From 842c74bffcdb1d305ccd9e61e417cceae86b9963 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2010 10:06:12 -0700 Subject: ip_gre: CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE support ipv6 can be a module, we should test CONFIG_IPV6 and CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE to enable ipv6 bits in ip_gre. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index 945b20a..35c93e8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ #include #include -#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6 +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) #include #include #include @@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev if ((dst = rt->rt_gateway) == 0) goto tx_error_icmp; } -#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6 +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { struct in6_addr *addr6; int addr_type; @@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev goto tx_error; } } -#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6 +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { struct rt6_info *rt6 = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb); @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev if ((iph->ttl = tiph->ttl) == 0) { if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) iph->ttl = old_iph->ttl; -#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6 +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) iph->ttl = ((struct ipv6hdr *)old_iph)->hop_limit; #endif -- cgit v1.1 From df6d02300f7c2fbd0fbe626d819c8e5237d72c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2010 00:38:25 +0200 Subject: wext: fix potential private ioctl memory content leak When a driver doesn't fill the entire buffer, old heap contents may remain, and if it also doesn't update the length properly, this old heap content will be copied back to userspace. It is very unlikely that this happens in any of the drivers using private ioctls since it would show up as junk being reported by iwpriv, but it seems better to be safe here, so use kzalloc. Reported-by: Jeff Mahoney Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/wireless/wext-priv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-priv.c b/net/wireless/wext-priv.c index 3feb28e..674d426 100644 --- a/net/wireless/wext-priv.c +++ b/net/wireless/wext-priv.c @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int ioctl_private_iw_point(struct iw_point *iwp, unsigned int cmd, } else if (!iwp->pointer) return -EFAULT; - extra = kmalloc(extra_size, GFP_KERNEL); + extra = kzalloc(extra_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!extra) return -ENOMEM; -- cgit v1.1 From 8444cf712c5f71845cba9dc30d8f530ff0d5ff83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Egerer Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2010 11:11:38 -0700 Subject: xfrm: Allow different selector family in temporary state The family parameter xfrm_state_find is used to find a state matching a certain policy. This value is set to the template's family (encap_family) right before xfrm_state_find is called. The family parameter is however also used to construct a temporary state in xfrm_state_find itself which is wrong for inter-family scenarios because it produces a selector for the wrong family. Since this selector is included in the xfrm_user_acquire structure, user space programs misinterpret IPv6 addresses as IPv4 and vice versa. This patch splits up the original init_tempsel function into a part that initializes the selector respectively the props and id of the temporary state, to allow for differing ip address families whithin the state. Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/xfrm4_state.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/ipv6/xfrm6_state.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 5 ++--- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 4 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_state.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_state.c index 1ef1366..4794762 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_state.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_state.c @@ -21,21 +21,25 @@ static int xfrm4_init_flags(struct xfrm_state *x) } static void -__xfrm4_init_tempsel(struct xfrm_state *x, struct flowi *fl, - struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, - xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr) +__xfrm4_init_tempsel(struct xfrm_selector *sel, struct flowi *fl) +{ + sel->daddr.a4 = fl->fl4_dst; + sel->saddr.a4 = fl->fl4_src; + sel->dport = xfrm_flowi_dport(fl); + sel->dport_mask = htons(0xffff); + sel->sport = xfrm_flowi_sport(fl); + sel->sport_mask = htons(0xffff); + sel->family = AF_INET; + sel->prefixlen_d = 32; + sel->prefixlen_s = 32; + sel->proto = fl->proto; + sel->ifindex = fl->oif; +} + +static void +xfrm4_init_temprop(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, + xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr) { - x->sel.daddr.a4 = fl->fl4_dst; - x->sel.saddr.a4 = fl->fl4_src; - x->sel.dport = xfrm_flowi_dport(fl); - x->sel.dport_mask = htons(0xffff); - x->sel.sport = xfrm_flowi_sport(fl); - x->sel.sport_mask = htons(0xffff); - x->sel.family = AF_INET; - x->sel.prefixlen_d = 32; - x->sel.prefixlen_s = 32; - x->sel.proto = fl->proto; - x->sel.ifindex = fl->oif; x->id = tmpl->id; if (x->id.daddr.a4 == 0) x->id.daddr.a4 = daddr->a4; @@ -70,6 +74,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state_afinfo xfrm4_state_afinfo = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .init_flags = xfrm4_init_flags, .init_tempsel = __xfrm4_init_tempsel, + .init_temprop = xfrm4_init_temprop, .output = xfrm4_output, .extract_input = xfrm4_extract_input, .extract_output = xfrm4_extract_output, diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_state.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_state.c index f417b77..a67575d 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_state.c +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_state.c @@ -20,23 +20,27 @@ #include static void -__xfrm6_init_tempsel(struct xfrm_state *x, struct flowi *fl, - struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, - xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr) +__xfrm6_init_tempsel(struct xfrm_selector *sel, struct flowi *fl) { /* Initialize temporary selector matching only * to current session. */ - ipv6_addr_copy((struct in6_addr *)&x->sel.daddr, &fl->fl6_dst); - ipv6_addr_copy((struct in6_addr *)&x->sel.saddr, &fl->fl6_src); - x->sel.dport = xfrm_flowi_dport(fl); - x->sel.dport_mask = htons(0xffff); - x->sel.sport = xfrm_flowi_sport(fl); - x->sel.sport_mask = htons(0xffff); - x->sel.family = AF_INET6; - x->sel.prefixlen_d = 128; - x->sel.prefixlen_s = 128; - x->sel.proto = fl->proto; - x->sel.ifindex = fl->oif; + ipv6_addr_copy((struct in6_addr *)&sel->daddr, &fl->fl6_dst); + ipv6_addr_copy((struct in6_addr *)&sel->saddr, &fl->fl6_src); + sel->dport = xfrm_flowi_dport(fl); + sel->dport_mask = htons(0xffff); + sel->sport = xfrm_flowi_sport(fl); + sel->sport_mask = htons(0xffff); + sel->family = AF_INET6; + sel->prefixlen_d = 128; + sel->prefixlen_s = 128; + sel->proto = fl->proto; + sel->ifindex = fl->oif; +} + +static void +xfrm6_init_temprop(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, + xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr) +{ x->id = tmpl->id; if (ipv6_addr_any((struct in6_addr*)&x->id.daddr)) memcpy(&x->id.daddr, daddr, sizeof(x->sel.daddr)); @@ -168,6 +172,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state_afinfo xfrm6_state_afinfo = { .eth_proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6), .owner = THIS_MODULE, .init_tempsel = __xfrm6_init_tempsel, + .init_temprop = xfrm6_init_temprop, .tmpl_sort = __xfrm6_tmpl_sort, .state_sort = __xfrm6_state_sort, .output = xfrm6_output, diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 2b3ed7a..cbab6e1 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -1175,9 +1175,8 @@ xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy *policy, struct flowi *fl, tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET) { remote = &tmpl->id.daddr; local = &tmpl->saddr; - family = tmpl->encap_family; - if (xfrm_addr_any(local, family)) { - error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, &tmp, remote, family); + if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) { + error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, &tmp, remote, tmpl->encap_family); if (error) goto fail; local = &tmp; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index 5208b12f..eb96ce5 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -656,15 +656,23 @@ void xfrm_sad_getinfo(struct net *net, struct xfrmk_sadinfo *si) EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_sad_getinfo); static int -xfrm_init_tempsel(struct xfrm_state *x, struct flowi *fl, - struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, - xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr, - unsigned short family) +xfrm_init_tempstate(struct xfrm_state *x, struct flowi *fl, + struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, + xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr, + unsigned short family) { struct xfrm_state_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_state_get_afinfo(family); if (!afinfo) return -1; - afinfo->init_tempsel(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr); + afinfo->init_tempsel(&x->sel, fl); + + if (family != tmpl->encap_family) { + xfrm_state_put_afinfo(afinfo); + afinfo = xfrm_state_get_afinfo(tmpl->encap_family); + if (!afinfo) + return -1; + } + afinfo->init_temprop(x, tmpl, daddr, saddr); xfrm_state_put_afinfo(afinfo); return 0; } @@ -790,37 +798,38 @@ xfrm_state_find(xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr, int error = 0; struct xfrm_state *best = NULL; u32 mark = pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m; + unsigned short encap_family = tmpl->encap_family; to_put = NULL; spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock); - h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, tmpl->reqid, family); + h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, tmpl->reqid, encap_family); hlist_for_each_entry(x, entry, net->xfrm.state_bydst+h, bydst) { - if (x->props.family == family && + if (x->props.family == encap_family && x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid && (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v && !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) && - xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, family) && + xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, encap_family) && tmpl->mode == x->props.mode && tmpl->id.proto == x->id.proto && (tmpl->id.spi == x->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi)) - xfrm_state_look_at(pol, x, fl, family, daddr, saddr, + xfrm_state_look_at(pol, x, fl, encap_family, daddr, saddr, &best, &acquire_in_progress, &error); } if (best) goto found; - h_wildcard = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, &saddr_wildcard, tmpl->reqid, family); + h_wildcard = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, &saddr_wildcard, tmpl->reqid, encap_family); hlist_for_each_entry(x, entry, net->xfrm.state_bydst+h_wildcard, bydst) { - if (x->props.family == family && + if (x->props.family == encap_family && x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid && (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v && !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) && - xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, family) && + xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, encap_family) && tmpl->mode == x->props.mode && tmpl->id.proto == x->id.proto && (tmpl->id.spi == x->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi)) - xfrm_state_look_at(pol, x, fl, family, daddr, saddr, + xfrm_state_look_at(pol, x, fl, encap_family, daddr, saddr, &best, &acquire_in_progress, &error); } @@ -829,7 +838,7 @@ found: if (!x && !error && !acquire_in_progress) { if (tmpl->id.spi && (x0 = __xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, daddr, tmpl->id.spi, - tmpl->id.proto, family)) != NULL) { + tmpl->id.proto, encap_family)) != NULL) { to_put = x0; error = -EEXIST; goto out; @@ -839,9 +848,9 @@ found: error = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - /* Initialize temporary selector matching only + /* Initialize temporary state matching only * to current session. */ - xfrm_init_tempsel(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr, family); + xfrm_init_tempstate(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr, family); memcpy(&x->mark, &pol->mark, sizeof(x->mark)); error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security, fl->secid); @@ -856,10 +865,10 @@ found: x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_ACQ; list_add(&x->km.all, &net->xfrm.state_all); hlist_add_head(&x->bydst, net->xfrm.state_bydst+h); - h = xfrm_src_hash(net, daddr, saddr, family); + h = xfrm_src_hash(net, daddr, saddr, encap_family); hlist_add_head(&x->bysrc, net->xfrm.state_bysrc+h); if (x->id.spi) { - h = xfrm_spi_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, x->id.spi, x->id.proto, family); + h = xfrm_spi_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, x->id.spi, x->id.proto, encap_family); hlist_add_head(&x->byspi, net->xfrm.state_byspi+h); } x->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds = net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires; -- cgit v1.1 From 9828e6e6e3f19efcb476c567b9999891d051f52f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2010 15:40:35 -0700 Subject: rose: Fix signedness issues wrt. digi count. Just use explicit casts, since we really can't change the types of structures exported to userspace which have been around for 15 years or so. Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/rose/af_rose.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rose/af_rose.c b/net/rose/af_rose.c index 8e45e76..d952e7e 100644 --- a/net/rose/af_rose.c +++ b/net/rose/af_rose.c @@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ static int rose_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) if (addr_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose) && addr->srose_ndigis > 1) return -EINVAL; - if (addr->srose_ndigis > ROSE_MAX_DIGIS) + if ((unsigned int) addr->srose_ndigis > ROSE_MAX_DIGIS) return -EINVAL; if ((dev = rose_dev_get(&addr->srose_addr)) == NULL) { @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ static int rose_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_le if (addr_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose) && addr->srose_ndigis > 1) return -EINVAL; - if (addr->srose_ndigis > ROSE_MAX_DIGIS) + if ((unsigned int) addr->srose_ndigis > ROSE_MAX_DIGIS) return -EINVAL; /* Source + Destination digis should not exceed ROSE_MAX_DIGIS */ -- cgit v1.1 From a4d258036ed9b2a1811c3670c6099203a0f284a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Marshall Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2010 15:42:05 -0700 Subject: tcp: Fix race in tcp_poll If a RST comes in immediately after checking sk->sk_err, tcp_poll will return POLLIN but not POLLOUT. Fix this by checking sk->sk_err at the end of tcp_poll. Additionally, ensure the correct order of operations on SMP machines with memory barriers. Signed-off-by: Tom Marshall Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 7 +++++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 3fb1428..95d75d4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -386,8 +386,6 @@ unsigned int tcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait) */ mask = 0; - if (sk->sk_err) - mask = POLLERR; /* * POLLHUP is certainly not done right. But poll() doesn't @@ -457,6 +455,11 @@ unsigned int tcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait) if (tp->urg_data & TCP_URG_VALID) mask |= POLLPRI; } + /* This barrier is coupled with smp_wmb() in tcp_reset() */ + smp_rmb(); + if (sk->sk_err) + mask |= POLLERR; + return mask; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_poll); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index e663b78..149e79a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4048,6 +4048,8 @@ static void tcp_reset(struct sock *sk) default: sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET; } + /* This barrier is coupled with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */ + smp_wmb(); if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) sk->sk_error_report(sk); -- cgit v1.1 From 3d13008e7345fa7a79d8f6438150dc15d6ba6e9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 08:47:45 +0000 Subject: ip: fix truesize mismatch in ip fragmentation Special care should be taken when slow path is hit in ip_fragment() : When walking through frags, we transfert truesize ownership from skb to frags. Then if we hit a slow_path condition, we must undo this or risk uncharging frags->truesize twice, and in the end, having negative socket sk_wmem_alloc counter, or even freeing socket sooner than expected. Many thanks to Nick Bowler, who provided a very clean bug report and test program. Thanks to Jarek for reviewing my first patch and providing a V2 While Nick bisection pointed to commit 2b85a34e911 (net: No more expensive sock_hold()/sock_put() on each tx), underlying bug is older (2.6.12-rc5) A side effect is to extend work done in commit b2722b1c3a893e (ip_fragment: also adjust skb->truesize for packets not owned by a socket) to ipv6 as well. Reported-and-bisected-by: Nick Bowler Tested-by: Nick Bowler Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet CC: Jarek Poplawski CC: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c index 04b6989..7649d77 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c @@ -488,9 +488,8 @@ int ip_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) * we can switch to copy when see the first bad fragment. */ if (skb_has_frags(skb)) { - struct sk_buff *frag; + struct sk_buff *frag, *frag2; int first_len = skb_pagelen(skb); - int truesizes = 0; if (first_len - hlen > mtu || ((first_len - hlen) & 7) || @@ -503,18 +502,18 @@ int ip_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) if (frag->len > mtu || ((frag->len & 7) && frag->next) || skb_headroom(frag) < hlen) - goto slow_path; + goto slow_path_clean; /* Partially cloned skb? */ if (skb_shared(frag)) - goto slow_path; + goto slow_path_clean; BUG_ON(frag->sk); if (skb->sk) { frag->sk = skb->sk; frag->destructor = sock_wfree; } - truesizes += frag->truesize; + skb->truesize -= frag->truesize; } /* Everything is OK. Generate! */ @@ -524,7 +523,6 @@ int ip_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list; skb_frag_list_init(skb); skb->data_len = first_len - skb_headlen(skb); - skb->truesize -= truesizes; skb->len = first_len; iph->tot_len = htons(first_len); iph->frag_off = htons(IP_MF); @@ -576,6 +574,15 @@ int ip_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) } IP_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS); return err; + +slow_path_clean: + skb_walk_frags(skb, frag2) { + if (frag2 == frag) + break; + frag2->sk = NULL; + frag2->destructor = NULL; + skb->truesize += frag2->truesize; + } } slow_path: diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index d40b330..980912e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) if (skb_has_frags(skb)) { int first_len = skb_pagelen(skb); - int truesizes = 0; + struct sk_buff *frag2; if (first_len - hlen > mtu || ((first_len - hlen) & 7) || @@ -651,18 +651,18 @@ static int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) if (frag->len > mtu || ((frag->len & 7) && frag->next) || skb_headroom(frag) < hlen) - goto slow_path; + goto slow_path_clean; /* Partially cloned skb? */ if (skb_shared(frag)) - goto slow_path; + goto slow_path_clean; BUG_ON(frag->sk); if (skb->sk) { frag->sk = skb->sk; frag->destructor = sock_wfree; - truesizes += frag->truesize; } + skb->truesize -= frag->truesize; } err = 0; @@ -693,7 +693,6 @@ static int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) first_len = skb_pagelen(skb); skb->data_len = first_len - skb_headlen(skb); - skb->truesize -= truesizes; skb->len = first_len; ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(first_len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)); @@ -756,6 +755,15 @@ static int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS); dst_release(&rt->dst); return err; + +slow_path_clean: + skb_walk_frags(skb, frag2) { + if (frag2 == frag) + break; + frag2->sk = NULL; + frag2->destructor = NULL; + skb->truesize += frag2->truesize; + } } slow_path: -- cgit v1.1 From d485d500cf6b13a33bc7a6c09091deea7ea603ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 21:17:29 +0000 Subject: netfilter: tproxy: nf_tproxy_assign_sock() can handle tw sockets transparent field of a socket is either inet_twsk(sk)->tw_transparent for timewait sockets, or inet_sk(sk)->transparent for other sockets (TCP/UDP). Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netfilter/nf_tproxy_core.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tproxy_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tproxy_core.c index 5490fc3..daab8c4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tproxy_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tproxy_core.c @@ -70,7 +70,11 @@ nf_tproxy_destructor(struct sk_buff *skb) int nf_tproxy_assign_sock(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) { - if (inet_sk(sk)->transparent) { + bool transparent = (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) ? + inet_twsk(sk)->tw_transparent : + inet_sk(sk)->transparent; + + if (transparent) { skb_orphan(skb); skb->sk = sk; skb->destructor = nf_tproxy_destructor; -- cgit v1.1 From 7874896a26624214bd7c05eeba7c8ab01548b1b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Horman Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 21:17:30 +0000 Subject: netfilter: nf_ct_sip: default to NF_ACCEPT in sip_help_tcp() I initially noticed this because of the compiler warning below, but it does seem to be a valid concern in the case where ct_sip_get_header() returns 0 in the first iteration of the while loop. net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c: In function 'sip_help_tcp': net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c:1379: warning: 'ret' may be used uninitialized in this function Signed-off-by: Simon Horman [Patrick: changed NF_DROP to NF_ACCEPT] Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c index 53d8922..f64de954 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c @@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ static int sip_help_tcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, unsigned int msglen, origlen; const char *dptr, *end; s16 diff, tdiff = 0; - int ret; + int ret = NF_ACCEPT; typeof(nf_nat_sip_seq_adjust_hook) nf_nat_sip_seq_adjust; if (ctinfo != IP_CT_ESTABLISHED && -- cgit v1.1 From b46ffb854554ff939701bdd492b81558da5706fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Changli Gao Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 21:17:31 +0000 Subject: netfilter: fix ipt_REJECT TCP RST routing for indev == outdev ip_route_me_harder can't create the route cache when the outdev is the same with the indev for the skbs whichout a valid protocol set. __mkroute_input functions has this check: 1998 if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP)) { 1999 /* Not IP (i.e. ARP). Do not create route, if it is 2000 * invalid for proxy arp. DNAT routes are always valid. 2001 * 2002 * Proxy arp feature have been extended to allow, ARP 2003 * replies back to the same interface, to support 2004 * Private VLAN switch technologies. See arp.c. 2005 */ 2006 if (out_dev == in_dev && 2007 IN_DEV_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN(in_dev) == 0) { 2008 err = -EINVAL; 2009 goto cleanup; 2010 } 2011 } This patch gives the new skb a valid protocol to bypass this check. In order to make ipt_REJECT work with bridges, you also need to enable ip_forward. This patch also fixes a regression. When we used skb_copy_expand(), we didn't have this issue stated above, as the protocol was properly set. Signed-off-by: Changli Gao Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c index b254daf..43eec80 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static void send_reset(struct sk_buff *oldskb, int hook) /* ip_route_me_harder expects skb->dst to be set */ skb_dst_set_noref(nskb, skb_dst(oldskb)); + nskb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); if (ip_route_me_harder(nskb, addr_type)) goto free_nskb; -- cgit v1.1 From 15cdeadaa5d76009e20c7792aed69f5a73808f97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 21:17:32 +0000 Subject: netfilter: fix a race in nf_ct_ext_create() As soon as rcu_read_unlock() is called, there is no guarantee current thread can safely derefence t pointer, rcu protected. Fix is to copy t->alloc_size in a temporary variable. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c index 7dcf7a4..8d9e4c94 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ nf_ct_ext_create(struct nf_ct_ext **ext, enum nf_ct_ext_id id, gfp_t gfp) { unsigned int off, len; struct nf_ct_ext_type *t; + size_t alloc_size; rcu_read_lock(); t = rcu_dereference(nf_ct_ext_types[id]); BUG_ON(t == NULL); off = ALIGN(sizeof(struct nf_ct_ext), t->align); len = off + t->len; + alloc_size = t->alloc_size; rcu_read_unlock(); - *ext = kzalloc(t->alloc_size, gfp); + *ext = kzalloc(alloc_size, gfp); if (!*ext) return NULL; -- cgit v1.1 From d6120b8afacec587f5feb37781bc751bc5d68a10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 21:17:33 +0000 Subject: netfilter: nf_nat_snmp: fix checksum calculation (v4) Fix checksum calculation in nf_nat_snmp_basic. Based on patches by Clark Wang and Stephen Hemminger . https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=17622 Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c index 1679e2c0..ee5f419 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c @@ -893,13 +893,15 @@ static void fast_csum(__sum16 *csum, unsigned char s[4]; if (offset & 1) { - s[0] = s[2] = 0; + s[0] = ~0; s[1] = ~*optr; + s[2] = 0; s[3] = *nptr; } else { - s[1] = s[3] = 0; s[0] = ~*optr; + s[1] = ~0; s[2] = *nptr; + s[3] = 0; } *csum = csum_fold(csum_partial(s, 4, ~csum_unfold(*csum))); -- cgit v1.1 From cbdd769ab9de26764bde0520a91536caa1587e13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 21:17:34 +0000 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack_defrag: check socket type before touching nodefrag flag we need to check proper socket type within ipv4_conntrack_defrag function before referencing the nodefrag flag. For example the tun driver receive path produces skbs with AF_UNSPEC socket type, and so current code is causing unwanted fragmented packets going out. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c index eab8de3..f3a9b42 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c @@ -66,9 +66,11 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_conntrack_defrag(unsigned int hooknum, const struct net_device *out, int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) { + struct sock *sk = skb->sk; struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(skb->sk); - if (inet && inet->nodefrag) + if (sk && (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) && + inet->nodefrag) return NF_ACCEPT; #if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MODULE) -- cgit v1.1 From 94e2238969e89f5112297ad2a00103089dde7e8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ulrich Weber Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2010 06:45:11 +0000 Subject: xfrm4: strip ECN bits from tos field otherwise ECT(1) bit will get interpreted as RTO_ONLINK and routing will fail with XfrmOutBundleGenError. Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c index 869078d..a580349 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static int xfrm4_get_saddr(struct net *net, static int xfrm4_get_tos(struct flowi *fl) { - return fl->fl4_tos; + return IPTOS_RT_MASK & fl->fl4_tos; /* Strip ECN bits */ } static int xfrm4_init_path(struct xfrm_dst *path, struct dst_entry *dst, -- cgit v1.1 From f064af1e500a2bf4607706f0f458163bdb2a6ea5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2010 12:43:39 +0000 Subject: net: fix a lockdep splat We have for each socket : One spinlock (sk_slock.slock) One rwlock (sk_callback_lock) Possible scenarios are : (A) (this is used in net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c) read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock) (without blocking BH) spin_lock(&sk->sk_slock.slock); ... read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); ... (B) write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) stuff write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) (C) spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_slock) ... write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) stuff write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_slock) This (C) case conflicts with (A) : CPU1 [A] CPU2 [C] read_lock(callback_lock) spin_lock_bh(slock) We have one problematic (C) use case in inet_csk_listen_stop() : local_bh_disable(); bh_lock_sock(child); // spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_slock) WARN_ON(sock_owned_by_user(child)); ... sock_orphan(child); // write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) lockdep is not happy with this, as reported by Tetsuo Handa It seems only way to deal with this is to use read_lock_bh(callbacklock) everywhere. Thanks to Jarek for pointing a bug in my first attempt and suggesting this solution. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet CC: Jarek Poplawski Tested-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 8 ++++---- net/rds/tcp_connect.c | 4 ++-- net/rds/tcp_listen.c | 4 ++-- net/rds/tcp_recv.c | 4 ++-- net/rds/tcp_send.c | 4 ++-- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index b05b9b6..ef30e9d 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1351,9 +1351,9 @@ int sock_i_uid(struct sock *sk) { int uid; - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); uid = sk->sk_socket ? SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_uid : 0; - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); return uid; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_i_uid); @@ -1362,9 +1362,9 @@ unsigned long sock_i_ino(struct sock *sk) { unsigned long ino; - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); ino = sk->sk_socket ? SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_ino : 0; - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); return ino; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_i_ino); diff --git a/net/rds/tcp_connect.c b/net/rds/tcp_connect.c index c397524..c519939 100644 --- a/net/rds/tcp_connect.c +++ b/net/rds/tcp_connect.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ void rds_tcp_state_change(struct sock *sk) struct rds_connection *conn; struct rds_tcp_connection *tc; - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); conn = sk->sk_user_data; if (conn == NULL) { state_change = sk->sk_state_change; @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void rds_tcp_state_change(struct sock *sk) break; } out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); state_change(sk); } diff --git a/net/rds/tcp_listen.c b/net/rds/tcp_listen.c index 975183f..27844f2 100644 --- a/net/rds/tcp_listen.c +++ b/net/rds/tcp_listen.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ void rds_tcp_listen_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int bytes) rdsdebug("listen data ready sk %p\n", sk); - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); ready = sk->sk_user_data; if (ready == NULL) { /* check for teardown race */ ready = sk->sk_data_ready; @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ void rds_tcp_listen_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int bytes) queue_work(rds_wq, &rds_tcp_listen_work); out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); ready(sk, bytes); } diff --git a/net/rds/tcp_recv.c b/net/rds/tcp_recv.c index 1aba687..e437974 100644 --- a/net/rds/tcp_recv.c +++ b/net/rds/tcp_recv.c @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ void rds_tcp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int bytes) rdsdebug("data ready sk %p bytes %d\n", sk, bytes); - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); conn = sk->sk_user_data; if (conn == NULL) { /* check for teardown race */ ready = sk->sk_data_ready; @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ void rds_tcp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int bytes) if (rds_tcp_read_sock(conn, GFP_ATOMIC, KM_SOFTIRQ0) == -ENOMEM) queue_delayed_work(rds_wq, &conn->c_recv_w, 0); out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); ready(sk, bytes); } diff --git a/net/rds/tcp_send.c b/net/rds/tcp_send.c index a28b895..2f012a0 100644 --- a/net/rds/tcp_send.c +++ b/net/rds/tcp_send.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ void rds_tcp_write_space(struct sock *sk) struct rds_connection *conn; struct rds_tcp_connection *tc; - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); conn = sk->sk_user_data; if (conn == NULL) { write_space = sk->sk_write_space; @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ void rds_tcp_write_space(struct sock *sk) queue_delayed_work(rds_wq, &conn->c_send_w, 0); out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); /* * write_space is only called when data leaves tcp's send queue if diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index b6309db..fe9306b 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static void xs_udp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int len) u32 _xid; __be32 *xp; - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); dprintk("RPC: xs_udp_data_ready...\n"); if (!(xprt = xprt_from_sock(sk))) goto out; @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static void xs_udp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int len) dropit: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } static inline void xs_tcp_read_fraghdr(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct xdr_skb_reader *desc) @@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ static void xs_tcp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int bytes) dprintk("RPC: xs_tcp_data_ready...\n"); - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); if (!(xprt = xprt_from_sock(sk))) goto out; if (xprt->shutdown) @@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ static void xs_tcp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int bytes) read = tcp_read_sock(sk, &rd_desc, xs_tcp_data_recv); } while (read > 0); out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } /* @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static void xs_tcp_state_change(struct sock *sk) { struct rpc_xprt *xprt; - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); if (!(xprt = xprt_from_sock(sk))) goto out; dprintk("RPC: xs_tcp_state_change client %p...\n", xprt); @@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ static void xs_tcp_state_change(struct sock *sk) switch (sk->sk_state) { case TCP_ESTABLISHED: - spin_lock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock); + spin_lock(&xprt->transport_lock); if (!xprt_test_and_set_connected(xprt)) { struct sock_xprt *transport = container_of(xprt, struct sock_xprt, xprt); @@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ static void xs_tcp_state_change(struct sock *sk) xprt_wake_pending_tasks(xprt, -EAGAIN); } - spin_unlock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock); + spin_unlock(&xprt->transport_lock); break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: /* The client initiated a shutdown of the socket */ @@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ static void xs_tcp_state_change(struct sock *sk) xs_sock_mark_closed(xprt); } out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } /** @@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ static void xs_error_report(struct sock *sk) { struct rpc_xprt *xprt; - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); if (!(xprt = xprt_from_sock(sk))) goto out; dprintk("RPC: %s client %p...\n" @@ -1384,7 +1384,7 @@ static void xs_error_report(struct sock *sk) __func__, xprt, sk->sk_err); xprt_wake_pending_tasks(xprt, -EAGAIN); out: - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } static void xs_write_space(struct sock *sk) @@ -1416,13 +1416,13 @@ static void xs_write_space(struct sock *sk) */ static void xs_udp_write_space(struct sock *sk) { - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); /* from net/core/sock.c:sock_def_write_space */ if (sock_writeable(sk)) xs_write_space(sk); - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } /** @@ -1437,13 +1437,13 @@ static void xs_udp_write_space(struct sock *sk) */ static void xs_tcp_write_space(struct sock *sk) { - read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); /* from net/core/stream.c:sk_stream_write_space */ if (sk_stream_wspace(sk) >= sk_stream_min_wspace(sk)) xs_write_space(sk); - read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } static void xs_udp_do_set_buffer_size(struct rpc_xprt *xprt) -- cgit v1.1 From a3d6713fbd2ccb50898a6f88664da96a7857c039 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Karl Hiramoto Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 01:50:54 +0000 Subject: br2684: fix scheduling while atomic You can't call atomic_notifier_chain_unregister() while in atomic context. Fix, call un/register_atmdevice_notifier in module __init and __exit. Bug report: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/172603 Reported-by: Mikko Vinni Tested-by: Mikko Vinni Signed-off-by: Karl Hiramoto Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/atm/br2684.c | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/atm/br2684.c b/net/atm/br2684.c index 651babd..ad2b232 100644 --- a/net/atm/br2684.c +++ b/net/atm/br2684.c @@ -399,12 +399,6 @@ static void br2684_push(struct atm_vcc *atmvcc, struct sk_buff *skb) unregister_netdev(net_dev); free_netdev(net_dev); } - read_lock_irq(&devs_lock); - if (list_empty(&br2684_devs)) { - /* last br2684 device */ - unregister_atmdevice_notifier(&atm_dev_notifier); - } - read_unlock_irq(&devs_lock); return; } @@ -675,7 +669,6 @@ static int br2684_create(void __user *arg) if (list_empty(&br2684_devs)) { /* 1st br2684 device */ - register_atmdevice_notifier(&atm_dev_notifier); brdev->number = 1; } else brdev->number = BRPRIV(list_entry_brdev(br2684_devs.prev))->number + 1; @@ -815,6 +808,7 @@ static int __init br2684_init(void) return -ENOMEM; #endif register_atm_ioctl(&br2684_ioctl_ops); + register_atmdevice_notifier(&atm_dev_notifier); return 0; } @@ -830,9 +824,7 @@ static void __exit br2684_exit(void) #endif - /* if not already empty */ - if (!list_empty(&br2684_devs)) - unregister_atmdevice_notifier(&atm_dev_notifier); + unregister_atmdevice_notifier(&atm_dev_notifier); while (!list_empty(&br2684_devs)) { net_dev = list_entry_brdev(br2684_devs.next); -- cgit v1.1 From 2cc6d2bf3d6195fabcf0febc192c01f99519a8f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Neil Horman Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 09:55:52 +0000 Subject: ipv6: add a missing unregister_pernet_subsys call Clean up a missing exit path in the ipv6 module init routines. In addrconf_init we call ipv6_addr_label_init which calls register_pernet_subsys for the ipv6_addr_label_ops structure. But if module loading fails, or if the ipv6 module is removed, there is no corresponding unregister_pernet_subsys call, which leaves a now-bogus address on the pernet_list, leading to oopses in subsequent registrations. This patch cleans up both the failed load path and the unload path. Tested by myself with good results. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman include/net/addrconf.h | 1 + net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 11 ++++++++--- net/ipv6/addrlabel.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 11 ++++++++--- net/ipv6/addrlabel.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index ab70a3f..324fac3 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -4637,10 +4637,12 @@ int __init addrconf_init(void) if (err < 0) { printk(KERN_CRIT "IPv6 Addrconf:" " cannot initialize default policy table: %d.\n", err); - return err; + goto out; } - register_pernet_subsys(&addrconf_ops); + err = register_pernet_subsys(&addrconf_ops); + if (err < 0) + goto out_addrlabel; /* The addrconf netdev notifier requires that loopback_dev * has it's ipv6 private information allocated and setup @@ -4692,7 +4694,9 @@ errout: unregister_netdevice_notifier(&ipv6_dev_notf); errlo: unregister_pernet_subsys(&addrconf_ops); - +out_addrlabel: + ipv6_addr_label_cleanup(); +out: return err; } @@ -4703,6 +4707,7 @@ void addrconf_cleanup(void) unregister_netdevice_notifier(&ipv6_dev_notf); unregister_pernet_subsys(&addrconf_ops); + ipv6_addr_label_cleanup(); rtnl_lock(); diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrlabel.c b/net/ipv6/addrlabel.c index f0e774c..8175f80 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrlabel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrlabel.c @@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ int __init ipv6_addr_label_init(void) return register_pernet_subsys(&ipv6_addr_label_ops); } +void ipv6_addr_label_cleanup(void) +{ + unregister_pernet_subsys(&ipv6_addr_label_ops); +} + static const struct nla_policy ifal_policy[IFAL_MAX+1] = { [IFAL_ADDRESS] = { .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr), }, [IFAL_LABEL] = { .len = sizeof(u32), }, -- cgit v1.1 From b3de7559afbb7a8a35b4be975a6adf6c5e3cdca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuchung Cheng Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 13:22:06 +0000 Subject: tcp: fix TSO FACK loss marking in tcp_mark_head_lost MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When TCP uses FACK algorithm to mark lost packets in tcp_mark_head_lost(), if the number of packets in the (TSO) skb is greater than the number of packets that should be marked lost, TCP incorrectly exits the loop and marks no packets lost in the skb. This underestimates tp->lost_out and affects the recovery/retransmission. This patch fargments the skb and marks the correct amount of packets lost. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 149e79a..b55f60f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -2545,7 +2545,8 @@ static void tcp_mark_head_lost(struct sock *sk, int packets) cnt += tcp_skb_pcount(skb); if (cnt > packets) { - if (tcp_is_sack(tp) || (oldcnt >= packets)) + if ((tcp_is_sack(tp) && !tcp_is_fack(tp)) || + (oldcnt >= packets)) break; mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size; -- cgit v1.1 From 7e1b33e5ea392dfc984fc63b76ca75acbf249dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ulrich Weber Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 15:02:18 -0700 Subject: ipv6: add IPv6 to neighbour table overflow warning IPv4 and IPv6 have separate neighbour tables, so the warning messages should be distinguishable. [ Add a suitable message prefix on the ipv4 side as well -DaveM ] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 6298f75..ac6559c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ restart: } if (net_ratelimit()) - printk(KERN_WARNING "Neighbour table overflow.\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "ipv4: Neighbour table overflow.\n"); rt_drop(rt); return -ENOBUFS; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index d126365..8323136 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static struct rt6_info *rt6_alloc_cow(struct rt6_info *ort, struct in6_addr *dad if (net_ratelimit()) printk(KERN_WARNING - "Neighbour table overflow.\n"); + "ipv6: Neighbour table overflow.\n"); dst_free(&rt->dst); return NULL; } -- cgit v1.1 From 0b20406cda621c2495d10baab1e87127ceb43337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 15:54:44 -0700 Subject: net/9p: Mount only matching virtio channels p9_virtio_create will only compare the the channel's tag characters against the device name till the end of the channel's tag but not till the end of the device name. This means that if a user defines channels with the tags foo and foobar then he would mount foo when he requested foonot and may mount foo when he requested foobar. Thus it is necessary to check both string lengths against each other in case of a successful partial string match. Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/9p/trans_virtio.c b/net/9p/trans_virtio.c index dcfbe99..b885159 100644 --- a/net/9p/trans_virtio.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_virtio.c @@ -329,7 +329,8 @@ p9_virtio_create(struct p9_client *client, const char *devname, char *args) mutex_lock(&virtio_9p_lock); list_for_each_entry(chan, &virtio_chan_list, chan_list) { - if (!strncmp(devname, chan->tag, chan->tag_len)) { + if (!strncmp(devname, chan->tag, chan->tag_len) && + strlen(devname) == chan->tag_len) { if (!chan->inuse) { chan->inuse = true; found = 1; -- cgit v1.1 From 01db403cf99f739f86903314a489fb420e0e254f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 20:24:54 -0700 Subject: tcp: Fix >4GB writes on 64-bit. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Fixes kernel bugzilla #16603 tcp_sendmsg() truncates iov_len to an 'int' which a 4GB write to write zero bytes, for example. There is also the problem higher up of how verify_iovec() works. It wants to prevent the total length from looking like an error return value. However it does this using 'int', but syscalls return 'long' (and thus signed 64-bit on 64-bit machines). So it could trigger false-positives on 64-bit as written. So fix it to use 'long'. Reported-by: Olaf Bonorden Reported-by: Daniel Büse Reported-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/iovec.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/iovec.c b/net/core/iovec.c index 1cd98df..e6b133b 100644 --- a/net/core/iovec.c +++ b/net/core/iovec.c @@ -35,9 +35,10 @@ * in any case. */ -int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode) +long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode) { - int size, err, ct; + int size, ct; + long err; if (m->msg_namelen) { if (mode == VERIFY_READ) { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 95d75d4..f115ea6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ int tcp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, sg = sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_SG; while (--iovlen >= 0) { - int seglen = iov->iov_len; + size_t seglen = iov->iov_len; unsigned char __user *from = iov->iov_base; iov++; -- cgit v1.1