ss/context.h | 27 +++- security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 11 +- security/selinux/ss/mls.h | 3 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 245 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 58 +++------ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 7 +- 8 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1c864c0..59c6e98 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2495,7 +2495,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } if (value && len) { - rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen); + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) { kfree(namep); return rc; @@ -2669,6 +2669,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return rc; rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); + if (rc == -EINVAL) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return rc; + rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); + } if (rc) return rc; @@ -2703,10 +2708,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return; } - rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); + rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context " - "%s, rc=%d\n", __func__, (char *)value, -rc); + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID" + "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); return; } @@ -5153,6 +5159,12 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, size--; } error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); + if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return error; + error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, + &sid); + } if (error) return error; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index ad30ac4..7c54300 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -93,12 +93,17 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); +int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); + int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid); int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags); +int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, + u32 *sid); + int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index b9a6f7f..658c2bd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ struct context { u32 role; u32 type; struct mls_range range; + char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */ + u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */ }; static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c) @@ -106,20 +108,43 @@ static inline void context_init(struct context *c) static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src) { + int rc; + dst->user = src->user; dst->role = src->role; dst->type = src->type; - return mls_context_cpy(dst, src); + if (src->str) { + dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!dst->str) + return -ENOMEM; + dst->len = src->len; + } else { + dst->str = NULL; + dst->len = 0; + } + rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src); + if (rc) { + kfree(dst->str); + return rc; + } + return 0; } static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c) { c->user = c->role = c->type = 0; + kfree(c->str); + c->str = NULL; + c->len = 0; mls_context_destroy(c); } static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2) { + if (c1->len && c2->len) + return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str)); + if (c1->len || c2->len) + return 0; return ((c1->user == c2->user) && (c1->role == c2->role) && (c1->type == c2->type) && diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 8b1706b..a6ca058 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c) * Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup. * */ -int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, +int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol, + char oldc, char **scontext, struct context *context, struct sidtab *s, @@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, *p++ = 0; for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { - levdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_levels.table, scontextp); + levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, scontextp); if (!levdatum) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, *rngptr++ = 0; } - catdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table, + catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, scontextp); if (!catdatum) { rc = -EINVAL; @@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, if (rngptr) { int i; - rngdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table, rngptr); + rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr); if (!rngdatum) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) if (!tmpstr) { rc = -ENOMEM; } else { - rc = mls_context_to_sid(':', &tmpstr, context, + rc = mls_context_to_sid(&policydb, ':', &tmpstr, context, NULL, SECSID_NULL); kfree(freestr); } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index 0fdf625..1276715 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c); int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r); int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l); -int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, +int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p, + char oldc, char **scontext, struct context *context, struct sidtab *s, diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index dcc2e1c..b86ac9d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -616,6 +616,14 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3 *scontext = NULL; *scontext_len = 0; + if (context->len) { + *scontext_len = context->len; + *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!(*scontext)) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; + } + /* Compute the size of the context. */ *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1; *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1; @@ -655,17 +663,8 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid) return initial_sid_to_string[sid]; } -/** - * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID. - * @sid: security identifier, SID - * @scontext: security context - * @scontext_len: length in bytes - * - * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid - * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext - * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string. - */ -int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) +static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, + u32 *scontext_len, int force) { struct context *context; int rc = 0; @@ -693,7 +692,10 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) goto out; } POLICY_RDLOCK; - context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); + if (force) + context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid); + else + context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); if (!context) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, sid); @@ -708,36 +710,44 @@ out: } -static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, - u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags) +/** + * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID. + * @sid: security identifier, SID + * @scontext: security context + * @scontext_len: length in bytes + * + * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid + * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext + * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string. + */ +int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { - char *scontext2; - struct context context; + return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0); +} + +int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) +{ + return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1); +} + +static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol, + struct sidtab *sidtabp, + const char *scontext, + u32 scontext_len, + struct context *ctx, + u32 def_sid, + gfp_t gfp_flags) +{ + char *scontext2 = NULL; struct role_datum *role; struct type_datum *typdatum; struct user_datum *usrdatum; char *scontextp, *p, oldc; int rc = 0; - if (!ss_initialized) { - int i; + context_init(ctx); - for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { - if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { - *sid = i; - goto out; - } - } - *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; - goto out; - } - *sid = SECSID_NULL; - - /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. - The string should already by null terminated, but we append a - null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing - attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part - of the attribute value. */ + /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */ scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags); if (!scontext2) { rc = -ENOMEM; @@ -746,11 +756,6 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len); scontext2[scontext_len] = 0; - context_init(&context); - *sid = SECSID_NULL; - - POLICY_RDLOCK; - /* Parse the security context. */ rc = -EINVAL; @@ -762,15 +767,15 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, p++; if (*p == 0) - goto out_unlock; + goto out; *p++ = 0; - usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp); + usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp); if (!usrdatum) - goto out_unlock; + goto out; - context.user = usrdatum->value; + ctx->user = usrdatum->value; /* Extract role. */ scontextp = p; @@ -778,14 +783,14 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, p++; if (*p == 0) - goto out_unlock; + goto out; *p++ = 0; - role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp); + role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp); if (!role) - goto out_unlock; - context.role = role->value; + goto out; + ctx->role = role->value; /* Extract type. */ scontextp = p; @@ -794,33 +799,74 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, oldc = *p; *p++ = 0; - typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp); + typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp); if (!typdatum) - goto out_unlock; + goto out; - context.type = typdatum->value; + ctx->type = typdatum->value; - rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context, &sidtab, def_sid); + rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid); if (rc) - goto out_unlock; + goto out; if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) { rc = -EINVAL; - goto out_unlock; + goto out; } /* Check the validity of the new context. */ - if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) { + if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) { rc = -EINVAL; - goto out_unlock; + context_destroy(ctx); + goto out; } - /* Obtain the new sid. */ - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid); -out_unlock: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; - context_destroy(&context); + rc = 0; +out: kfree(scontext2); + return rc; +} + +static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, + u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags, + int force) +{ + struct context context; + int rc = 0; + + if (!ss_initialized) { + int i; + + for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { + if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { + *sid = i; + goto out; + } + } + *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; + goto out; + } + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, + scontext, scontext_len, + &context, def_sid, gfp_flags); + if (rc == -EINVAL && force) { + context.str = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags); + if (!context.str) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + memcpy(context.str, scontext, scontext_len); + context.str[scontext_len] = 0; + context.len = scontext_len; + } else if (rc) + goto out; + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid); + if (rc) + context_destroy(&context); out: + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; return rc; } @@ -838,7 +884,7 @@ out: int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) { return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, - sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL); + sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0); } /** @@ -855,6 +901,7 @@ int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel). + * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet. * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ @@ -862,7 +909,14 @@ int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags) { return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, - sid, def_sid, gfp_flags); + sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1); +} + +int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, + u32 *sid) +{ + return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, + sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1); } static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context( @@ -1246,9 +1300,12 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context char *s; u32 len; - context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len); - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: context %s is invalid\n", s); - kfree(s); + if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", + s); + kfree(s); + } } return rc; } @@ -1280,6 +1337,32 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key, args = p; + if (c->str) { + struct context ctx; + rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, c->str, + c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rc) { + printk(KERN_INFO + "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n", + c->str); + /* Replace string with mapped representation. */ + kfree(c->str); + memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c)); + goto out; + } else if (rc == -EINVAL) { + /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */ + rc = 0; + goto out; + } else { + /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */ + printk(KERN_ERR + "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n", + c->str, -rc); + goto out; + } + } + rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c); if (rc) goto out; @@ -1319,13 +1402,21 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key, } context_destroy(&oldc); + rc = 0; out: return rc; bad: - context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len); + /* Map old representation to string and save it. */ + if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len)) + return -ENOMEM; context_destroy(&oldc); - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: invalidating context %s\n", s); - kfree(s); + context_destroy(c); + c->str = s; + c->len = len; + printk(KERN_INFO + "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n", + c->str); + rc = 0; goto out; } @@ -1406,7 +1497,11 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) return -EINVAL; } - sidtab_init(&newsidtab); + if (sidtab_init(&newsidtab)) { + LOAD_UNLOCK; + policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); + return -ENOMEM; + } /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */ if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) { @@ -1429,11 +1524,15 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) goto err; } - /* Convert the internal representations of contexts - in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */ + /* + * Convert the internal representations of contexts + * in the new SID table. + */ args.oldp = &policydb; args.newp = &newpolicydb; - sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args); + rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args); + if (rc) + goto err; /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */ memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb); @@ -1673,6 +1772,8 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, POLICY_RDLOCK; + context_init(&usercon); + fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid); if (!fromcon) { rc = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 4a516ff..ba35416 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ out: return rc; } -struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid) +static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force) { int hvalue; struct sidtab_node *cur; @@ -99,7 +99,10 @@ struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid) while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid) cur = cur->next; - if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid) { + if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len) + return &cur->context; + + if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) { /* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */ sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid); @@ -113,6 +116,16 @@ struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid) return &cur->context; } +struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid) +{ + return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 0); +} + +struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid) +{ + return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1); +} + int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s, int (*apply) (u32 sid, struct context *context, @@ -138,43 +151,6 @@ out: return rc; } -void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s, - int (*apply) (u32 sid, - struct context *context, - void *args), - void *args) -{ - int i, ret; - struct sidtab_node *last, *cur, *temp; - - if (!s) - return; - - for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { - last = NULL; - cur = s->htable[i]; - while (cur != NULL) { - ret = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args); - if (ret) { - if (last) - last->next = cur->next; - else - s->htable[i] = cur->next; - temp = cur; - cur = cur->next; - context_destroy(&temp->context); - kfree(temp); - s->nel--; - } else { - last = cur; - cur = cur->next; - } - } - } - - return; -} - static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context) { @@ -215,6 +191,10 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, goto unlock_out; } sid = s->next_sid++; + if (context->len) + printk(KERN_INFO + "SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n", + context->str); ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context); if (ret) s->next_sid--; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h index 2fe9dfa..64ea5b1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct sidtab { int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s); int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context); struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid); +struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid); int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s, int (*apply) (u32 sid, @@ -39,12 +40,6 @@ int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s, void *args), void *args); -void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s, - int (*apply) (u32 sid, - struct context *context, - void *args), - void *args); - int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid); -- cgit v1.1 From 9a59daa03df72526d234b91dd3e32ded5aebd3ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Wed, 14 May 2008 10:33:55 -0400 Subject: SELinux: fix sleeping allocation in security_context_to_sid Fix a sleeping function called from invalid context bug by moving allocation to the callers prior to taking the policy rdlock. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index b86ac9d..2d5e5a3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -730,15 +730,16 @@ int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1); } +/* + * Caveat: Mutates scontext. + */ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol, struct sidtab *sidtabp, - const char *scontext, + char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, struct context *ctx, - u32 def_sid, - gfp_t gfp_flags) + u32 def_sid) { - char *scontext2 = NULL; struct role_datum *role; struct type_datum *typdatum; struct user_datum *usrdatum; @@ -747,19 +748,10 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol, context_init(ctx); - /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */ - scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags); - if (!scontext2) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len); - scontext2[scontext_len] = 0; - /* Parse the security context. */ rc = -EINVAL; - scontextp = (char *) scontext2; + scontextp = (char *) scontext; /* Extract the user. */ p = scontextp; @@ -809,7 +801,7 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol, if (rc) goto out; - if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) { + if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -822,7 +814,6 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol, } rc = 0; out: - kfree(scontext2); return rc; } @@ -830,6 +821,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags, int force) { + char *scontext2, *str = NULL; struct context context; int rc = 0; @@ -839,27 +831,38 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { *sid = i; - goto out; + return 0; } } *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; - goto out; + return 0; } *sid = SECSID_NULL; + /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */ + scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags); + if (!scontext2) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len); + scontext2[scontext_len] = 0; + + if (force) { + /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */ + str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags); + if (!str) { + kfree(scontext2); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + POLICY_RDLOCK; rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, - scontext, scontext_len, - &context, def_sid, gfp_flags); + scontext2, scontext_len, + &context, def_sid); if (rc == -EINVAL && force) { - context.str = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags); - if (!context.str) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - memcpy(context.str, scontext, scontext_len); - context.str[scontext_len] = 0; + context.str = str; context.len = scontext_len; + str = NULL; } else if (rc) goto out; rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid); @@ -867,6 +870,8 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, context_destroy(&context); out: POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + kfree(scontext2); + kfree(str); return rc; } @@ -1339,9 +1344,14 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key, if (c->str) { struct context ctx; - rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, c->str, - c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL, - GFP_KERNEL); + s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!s) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s, + c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL); + kfree(s); if (!rc) { printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n", -- cgit v1.1 From f5269710789f666a65cf1132c4f1d14fbc8d3c29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Wed, 14 May 2008 11:27:45 -0400 Subject: SELinux: keep the code clean formating and syntax Formatting and syntax changes whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space put open { on same line as struct def remove unneeded {} after if statements change printk("Lu") to printk("llu") convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtol Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 +++++++++++------- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 ++-- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 15 +++++++-------- security/selinux/netnode.c | 1 - security/selinux/netport.c | 3 +-- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 10 +++++++--- security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 8 ++++---- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 ++-- 9 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 59c6e98..eca70f42 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ #include /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ #include #include -#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -104,7 +104,9 @@ int selinux_enforcing; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { - selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); + unsigned long enforcing; + if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) + selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); @@ -115,7 +117,9 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { - selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); + unsigned long enabled; + if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) + selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); @@ -594,7 +598,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, */ if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) && (num_opts == 0)) - goto out; + goto out; /* * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. @@ -2695,7 +2699,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, } static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; @@ -5390,7 +5394,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv, - .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, + .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, @@ -5431,7 +5435,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, - .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, + .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 6c8b9ef..1bdf973 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks * - * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which + * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which * is released under below copyrights: * * Author: James Morris @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule); * -errno on failure. */ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule, - struct audit_context *actx); + struct audit_context *actx); /** * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields. diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 8e23d7a..7b9769f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -75,13 +75,12 @@ struct avc_audit_data { /* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */ #define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \ - { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; } + { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; } /* * AVC statistics */ -struct avc_cache_stats -{ +struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned int lookups; unsigned int hits; unsigned int misses; @@ -97,8 +96,8 @@ struct avc_cache_stats void __init avc_init(void); void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata); + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata); #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, @@ -107,8 +106,8 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, struct av_decision *avd); int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct avc_audit_data *auditdata); + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct avc_audit_data *auditdata); u32 avc_policy_seqno(void); @@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void); #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128 int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, + u16 tclass, u32 perms, u32 *out_retained), u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 perms); diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index b6ccd093..7100072 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include "netnode.h" #include "objsec.h" diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c index 90b4cff..fe7fba6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netport.c +++ b/security/selinux/netport.c @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include "netport.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -272,7 +271,7 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void) } ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); if (ret != 0) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index ac1ccc1..07a5db6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include /* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API. Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */ @@ -57,14 +57,18 @@ int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { - selinux_checkreqprot = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0) ? 1 : 0; + unsigned long checkreqprot; + if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) + selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); static int __init selinux_compat_net_setup(char *str) { - selinux_compat_net = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0) ? 1 : 0; + unsigned long compat_net; + if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &compat_net)) + selinux_compat_net = compat_net ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("selinux_compat_net=", selinux_compat_net_setup); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index 9e66263..a1be97f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag) } printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, " - "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %Lu\n", + "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len, chain2_len_sum); } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index a6ca058..77d745d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -437,13 +437,13 @@ int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]); /* Honor the user's default level if we can */ - if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr)) { + if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr)) *usercon_sen = *user_def; - } else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr)) { + else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr)) *usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen; - } else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def)) { + else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def)) *usercon_sen = *user_low; - } else + else return -EINVAL; /* Lower the clearance of available contexts diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 2d5e5a3..0696aad 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2531,7 +2531,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) } int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, - struct audit_context *actx) + struct audit_context *actx) { struct context *ctxt; struct mls_level *level; @@ -2645,7 +2645,7 @@ out: static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules; static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) + u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) { int err = 0; -- cgit v1.1 From fdeb05184b8b2500e120647778d63fddba76dc59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Kennedy Date: Sun, 18 May 2008 12:32:57 +0100 Subject: SELinux: reorder inode_security_struct to increase objs/slab on 64bit reorder inode_security_struct to remove padding on 64 bit builds size reduced from 72 to 64 bytes increasing objects per slab to 64. Signed-off-by: Richard Kennedy Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 032c235..5f0be19 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ struct inode_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */ unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */ - struct mutex lock; unsigned char inherit; /* inherit SID from parent entry */ + struct mutex lock; }; struct file_security_struct { -- cgit v1.1 From feb2a5b82d87fbdc01c00b7e9413e4b5f4c1f0c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Tue, 20 May 2008 09:42:33 +1000 Subject: SELinux: remove inherit field from inode_security_struct Remove inherit field from inode_security_struct, per Stephen Smalley: "Let's just drop inherit altogether - dead field." Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 5f0be19..91070ab 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct inode_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */ unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */ - unsigned char inherit; /* inherit SID from parent entry */ struct mutex lock; }; -- cgit v1.1 From 006ebb40d3d65338bd74abb03b945f8d60e362bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Mon, 19 May 2008 08:32:49 -0400 Subject: Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security modules to permit access to reading process state without granting full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged. Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the read mode instead of attach. In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps, lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired) or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks). This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler (change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking). Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0 or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Chris Wright Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/commoncap.c | 3 ++- security/dummy.c | 3 ++- security/security.c | 5 +++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 +++++++++++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++-- 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 33d3433..0b6537a 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) return 0; } -int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) +int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) { /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) && diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index b891688..1db712d 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ #include #include -static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) +static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 59838a9..c4507ce 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -161,9 +161,10 @@ int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) /* Security operations */ -int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) +int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) { - return security_ops->ptrace(parent, child); + return security_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode); } int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index eca70f42..4be1563 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1686,14 +1686,23 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) /* Hook functions begin here. */ -static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) +static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, + struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child); + rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode); if (rc) return rc; + if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) { + struct task_security_struct *tsec = parent->security; + struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security; + return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid, + SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); + } + return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE); } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 4a09293..3c7150b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -95,11 +95,12 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack) * * Do the capability checks, and require read and write. */ -static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp) +static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp, + unsigned int mode) { int rc; - rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp); + rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp, mode); if (rc != 0) return rc; -- cgit v1.1 From abc69bb633931bf54c6db798bcdc6fd1e0284742 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Wed, 21 May 2008 14:16:12 -0400 Subject: SELinux: enable processes with mac_admin to get the raw inode contexts Enable processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy to get undefined contexts on inodes. This extends the support for deferred mapping of security contexts in order to permit restorecon and similar programs to see the raw file contexts unknown to the system policy in order to check them. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 4be1563..91b666a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2754,9 +2754,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) } /* - * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the - * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to - * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user. + * Copy the inode security context value to the user. * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ @@ -2765,12 +2763,33 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name u32 size; int error; char *context = NULL; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); + /* + * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context + * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, + * use the in-core value under current policy. + * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since + * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly + * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the + * in-core context value, not a denial. + */ + error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN); + if (!error) + error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2, + CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN, + 0, + NULL); + if (!error) + error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, + &size); + else + error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); if (error) return error; error = size; -- cgit v1.1 From 242631c49d4cf39642741d6627750151b058233b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 09:21:28 -0400 Subject: selinux: simplify ioctl checking Simplify and improve the robustness of the SELinux ioctl checking by using the "access mode" bits of the ioctl command to determine the permission check rather than dealing with individual command values. This removes any knowledge of specific ioctl commands from SELinux and follows the same guidance we gave to Smack earlier. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 48 ++++++++---------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 91b666a..f530008 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -42,9 +42,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -2903,46 +2901,16 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { - int error = 0; - - switch (cmd) { - case FIONREAD: - /* fall through */ - case FIBMAP: - /* fall through */ - case FIGETBSZ: - /* fall through */ - case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS: - /* fall through */ - case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION: - error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR); - break; - - case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS: - /* fall through */ - case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: - error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR); - break; - - /* sys_ioctl() checks */ - case FIONBIO: - /* fall through */ - case FIOASYNC: - error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); - break; + u32 av = 0; - case KDSKBENT: - case KDSKBSENT: - error = task_has_capability(current, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG); - break; + if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) + av |= FILE__WRITE; + if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) + av |= FILE__READ; + if (!av) + av = FILE__IOCTL; - /* default case assumes that the command will go - * to the file's ioctl() function. - */ - default: - error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL); - } - return error; + return file_has_perm(current, file, av); } static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) -- cgit v1.1 From 59dbd1ba9847837aa7095f3e4a29599dae412ac4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 09:48:51 -0400 Subject: selinux: fix endianness bug in network node address handling Fix an endianness bug in the handling of network node addresses by SELinux. This yields no change on little endian hardware but fixes the incorrect handling on big endian hardware. The network node addresses are stored in network order in memory by checkpolicy, not in cpu/host order, and thus should not have cpu_to_le32/le32_to_cpu conversions applied upon policy write/read unlike other data in the policy. Bug reported by John Weeks of Sun, who noticed that binary policy files built from the same policy source on x86 and sparc differed and tracked it down to the ipv4 address handling in checkpolicy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 84f8cc7..2391761 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -1478,7 +1478,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) struct ocontext *l, *c, *newc; struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs, *newgenfs; int i, j, rc; - __le32 buf[8]; + __le32 buf[4]; + u32 nodebuf[8]; u32 len, len2, config, nprim, nel, nel2; char *policydb_str; struct policydb_compat_info *info; @@ -1749,11 +1750,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) goto bad; break; case OCON_NODE: - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2); + rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2); if (rc < 0) goto bad; - c->u.node.addr = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - c->u.node.mask = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */ + c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); if (rc) goto bad; @@ -1782,13 +1783,13 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) case OCON_NODE6: { int k; - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8); + rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8); if (rc < 0) goto bad; for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) - c->u.node6.addr[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k]); + c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k]; for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) - c->u.node6.mask[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k+4]); + c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4]; if (context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp)) goto bad; break; -- cgit v1.1 From 0804d1133c02cbdfba0055de774f2c21a8b777dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2008 18:40:29 +1000 Subject: SELinux: open code policy_rwlock Open code policy_rwlock, as suggested by Andrew Morton. Signed-off-by: James Morris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 0696aad..e8ec54d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -71,10 +71,6 @@ int selinux_policycap_openperm; extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm; static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); -#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock) -#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock) -#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock) -#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock) static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex); #define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex) @@ -429,7 +425,7 @@ int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid) u32 type; int rc; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); BUG_ON(!context); @@ -441,7 +437,7 @@ int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid) */ rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, type); - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -486,7 +482,7 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, if (!ss_initialized) return 0; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); /* * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions. @@ -543,7 +539,7 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, } out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -578,7 +574,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, return 0; } - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { @@ -598,7 +594,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, requested, avd); out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -691,7 +687,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); if (force) context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid); else @@ -704,7 +700,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, } rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len); out_unlock: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); out: return rc; @@ -855,7 +851,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, } } - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2, scontext_len, &context, def_sid); @@ -869,7 +865,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, if (rc) context_destroy(&context); out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); kfree(scontext2); kfree(str); return rc; @@ -981,7 +977,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, context_init(&newcontext); - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { @@ -1086,7 +1082,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, /* Obtain the sid for the context. */ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid); out_unlock: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); context_destroy(&newcontext); out: return rc; @@ -1549,13 +1545,13 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab); /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */ - POLICY_WRLOCK; + write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock); memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb); sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab); security_load_policycaps(); seqno = ++latest_granting; policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; - POLICY_WRUNLOCK; + write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); LOAD_UNLOCK; /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ @@ -1588,7 +1584,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid) struct ocontext *c; int rc = 0; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; while (c) { @@ -1613,7 +1609,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid) } out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -1627,7 +1623,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid) int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF]; while (c) { @@ -1654,7 +1650,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid) *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF; out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -1686,7 +1682,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); switch (domain) { case AF_INET: { @@ -1741,7 +1737,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, } out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -1780,7 +1776,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, if (!ss_initialized) goto out; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); context_init(&usercon); @@ -1833,7 +1829,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, } out_unlock: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); if (rc || !mynel) { kfree(mysids); goto out; @@ -1886,7 +1882,7 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/') path++; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype); @@ -1923,7 +1919,7 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, *sid = c->sid[0]; out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -1941,7 +1937,7 @@ int security_fs_use( int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; while (c) { @@ -1971,7 +1967,7 @@ int security_fs_use( } out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -1979,7 +1975,7 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values) { int i, rc = -ENOMEM; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); *names = NULL; *values = NULL; @@ -2009,7 +2005,7 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values) } rc = 0; out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; err: if (*names) { @@ -2027,7 +2023,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values) int lenp, seqno = 0; struct cond_node *cur; - POLICY_WRLOCK; + write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock); lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim; if (len != lenp) { @@ -2061,7 +2057,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values) seqno = ++latest_granting; out: - POLICY_WRUNLOCK; + write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); if (!rc) { avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); @@ -2075,7 +2071,7 @@ int security_get_bool_value(int bool) int rc = 0; int len; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); len = policydb.p_bools.nprim; if (bool >= len) { @@ -2085,7 +2081,7 @@ int security_get_bool_value(int bool) rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state; out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2140,7 +2136,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) context_init(&newcon); - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); if (!context1) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", @@ -2182,7 +2178,7 @@ bad: } out_unlock: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); context_destroy(&newcon); out: return rc; @@ -2239,7 +2235,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, return 0; } - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid); if (!nlbl_ctx) { @@ -2258,7 +2254,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES); out_slowpath: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); if (rc == 0) /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID @@ -2288,7 +2284,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses) { int rc = -ENOMEM; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim; *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(*classes), GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -2305,7 +2301,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses) } out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2327,7 +2323,7 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) int rc = -ENOMEM, i; struct class_datum *match; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class); if (!match) { @@ -2355,11 +2351,11 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) goto err; out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; err: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++) kfree((*perms)[i]); kfree(*perms); @@ -2390,9 +2386,9 @@ int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap) { int rc; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap); - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2456,7 +2452,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting; @@ -2493,7 +2489,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) break; } - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); if (rc) { selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule); @@ -2544,7 +2540,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, return -ENOENT; } - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) { audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, @@ -2638,7 +2634,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, } out: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return match; } @@ -2726,7 +2722,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, return 0; } - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) { *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data; @@ -2771,7 +2767,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, } netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup: ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); @@ -2796,7 +2792,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) if (!ss_initialized) return 0; - POLICY_RDLOCK; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); if (ctx == NULL) goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure; @@ -2807,12 +2803,12 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr); if (rc != 0) goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure; - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return 0; netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ -- cgit v1.1 From 972ccac2b237967ed7e56a50eb181b5a0a484b79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2008 18:43:26 +1000 Subject: SELinux: open code load_mutex Open code load_mutex as suggested by Andrew Morton. Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 21 +++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e8ec54d..d06df33 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -71,10 +71,7 @@ int selinux_policycap_openperm; extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm; static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); - static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex); -#define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex) -#define LOAD_UNLOCK mutex_unlock(&load_mutex) static struct sidtab sidtab; struct policydb policydb; @@ -1456,17 +1453,17 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; - LOAD_LOCK; + mutex_lock(&load_mutex); if (!ss_initialized) { avtab_cache_init(); if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) { - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; } if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) { - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; @@ -1475,7 +1472,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) if (validate_classes(&policydb)) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: the definition of a class is incorrect\n"); - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); sidtab_destroy(&sidtab); policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); @@ -1485,7 +1482,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; ss_initialized = 1; seqno = ++latest_granting; - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); selinux_complete_init(); avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); @@ -1499,12 +1496,12 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) #endif if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) { - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); return -EINVAL; } if (sidtab_init(&newsidtab)) { - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -1552,7 +1549,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) seqno = ++latest_granting; policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb); @@ -1566,7 +1563,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) return 0; err: - LOAD_UNLOCK; + mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab); policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); return rc; -- cgit v1.1 From bdd581c1439339f1d3e8446b83e0f1beaef294e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2008 18:50:12 +1000 Subject: SELinux: open code sidtab lock Open code sidtab lock to make Andrew Morton happy. Signed-off-by: James Morris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley --- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 18 +++++++----------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index ba35416..a81ded1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -14,10 +14,6 @@ #define SIDTAB_HASH(sid) \ (sid & SIDTAB_HASH_MASK) -#define INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s) spin_lock_init(&s->lock) -#define SIDTAB_LOCK(s, x) spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, x) -#define SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, x) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, x) - int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) { int i; @@ -30,7 +26,7 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) s->nel = 0; s->next_sid = 1; s->shutdown = 0; - INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s); + spin_lock_init(&s->lock); return 0; } @@ -180,7 +176,7 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context); if (!sid) { - SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags); /* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */ sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context); if (sid) @@ -199,7 +195,7 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, if (ret) s->next_sid--; unlock_out: - SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags); } if (ret) @@ -264,19 +260,19 @@ void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src) { unsigned long flags; - SIDTAB_LOCK(src, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&src->lock, flags); dst->htable = src->htable; dst->nel = src->nel; dst->next_sid = src->next_sid; dst->shutdown = 0; - SIDTAB_UNLOCK(src, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->lock, flags); } void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s) { unsigned long flags; - SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags); s->shutdown = 1; - SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags); } -- cgit v1.1 From cea78dc4ca044e9666e8f5d797ec50ab85253e49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 15:43:12 -0400 Subject: SELinux: fix off by 1 reference of class_to_string in context_struct_compute_av The class_to_string array is referenced by tclass. My code mistakenly was using tclass - 1. If the proceeding class is a userspace class rather than kernel class this may cause a denial/EINVAL even if unknown handling is set to allow. The bug shouldn't be allowing excess privileges since those are given based on the contents of another array which should be correctly referenced. At this point in time its pretty unlikely this is going to cause problems. The most recently added kernel classes which could be affected are association, dccp_socket, and peer. Its pretty unlikely any policy with handle_unknown=allow doesn't have association and dccp_socket undefined (they've been around longer than unknown handling) and peer is conditionalized on a policy cap which should only be defined if that class exists in policy. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index d06df33..f26a8ca 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, goto inval_class; if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) if (tclass > kdefs->cts_len || - !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass - 1] || + !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass] || !policydb.allow_unknown) goto inval_class; -- cgit v1.1 From 89abd0acf0335f3f760a3c0698d43bb1eaa83e44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 15:58:04 -0400 Subject: SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policy We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex, sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 14 +------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index f26a8ca..543fd0f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ int selinux_policycap_openperm; extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm; static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); -static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex); static struct sidtab sidtab; struct policydb policydb; @@ -1453,17 +1452,13 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; - mutex_lock(&load_mutex); - if (!ss_initialized) { avtab_cache_init(); if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) { - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; } if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) { - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; @@ -1472,7 +1467,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) if (validate_classes(&policydb)) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: the definition of a class is incorrect\n"); - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); sidtab_destroy(&sidtab); policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); @@ -1482,7 +1476,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; ss_initialized = 1; seqno = ++latest_granting; - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); selinux_complete_init(); avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); @@ -1495,13 +1488,10 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids"); #endif - if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) { - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); + if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) return -EINVAL; - } if (sidtab_init(&newsidtab)) { - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -1549,7 +1539,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) seqno = ++latest_granting; policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb); @@ -1563,7 +1552,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) return 0; err: - mutex_unlock(&load_mutex); sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab); policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb); return rc; -- cgit v1.1 From 22df4adb049a5cbb340dd935f5bbfa1ab3947562 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 16:03:56 -0400 Subject: selinux: change handling of invalid classes (Was: Re: 2.6.26-rc5-mm1 selinux whine) On Mon, 2008-06-09 at 01:24 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > Getting a few of these with FC5: > > SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69 > SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69 > > one came out when I logged in. > > No other symptoms, yet. Change handling of invalid classes by SELinux, reporting class values unknown to the kernel as errors (w/ ratelimit applied) and handling class values unknown to policy as normal denials. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 543fd0f..04c0b70 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -407,9 +407,19 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, return 0; inval_class: - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n", __func__, - tclass); - return -EINVAL; + if (!tclass || tclass > kdefs->cts_len || + !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass]) { + if (printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n", + __func__, tclass); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * Known to the kernel, but not to the policy. + * Handle as a denial (allowed is 0). + */ + return 0; } /* -- cgit v1.1 From 6cbe27061a69ab89d25dbe42d1a4f33a8425fe88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 16:51:37 -0400 Subject: SELinux: more user friendly unknown handling printk I've gotten complaints and reports about people not understanding the meaning of the current unknown class/perm handling the kernel emits on every policy load. Hopefully this will make make it clear to everyone the meaning of the message and won't waste a printk the user won't care about anyway on systems where the kernel and the policy agree on everything. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 5 ----- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 07a5db6..69c9dcc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -356,11 +356,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, length = count; out1: - - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: policy loaded with handle_unknown=%s\n", - (security_get_reject_unknown() ? "reject" : - (security_get_allow_unknown() ? "allow" : "deny"))); - audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u", audit_get_loginuid(current), diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 04c0b70..b52f923 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1171,6 +1171,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p) const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm; const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class; struct symtab *perms; + bool print_unknown_handle = 0; if (p->allow_unknown) { u32 num_classes = kdefs->cts_len; @@ -1191,6 +1192,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p) return -EINVAL; if (p->allow_unknown) p->undefined_perms[i-1] = ~0U; + print_unknown_handle = 1; continue; } pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1]; @@ -1220,6 +1222,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p) return -EINVAL; if (p->allow_unknown) p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= perm_val; + print_unknown_handle = 1; continue; } perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm); @@ -1267,6 +1270,7 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p) return -EINVAL; if (p->allow_unknown) p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= (1 << j); + print_unknown_handle = 1; continue; } perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm); @@ -1284,6 +1288,9 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p) } } } + if (print_unknown_handle) + printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", + (security_get_allow_unknown() ? "allowed" : "denied")); return 0; } -- cgit v1.1 From e399f98224a03d2e85fb45eacba367c47173f6f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 01:39:58 +1000 Subject: SELinux: remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable Remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable. Picked up by sparse. Signed-off-by: James Morris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index f530008..6e8d0e9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3669,7 +3669,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen; + u32 sid, node_perm; tsec = current->security; isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; @@ -3677,12 +3677,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in if (family == PF_INET) { addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); - addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; } else { addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); - addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; } -- cgit v1.1 From 2baf06df85b27c1d64867883a0692519594f1ef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 01:42:35 +1000 Subject: SELinux: use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block Use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block. Sparse complained. Signed-off-by: James Morris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6e8d0e9..4130d64 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5196,12 +5196,12 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *g, *t; struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm; read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - do_each_thread(g, t) + do_each_thread(g, t) { if (t->mm == mm && t != p) { read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); return -EPERM; } - while_each_thread(g, t); + } while_each_thread(g, t); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } -- cgit v1.1 From 65fc7668006b537f7ae8451990c0ed9ec882544e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 01:00:10 +1000 Subject: security: fix return of void-valued expressions Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form "returning void-valued expression". Signed-off-by: James Morris Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Serge Hallyn --- security/security.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index c4507ce..2c0a587 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { - return security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen); + security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); @@ -1012,12 +1012,12 @@ int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) { - return security_ops->sk_free_security(sk); + security_ops->sk_free_security(sk); } void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - return security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); + security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); } void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl) -- cgit v1.1 From 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 09:50:04 -0400 Subject: SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all. This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy. An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs if available and will follow the genfs rule. This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with this path we just don't need to define it! Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support: SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support: SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattr It is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 4130d64..85f74f6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -556,13 +556,15 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; const char *name = sb->s_type->name; - struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; - struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; + struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; + struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode; + struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = root_inode->i_security; u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; u32 defcontext_sid = 0; char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts; int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags; int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts; + bool can_xattr = false; mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); @@ -666,14 +668,24 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, goto out; } - if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) + if (strcmp(name, "proc") == 0) sbsec->proc = 1; + /* + * test if the fs supports xattrs, fs_use might make use of this if the + * fs has no definition in policy. + */ + if (root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { + rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); + if (rc >= 0 || rc == -ENODATA) + can_xattr = true; + } + /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ - rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); + rc = security_fs_use(name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid, can_xattr); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", - __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); + __func__, name, rc); goto out; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 7c54300..44cba2e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void); #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT 6 /* use mountpoint labeling */ int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior, - u32 *sid); + u32 *sid, bool can_xattr); int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, u32 *sid); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index b52f923..8e42da1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1934,7 +1934,8 @@ out: int security_fs_use( const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior, - u32 *sid) + u32 *sid, + bool can_xattr) { int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; @@ -1948,6 +1949,7 @@ int security_fs_use( c = c->next; } + /* look for labeling behavior defined in policy */ if (c) { *behavior = c->v.behavior; if (!c->sid[0]) { @@ -1958,14 +1960,23 @@ int security_fs_use( goto out; } *sid = c->sid[0]; + goto out; + } + + /* labeling behavior not in policy, use xattrs if possible */ + if (can_xattr) { + *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR; + *sid = SECINITSID_FS; + goto out; + } + + /* no behavior in policy and can't use xattrs, try GENFS */ + rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid); + if (rc) { + *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; + rc = 0; } else { - rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid); - if (rc) { - *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; - rc = 0; - } else { - *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS; - } + *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS; } out: -- cgit v1.1 From 2069f457848f846cb31149c9aa29b330a6b66d1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2008 09:47:13 +1000 Subject: LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mounts This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own security_sb_show_options() function. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/dummy.c | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 5 +++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 1db712d..c155f08 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ static int dummy_sb_kern_mount (struct super_block *sb, void *data) return 0; } +static int dummy_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) +{ + return 0; +} + static int dummy_sb_statfs (struct dentry *dentry) { return 0; @@ -1088,6 +1093,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_free_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_show_options); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_statfs); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_mount); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_check_sb); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 2c0a587..de74fdc 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -292,6 +292,11 @@ int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, data); } +int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) +{ + return security_ops->sb_show_options(m, sb); +} + int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 85f74f6..33dee83 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ * James Morris * * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. - * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris + * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris + * Eric Paris * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. @@ -970,6 +971,57 @@ out_err: return rc; } +void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ + int i; + char *prefix; + + for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) { + char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); + + switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { + case CONTEXT_MNT: + prefix = CONTEXT_STR; + break; + case FSCONTEXT_MNT: + prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR; + break; + case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: + prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR; + break; + case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: + prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; + break; + default: + BUG(); + }; + /* we need a comma before each option */ + seq_putc(m, ','); + seq_puts(m, prefix); + if (has_comma) + seq_putc(m, '\"'); + seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]); + if (has_comma) + seq_putc(m, '\"'); + } +} + +static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) +{ + struct security_mnt_opts opts; + int rc; + + rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); + if (rc) + return rc; + + selinux_write_opts(m, &opts); + + security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); + + return rc; +} + static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) { switch (mode & S_IFMT) { @@ -5365,6 +5417,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, + .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options, .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, .sb_mount = selinux_mount, .sb_umount = selinux_umount, -- cgit v1.1 From b478a9f9889c81e88077d1495daadee64c0af541 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2008 20:56:04 +0200 Subject: security: remove unused sb_get_mnt_opts hook The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the sb_show_options() hook. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Acked-by: James Morris --- security/dummy.c | 8 -------- security/security.c | 6 ------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index c155f08..7938566 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -252,13 +252,6 @@ static void dummy_sb_post_pivotroot (struct path *old_path, struct path *new_pat return; } -static int dummy_sb_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, - struct security_mnt_opts *opts) -{ - security_init_mnt_opts(opts); - return 0; -} - static int dummy_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) { @@ -1104,7 +1097,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_addmount); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_pivotroot); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_get_mnt_opts); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index de74fdc..28b2860 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -348,12 +348,6 @@ void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot(old_path, new_path); } -int security_sb_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, - struct security_mnt_opts *opts) -{ - return security_ops->sb_get_mnt_opts(sb, opts); -} - int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) { diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 33dee83..745a69e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5421,7 +5421,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, .sb_mount = selinux_mount, .sb_umount = selinux_umount, - .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts, .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts, .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts, .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str, -- cgit v1.1 From 5915eb53861c5776cfec33ca4fcc1fd20d66dd27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2008 20:56:05 +0200 Subject: security: remove dummy module Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default. Compile and boot tested. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/Kconfig | 10 +- security/Makefile | 11 +- security/capability.c | 1050 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/dummy.c | 1250 ------------------------------------------------- security/security.c | 15 +- 5 files changed, 996 insertions(+), 1340 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 security/dummy.c (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 49b51f9..77def9f 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -73,17 +73,9 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM IPSec. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES - bool "Default Linux Capabilities" - depends on SECURITY - default y - help - This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality. - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y. - config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES bool "File POSIX Capabilities (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on (SECURITY=n || SECURITY_CAPABILITIES!=n) && EXPERIMENTAL + depends on SECURITY && EXPERIMENTAL default n help This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 7ef1107..f654260 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -6,16 +6,13 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack -# if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities -ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y) +# always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o -endif # Object file lists -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o dummy.o inode.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o inode.o # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly. obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += commoncap.o smack/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += commoncap.o root_plug.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += root_plug.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 38ac54e..6e0671c 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ /* * Capabilities Linux Security Module * + * This is the default security module in case no other module is loaded. + * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or @@ -8,75 +10,995 @@ * */ -#include -#include #include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -static struct security_operations capability_ops = { - .ptrace = cap_ptrace, - .capget = cap_capget, - .capset_check = cap_capset_check, - .capset_set = cap_capset_set, - .capable = cap_capable, - .settime = cap_settime, - .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, - .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, - - .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds, - .bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security, - .bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec, - - .inode_setxattr = cap_inode_setxattr, - .inode_removexattr = cap_inode_removexattr, - .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, - .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, - - .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler, - .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio, - .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice, - .task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid, - .task_prctl = cap_task_prctl, - .task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init, - - .syslog = cap_syslog, - - .vm_enough_memory = cap_vm_enough_memory, -}; -/* flag to keep track of how we were registered */ -static int secondary; +static int cap_acct(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ +} + +static void cap_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ +} + +static int cap_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) +{ +} + +static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, + unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +} + +static void cap_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +} + +static void cap_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, + void *data) +{ +} + +static void cap_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path) +{ +} + +static int cap_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) +{ +} + +static int cap_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, + struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ + if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; +} + +static void cap_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, + struct super_block *newsb) +{ +} + +static int cap_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) +{ +} + +static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + char **name, void **value, size_t *len) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static int cap_inode_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, + int mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_unlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_symlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, + int mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, + int mode, dev_t dev) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, + struct nameidata *nameidata) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, + struct nameidata *nd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_inode_delete(struct inode *ino) +{ +} + +static void cap_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ +} + +static int cap_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, + void **buffer, bool alloc) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static int cap_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static int cap_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, + size_t buffer_size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + +static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_file_free_security(struct file *file) +{ +} + +static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command, + unsigned long arg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +{ + if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + return -EACCES; + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_dentry_open(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_task_free_security(struct task_struct *p) +{ +} + +static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) +{ + return 0; +} -static int capability_disable; -module_param_named(disable, capability_disable, int, 0); +static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) +{ + return 0; +} -static int __init capability_init (void) +static int cap_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { - if (capability_disable) { - printk(KERN_INFO "Capabilities disabled at initialization\n"); - return 0; - } - /* register ourselves with the security framework */ - if (register_security (&capability_ops)) { - /* try registering with primary module */ - if (mod_reg_security (KBUILD_MODNAME, &capability_ops)) { - printk (KERN_INFO "Failure registering capabilities " - "with primary security module.\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - secondary = 1; - } - printk (KERN_INFO "Capability LSM initialized%s\n", - secondary ? " as secondary" : ""); return 0; } -security_initcall (capability_init); +static int cap_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + +static int cap_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, + int sig, u32 secid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) +{ +} + +static int cap_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + +static int cap_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ +} + +static int cap_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) +{ +} + +static int cap_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, + int msgflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, + struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) +{ +} + +static int cap_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, + int shmflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) +{ +} + +static int cap_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, + unsigned nsops, int alter) +{ + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK +static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, + int protocol, int kern) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ +} + +static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + int size, int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, + char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, unsigned len) +{ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} + +static int cap_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +{ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} + +static int cap_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) +{ +} + +static void cap_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) +{ +} + +static void cap_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) +{ +} + +static void cap_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ +} + +static int cap_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req) +{ +} + +static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +} + +static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, + struct flowi *fl) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM +static int cap_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ +} + +static int cap_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, + u32 secid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ +} + +static int cap_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + struct flowi *fl) +{ + return 1; +} + +static int cap_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ +static int cap_register_security(const char *name, + struct security_operations *ops) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static void cap_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) +{ +} + +static int cap_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, + size_t size) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static int cap_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) +{ +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *ctx, + unsigned long flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_key_free(struct key *key) +{ +} + +static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, struct task_struct *context, + key_perm_t perm) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) +{ + *_buffer = NULL; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +static int cap_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +struct security_operations default_security_ops = { + .name = "default", +}; + +#define set_to_cap_if_null(ops, function) \ + do { \ + if (!ops->function) { \ + ops->function = cap_##function; \ + pr_debug("Had to override the " #function \ + " security operation with the default.\n");\ + } \ + } while (0) + +void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) +{ + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset_check); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset_set); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, acct); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sysctl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_apply_creds); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_post_apply_creds); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_set_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_mount); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_check_sb); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount_close); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount_busy); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_remount); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_addmount); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_pivotroot); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_init_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_create); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_link); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_unlink); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_symlink); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mkdir); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rmdir); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mknod); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rename); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_readlink); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_follow_link); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_permission); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_delete); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_need_killpriv); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_killpriv); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mmap); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_post_setuid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsecid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgroups); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setnice); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setioprio); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getioprio); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setrlimit); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setscheduler); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getscheduler); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_movememory); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_wait); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_kill); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_prctl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_associate); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgctl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgsnd); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgrcv); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_associate); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmctl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmat); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_associate); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, register_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_create); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_create); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_bind); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeername); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_getsecid); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sock_graft); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_alloc); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity); +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free); +#endif +} diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7938566..0000000 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1250 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Stub functions for the default security function pointers in case no - * security model is loaded. - * - * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc - * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman - * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - */ - -#undef DEBUG - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child, - unsigned int mode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective, - kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted) -{ - if (target->euid == 0) { - cap_set_full(*permitted); - cap_set_init_eff(*effective); - } else { - cap_clear(*permitted); - cap_clear(*effective); - } - - cap_clear(*inheritable); - - if (target->fsuid != 0) { - *permitted = cap_drop_fs_set(*permitted); - *effective = cap_drop_fs_set(*effective); - } - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, - kernel_cap_t * effective, - kernel_cap_t * inheritable, - kernel_cap_t * permitted) -{ - return -EPERM; -} - -static void dummy_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, - kernel_cap_t * effective, - kernel_cap_t * inheritable, - kernel_cap_t * permitted) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_acct (struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) -{ - if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap)) - return 0; - return -EPERM; -} - -static int dummy_sysctl (ctl_table * table, int op) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_quotactl (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_quota_on (struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_syslog (int type) -{ - if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && current->euid) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) -{ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) -{ - int cap_sys_admin = 0; - - if (dummy_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) - cap_sys_admin = 1; - return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); -} - -static int dummy_bprm_alloc_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_bprm_free_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return; -} - -static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) -{ - if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - - if ((unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - bprm->e_uid = current->uid; - bprm->e_gid = current->gid; - } - } - - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; - - dummy_capget(current, ¤t->cap_effective, ¤t->cap_inheritable, ¤t->cap_permitted); -} - -static void dummy_bprm_post_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - /* The new userland will simply use the value provided - in the AT_SECURE field to decide whether secure mode - is required. Hence, this logic is required to preserve - the legacy decision algorithm used by the old userland. */ - return (current->euid != current->uid || - current->egid != current->gid); -} - -static int dummy_sb_alloc_security (struct super_block *sb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_sb_free_security (struct super_block *sb) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_sb_copy_data (char *orig, char *copy) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sb_kern_mount (struct super_block *sb, void *data) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sb_statfs (struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sb_mount (char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, - unsigned long flags, void *data) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sb_check_sb (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sb_umount (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_sb_umount_close (struct vfsmount *mnt) -{ - return; -} - -static void dummy_sb_umount_busy (struct vfsmount *mnt) -{ - return; -} - -static void dummy_sb_post_remount (struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, - void *data) -{ - return; -} - - -static void dummy_sb_post_addmount (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_sb_pivotroot (struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_sb_post_pivotroot (struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, - struct security_mnt_opts *opts) -{ - if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts)) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, - struct super_block *newsb) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_alloc_security (struct inode *inode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_inode_free_security (struct inode *inode) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_inode_init_security (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - char **name, void **value, size_t *len) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int dummy_inode_create (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - int mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_link (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, - struct dentry *new_dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_unlink (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_symlink (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_mkdir (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - int mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_rmdir (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_mknod (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - int mode, dev_t dev) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_rename (struct inode *old_inode, - struct dentry *old_dentry, - struct inode *new_inode, - struct dentry *new_dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_readlink (struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_follow_link (struct dentry *dentry, - struct nameidata *nameidata) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_permission (struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_getattr (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_inode_delete (struct inode *ino) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -{ - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, - sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, - int flags) -{ -} - -static int dummy_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) -{ - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, - sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int dummy_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) -{ - *secid = 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_alloc_security (struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_file_free_security (struct file *file) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int command, - unsigned long arg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, - unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, - unsigned long addr_only) -{ - if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) - return -EACCES; - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_lock (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_fcntl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_set_fowner (struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_send_sigiotask (struct task_struct *tsk, - struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_file_receive (struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_dentry_open (struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_alloc_security (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_task_free_security (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_task_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_post_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) -{ - dummy_capget(current, ¤t->cap_effective, ¤t->cap_inheritable, ¤t->cap_permitted); - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_setgid (gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) -{ - *secid = 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_setrlimit (unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, - struct sched_param *lp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_getscheduler (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_movememory (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_wait (struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_kill (struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, - int sig, u32 secid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p) -{ - switch (option) { - case PR_CAPBSET_READ: - *rc_p = (cap_valid(arg2) ? 1 : -EINVAL); - break; - case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: - *rc_p = issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); - break; - case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: - if (arg2 > 1) - *rc_p = -EINVAL; - else if (arg2) - current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); - else - current->securebits &= - ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); - break; - default: - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static void dummy_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) -{ - p->euid = p->fsuid = 0; - return; -} - -static void dummy_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) -{ } - -static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) -{ - *secid = 0; -} - -static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_msg_msg_free_security (struct msg_msg *msg) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_msg_queue_alloc_security (struct msg_queue *msq) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_msg_queue_free_security (struct msg_queue *msq) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_msg_queue_associate (struct msg_queue *msq, - int msqflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_msg_queue_msgctl (struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_msg_queue_msgsnd (struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, - int msgflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_msg_queue_msgrcv (struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, - struct task_struct *target, long type, - int mode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_shm_alloc_security (struct shmid_kernel *shp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_shm_free_security (struct shmid_kernel *shp) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_shm_associate (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_shm_shmctl (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_shm_shmat (struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, - int shmflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sem_alloc_security (struct sem_array *sma) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_sem_free_security (struct sem_array *sma) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_sem_associate (struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sem_semctl (struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_sem_semop (struct sem_array *sma, - struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_netlink_send (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective; - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) -{ - if (!cap_raised (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, cap)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -static int dummy_unix_stream_connect (struct socket *sock, - struct socket *other, - struct sock *newsk) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_unix_may_send (struct socket *sock, - struct socket *other) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_create (int family, int type, - int protocol, int kern) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_post_create (struct socket *sock, int family, int type, - int protocol, int kern) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_bind (struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, - int addrlen) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_connect (struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, - int addrlen) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_listen (struct socket *sock, int backlog) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_accept (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_socket_post_accept (struct socket *sock, - struct socket *newsock) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_socket_sendmsg (struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, - int size) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_recvmsg (struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, - int size, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_getsockname (struct socket *sock) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_getpeername (struct socket *sock) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_setsockopt (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_getsockopt (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_shutdown (struct socket *sock, int how) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, - int __user *optlen, unsigned len) -{ - return -ENOPROTOOPT; -} - -static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) -{ - return -ENOPROTOOPT; -} - -static inline int dummy_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void dummy_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) -{ -} - -static inline void dummy_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) -{ -} - -static inline void dummy_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) -{ -} - -static inline void dummy_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent) -{ -} - -static inline int dummy_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, - struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void dummy_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, - const struct request_sock *req) -{ -} - -static inline void dummy_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, - struct sk_buff *skb) -{ -} - -static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, - struct flowi *fl) -{ -} -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM -static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int dummy_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, - struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) -{ -} - -static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void dummy_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x) -{ -} - -static int dummy_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, - u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl) -{ - return 1; -} - -static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall) -{ - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ -static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - -static void dummy_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) -{ - return; -} - -static int dummy_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - -static int dummy_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - -static int dummy_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int dummy_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static void dummy_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) -{ -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS -static inline int dummy_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *ctx, - unsigned long flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void dummy_key_free(struct key *key) -{ -} - -static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, - struct task_struct *context, - key_perm_t perm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int dummy_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) -{ - *_buffer = NULL; - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT -static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule, - struct audit_context *actx) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) -{ } - -#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ - -struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = { - .name = "dummy", -}; - -#define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \ - do { \ - if (!ops->function) { \ - ops->function = dummy_##function; \ - pr_debug("Had to override the " #function \ - " security operation with the dummy one.\n");\ - } \ - } while (0) - -void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) -{ - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ptrace); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capget); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capset_check); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capset_set); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, acct); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capable); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, quotactl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, quota_on); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sysctl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, syslog); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, settime); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_apply_creds); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_post_apply_creds); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_set_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_show_options); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_statfs); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_mount); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_check_sb); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_umount); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_umount_close); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_umount_busy); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_remount); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_addmount); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_pivotroot); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_init_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_create); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_link); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_unlink); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_symlink); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_mkdir); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_rmdir); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_mknod); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_rename); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_readlink); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_follow_link); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_permission); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_delete); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_need_killpriv); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_killpriv); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_ioctl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_mmap); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_mprotect); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_lock); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_fcntl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_receive); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, dentry_open); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_create); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setuid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_post_setuid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setgid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setpgid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getpgid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getsid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getsecid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setgroups); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setnice); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setioprio); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getioprio); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setrlimit); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setscheduler); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getscheduler); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_movememory); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_wait); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_kill); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_prctl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_associate); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgctl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgsnd); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgrcv); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_associate); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_shmctl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_shmat); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_associate); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_semctl); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_semop); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, netlink_send); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, netlink_recv); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, register_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, getprocattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, setprocattr); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, release_secctx); -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_may_send); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_create); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_post_create); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_bind); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_connect); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_listen); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_accept); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeername); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsecid); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sock_graft); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow); - #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session); -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity); -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free); -#endif -} - diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 28b2860..30b0278 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; -/* things that live in dummy.c */ -extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; +/* things that live in capability.c */ +extern struct security_operations default_security_ops; extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops); struct security_operations *security_ops; /* Initialized to NULL */ @@ -57,13 +57,8 @@ int __init security_init(void) { printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework initialized\n"); - if (verify(&dummy_security_ops)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "%s could not verify " - "dummy_security_ops structure.\n", __func__); - return -EIO; - } - - security_ops = &dummy_security_ops; + security_fixup_ops(&default_security_ops); + security_ops = &default_security_ops; do_security_initcalls(); return 0; @@ -122,7 +117,7 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops) return -EINVAL; } - if (security_ops != &dummy_security_ops) + if (security_ops != &default_security_ops) return -EAGAIN; security_ops = ops; -- cgit v1.1 From 93cbace7a058bce7f99319ef6ceff4b78cf45051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2008 11:10:09 +0200 Subject: security: remove dummy module fix Fix small oversight in "security: remove dummy module": CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES doesn't depend on CONFIG_SECURITY Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 77def9f..62ed471 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES bool "File POSIX Capabilities (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on SECURITY && EXPERIMENTAL + depends on EXPERIMENTAL default n help This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give -- cgit v1.1 From 6f0f0fd496333777d53daff21a4e3b28c4d03a6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2008 17:02:07 +0900 Subject: security: remove register_security hook The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as a secondary module should do so explicitly. Signed-off-by: James Morris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/capability.c | 7 ------- security/root_plug.c | 9 --------- security/security.c | 29 ----------------------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 32 +++++--------------------------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 23 ----------------------- 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 6e0671c..5b01c0b 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -721,12 +721,6 @@ static int cap_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall) } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ -static int cap_register_security(const char *name, - struct security_operations *ops) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - static void cap_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { } @@ -940,7 +934,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, register_security); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr); diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c index a41cf42..be0ebec 100644 --- a/security/root_plug.c +++ b/security/root_plug.c @@ -28,9 +28,6 @@ #include #include -/* flag to keep track of how we were registered */ -static int secondary; - /* default is a generic type of usb to serial converter */ static int vendor_id = 0x0557; static int product_id = 0x2008; @@ -97,13 +94,7 @@ static int __init rootplug_init (void) if (register_security (&rootplug_security_ops)) { printk (KERN_INFO "Failure registering Root Plug module with the kernel\n"); - /* try registering with primary module */ - if (mod_reg_security (MY_NAME, &rootplug_security_ops)) { - printk (KERN_INFO "Failure registering Root Plug " - " module with primary security module.\n"); return -EINVAL; - } - secondary = 1; } printk (KERN_INFO "Root Plug module initialized, " "vendor_id = %4.4x, product id = %4.4x\n", vendor_id, product_id); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 30b0278..59f23b5 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -125,35 +125,6 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops) return 0; } -/** - * mod_reg_security - allows security modules to be "stacked" - * @name: a pointer to a string with the name of the security_options to be registered - * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered - * - * This function allows security modules to be stacked if the currently loaded - * security module allows this to happen. It passes the @name and @ops to the - * register_security function of the currently loaded security module. - * - * The return value depends on the currently loaded security module, with 0 as - * success. - */ -int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) -{ - if (verify(ops)) { - printk(KERN_INFO "%s could not verify " - "security operations.\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (ops == security_ops) { - printk(KERN_INFO "%s security operations " - "already registered.\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; - } - - return security_ops->register_security(name, ops); -} - /* Security operations */ int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child, diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 745a69e..91200fe 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -126,13 +126,11 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); int selinux_enabled = 1; #endif -/* Original (dummy) security module. */ -static struct security_operations *original_ops; -/* Minimal support for a secondary security module, - just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules. - The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary - module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */ +/* + * Minimal support for a secondary security module, + * just to allow the use of the capability module. + */ static struct security_operations *secondary_ops; /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized @@ -5115,24 +5113,6 @@ static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) *secid = isec->sid; } -/* module stacking operations */ -static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) -{ - if (secondary_ops != original_ops) { - printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security " - "module registered.\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; - } - - secondary_ops = ops; - - printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", - __func__, - name); - - return 0; -} - static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { if (inode) @@ -5517,8 +5497,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, - .register_security = selinux_register_security, - .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, @@ -5612,7 +5590,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); avc_init(); - original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops; + secondary_ops = security_ops; if (!secondary_ops) panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n"); if (register_security(&selinux_ops)) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 3c7150b..ee5a51c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1822,27 +1822,6 @@ static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid) *secid = smack_to_secid(smack); } -/* module stacking operations */ - -/** - * smack_register_security - stack capability module - * @name: module name - * @ops: module operations - ignored - * - * Allow the capability module to register. - */ -static int smack_register_security(const char *name, - struct security_operations *ops) -{ - if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) - return -EINVAL; - - printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", - __func__, name); - - return 0; -} - /** * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode * @opt_dentry: unused @@ -2673,8 +2652,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, - .register_security = smack_register_security, - .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate, .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr, -- cgit v1.1