From cf309e3fb863b7a245b91f816193957f6daf786f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jochen Friedrich Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2005 04:44:55 -0300 Subject: [LLC]: Fix for Bugzilla ticket #5156 Signed-off-by: Jochen Friedrich Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo --- net/core/dev.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index c01511e..37c8810 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -574,6 +574,8 @@ struct net_device *dev_getbyhwaddr(unsigned short type, char *ha) return dev; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dev_getbyhwaddr); + struct net_device *dev_getfirstbyhwtype(unsigned short type) { struct net_device *dev; -- cgit v1.1 From 45fc3b11f1d419ed6c636e5ca84472d9805f520e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amos Waterland Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2005 16:53:16 -0700 Subject: [NET]: Protect neigh_stat_seq_fops by CONFIG_PROC_FS From: Amos Waterland If CONFIG_PROC_FS is not selected, the compiler emits this warning: net/core/neighbour.c:64: warning: `neigh_stat_seq_fops' defined but not used Which is correct, because neigh_stat_seq_fops is in fact only initialized and used by code that is protected by CONFIG_PROC_FS. So this patch fixes that up. Signed-off-by: Amos Waterland Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/neighbour.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index 39fc55e..5f16008 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ static int pneigh_ifdown(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev); void neigh_changeaddr(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev); static struct neigh_table *neigh_tables; +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS static struct file_operations neigh_stat_seq_fops; +#endif /* Neighbour hash table buckets are protected with rwlock tbl->lock. -- cgit v1.1 From 667347f1ca7e099f6833551f194cf2bcc778871b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 12:07:44 -0700 Subject: [NEIGH]: Add debugging check when adding timers. If we double-add a neighbour entry timer, which should be impossible but has been reported, dump the current state of the entry so that we can debug this. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/neighbour.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index 5f16008..4128fc7 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -727,6 +727,13 @@ static __inline__ int neigh_max_probes(struct neighbour *n) p->ucast_probes + p->app_probes + p->mcast_probes); } +static inline void neigh_add_timer(struct neighbour *n, unsigned long when) +{ + if (unlikely(mod_timer(&n->timer, when))) { + printk("NEIGH: BUG, double timer add, state is %x\n", + n->nud_state); + } +} /* Called when a timer expires for a neighbour entry. */ @@ -811,8 +818,7 @@ static void neigh_timer_handler(unsigned long arg) neigh_hold(neigh); if (time_before(next, jiffies + HZ/2)) next = jiffies + HZ/2; - neigh->timer.expires = next; - add_timer(&neigh->timer); + neigh_add_timer(neigh, next); } if (neigh->nud_state & (NUD_INCOMPLETE | NUD_PROBE)) { struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&neigh->arp_queue); @@ -854,8 +860,7 @@ int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb) atomic_set(&neigh->probes, neigh->parms->ucast_probes); neigh->nud_state = NUD_INCOMPLETE; neigh_hold(neigh); - neigh->timer.expires = now + 1; - add_timer(&neigh->timer); + neigh_add_timer(neigh, now + 1); } else { neigh->nud_state = NUD_FAILED; write_unlock_bh(&neigh->lock); @@ -868,8 +873,8 @@ int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb) NEIGH_PRINTK2("neigh %p is delayed.\n", neigh); neigh_hold(neigh); neigh->nud_state = NUD_DELAY; - neigh->timer.expires = jiffies + neigh->parms->delay_probe_time; - add_timer(&neigh->timer); + neigh_add_timer(neigh, + jiffies + neigh->parms->delay_probe_time); } if (neigh->nud_state == NUD_INCOMPLETE) { @@ -1015,10 +1020,10 @@ int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh, const u8 *lladdr, u8 new, neigh_del_timer(neigh); if (new & NUD_IN_TIMER) { neigh_hold(neigh); - neigh->timer.expires = jiffies + + neigh_add_timer(neigh, (jiffies + ((new & NUD_REACHABLE) ? - neigh->parms->reachable_time : 0); - add_timer(&neigh->timer); + neigh->parms->reachable_time : + 0))); } neigh->nud_state = new; } -- cgit v1.1 From bc8dfcb93970ad7139c976356bfc99d7e251deaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Phillips Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 15:22:35 -0700 Subject: [NET]: Use non-recursive algorithm in skb_copy_datagram_iovec() Use iteration instead of recursion. Fraglists within fraglists should never occur, so we BUG check this. Signed-off-by: Daniel Phillips Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/datagram.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/datagram.c b/net/core/datagram.c index da9bf71..81987df 100644 --- a/net/core/datagram.c +++ b/net/core/datagram.c @@ -211,74 +211,45 @@ void skb_free_datagram(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) int skb_copy_datagram_iovec(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, struct iovec *to, int len) { - int start = skb_headlen(skb); - int i, copy = start - offset; - - /* Copy header. */ - if (copy > 0) { - if (copy > len) - copy = len; - if (memcpy_toiovec(to, skb->data + offset, copy)) - goto fault; - if ((len -= copy) == 0) - return 0; - offset += copy; - } + int i, err, fraglen, end = 0; + struct sk_buff *next = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list; +next_skb: + fraglen = skb_headlen(skb); + i = -1; - /* Copy paged appendix. Hmm... why does this look so complicated? */ - for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) { - int end; - - BUG_TRAP(start <= offset + len); + while (1) { + int start = end; - end = start + skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i].size; - if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) { - int err; - u8 *vaddr; - skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]; - struct page *page = frag->page; + if ((end += fraglen) > offset) { + int copy = end - offset, o = offset - start; if (copy > len) copy = len; - vaddr = kmap(page); - err = memcpy_toiovec(to, vaddr + frag->page_offset + - offset - start, copy); - kunmap(page); + if (i == -1) + err = memcpy_toiovec(to, skb->data + o, copy); + else { + skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]; + struct page *page = frag->page; + void *p = kmap(page) + frag->page_offset + o; + err = memcpy_toiovec(to, p, copy); + kunmap(page); + } if (err) goto fault; if (!(len -= copy)) return 0; offset += copy; } - start = end; + if (++i >= skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags) + break; + fraglen = skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i].size; } - - if (skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list) { - struct sk_buff *list = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list; - - for (; list; list = list->next) { - int end; - - BUG_TRAP(start <= offset + len); - - end = start + list->len; - if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) { - if (copy > len) - copy = len; - if (skb_copy_datagram_iovec(list, - offset - start, - to, copy)) - goto fault; - if ((len -= copy) == 0) - return 0; - offset += copy; - } - start = end; - } + if (next) { + skb = next; + BUG_ON(skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list); + next = skb->next; + goto next_skb; } - if (!len) - return 0; - fault: return -EFAULT; } -- cgit v1.1 From 2d7ceece08ad940d0ceac98ab1b5a3b82dfc2a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 15:22:58 -0700 Subject: [NET]: Prefetch dev->qdisc_lock in dev_queue_xmit() We know the lock is going to be taken. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 37c8810..9066c87 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -1259,6 +1259,8 @@ int dev_queue_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb) if (skb_checksum_help(skb, 0)) goto out_kfree_skb; + spin_lock_prefetch(&dev->queue_lock); + /* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also * stops preemption for RCU. */ -- cgit v1.1 From a79af59efd20990473d579b1d8d70bb120f0920c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frank Filz Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 15:23:38 -0700 Subject: [NET]: Fix module reference counts for loadable protocol modules I have been experimenting with loadable protocol modules, and ran into several issues with module reference counting. The first issue was that __module_get failed at the BUG_ON check at the top of the routine (checking that my module reference count was not zero) when I created the first socket. When sk_alloc() is called, my module reference count was still 0. When I looked at why sctp didn't have this problem, I discovered that sctp creates a control socket during module init (when the module ref count is not 0), which keeps the reference count non-zero. This section has been updated to address the point Stephen raised about checking the return value of try_module_get(). The next problem arose when my socket init routine returned an error. This resulted in my module reference count being decremented below 0. My socket ops->release routine was also being called. The issue here is that sock_release() calls the ops->release routine and decrements the ref count if sock->ops is not NULL. Since the socket probably didn't get correctly initialized, this should not be done, so we will set sock->ops to NULL because we will not call try_module_get(). While searching for another bug, I also noticed that sys_accept() has a possibility of doing a module_put() when it did not do an __module_get so I re-ordered the call to security_socket_accept(). Signed-off-by: Frank Filz Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index ac63b56..928d2a1 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -660,16 +660,20 @@ struct sock *sk_alloc(int family, unsigned int __nocast priority, sock_lock_init(sk); } - if (security_sk_alloc(sk, family, priority)) { - if (slab != NULL) - kmem_cache_free(slab, sk); - else - kfree(sk); - sk = NULL; - } else - __module_get(prot->owner); + if (security_sk_alloc(sk, family, priority)) + goto out_free; + + if (!try_module_get(prot->owner)) + goto out_free; } return sk; + +out_free: + if (slab != NULL) + kmem_cache_free(slab, sk); + else + kfree(sk); + return NULL; } void sk_free(struct sock *sk) -- cgit v1.1 From 666002218d59db271e5c1ede1d80227170c51987 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2005 22:32:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] proc_mkdir() should be used to create procfs directories A bunch of create_proc_dir_entry() calls creating directories had crept in since the last sweep; converted to proc_mkdir(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- net/core/pktgen.c | 23 ++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index ef430b1e..b7f2d65 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ /* Used to help with determining the pkts on receive */ #define PKTGEN_MAGIC 0xbe9be955 -#define PG_PROC_DIR "pktgen" +#define PG_PROC_DIR "net/pktgen" #define MAX_CFLOWS 65536 @@ -1476,18 +1476,7 @@ static int proc_thread_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buffer, static int create_proc_dir(void) { - int len; - /* does proc_dir already exists */ - len = strlen(PG_PROC_DIR); - - for (pg_proc_dir = proc_net->subdir; pg_proc_dir; pg_proc_dir=pg_proc_dir->next) { - if ((pg_proc_dir->namelen == len) && - (! memcmp(pg_proc_dir->name, PG_PROC_DIR, len))) - break; - } - - if (!pg_proc_dir) - pg_proc_dir = create_proc_entry(PG_PROC_DIR, S_IFDIR, proc_net); + pg_proc_dir = proc_mkdir(PG_PROC_DIR, NULL); if (!pg_proc_dir) return -ENODEV; @@ -1497,7 +1486,7 @@ static int create_proc_dir(void) static int remove_proc_dir(void) { - remove_proc_entry(PG_PROC_DIR, proc_net); + remove_proc_entry(PG_PROC_DIR, NULL); return 0; } @@ -2908,7 +2897,7 @@ static int pktgen_add_device(struct pktgen_thread *t, const char* ifname) pkt_dev->udp_dst_max = 9; strncpy(pkt_dev->ifname, ifname, 31); - sprintf(pkt_dev->fname, "net/%s/%s", PG_PROC_DIR, ifname); + sprintf(pkt_dev->fname, "%s/%s", PG_PROC_DIR, ifname); if (! pktgen_setup_dev(pkt_dev)) { printk("pktgen: ERROR: pktgen_setup_dev failed.\n"); @@ -2981,7 +2970,7 @@ static int pktgen_create_thread(const char* name, int cpu) spin_lock_init(&t->if_lock); t->cpu = cpu; - sprintf(t->fname, "net/%s/%s", PG_PROC_DIR, t->name); + sprintf(t->fname, "%s/%s", PG_PROC_DIR, t->name); t->proc_ent = create_proc_entry(t->fname, 0600, NULL); if (!t->proc_ent) { printk("pktgen: cannot create %s procfs entry.\n", t->fname); @@ -3064,7 +3053,7 @@ static int __init pg_init(void) create_proc_dir(); - sprintf(module_fname, "net/%s/pgctrl", PG_PROC_DIR); + sprintf(module_fname, "%s/pgctrl", PG_PROC_DIR); module_proc_ent = create_proc_entry(module_fname, 0600, NULL); if (!module_proc_ent) { printk("pktgen: ERROR: cannot create %s procfs entry.\n", module_fname); -- cgit v1.1 From 325ed8239309cb29f10ea58c5a668058ead11479 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2005 13:57:23 -0700 Subject: [NET]: Fix packet timestamping. I've found the problem in general. It affects any 64-bit architecture. The problem occurs when you change the system time. Suppose that when you boot your system clock is forward by a day. This gets recorded down in skb_tv_base. You then wind the clock back by a day. From that point onwards the offset will be negative which essentially overflows the 32-bit variables they're stored in. In fact, why don't we just store the real time stamp in those 32-bit variables? After all, we're not going to overflow for quite a while yet. When we do overflow, we'll need a better solution of course. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/skbuff.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index f80a287..0e9431b 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -71,8 +71,6 @@ static kmem_cache_t *skbuff_head_cache __read_mostly; static kmem_cache_t *skbuff_fclone_cache __read_mostly; -struct timeval __read_mostly skb_tv_base; - /* * Keep out-of-line to prevent kernel bloat. * __builtin_return_address is not used because it is not always @@ -1708,8 +1706,6 @@ void __init skb_init(void) NULL, NULL); if (!skbuff_fclone_cache) panic("cannot create skbuff cache"); - - do_gettimeofday(&skb_tv_base); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(___pskb_trim); @@ -1743,4 +1739,3 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_prepare_seq_read); EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_seq_read); EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_abort_seq_read); EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_find_text); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_tv_base); -- cgit v1.1 From e5ed639913eea3e4783a550291775ab78dd84966 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2005 14:35:55 -0700 Subject: [IPV4]: Replace __in_dev_get with __in_dev_get_rcu/rtnl The following patch renames __in_dev_get() to __in_dev_get_rtnl() and introduces __in_dev_get_rcu() to cover the second case. 1) RCU with refcnt should use in_dev_get(). 2) RCU without refcnt should use __in_dev_get_rcu(). 3) All others must hold RTNL and use __in_dev_get_rtnl(). There is one exception in net/ipv4/route.c which is in fact a pre-existing race condition. I've marked it as such so that we remember to fix it. This patch is based on suggestions and prior work by Suzanne Wood and Paul McKenney. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/netpoll.c | 2 +- net/core/pktgen.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/netpoll.c b/net/core/netpoll.c index 5265dfd..802fe11 100644 --- a/net/core/netpoll.c +++ b/net/core/netpoll.c @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np) if (!np->local_ip) { rcu_read_lock(); - in_dev = __in_dev_get(ndev); + in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(ndev); if (!in_dev || !in_dev->ifa_list) { rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index b7f2d65..44de070 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -1667,7 +1667,7 @@ static void pktgen_setup_inject(struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev) struct in_device *in_dev; rcu_read_lock(); - in_dev = __in_dev_get(pkt_dev->odev); + in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(pkt_dev->odev); if (in_dev) { if (in_dev->ifa_list) { pkt_dev->saddr_min = in_dev->ifa_list->ifa_address; -- cgit v1.1 From 3e56a40bb36f1f73b4eac2ffe267c5357811e321 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2005 14:36:32 -0700 Subject: [IPV4]: Get rid of bogus __in_put_dev in pktgen This patch gets rid of a bogus __in_dev_put() in pktgen.c. This was spotted by Suzanne Wood. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/pktgen.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index 44de070..5f043d3 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -1673,7 +1673,6 @@ static void pktgen_setup_inject(struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev) pkt_dev->saddr_min = in_dev->ifa_list->ifa_address; pkt_dev->saddr_max = pkt_dev->saddr_min; } - __in_dev_put(in_dev); } rcu_read_unlock(); } -- cgit v1.1 From dd0fc66fb33cd610bc1a5db8a5e232d34879b4d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2005 07:46:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1 - added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t; - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with typedef) and documents what's going on far better. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- net/core/dev.c | 2 +- net/core/skbuff.c | 14 +++++++------- net/core/sock.c | 10 +++++----- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 9066c87..a44eeef 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static inline int illegal_highdma(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) #endif /* Keep head the same: replace data */ -int __skb_linearize(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask) +int __skb_linearize(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask) { unsigned int size; u8 *data; diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 0e9431b..af9b151 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ void skb_under_panic(struct sk_buff *skb, int sz, void *here) * Buffers may only be allocated from interrupts using a @gfp_mask of * %GFP_ATOMIC. */ -struct sk_buff *__alloc_skb(unsigned int size, unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask, +struct sk_buff *__alloc_skb(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp_mask, int fclone) { struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ nodata: */ struct sk_buff *alloc_skb_from_cache(kmem_cache_t *cp, unsigned int size, - unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask) + gfp_t gfp_mask) { struct sk_buff *skb; u8 *data; @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ void __kfree_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) * %GFP_ATOMIC. */ -struct sk_buff *skb_clone(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask) +struct sk_buff *skb_clone(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask) { struct sk_buff *n; @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static void copy_skb_header(struct sk_buff *new, const struct sk_buff *old) * header is going to be modified. Use pskb_copy() instead. */ -struct sk_buff *skb_copy(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask) +struct sk_buff *skb_copy(const struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask) { int headerlen = skb->data - skb->head; /* @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_copy(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int __nocast gfp_ma * The returned buffer has a reference count of 1. */ -struct sk_buff *pskb_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask) +struct sk_buff *pskb_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask) { /* * Allocate the copy buffer @@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ out: */ int pskb_expand_head(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhead, int ntail, - unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask) + gfp_t gfp_mask) { int i; u8 *data; @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_realloc_headroom(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int headroom) */ struct sk_buff *skb_copy_expand(const struct sk_buff *skb, int newheadroom, int newtailroom, - unsigned int __nocast gfp_mask) + gfp_t gfp_mask) { /* * Allocate the copy buffer diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 928d2a1..1c52fe8 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ lenout: * @prot: struct proto associated with this new sock instance * @zero_it: if we should zero the newly allocated sock */ -struct sock *sk_alloc(int family, unsigned int __nocast priority, +struct sock *sk_alloc(int family, gfp_t priority, struct proto *prot, int zero_it) { struct sock *sk = NULL; @@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ void sk_free(struct sock *sk) module_put(owner); } -struct sock *sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, const unsigned int __nocast priority) +struct sock *sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, const gfp_t priority) { struct sock *newsk = sk_alloc(sk->sk_family, priority, sk->sk_prot, 0); @@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ unsigned long sock_i_ino(struct sock *sk) * Allocate a skb from the socket's send buffer. */ struct sk_buff *sock_wmalloc(struct sock *sk, unsigned long size, int force, - unsigned int __nocast priority) + gfp_t priority) { if (force || atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) < sk->sk_sndbuf) { struct sk_buff * skb = alloc_skb(size, priority); @@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_wmalloc(struct sock *sk, unsigned long size, int force, * Allocate a skb from the socket's receive buffer. */ struct sk_buff *sock_rmalloc(struct sock *sk, unsigned long size, int force, - unsigned int __nocast priority) + gfp_t priority) { if (force || atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) < sk->sk_rcvbuf) { struct sk_buff *skb = alloc_skb(size, priority); @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_rmalloc(struct sock *sk, unsigned long size, int force, /* * Allocate a memory block from the socket's option memory buffer. */ -void *sock_kmalloc(struct sock *sk, int size, unsigned int __nocast priority) +void *sock_kmalloc(struct sock *sk, int size, gfp_t priority) { if ((unsigned)size <= sysctl_optmem_max && atomic_read(&sk->sk_omem_alloc) + size < sysctl_optmem_max) { -- cgit v1.1