From ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 23:11:12 +0200 Subject: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Mark Seaborn Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index 956b75d..6dee68d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -1325,6 +1325,9 @@ out: static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { + /* do not disclose physical addresses: attack vector */ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about " "to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the " "linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n"); -- cgit v1.1