From 31d4b761896101660b3efe01816b63d9814755eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Libo Chen <clbchenlibo.chen@huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 14:11:28 +0800
Subject: ima: new helper: file_inode(file)

Replace "file->f_dentry->d_inode" with the new file_inode() helper
function.

Signed-off-by: Libo Chen <clbchenlibo.chen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c38bbce..6d76d4a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	int violation = 1;
 	int result;
 
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 52a13284844b354c7a37533f5366cb5b653a76b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 14:44:04 -0500
Subject: ima: use static const char array definitions

A const char pointer allocates memory for a pointer as well as for
a string,  This patch replaces a number of the const char pointers
throughout IMA, with a static const char array.

Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      | 8 ++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c     | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 4 ++--
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 6d76d4a..393b9d4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
 		       const unsigned char *filename)
 {
-	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
-	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+	static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
 	char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
 	int result;
 	struct {
@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len)
 {
-	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
-	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+	static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 734e946..291bf0f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -177,11 +177,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len)
 {
+	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
+	char *cause = "unknown";
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	const char *op = "appraise_data";
-	char *cause = "unknown";
 	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 3712276..315f2b9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ int ima_used_chip;
  */
 static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 {
+	static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
-	const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
-	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	int violation = 0;
 	struct {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 354b125..3f6b8a4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
  */
 void ima_update_policy(void)
 {
-	const char *op = "policy_update";
+	static const char op[] = "policy_update";
 	const char *cause = "already exists";
 	int result = 1;
 	int audit_info = 0;
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  */
 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 {
-	const char *op = "update_policy";
+	static const char op[] = "update_policy";
 	char *p;
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	ssize_t result, len;
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 73a6b44a003ad5dd1af9a8d05f01589dce7cd47a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2013 20:49:01 +0900
Subject: Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()

When we pass task->comm to audit_log_untrustedstring(), we need to pass it
via get_task_comm() because task->comm can be changed to contain untrusted
string by other threads after audit_log_untrustedstring() confirmed that
task->comm does not contain untrusted string.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 809ec842..4b996ba 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
 	if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1)	/* Skip info messages */
 		return;
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 	audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
 	audit_log_string(ab, cause);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
 	if (fname) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
-- 
cgit v1.1


From c019e307ad82a8ee652b8ccbacf69ae94263b07b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2014 13:56:04 +0100
Subject: ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template

With the new template mechanism introduced in IMA since kernel 3.13,
the format of data sent through the binary_runtime_measurements interface
is slightly changed. Now, for a generic measurement, the format of
template data (after the template name) is:

template_len | field1_len | field1 | ... | fieldN_len | fieldN

In addition, fields containing a string now include the '\0' termination
character.

Instead, the format for the 'ima' template should be:

SHA1 digest | event name length | event name

It must be noted that while in the IMA 3.13 code 'event name length' is
'IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1' (256 bytes), so that the template digest
is calculated correctly, and 'event name' contains '\0', in the pre 3.13
code 'event name length' is exactly the string length and 'event name'
does not contain the termination character.

The patch restores the behavior of the IMA code pre 3.13 for the 'ima'
template so that legacy userspace tools obtain a consistent behavior
when receiving data from the binary_runtime_measurements interface
regardless of which kernel version is used.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.3.13: 3ce1217 ima: define template fields library
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c           |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 10 +++++++---
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 0356e1d..f79fa8b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
 enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
-		     IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+		     IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
 enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 
 /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index db01125..468a3ba 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 		if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
 			show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
+		if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
+			show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
 		field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
 	}
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 1683bbf..e8592e7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -109,13 +109,16 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
 					  enum data_formats datafmt,
 					  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
+	u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ?
+	    strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len;
+
 	if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
-		ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+		ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len));
 
-	if (!field_data->len)
+	if (!len)
 		return;
 
-	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len);
 }
 
 static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
@@ -129,6 +132,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
 		break;
 	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
 	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT:
 		ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
 		break;
 	default:
-- 
cgit v1.1


From e3b64c268b485f578a498c2f6d5704ef54ab4432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2014 13:56:05 +0100
Subject: ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is
 used

Before this change, to correctly calculate the template digest for the
'ima' template, the event name field (id: 'n') length was set to the fixed
size of 256 bytes.

This patch reduces the length of the event name field to the string
length incremented of one (to make room for the termination character '\0')
and handles the specific case of the digest calculation for the 'ima'
template directly in ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c       | 11 +++++++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 19 ++++---------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index fdf60de..d8b55c9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -161,15 +161,22 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 		return rc;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
+		u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 };
+		u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data;
+		u32 datalen = field_data[i].len;
+
 		if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
 			rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
 						(const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
 						sizeof(field_data[i].len));
 			if (rc)
 				break;
+		} else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) {
+			memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen);
+			data_to_hash = buffer;
+			datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
 		}
-		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
-					 field_data[i].len);
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, data_to_hash, datalen);
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index e8592e7..1506f02 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
 enum data_formats {
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
-	DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
 	DATA_FMT_STRING,
 	DATA_FMT_HEX
 };
@@ -37,18 +36,10 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
-	u32 buflen;
+	u32 buflen = datalen;
 
-	switch (datafmt) {
-	case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME:
-		buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
-		break;
-	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING)
 		buflen = datalen + 1;
-		break;
-	default:
-		buflen = datalen;
-	}
 
 	buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buf)
@@ -63,7 +54,7 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
 	 * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
 	 * character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
 	 */
-	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
 		for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
 			if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
 				*buf_ptr = '_';
@@ -281,8 +272,6 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 {
 	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
 	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
-	enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ?
-	    DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING;
 
 	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
 
@@ -305,7 +294,7 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
 out:
 	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
-					     fmt, field_data);
+					     DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 20ee451f5a7cd43edda56ba36cbec4d881d3329f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 13:59:56 -0800
Subject: security: integrity: Use a more current logging style

Convert printks to pr_<level>.
Add pr_fmt.
Remove embedded prefixes.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c   | 4 +++-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     | 6 ++++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c    | 6 ++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c   | 4 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c     | 5 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c    | 8 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 5 ++++-
 7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 3bab89e..9bd329f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
  *	 Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
 
 	desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
 	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
+		pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
 		return PTR_ERR(desc);
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 336b3dd..996092f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
  *	evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -432,7 +434,7 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
 
 	error = evm_init_secfs();
 	if (error < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
+		pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
 		goto err;
 	}
 
@@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ static int __init evm_display_config(void)
 	char **xattrname;
 
 	for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
-		printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
+		pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 30f670a..cf12a04 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
  *	- Get the key and enable EVM
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include "evm.h"
@@ -79,9 +81,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	error = evm_init_key();
 	if (!error) {
 		evm_initialized = 1;
-		pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
+		pr_info("initialized\n");
 	} else
-		pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
+		pr_err("initialization failed\n");
 	return count;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index d8b55c9..9999057 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
  * 	Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
@@ -212,7 +214,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 		return;
 
 	if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
-		pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 315f2b9..e8f9d70 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
  * File: ima_init.c
  *             initialization and cleanup functions
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 		ima_used_chip = 1;
 
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
-		pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
 
 	rc = ima_init_crypto();
 	if (rc)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index d85e997..91128b4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
  *       The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
  *       ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
 
 	qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (qe == NULL) {
-		pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
+		pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n");
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	qe->entry = entry;
@@ -95,8 +98,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
 
 	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
 	if (result != 0)
-		pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n",
-		       result);
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
 	return result;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 635695f..9a4a0d1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
  * File: ima_template.c
  *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 	 */
 	if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
 	    ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
-		pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n");
+		pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n");
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 09b1148ef59c93d292a3355c00e9b5779b2ecad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 23:42:39 +0200
Subject: ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr

ima_inode_post_setattr() calls ima_must_appraise() to check if the
file needs to be appraised. If it does not then it removes security.ima
xattr. With original policy matching code it might happen that even
file needs to be appraised with FILE_CHECK hook, it might not be
for POST_SETATTR hook. 'security.ima' might be erronously removed.

This patch treats POST_SETATTR as special wildcard function and will
cause ima_must_appraise() to be true if any of the hooks rules matches.
security.ima will not be removed if any of the hooks would require
appraisal.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3f6b8a4..a556d5b9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -167,9 +167,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int i;
 
-	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
+	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
-	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
+	    (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
 	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 2bb930abcf39d8be243ddb4583cf013ea2a750d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2014 18:04:20 +0200
Subject: integrity: fix checkpatch errors

Between checkpatch changes (eg. sizeof) and inconsistencies between
Lindent and checkpatch, unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult
to see new errors. This patch fixes them. Some lines with over 80 chars
remained unchanged to improve code readability.

The "extern" keyword is removed from internal evm.h to make it consistent
with internal ima.h.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h          | 28 +++++++--------
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c   |  4 +--
 security/integrity/iint.c             |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  8 ++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c   |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c       |  6 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  4 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 65 +++++++++++++++++------------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c    |  4 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 14 ++++----
 security/integrity/integrity_audit.c  |  2 +-
 11 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 30bd1ec..37c88dd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
 extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
 
-extern int evm_init_key(void);
-extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			       const char *req_xattr_name,
-			       const char *req_xattr_value,
-			       size_t req_xattr_value_len);
-extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-			 const char *req_xattr_value,
-			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-			 const char *req_xattr_value,
-			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
-			 char *hmac_val);
-extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
+int evm_init_key(void);
+int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+			const char *req_xattr_name,
+			const char *req_xattr_value,
+			size_t req_xattr_value_len);
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
+		  char *hmac_val);
+int evm_init_secfs(void);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 9bd329f..babd862 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
 		umode_t mode;
 	} hmac_misc;
 
-	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
+	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
 	hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
 	hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
 	hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
 	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
 	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
-	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
+	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
 	if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
 		crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
 				    sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index c49d3f1..a521edf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
 
-	memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
 	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 393b9d4..c6b4a73 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out:
  * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
- * 		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
+ *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- * 	mask: contains the permission mask
+ *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
+ *	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
  * but the measurement could already exist:
- * 	- multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
+ *	- multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
  *	  different filesystems.
  *	- the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
  *	  containing the hashing info.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 9999057..d257e36 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
  *
  * File: ima_crypto.c
- * 	Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
+ *	Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 468a3ba..da92fcc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	 * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
 	 * little-endian format
 	 */
-	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
+	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
 
 	/* 2nd: template digest */
 	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
 	namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
-	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
+	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
 
 	/* 4th:  template name */
 	ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
 /*
  * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
  */
-static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
 	/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
 	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 149ee11..50413d0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
  * ima_rdwr_violation_check
  *
  * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- * 	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
  *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
  *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
+ *	  could result in a file measurement error.
  *
  */
 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a556d5b9..93873a4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
  *
  * ima_policy.c
- * 	- initialize default measure policy rules
+ *	- initialize default measure policy rules
  *
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
 #include "ima.h"
 
 /* flags definitions */
-#define IMA_FUNC 	0x0001
-#define IMA_MASK 	0x0002
+#define IMA_FUNC	0x0001
+#define IMA_MASK	0x0002
 #define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008
 #define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
@@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  * and running executables.
  */
 static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 };
 
 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
 };
 
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
@@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
-/* 
+/*
  * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
  * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
  * stale LSM policy.
  *
- * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. 
+ * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
  * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
  */
 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ retry:
 			retried = 1;
 			ima_lsm_update_rules();
 			goto retry;
-		} 
+		}
 		if (!rc)
 			return false;
 	}
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
 	if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
 		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
 
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 	measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
 	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
 			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
-	
+
 	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
 		if (i < measure_entries)
 			list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
@@ -522,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				break;
 			}
 
-			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16,
-						&entry->fsmagic);
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
 			if (!result)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
 			break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 91128b4..552705d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 
 	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
 	if (!violation) {
-		memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
+		memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
 		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
 			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
 			result = -EEXIST;
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 	}
 
 	if (violation)		/* invalidate pcr */
-		memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
+		memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
 
 	tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
 	if (tpmresult != 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 9a4a0d1..a076a96 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -22,20 +22,20 @@
 
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
 	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
-	{.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
-	{.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+	{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
+	{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
-	{.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
+	{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
-	{.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
+	{.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
-	{.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
+	{.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
-	{.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
+	{.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
-	{.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
+	{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
 };
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 4b996ba..aab9fa5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
  *
  * File: integrity_audit.c
- * 	Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ *	Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
  */
 
 #include <linux/fs.h>
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 61997c4383c28fe93fb053295562ff6482ef5c07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 22:23:20 +0200
Subject: ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails

This is a small refactoring so ima_d_path() returns dentry name
if path reconstruction fails. It simplifies callers actions
and removes code duplication.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 +------
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c6b4a73..ba9e4d7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -332,5 +332,5 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
 			pathname = NULL;
 		}
 	}
-	return pathname;
+	return pathname ?: (const char *)path->dentry->d_name.name;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 50413d0..52ac6cf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
  */
 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 {
-	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 	int must_measure;
@@ -111,8 +110,6 @@ out:
 		return;
 
 	pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
-	if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
-		pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
 		ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
@@ -220,9 +217,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out_digsig;
 
-	pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename;
-	if (!pathname)
-		pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+	pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
-- 
cgit v1.1


From e0420039b643a832231028000a5c0d7358b14f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 17:47:46 +0200
Subject: evm: EVM does not use MD5

EVM does not use MD5 HMAC. Selection of CRYPTO_MD5 can be safely removed.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index fea9749..5aa9103 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ config EVM
 	boolean "EVM support"
 	depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	default n
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 1d91ac6213003f525ac34da5e39cbb6612d19deb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2014 20:16:47 +0200
Subject: ima: skip memory allocation for empty files

Memory allocation is unnecessary for empty files.
This patch calculates the hash without memory allocation.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index d257e36..1bde8e6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -87,16 +87,20 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!rbuf) {
-		rc = -ENOMEM;
+	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+	if (i_size == 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
+
+	rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
 		file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
 		read = 1;
 	}
-	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
 	while (offset < i_size) {
 		int rbuf_len;
 
@@ -113,12 +117,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 	}
-	kfree(rbuf);
-	if (!rc)
-		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
 	if (read)
 		file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
+	kfree(rbuf);
 out:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.1


From a3aef94b312ec51b5dfc199ef884924e60ad1b75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2014 14:18:09 +0200
Subject: evm: enable key retention service automatically

If keys are not enabled, EVM is not visible in the configuration menu.
It may be difficult to figure out what to do unless you really know.
Other subsystems as NFS, CIFS select keys automatically. This patch does
the same.

This patch also removes '(TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)' dependency,
which is unnecessary. EVM does not depend on trusted keys, but on
encrypted keys. evm.h provides compile time dependency.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index 5aa9103..d35b491 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 config EVM
 	boolean "EVM support"
-	depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select KEYS
+	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	default n
 	help
 	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
-- 
cgit v1.1