From 8f65b5354b1a34a536641bd915958662e8af5320 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2008 01:41:09 -0800
Subject: tcp_htcp: last_cong bug fix

This patch fixes a minor bug in tcp_htcp.c which has been
highlighted by Lachlan Andrew and Lawrence Stewart.  Currently, the
time since the last congestion event, which is stored in variable
last_cong, is reset whenever there is a state change into
TCP_CA_Open.  This includes transitions of the type
TCP_CA_Open->TCP_CA_Disorder->TCP_CA_Open which are not associated
with backoff of cwnd.  The patch changes last_cong to be updated
only on transitions into TCP_CA_Open that occur after experiencing
the congestion-related states TCP_CA_Loss, TCP_CA_Recovery,
TCP_CA_CWR.

Signed-off-by: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_htcp.c | 14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/ipv4')

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_htcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_htcp.c
index af99776..937549b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_htcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_htcp.c
@@ -69,9 +69,12 @@ static u32 htcp_cwnd_undo(struct sock *sk)
 	const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	struct htcp *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
 
-	ca->last_cong = ca->undo_last_cong;
-	ca->maxRTT = ca->undo_maxRTT;
-	ca->old_maxB = ca->undo_old_maxB;
+	if (ca->undo_last_cong) {
+		ca->last_cong = ca->undo_last_cong;
+		ca->maxRTT = ca->undo_maxRTT;
+		ca->old_maxB = ca->undo_old_maxB;
+		ca->undo_last_cong = 0;
+	}
 
 	return max(tp->snd_cwnd, (tp->snd_ssthresh << 7) / ca->beta);
 }
@@ -268,7 +271,10 @@ static void htcp_state(struct sock *sk, u8 new_state)
 	case TCP_CA_Open:
 		{
 			struct htcp *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
-			ca->last_cong = jiffies;
+			if (ca->undo_last_cong) {
+				ca->last_cong = jiffies;
+				ca->undo_last_cong = 0;
+			}
 		}
 		break;
 	case TCP_CA_CWR:
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 9c0188acf6dd6990bac9cd906cd554a1476c6d12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2008 23:23:51 -0800
Subject: net: shy netns_ok check

Failure to pass netns_ok check is SILENT, except some MIB counter is
incremented somewhere.

And adding "netns_ok = 1" (after long head-scratching session) is
usually the last step in making some protocol netns-ready...

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 net/ipv4/ip_input.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net/ipv4')

diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_input.c b/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
index 861978a..cfb38ac 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
@@ -209,9 +209,17 @@ static int ip_local_deliver_finish(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 		hash = protocol & (MAX_INET_PROTOS - 1);
 		ipprot = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[hash]);
-		if (ipprot != NULL && (net == &init_net || ipprot->netns_ok)) {
+		if (ipprot != NULL) {
 			int ret;
 
+			if (!net_eq(net, &init_net) && !ipprot->netns_ok) {
+				if (net_ratelimit())
+					printk("%s: proto %d isn't netns-ready\n",
+						__func__, protocol);
+				kfree_skb(skb);
+				goto out;
+			}
+
 			if (!ipprot->no_policy) {
 				if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
 					kfree_skb(skb);
-- 
cgit v1.1