From 9cfe015aa424b3c003baba3841a60dd9b5ad319b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2008 01:37:16 -0800 Subject: get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open NR_OPEN (historically set to 1024*1024) actually forbids processes to open more than 1024*1024 handles. Unfortunatly some production servers hit the not so 'ridiculously high value' of 1024*1024 file descriptors per process. Changing NR_OPEN is not considered safe because of vmalloc space potential exhaust. This patch introduces a new sysctl (/proc/sys/fs/nr_open) wich defaults to 1024*1024, so that admins can decide to change this limit if their workload needs it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export it for sparc64] Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Alan Cox Cc: Richard Henderson Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Ralf Baechle Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/sys.c | 2 +- kernel/sysctl.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 53de35f..2b8e2da 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim) if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) return -EPERM; - if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > NR_OPEN) + if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) return -EPERM; retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim); diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 5e2ad5b..86daaa2 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1203,6 +1203,14 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = { .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, }, { + .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED, + .procname = "nr_open", + .data = &sysctl_nr_open, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, + { .ctl_name = FS_DENTRY, .procname = "dentry-state", .data = &dentry_stat, -- cgit v1.1