From 72da7b3860cabf427590b4982bc880bafab4d5c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 18:39:19 -0700 Subject: [SCTP]: Add check for hmac_algo parameter in sctp_verify_param() RFC 4890 has the following text: The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter. As a result, we need to check in sctp_verify_param() that HMAC_SHA1 is present in the list. If not, we should probably treat this as a protocol violation. It should also be a protocol violation if the HMAC parameter is empty. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 578630e..36ebb39 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1982,7 +1982,10 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *chunk, struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk) { + struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs; int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR; + __u16 n_elt, id = 0; + int i; /* FIXME - This routine is not looking at each parameter per the * chunk type, i.e., unrecognized parameters should be further @@ -2056,9 +2059,29 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, break; case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO: - if (sctp_auth_enable) - break; - /* Fall Through */ + if (!sctp_auth_enable) + goto fallthrough; + + hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p; + n_elt = (ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) >> 1; + + /* SCTP-AUTH: Section 6.1 + * The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and + * included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter. + */ + for (i = 0; i < n_elt; i++) { + id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]); + + if (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) + break; + } + + if (id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) { + sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, + err_chunk); + retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT; + } + break; fallthrough: default: SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Unrecognized param: %d for chunk %d.\n", -- cgit v1.1 From f4ad85ca3ef8a1ede76c5020a28a8f4057b4d24f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gui Jianfeng Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 18:39:34 -0700 Subject: [SCTP]: Fix protocol violation when receiving an error lenght INIT-ACK When receiving an error length INIT-ACK during COOKIE-WAIT, a 0-vtag ABORT will be responsed. This action violates the protocol apparently. This patch achieves the following things. 1 If the INIT-ACK contains all the fixed parameters, use init-tag recorded from INIT-ACK as vtag. 2 If the INIT-ACK doesn't contain all the fixed parameters, just reflect its vtag. Signed-off-by: Gui Jianfeng Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/outqueue.c | 3 +++ net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 3 +++ net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c index 1bb3c5c..c071446 100644 --- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c @@ -793,6 +793,9 @@ int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int rtx_timeout) break; case SCTP_CID_ABORT: + if (sctp_test_T_bit(chunk)) { + packet->vtag = asoc->c.my_vtag; + } case SCTP_CID_SACK: case SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT: case SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT_ACK: diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c index 28eb38e..a4763fd 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c @@ -1536,6 +1536,9 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(sctp_event_t event_type, error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC); break; + case SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG: + asoc->peer.i.init_tag = cmd->obj.u32; + break; default: printk(KERN_WARNING "Impossible command: %u, %p\n", diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index f2ed647..3ef9749 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -4144,6 +4144,24 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation( goto nomem; if (asoc) { + /* Treat INIT-ACK as a special case during COOKIE-WAIT. */ + if (chunk->chunk_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK && + !asoc->peer.i.init_tag) { + sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack; + + initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr; + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, + sizeof(sctp_initack_chunk_t))) + abort->chunk_hdr->flags |= SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T; + else { + unsigned int inittag; + + inittag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag); + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG, + SCTP_U32(inittag)); + } + } + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort)); SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS); -- cgit v1.1 From ab38fb04c9f8928cfaf6f4966633d783419906a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlad Yasevich Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 18:40:06 -0700 Subject: [SCTP]: Fix compiler warning about const qualifiers Fix 3 warnings about discarding const qualifiers: net/sctp/ulpevent.c:862: warning: passing argument 1 of 'sctp_event2skb' discards qualifiers from pointer target type net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c:4393: warning: passing argument 1 of 'SCTP_ASOC' discards qualifiers from pointer target type net/sctp/socket.c:5874: warning: passing argument 1 of 'cmsg_nxthdr' discards qualifiers from pointer target type Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 5 +++-- net/sctp/socket.c | 5 +++-- net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 3ef9749..07194c2 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -4367,6 +4367,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands) { struct sctp_chunk *repl; + struct sctp_association* my_asoc; /* The comment below says that we enter COOKIE-WAIT AFTER * sending the INIT, but that doesn't actually work in our @@ -4390,8 +4391,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, /* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just * rerun it through as a sideffect. */ - sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, - SCTP_ASOC((struct sctp_association *) asoc)); + my_asoc = (struct sctp_association *)asoc; + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(my_asoc)); /* Choose transport for INIT. */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_CHOOSE_TRANSPORT, diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index d994d82..998e63a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -5868,11 +5868,12 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg, sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs) { struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + struct msghdr *my_msg = (struct msghdr *)msg; for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); cmsg != NULL; - cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR((struct msghdr*)msg, cmsg)) { - if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg)) + cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(my_msg, cmsg)) { + if (!CMSG_OK(my_msg, cmsg)) return -EINVAL; /* Should we parse this header or ignore? */ diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c index b43f1f1..ce6cda6 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c +++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c @@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ __u16 sctp_ulpevent_get_notification_type(const struct sctp_ulpevent *event) union sctp_notification *notification; struct sk_buff *skb; - skb = sctp_event2skb((struct sctp_ulpevent *)event); + skb = sctp_event2skb(event); notification = (union sctp_notification *) skb->data; return notification->sn_header.sn_type; } -- cgit v1.1 From a40a7d15ba602b547f56b7b19e0282fe4fc3dee3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Emelyanov Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 18:40:38 -0700 Subject: [SCTP]: IPv4 vs IPv6 addresses mess in sctp_inet[6]addr_event. All IP addresses that are present in a system are duplicated on struct sctp_sockaddr_entry. They are linked in the global list called sctp_local_addr_list. And this struct unions IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. So, there can be rare case, when a sockaddr_in.sin_addr coincides with the corresponding part of the sockaddr_in6 and the notifier for IPv4 will carry away an IPv6 entry. The fix is to check the family before comparing the addresses. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/ipv6.c | 5 +++-- net/sctp/protocol.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c index b1e05d7..85f1495 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c @@ -110,8 +110,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long ev, spin_lock_bh(&sctp_local_addr_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(addr, temp, &sctp_local_addr_list, list) { - if (ipv6_addr_equal(&addr->a.v6.sin6_addr, - &ifa->addr)) { + if (addr->a.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 && + ipv6_addr_equal(&addr->a.v6.sin6_addr, + &ifa->addr)) { found = 1; addr->valid = 0; list_del_rcu(&addr->list); diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c index f90091a..c2dd65d 100644 --- a/net/sctp/protocol.c +++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c @@ -647,7 +647,9 @@ static int sctp_inetaddr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long ev, spin_lock_bh(&sctp_local_addr_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(addr, temp, &sctp_local_addr_list, list) { - if (addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr == ifa->ifa_local) { + if (addr->a.sa.sa_family == AF_INET && + addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr == + ifa->ifa_local) { found = 1; addr->valid = 0; list_del_rcu(&addr->list); -- cgit v1.1