From 92a0acce186cde8ead56c6915d9479773673ea1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2009 21:24:05 -0800 Subject: net: Kill skb_truesize_check(), it only catches false-positives. A long time ago we had bugs, primarily in TCP, where we would modify skb->truesize (for TSO queue collapsing) in ways which would corrupt the socket memory accounting. skb_truesize_check() was added in order to try and catch this error more systematically. However this debugging check has morphed into a Frankenstein of sorts and these days it does nothing other than catch false-positives. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/skbuff.c | 8 -------- net/core/sock.c | 1 - 2 files changed, 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index da74b84..c6a6b16 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -143,14 +143,6 @@ void skb_under_panic(struct sk_buff *skb, int sz, void *here) BUG(); } -void skb_truesize_bug(struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - WARN(net_ratelimit(), KERN_ERR "SKB BUG: Invalid truesize (%u) " - "len=%u, sizeof(sk_buff)=%Zd\n", - skb->truesize, skb->len, sizeof(struct sk_buff)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_truesize_bug); - /* Allocate a new skbuff. We do this ourselves so we can fill in a few * 'private' fields and also do memory statistics to find all the * [BEEP] leaks. diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 6f2e133..6e4f14d 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1137,7 +1137,6 @@ void sock_rfree(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sock *sk = skb->sk; - skb_truesize_check(skb); atomic_sub(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc); sk_mem_uncharge(skb->sk, skb->truesize); } -- cgit v1.1 From 4aa3b2ee1945ed082430ae1fb988d60eef64ca07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Leblond Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 15:28:46 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack_ipv6: fix nf_log_packet message in icmpv6 conntrack This patch fixes a trivial typo that was adding a new line at end of the nf_log_packet() prefix. It also make the logging conditionnal by adding a LOG_INVALID test. Signed-off-by: Eric Leblond Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c index c323643..72dbb6d 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c @@ -201,8 +201,9 @@ icmpv6_error(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff, if (net->ct.sysctl_checksum && hooknum == NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING && nf_ip6_checksum(skb, hooknum, dataoff, IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) { - nf_log_packet(PF_INET6, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL, - "nf_ct_icmpv6: ICMPv6 checksum failed\n"); + if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) + nf_log_packet(PF_INET6, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL, + "nf_ct_icmpv6: ICMPv6 checksum failed "); return -NF_ACCEPT; } -- cgit v1.1 From 5ca431f9ae8db8c6edb9c64bebe6d6521077afd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Leblond Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 15:29:23 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_log: fix per-rule qthreshold override In NFLOG the per-rule qthreshold should overrides per-instance only it is set. With current code, the per-rule qthreshold is 1 if not set and it overrides the per-instance qthreshold. This patch modifies the default xt_NFLOG threshold from 1 to 0. Thus a value of 0 means there is no per-rule setting and the instance parameter has to apply. Signed-off-by: Eric Leblond Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index fa49dc7..580b837 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -590,8 +590,10 @@ nfulnl_log_packet(u_int8_t pf, qthreshold = inst->qthreshold; /* per-rule qthreshold overrides per-instance */ - if (qthreshold > li->u.ulog.qthreshold) - qthreshold = li->u.ulog.qthreshold; + if (li->u.ulog.qthreshold) + if (qthreshold > li->u.ulog.qthreshold) + qthreshold = li->u.ulog.qthreshold; + switch (inst->copy_mode) { case NFULNL_COPY_META: -- cgit v1.1 From 2c6764b743f9d25dd0806a417f06920dcbd0f599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Leblond Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 15:29:49 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_log: fix timeout handling NFLOG timeout was computed in timer by doing: flushtimeout*HZ/100 Default value of flushtimeout was HZ (for 1 second delay). This was wrong for non 100HZ computer. This patch modify the default delay by using 100 instead of HZ. Signed-off-by: Eric Leblond Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index 580b837..c712e9f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ #endif #define NFULNL_NLBUFSIZ_DEFAULT NLMSG_GOODSIZE -#define NFULNL_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT HZ /* every second */ +#define NFULNL_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 100 /* every second */ #define NFULNL_QTHRESH_DEFAULT 100 /* 100 packets */ #define NFULNL_COPY_RANGE_MAX 0xFFFF /* max packet size is limited by 16-bit struct nfattr nfa_len field */ -- cgit v1.1 From eb132205ca2f7ad44d8c8c482815b6911200b6a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Engelhardt Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 16:42:19 +0100 Subject: netfilter: make proc/net/ip* print names from foreign NFPROTO When extensions were moved to the NFPROTO_UNSPEC wildcard in ab4f21e6fb1c09b13c4c3cb8357babe8223471bd, they disappeared from the procfs files. Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 199 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c index bfbf521..5baccfa 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c @@ -827,59 +827,143 @@ static const struct file_operations xt_table_ops = { .release = seq_release_net, }; -static void *xt_match_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) +/* + * Traverse state for ip{,6}_{tables,matches} for helping crossing + * the multi-AF mutexes. + */ +struct nf_mttg_trav { + struct list_head *head, *curr; + uint8_t class, nfproto; +}; + +enum { + MTTG_TRAV_INIT, + MTTG_TRAV_NFP_UNSPEC, + MTTG_TRAV_NFP_SPEC, + MTTG_TRAV_DONE, +}; + +static void *xt_mttg_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *ppos, + bool is_target) { - struct proc_dir_entry *pde = (struct proc_dir_entry *)seq->private; - u_int16_t af = (unsigned long)pde->data; + static const uint8_t next_class[] = { + [MTTG_TRAV_NFP_UNSPEC] = MTTG_TRAV_NFP_SPEC, + [MTTG_TRAV_NFP_SPEC] = MTTG_TRAV_DONE, + }; + struct nf_mttg_trav *trav = seq->private; + + switch (trav->class) { + case MTTG_TRAV_INIT: + trav->class = MTTG_TRAV_NFP_UNSPEC; + mutex_lock(&xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].mutex); + trav->head = trav->curr = is_target ? + &xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].target : &xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].match; + break; + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_UNSPEC: + trav->curr = trav->curr->next; + if (trav->curr != trav->head) + break; + mutex_unlock(&xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].mutex); + mutex_lock(&xt[trav->nfproto].mutex); + trav->head = trav->curr = is_target ? + &xt[trav->nfproto].target : &xt[trav->nfproto].match; + trav->class = next_class[trav->class]; + break; + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_SPEC: + trav->curr = trav->curr->next; + if (trav->curr != trav->head) + break; + /* fallthru, _stop will unlock */ + default: + return NULL; + } - mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex); - return seq_list_start(&xt[af].match, *pos); + if (ppos != NULL) + ++*ppos; + return trav; } -static void *xt_match_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +static void *xt_mttg_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos, + bool is_target) { - struct proc_dir_entry *pde = (struct proc_dir_entry *)seq->private; - u_int16_t af = (unsigned long)pde->data; + struct nf_mttg_trav *trav = seq->private; + unsigned int j; - return seq_list_next(v, &xt[af].match, pos); + trav->class = MTTG_TRAV_INIT; + for (j = 0; j < *pos; ++j) + if (xt_mttg_seq_next(seq, NULL, NULL, is_target) == NULL) + return NULL; + return trav; } -static void xt_match_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +static void xt_mttg_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { - struct proc_dir_entry *pde = seq->private; - u_int16_t af = (unsigned long)pde->data; + struct nf_mttg_trav *trav = seq->private; + + switch (trav->class) { + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_UNSPEC: + mutex_unlock(&xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].mutex); + break; + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_SPEC: + mutex_unlock(&xt[trav->nfproto].mutex); + break; + } +} - mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex); +static void *xt_match_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) +{ + return xt_mttg_seq_start(seq, pos, false); } -static int xt_match_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +static void *xt_match_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *ppos) { - struct xt_match *match = list_entry(v, struct xt_match, list); + return xt_mttg_seq_next(seq, v, ppos, false); +} - if (strlen(match->name)) - return seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", match->name); - else - return 0; +static int xt_match_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + const struct nf_mttg_trav *trav = seq->private; + const struct xt_match *match; + + switch (trav->class) { + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_UNSPEC: + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_SPEC: + if (trav->curr == trav->head) + return 0; + match = list_entry(trav->curr, struct xt_match, list); + return (*match->name == '\0') ? 0 : + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", match->name); + } + return 0; } static const struct seq_operations xt_match_seq_ops = { .start = xt_match_seq_start, .next = xt_match_seq_next, - .stop = xt_match_seq_stop, + .stop = xt_mttg_seq_stop, .show = xt_match_seq_show, }; static int xt_match_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { + struct seq_file *seq; + struct nf_mttg_trav *trav; int ret; - ret = seq_open(file, &xt_match_seq_ops); - if (!ret) { - struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; + trav = kmalloc(sizeof(*trav), GFP_KERNEL); + if (trav == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; - seq->private = PDE(inode); + ret = seq_open(file, &xt_match_seq_ops); + if (ret < 0) { + kfree(trav); + return ret; } - return ret; + + seq = file->private_data; + seq->private = trav; + trav->nfproto = (unsigned long)PDE(inode)->data; + return 0; } static const struct file_operations xt_match_ops = { @@ -887,62 +971,63 @@ static const struct file_operations xt_match_ops = { .open = xt_match_open, .read = seq_read, .llseek = seq_lseek, - .release = seq_release, + .release = seq_release_private, }; static void *xt_target_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) { - struct proc_dir_entry *pde = (struct proc_dir_entry *)seq->private; - u_int16_t af = (unsigned long)pde->data; - - mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex); - return seq_list_start(&xt[af].target, *pos); + return xt_mttg_seq_start(seq, pos, true); } -static void *xt_target_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +static void *xt_target_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *ppos) { - struct proc_dir_entry *pde = (struct proc_dir_entry *)seq->private; - u_int16_t af = (unsigned long)pde->data; - - return seq_list_next(v, &xt[af].target, pos); -} - -static void xt_target_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) -{ - struct proc_dir_entry *pde = seq->private; - u_int16_t af = (unsigned long)pde->data; - - mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex); + return xt_mttg_seq_next(seq, v, ppos, true); } static int xt_target_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { - struct xt_target *target = list_entry(v, struct xt_target, list); - - if (strlen(target->name)) - return seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", target->name); - else - return 0; + const struct nf_mttg_trav *trav = seq->private; + const struct xt_target *target; + + switch (trav->class) { + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_UNSPEC: + case MTTG_TRAV_NFP_SPEC: + if (trav->curr == trav->head) + return 0; + target = list_entry(trav->curr, struct xt_target, list); + return (*target->name == '\0') ? 0 : + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", target->name); + } + return 0; } static const struct seq_operations xt_target_seq_ops = { .start = xt_target_seq_start, .next = xt_target_seq_next, - .stop = xt_target_seq_stop, + .stop = xt_mttg_seq_stop, .show = xt_target_seq_show, }; static int xt_target_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { + struct seq_file *seq; + struct nf_mttg_trav *trav; int ret; - ret = seq_open(file, &xt_target_seq_ops); - if (!ret) { - struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; + trav = kmalloc(sizeof(*trav), GFP_KERNEL); + if (trav == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; - seq->private = PDE(inode); + ret = seq_open(file, &xt_target_seq_ops); + if (ret < 0) { + kfree(trav); + return ret; } - return ret; + + seq = file->private_data; + seq->private = trav; + trav->nfproto = (unsigned long)PDE(inode)->data; + return 0; } static const struct file_operations xt_target_ops = { @@ -950,7 +1035,7 @@ static const struct file_operations xt_target_ops = { .open = xt_target_open, .read = seq_read, .llseek = seq_lseek, - .release = seq_release, + .release = seq_release_private, }; #define FORMAT_TABLES "_tables_names" -- cgit v1.1 From 5209921cf15452cbe43097afce11d2846630cb51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 17:45:44 -0800 Subject: tcp: remove obsoleted comment about different passes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This is obsolete since the passes got combined. Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index dda42f0..da2c3b8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2023,7 +2023,6 @@ void tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(struct sock *sk) last_lost = tp->snd_una; } - /* First pass: retransmit lost packets. */ tcp_for_write_queue_from(skb, sk) { __u8 sacked = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked; -- cgit v1.1 From 486a87f1e5624096bd1c09e9e716239597d48dca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Lezcano Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2009 00:07:53 -0800 Subject: netns: fix double free at netns creation This patch fix a double free when a network namespace fails. The previous code does a kfree of the net_generic structure when one of the init subsystem initialization fails. The 'setup_net' function does kfree(ng) and returns an error. The caller, 'copy_net_ns', call net_free on error, and this one calls kfree(net->gen), making this pointer freed twice. This patch make the code symetric, the net_alloc does the net_generic allocation and the net_free frees the net_generic. Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/net_namespace.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index 55151fa..b0767ab 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -32,24 +32,14 @@ static __net_init int setup_net(struct net *net) { /* Must be called with net_mutex held */ struct pernet_operations *ops; - int error; - struct net_generic *ng; + int error = 0; atomic_set(&net->count, 1); + #ifdef NETNS_REFCNT_DEBUG atomic_set(&net->use_count, 0); #endif - error = -ENOMEM; - ng = kzalloc(sizeof(struct net_generic) + - INITIAL_NET_GEN_PTRS * sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL); - if (ng == NULL) - goto out; - - ng->len = INITIAL_NET_GEN_PTRS; - rcu_assign_pointer(net->gen, ng); - - error = 0; list_for_each_entry(ops, &pernet_list, list) { if (ops->init) { error = ops->init(net); @@ -70,7 +60,6 @@ out_undo: } rcu_barrier(); - kfree(ng); goto out; } @@ -78,16 +67,43 @@ out_undo: static struct kmem_cache *net_cachep; static struct workqueue_struct *netns_wq; -static struct net *net_alloc(void) +static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) { - return kmem_cache_zalloc(net_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); + struct net_generic *ng; + size_t generic_size = sizeof(struct net_generic) + + INITIAL_NET_GEN_PTRS * sizeof(void *); + + ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ng) + ng->len = INITIAL_NET_GEN_PTRS; + + return ng; } -static void net_free(struct net *net) +static struct net *net_alloc(void) { + struct net *net = NULL; + struct net_generic *ng; + + ng = net_alloc_generic(); + if (!ng) + goto out; + + net = kmem_cache_zalloc(net_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!net) - return; + goto out_free; + + rcu_assign_pointer(net->gen, ng); +out: + return net; + +out_free: + kfree(ng); + goto out; +} +static void net_free(struct net *net) +{ #ifdef NETNS_REFCNT_DEBUG if (unlikely(atomic_read(&net->use_count) != 0)) { printk(KERN_EMERG "network namespace not free! Usage: %d\n", @@ -112,27 +128,28 @@ struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags, struct net *old_net) err = -ENOMEM; new_net = net_alloc(); if (!new_net) - goto out; + goto out_err; mutex_lock(&net_mutex); err = setup_net(new_net); - if (err) - goto out_unlock; - - rtnl_lock(); - list_add_tail(&new_net->list, &net_namespace_list); - rtnl_unlock(); - - -out_unlock: + if (!err) { + rtnl_lock(); + list_add_tail(&new_net->list, &net_namespace_list); + rtnl_unlock(); + } mutex_unlock(&net_mutex); + + if (err) + goto out_free; out: put_net(old_net); - if (err) { - net_free(new_net); - new_net = ERR_PTR(err); - } return new_net; + +out_free: + net_free(new_net); +out_err: + new_net = ERR_PTR(err); + goto out; } static void cleanup_net(struct work_struct *work) @@ -188,6 +205,7 @@ struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags, struct net *old_net) static int __init net_ns_init(void) { + struct net_generic *ng; int err; printk(KERN_INFO "net_namespace: %zd bytes\n", sizeof(struct net)); @@ -202,6 +220,12 @@ static int __init net_ns_init(void) panic("Could not create netns workq"); #endif + ng = net_alloc_generic(); + if (!ng) + panic("Could not allocate generic netns"); + + rcu_assign_pointer(init_net.gen, ng); + mutex_lock(&net_mutex); err = setup_net(&init_net); -- cgit v1.1 From ebe47d47b7b7fed72dabcce4717da727b4e2367d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Clemens Noss Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 15:37:35 -0800 Subject: netns: build fix for net_alloc_generic net_alloc_generic was defined in #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS, but used unconditionally. Move net_alloc_generic out of #ifdef. Signed-off-by: Clemens Noss Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/net_namespace.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index b0767ab..2adb1a7 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -63,10 +63,6 @@ out_undo: goto out; } -#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS -static struct kmem_cache *net_cachep; -static struct workqueue_struct *netns_wq; - static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) { struct net_generic *ng; @@ -80,6 +76,10 @@ static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) return ng; } +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS +static struct kmem_cache *net_cachep; +static struct workqueue_struct *netns_wq; + static struct net *net_alloc(void) { struct net *net = NULL; -- cgit v1.1 From 50fee1dec5d71b8a14c1b82f2f42e16adc227f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eugene Teo Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 15:38:41 -0800 Subject: net: amend the fix for SO_BSDCOMPAT gsopt infoleak The fix for CVE-2009-0676 (upstream commit df0bca04) is incomplete. Note that the same problem of leaking kernel memory will reappear if someone on some architecture uses struct timeval with some internal padding (for example tv_sec 64-bit and tv_usec 32-bit) --- then, you are going to leak the padded bytes to userspace. Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 6e4f14d..5f97caa 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, if (len < 0) return -EINVAL; - v.val = 0; + memset(&v, 0, sizeof(v)); switch(optname) { case SO_DEBUG: -- cgit v1.1 From 325fb5b4d26038cba665dd0d8ee09555321061f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Drexler Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 14:53:12 +0100 Subject: netfilter: xt_recent: fix proc-file addition/removal of IPv4 addresses Fix regression introduded by commit 079aa88 (netfilter: xt_recent: IPv6 support): From http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12753: Problem Description: An uninitialized buffer causes IPv4 addresses added manually (via the +IP command to the proc interface) to never match any packets. Similarly, the -IP command fails to remove IPv4 addresses. Details: In the function recent_entry_lookup, the xt_recent module does comparisons of the entire nf_inet_addr union value, both for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. For addresses initialized from actual packets the remaining 12 bytes not occupied by the IPv4 are zeroed so this works correctly. However when setting the nf_inet_addr addr variable in the recent_mt_proc_write function, only the IPv4 bytes are initialized and the remaining 12 bytes contain garbage. Hence addresses added in this way never match any packets, unless these uninitialized 12 bytes happened to be zero by coincidence. Similarly, addresses cannot consistently be removed using the proc interface due to mismatch of the garbage bytes (although it will sometimes work to remove an address that was added manually). Reading the /proc/net/xt_recent/ entries hides this problem because this only uses the first 4 bytes when displaying IPv4 addresses. Steps to reproduce: $ iptables -I INPUT -m recent --rcheck -j LOG $ echo +169.254.156.239 > /proc/net/xt_recent/DEFAULT $ cat /proc/net/xt_recent/DEFAULT src=169.254.156.239 ttl: 0 last_seen: 119910 oldest_pkt: 1 119910 [At this point no packets from 169.254.156.239 are being logged.] $ iptables -I INPUT -s 169.254.156.239 -m recent --set $ cat /proc/net/xt_recent/DEFAULT src=169.254.156.239 ttl: 0 last_seen: 119910 oldest_pkt: 1 119910 src=169.254.156.239 ttl: 255 last_seen: 126184 oldest_pkt: 4 125434, 125684, 125934, 126184 [At this point, adding the address via an iptables rule, packets are being logged correctly.] $ echo -169.254.156.239 > /proc/net/xt_recent/DEFAULT $ cat /proc/net/xt_recent/DEFAULT src=169.254.156.239 ttl: 0 last_seen: 119910 oldest_pkt: 1 119910 src=169.254.156.239 ttl: 255 last_seen: 126992 oldest_pkt: 10 125434, 125684, 125934, 126184, 126434, 126684, 126934, 126991, 126991, 126992 $ echo -169.254.156.239 > /proc/net/xt_recent/DEFAULT $ cat /proc/net/xt_recent/DEFAULT src=169.254.156.239 ttl: 0 last_seen: 119910 oldest_pkt: 1 119910 src=169.254.156.239 ttl: 255 last_seen: 126992 oldest_pkt: 10 125434, 125684, 125934, 126184, 126434, 126684, 126934, 126991, 126991, 126992 [Removing the address via /proc interface failed evidently.] Possible solutions: - initialize the addr variable in recent_mt_proc_write - compare only 4 bytes for IPv4 addresses in recent_entry_lookup Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/netfilter/xt_recent.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c b/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c index fe80b61..791e030 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ recent_mt_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *input, struct recent_entry *e; char buf[sizeof("+b335:1d35:1e55:dead:c0de:1715:5afe:c0de")]; const char *c = buf; - union nf_inet_addr addr; + union nf_inet_addr addr = {}; u_int16_t family; bool add, succ; -- cgit v1.1 From a52b8bd338630f78a6bfe39fe17cb8469d2679ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Perches Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 16:40:16 -0800 Subject: tcp_scalable: Update malformed & dead url Signed-off-by: Joe Perches Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_scalable.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_scalable.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_scalable.c index 2747ec7..4660b08 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_scalable.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_scalable.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* Tom Kelly's Scalable TCP * - * See htt://www-lce.eng.cam.ac.uk/~ctk21/scalable/ + * See http://www.deneholme.net/tom/scalable/ * * John Heffner */ -- cgit v1.1 From 3f53a38131a4e7a053c0aa060aba0411242fb6b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Emelyanov Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2009 03:35:13 -0800 Subject: ipv6: don't use tw net when accounting for recycled tw We already have a valid net in that place, but this is not just a cleanup - the tw pointer can be NULL there sometimes, thus causing an oops in NET_NS=y case. The same place in ipv4 code already works correctly using existing net, rather than tw's one. The bug exists since 2.6.27. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c index 8fe267f..1bcc343 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c @@ -258,11 +258,11 @@ unique: if (twp != NULL) { *twp = tw; - NET_INC_STATS_BH(twsk_net(tw), LINUX_MIB_TIMEWAITRECYCLED); + NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_TIMEWAITRECYCLED); } else if (tw != NULL) { /* Silly. Should hash-dance instead... */ inet_twsk_deschedule(tw, death_row); - NET_INC_STATS_BH(twsk_net(tw), LINUX_MIB_TIMEWAITRECYCLED); + NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_TIMEWAITRECYCLED); inet_twsk_put(tw); } -- cgit v1.1 From 1844f747947bb89d7f12cd3034548805113f764b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarek Poplawski Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 02:42:38 -0800 Subject: pkt_sched: sch_drr: Fix oops in drr_change_class. drr_change_class lacks a check for NULL of tca[TCA_OPTIONS], so oops is possible. Reported-by: Denys Fedoryschenko Signed-off-by: Jarek Poplawski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_drr.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_drr.c b/net/sched/sch_drr.c index f6b4fa9..e36e94a 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_drr.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_drr.c @@ -66,11 +66,15 @@ static int drr_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, u32 parentid, { struct drr_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch); struct drr_class *cl = (struct drr_class *)*arg; + struct nlattr *opt = tca[TCA_OPTIONS]; struct nlattr *tb[TCA_DRR_MAX + 1]; u32 quantum; int err; - err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_DRR_MAX, tca[TCA_OPTIONS], drr_policy); + if (!opt) + return -EINVAL; + + err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_DRR_MAX, opt, drr_policy); if (err < 0) return err; -- cgit v1.1 From 4ead443163b798661c2a2ede5e512e116a9e41e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 00:11:52 -0800 Subject: netpoll: Add drop checks to all entry points The netpoll entry checks are required to ensure that we don't receive normal packets when invoked via netpoll. Unfortunately it only ever worked for the netif_receive_skb/netif_rx entry points. The VLAN (and subsequently GRO) entry point didn't have the check and therefore can trigger all sorts of weird problems. This patch adds the netpoll check to all entry points. I'm still uneasy with receiving at all under netpoll (which apparently is only used by the out-of-tree kdump code). The reason is it is perfectly legal to receive all data including headers into highmem if netpoll is off, but if you try to do that with netpoll on and someone gets a printk in an IRQ handler you're going to get a nice BUG_ON. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/8021q/vlan_core.c | 10 ++++++++++ net/core/dev.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_core.c b/net/8021q/vlan_core.c index e9db889..2886d2f 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan_core.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan_core.c @@ -1,12 +1,16 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "vlan.h" /* VLAN rx hw acceleration helper. This acts like netif_{rx,receive_skb}(). */ int __vlan_hwaccel_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct vlan_group *grp, u16 vlan_tci, int polling) { + if (netpoll_rx(skb)) + return NET_RX_DROP; + if (skb_bond_should_drop(skb)) goto drop; @@ -100,6 +104,9 @@ int vlan_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct vlan_group *grp, { int err = NET_RX_SUCCESS; + if (netpoll_receive_skb(skb)) + return NET_RX_DROP; + switch (vlan_gro_common(napi, grp, vlan_tci, skb)) { case -1: return netif_receive_skb(skb); @@ -126,6 +133,9 @@ int vlan_gro_frags(struct napi_struct *napi, struct vlan_group *grp, if (!skb) goto out; + if (netpoll_receive_skb(skb)) + goto out; + err = NET_RX_SUCCESS; switch (vlan_gro_common(napi, grp, vlan_tci, skb)) { diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index a17e006..72b0d26f 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -2488,6 +2488,9 @@ static int __napi_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb) int napi_gro_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb) { + if (netpoll_receive_skb(skb)) + return NET_RX_DROP; + switch (__napi_gro_receive(napi, skb)) { case -1: return netif_receive_skb(skb); @@ -2558,6 +2561,9 @@ int napi_gro_frags(struct napi_struct *napi, struct napi_gro_fraginfo *info) if (!skb) goto out; + if (netpoll_receive_skb(skb)) + goto out; + err = NET_RX_SUCCESS; switch (__napi_gro_receive(napi, skb)) { -- cgit v1.1 From 9ec06ff57a9badef3b6b019f35efc6b21fc27d03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ilpo=20J=C3=A4rvinen?= Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2009 00:21:36 -0800 Subject: tcp: fix retrans_out leaks MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit There's conflicting assumptions in shifting, the caller assumes that dupsack results in S'ed skbs (or a part of it) for sure but never gave a hint to tcp_sacktag_one when dsack is actually in use. Thus DSACK retrans_out -= pcount was not taken and the counter became out of sync. Remove obstacle from that information flow to get DSACKs accounted in tcp_sacktag_one as expected. Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Tested-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index a6961d7..c28976a7 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -1374,7 +1374,8 @@ static u8 tcp_sacktag_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, static int tcp_shifted_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_sacktag_state *state, - unsigned int pcount, int shifted, int mss) + unsigned int pcount, int shifted, int mss, + int dup_sack) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct sk_buff *prev = tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb); @@ -1410,7 +1411,7 @@ static int tcp_shifted_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, } /* We discard results */ - tcp_sacktag_one(skb, sk, state, 0, pcount); + tcp_sacktag_one(skb, sk, state, dup_sack, pcount); /* Difference in this won't matter, both ACKed by the same cumul. ACK */ TCP_SKB_CB(prev)->sacked |= (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS); @@ -1561,7 +1562,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_shift_skb_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, if (!skb_shift(prev, skb, len)) goto fallback; - if (!tcp_shifted_skb(sk, skb, state, pcount, len, mss)) + if (!tcp_shifted_skb(sk, skb, state, pcount, len, mss, dup_sack)) goto out; /* Hole filled allows collapsing with the next as well, this is very @@ -1580,7 +1581,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_shift_skb_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, len = skb->len; if (skb_shift(prev, skb, len)) { pcount += tcp_skb_pcount(skb); - tcp_shifted_skb(sk, skb, state, tcp_skb_pcount(skb), len, mss); + tcp_shifted_skb(sk, skb, state, tcp_skb_pcount(skb), len, mss, 0); } out: -- cgit v1.1