From 086ba77a6db00ed858ff07451bedee197df868c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rabin Vincent Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 23:06:58 +0100 Subject: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers. # trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report ... true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0) true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264 true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1) true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0 ... # trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true [ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace [ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000 [ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000 [ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [ 17.290169] Modules linked in: [ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21 [ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000 [ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8 [ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184 Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers. Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls" added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked for greater than NR_syscalls. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+ Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt --- kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c index 4dc8b79..29228c4 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void ftrace_syscall_enter(void *data, struct pt_regs *regs, long id) int size; syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs); - if (syscall_nr < 0) + if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls) return; /* Here we're inside tp handler's rcu_read_lock_sched (__DO_TRACE) */ @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static void ftrace_syscall_exit(void *data, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret) int syscall_nr; syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs); - if (syscall_nr < 0) + if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls) return; /* Here we're inside tp handler's rcu_read_lock_sched (__DO_TRACE()) */ @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static void perf_syscall_enter(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long id) int size; syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs); - if (syscall_nr < 0) + if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls) return; if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_enter_syscalls)) return; @@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static void perf_syscall_exit(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret) int size; syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs); - if (syscall_nr < 0) + if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls) return; if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_exit_syscalls)) return; -- cgit v1.1