From c953e23936f902c7719166327e3113639105c981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2015 12:43:53 +0900 Subject: netlink: mmap: fix tx type check I can't send netlink message via mmaped netlink socket since commit: a8866ff6a5bce7d0ec465a63bc482a85c09b0d39 netlink: make the check for "send from tx_ring" deterministic msg->msg_iter.type is set to WRITE (1) at SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, ... import_single_range(WRITE, ... iov_iter_init(1, WRITE, ... call path, so that we need to check the type by iter_is_iovec() to accept the WRITE. Signed-off-by: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index 67d2104..a774985 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -2401,7 +2401,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) * sendmsg(), but that's what we've got... */ if (netlink_tx_is_mmaped(sk) && - msg->msg_iter.type == ITER_IOVEC && + iter_is_iovec(&msg->msg_iter) && msg->msg_iter.nr_segs == 1 && msg->msg_iter.iov->iov_base == NULL) { err = netlink_mmap_sendmsg(sk, msg, dst_portid, dst_group, -- cgit v1.1 From ba51b6be38c122f7dab40965b4397aaf6188a464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 15:17:17 -0600 Subject: net: Fix RCU splat in af_key Hit the following splat testing VRF change for ipsec: [ 113.475692] =============================== [ 113.476194] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 113.476667] 4.2.0-rc6-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED #3.2.65-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED Not tainted [ 113.477545] ------------------------------- [ 113.478013] /work/monster-14/dsa/kernel.git/include/linux/rcupdate.h:568 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ 113.479288] [ 113.479288] other info that might help us debug this: [ 113.479288] [ 113.480207] [ 113.480207] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 113.480931] 2 locks held by setkey/6829: [ 113.481371] #0: (&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] pfkey_sendmsg+0xfb/0x213 [ 113.482509] #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [] rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x6e [ 113.483509] [ 113.483509] stack backtrace: [ 113.484041] CPU: 0 PID: 6829 Comm: setkey Not tainted 4.2.0-rc6-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED #3.2.65-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED [ 113.485422] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5.1-0-g8936dbb-20141113_115728-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 [ 113.486845] 0000000000000001 ffff88001d4c7a98 ffffffff81518af2 ffffffff81086962 [ 113.487732] ffff88001d538480 ffff88001d4c7ac8 ffffffff8107ae75 ffffffff8180a154 [ 113.488628] 0000000000000b30 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 ffff88001d4c7ad8 [ 113.489525] Call Trace: [ 113.489813] [] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [ 113.490389] [] ? console_unlock+0x3d6/0x405 [ 113.491039] [] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfa/0x103 [ 113.491735] [] rcu_preempt_sleep_check+0x45/0x47 [ 113.492442] [] ___might_sleep+0x19/0x1c8 [ 113.493077] [] __might_sleep+0x6c/0x82 [ 113.493681] [] cache_alloc_debugcheck_before.isra.50+0x1d/0x24 [ 113.494508] [] kmem_cache_alloc+0x31/0x18f [ 113.495149] [] skb_clone+0x64/0x80 [ 113.495712] [] pfkey_broadcast_one+0x3d/0xff [ 113.496380] [] pfkey_broadcast+0xb5/0x11e [ 113.497024] [] pfkey_register+0x191/0x1b1 [ 113.497653] [] pfkey_process+0x162/0x17e [ 113.498274] [] pfkey_sendmsg+0x109/0x213 In pfkey_sendmsg the net mutex is taken and then pfkey_broadcast takes the RCU lock. Since pfkey_broadcast takes the RCU lock the allocation argument is pointless since GFP_ATOMIC must be used between the rcu_read_{,un}lock. The one call outside of rcu can be done with GFP_KERNEL. Fixes: 7f6b9dbd5afbd ("af_key: locking change") Signed-off-by: David Ahern Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/key/af_key.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index b397f0a..83a7068 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff **skb2, #define BROADCAST_ONE 1 #define BROADCAST_REGISTERED 2 #define BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY 4 -static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, +static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, int broadcast_flags, struct sock *one_sk, struct net *net) { @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, * socket. */ if (pfk->promisc) - pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, sk); + pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, GFP_ATOMIC, sk); /* the exact target will be processed later */ if (sk == one_sk) @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, continue; } - err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, sk); + err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, GFP_ATOMIC, sk); /* Error is cleare after succecful sending to at least one * registered KM */ @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, rcu_read_unlock(); if (one_sk != NULL) - err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, one_sk); + err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, GFP_KERNEL, one_sk); kfree_skb(skb2); kfree_skb(skb); @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int pfkey_do_dump(struct pfkey_sock *pfk) hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) pfk->dump.skb->data; hdr->sadb_msg_seq = 0; hdr->sadb_msg_errno = rc; - pfkey_broadcast(pfk->dump.skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE, + pfkey_broadcast(pfk->dump.skb, BROADCAST_ONE, &pfk->sk, sock_net(&pfk->sk)); pfk->dump.skb = NULL; } @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static int pfkey_error(const struct sadb_msg *orig, int err, struct sock *sk) hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t)); - pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_KERNEL, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk)); + pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk)); return 0; } @@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ static int pfkey_getspi(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_ xfrm_state_put(x); - pfkey_broadcast(resp_skb, GFP_KERNEL, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, net); + pfkey_broadcast(resp_skb, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, net); return 0; } @@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ static int key_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c) hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq; hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid; - pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, xs_net(x)); + pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, xs_net(x)); return 0; } @@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static int pfkey_get(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg out_hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0; out_hdr->sadb_msg_seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq; out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid; - pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk)); + pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk)); return 0; } @@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ static int pfkey_register(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sad return -ENOBUFS; } - pfkey_broadcast(supp_skb, GFP_KERNEL, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, sk, sock_net(sk)); + pfkey_broadcast(supp_skb, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, sk, sock_net(sk)); return 0; } @@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ static int unicast_flush_resp(struct sock *sk, const struct sadb_msg *ihdr) hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0; hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t)); - return pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk)); + return pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk)); } static int key_notify_sa_flush(const struct km_event *c) @@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ static int key_notify_sa_flush(const struct km_event *c) hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t)); hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0; - pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net); + pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net); return 0; } @@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@ static int dump_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr) out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = pfk->dump.msg_portid; if (pfk->dump.skb) - pfkey_broadcast(pfk->dump.skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE, + pfkey_broadcast(pfk->dump.skb, BROADCAST_ONE, &pfk->sk, sock_net(&pfk->sk)); pfk->dump.skb = out_skb; @@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static int pfkey_promisc(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb new_hdr->sadb_msg_errno = 0; } - pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_KERNEL, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, sock_net(sk)); + pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, sock_net(sk)); return 0; } @@ -2181,7 +2181,7 @@ static int key_notify_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, const struct km_ev out_hdr->sadb_msg_errno = 0; out_hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq; out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid; - pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, xp_net(xp)); + pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, xp_net(xp)); return 0; } @@ -2401,7 +2401,7 @@ static int key_pol_get_resp(struct sock *sk, struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struc out_hdr->sadb_msg_errno = 0; out_hdr->sadb_msg_seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq; out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid; - pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, xp_net(xp)); + pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, xp_net(xp)); err = 0; out: @@ -2655,7 +2655,7 @@ static int dump_sp(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, int count, void *ptr) out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = pfk->dump.msg_portid; if (pfk->dump.skb) - pfkey_broadcast(pfk->dump.skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE, + pfkey_broadcast(pfk->dump.skb, BROADCAST_ONE, &pfk->sk, sock_net(&pfk->sk)); pfk->dump.skb = out_skb; @@ -2708,7 +2708,7 @@ static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c) hdr->sadb_msg_satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC; hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t)); hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0; - pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net); + pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net); return 0; } @@ -2770,7 +2770,7 @@ static int pfkey_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb void *ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_MAX]; int err; - pfkey_broadcast(skb_clone(skb, GFP_KERNEL), GFP_KERNEL, + pfkey_broadcast(skb_clone(skb, GFP_KERNEL), BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY, NULL, sock_net(sk)); memset(ext_hdrs, 0, sizeof(ext_hdrs)); @@ -2992,7 +2992,7 @@ static int key_notify_sa_expire(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c) out_hdr->sadb_msg_seq = 0; out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = 0; - pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x)); + pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x)); return 0; } @@ -3182,7 +3182,7 @@ static int pfkey_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *t, struct xfrm_ctx->ctx_len); } - return pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x)); + return pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x)); } static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt, @@ -3380,7 +3380,7 @@ static int pfkey_send_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_port = sport; n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_reserved = 0; - return pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x)); + return pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x)); } #ifdef CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE @@ -3572,7 +3572,7 @@ static int pfkey_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type, } /* broadcast migrate message to sockets */ - pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, &init_net); + pfkey_broadcast(skb, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, &init_net); return 0; -- cgit v1.1 From d4257295ba1b389c693b79de857a96e4b7cd8ac0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: huaibin Wang Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 16:20:34 +0200 Subject: ip6_gre: release cached dst on tunnel removal When a tunnel is deleted, the cached dst entry should be released. This problem may prevent the removal of a netns (seen with a x-netns IPv6 gre tunnel): unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 3 CC: Dmitry Kozlov Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Signed-off-by: huaibin Wang Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c index a38d3ac..69f4f68 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c @@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ static void ip6gre_tunnel_uninit(struct net_device *dev) struct ip6gre_net *ign = net_generic(t->net, ip6gre_net_id); ip6gre_tunnel_unlink(ign, t); + ip6_tnl_dst_reset(t); dev_put(dev); } -- cgit v1.1 From a6c1aea044e490da3e59124ec55991fe316818d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WANG Cong Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 16:38:12 -0700 Subject: cls_u32: complete the check for non-forced case in u32_destroy() In commit 1e052be69d04 ("net_sched: destroy proto tp when all filters are gone") I added a check in u32_destroy() to see if all real filters are gone for each tp, however, that is only done for root_ht, same is needed for others. This can be reproduced by the following tc commands: tc filter add dev eth0 parent 1:0 prio 5 handle 15: protocol ip u32 divisor 256 tc filter add dev eth0 protocol ip parent 1: prio 5 handle 15:2:2 u32 ht 15:2: match ip src 10.0.0.2 flowid 1:10 tc filter add dev eth0 protocol ip parent 1: prio 5 handle 15:2:3 u32 ht 15:2: match ip src 10.0.0.3 flowid 1:10 Fixes: 1e052be69d04 ("net_sched: destroy proto tp when all filters are gone") Reported-by: Akshat Kakkar Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index cab9e9b..4fbb674 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -490,6 +490,19 @@ static bool u32_destroy(struct tcf_proto *tp, bool force) return false; } } + + if (tp_c->refcnt > 1) + return false; + + if (tp_c->refcnt == 1) { + struct tc_u_hnode *ht; + + for (ht = rtnl_dereference(tp_c->hlist); + ht; + ht = rtnl_dereference(ht->next)) + if (!ht_empty(ht)) + return false; + } } if (root_ht && --root_ht->refcnt == 0) -- cgit v1.1 From ce7b4ccc4f62775f4167495a06fbee0025f87175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lucien Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2015 16:26:34 +0800 Subject: sctp: asconf's process should verify address parameter is in the beginning in sctp_process_asconf(), we get address parameter from the beginning of the addip params. but we never check if it's really there. if the addr param is not there, it still can pass sctp_verify_asconf(), then to be handled by sctp_process_asconf(), it will not be safe. so add a code in sctp_verify_asconf() to check the address parameter is in the beginning, or return false to send abort. note that this can also detect multiple address parameters, and reject it. Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 06320c8..a655ddc 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -3132,11 +3132,18 @@ bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc, case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS: if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv4addr_param_t)) return false; + /* ensure there is only one addr param and it's in the + * beginning of addip_hdr params, or we reject it. + */ + if (param.v != addip->addip_hdr.params) + return false; addr_param_seen = true; break; case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS: if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv6addr_param_t)) return false; + if (param.v != addip->addip_hdr.params) + return false; addr_param_seen = true; break; case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP: -- cgit v1.1 From f648f807f61e64d247d26611e34cc97e4ed03401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lucien Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2015 04:52:20 +0800 Subject: sctp: donot reset the overall_error_count in SHUTDOWN_RECEIVE state Commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") fixed a problem with excessive retransmissions in the SHUTDOWN_PENDING by not resetting the association overall_error_count. This allowed the association to better enforce assoc.max_retrans limit. However, the same issue still exists when the association is in SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED state. In this state, HB-ACKs will continue to reset the overall_error_count for the association would extend the lifetime of association unnecessarily. This patch solves this by resetting the overall_error_count whenever the current state is small then SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING. As a small side-effect, we end up also handling SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT and SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT states, but they are not really impacted because we disable Heartbeats in those states. Fixes: Commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c index fef2acd..85e6f03 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void sctp_cmd_transport_on(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds, * outstanding data and rely on the retransmission limit be reached * to shutdown the association. */ - if (t->asoc->state != SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) + if (t->asoc->state < SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) t->asoc->overall_error_count = 0; /* Clear the hb_sent flag to signal that we had a good -- cgit v1.1