From f285aa8db7cc4432c1a03f8b55ff34fe96317c11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 15:30:18 +0100
Subject: xen/scsiback: correct frontend counting

When adding a new frontend to xen-scsiback don't decrement the number
of active frontends in case of no error. Doing so results in a failure
when trying to remove the xen-pvscsi nexus even if no domain is using
it.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
---
 drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'drivers/xen')

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
index ad4eb10..51387d7 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
@@ -939,12 +939,12 @@ out:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
 
 out_free:
-	mutex_lock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
-	tpg->tv_tpg_fe_count--;
-	mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
-
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		mutex_lock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
+		tpg->tv_tpg_fe_count--;
+		mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
 		kfree(new);
+	}
 
 	return err;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.1


From c9e2f531be000af652927ee0af3a0f24f8e9e046 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 15:30:19 +0100
Subject: xen/scsiback: avoid warnings when adding multiple LUNs to a domain

When adding more than one LUN to a frontend a warning for a failed
assignment is issued in dom0 for each already existing LUN. Avoid this
warning by checking for a LUN already existing when existence is
allowed (scsiback_do_add_lun() called with try == 1).

As the LUN existence check is needed now for a third time, factor it
out into a function. This in turn leads to a more or less complete
rewrite of scsiback_del_translation_entry() which will now return a
proper error code in case of failure.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
---
 drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

(limited to 'drivers/xen')

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
index 51387d7..c46ee18 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
@@ -849,15 +849,31 @@ static int scsiback_map(struct vscsibk_info *info)
 }
 
 /*
+  Check for a translation entry being present
+*/
+static struct v2p_entry *scsiback_chk_translation_entry(
+	struct vscsibk_info *info, struct ids_tuple *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *head = &(info->v2p_entry_lists);
+	struct v2p_entry *entry;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(entry, head, l)
+		if ((entry->v.chn == v->chn) &&
+		    (entry->v.tgt == v->tgt) &&
+		    (entry->v.lun == v->lun))
+			return entry;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
   Add a new translation entry
 */
 static int scsiback_add_translation_entry(struct vscsibk_info *info,
 					  char *phy, struct ids_tuple *v)
 {
 	int err = 0;
-	struct v2p_entry *entry;
 	struct v2p_entry *new;
-	struct list_head *head = &(info->v2p_entry_lists);
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char *lunp;
 	unsigned long long unpacked_lun;
@@ -917,15 +933,10 @@ static int scsiback_add_translation_entry(struct vscsibk_info *info,
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
 
 	/* Check double assignment to identical virtual ID */
-	list_for_each_entry(entry, head, l) {
-		if ((entry->v.chn == v->chn) &&
-		    (entry->v.tgt == v->tgt) &&
-		    (entry->v.lun == v->lun)) {
-			pr_warn("Virtual ID is already used. Assignment was not performed.\n");
-			err = -EEXIST;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
+	if (scsiback_chk_translation_entry(info, v)) {
+		pr_warn("Virtual ID is already used. Assignment was not performed.\n");
+		err = -EEXIST;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* Create a new translation entry and add to the list */
@@ -933,7 +944,7 @@ static int scsiback_add_translation_entry(struct vscsibk_info *info,
 	new->v = *v;
 	new->tpg = tpg;
 	new->lun = unpacked_lun;
-	list_add_tail(&new->l, head);
+	list_add_tail(&new->l, &info->v2p_entry_lists);
 
 out:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
@@ -956,39 +967,40 @@ static void __scsiback_del_translation_entry(struct v2p_entry *entry)
 }
 
 /*
-  Delete the translation entry specfied
+  Delete the translation entry specified
 */
 static int scsiback_del_translation_entry(struct vscsibk_info *info,
 					  struct ids_tuple *v)
 {
 	struct v2p_entry *entry;
-	struct list_head *head = &(info->v2p_entry_lists);
 	unsigned long flags;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
 	/* Find out the translation entry specified */
-	list_for_each_entry(entry, head, l) {
-		if ((entry->v.chn == v->chn) &&
-		    (entry->v.tgt == v->tgt) &&
-		    (entry->v.lun == v->lun)) {
-			goto found;
-		}
-	}
-
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
-	return 1;
-
-found:
-	/* Delete the translation entry specfied */
-	__scsiback_del_translation_entry(entry);
+	entry = scsiback_chk_translation_entry(info, v);
+	if (entry)
+		__scsiback_del_translation_entry(entry);
+	else
+		ret = -ENOENT;
 
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void scsiback_do_add_lun(struct vscsibk_info *info, const char *state,
 				char *phy, struct ids_tuple *vir, int try)
 {
+	struct v2p_entry *entry;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (try) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
+		entry = scsiback_chk_translation_entry(info, vir);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->v2p_lock, flags);
+		if (entry)
+			return;
+	}
 	if (!scsiback_add_translation_entry(info, phy, vir)) {
 		if (xenbus_printf(XBT_NIL, info->dev->nodename, state,
 				  "%d", XenbusStateInitialised)) {
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 85c0a87cd117e83361932b2b160c9af178fdb21a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 11:54:43 -0500
Subject: xen: fix potential integer overflow in queue_reply

When len is greater than UINT_MAX - sizeof(*rb), in next allocation,
it can overflow integer range and allocates small size of heap.
After that, memcpy will overflow the allocated heap.
Therefore, it needs to check the size of given length.

Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
---
 drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'drivers/xen')

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c
index 9433e46..912b64e 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_dev_frontend.c
@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ static int queue_reply(struct list_head *queue, const void *data, size_t len)
 
 	if (len == 0)
 		return 0;
+	if (len > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	rb = kmalloc(sizeof(*rb) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rb == NULL)
-- 
cgit v1.1


From 8d47065f7d1980dde52abb874b301054f3013602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 16:10:23 -0500
Subject: xen/pciback: Check PF instead of VF for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY

Commit 408fb0e5aa7fda0059db282ff58c3b2a4278baa0 (xen/pciback: Don't
allow MSI-X ops if PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY is not set) prevented enabling
MSI-X on passed-through virtual functions, because it checked the VF
for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY but this is not a valid bit for VFs.

Instead, check the physical function for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
---
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'drivers/xen')

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
index 73dafdc..1078e8d 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
@@ -227,8 +227,9 @@ int xen_pcibk_enable_msix(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev,
 	/*
 	 * PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY must be enabled, otherwise we may not be able
 	 * to access the BARs where the MSI-X entries reside.
+	 * But VF devices are unique in which the PF needs to be checked.
 	 */
-	pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
+	pci_read_config_word(pci_physfn(dev), PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
 	if (dev->msi_enabled || !(cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY))
 		return -ENXIO;
 
-- 
cgit v1.1


From d159457b84395927b5a52adb72f748dd089ad5e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 16:10:24 -0500
Subject: xen/pciback: Save the number of MSI-X entries to be copied later.

Commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 (xen/pciback: Save
xen_pci_op commands before processing it) broke enabling MSI-X because
it would never copy the resulting vectors into the response.  The
number of vectors requested was being overwritten by the return value
(typically zero for success).

Save the number of vectors before processing the op, so the correct
number of vectors are copied afterwards.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
---
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'drivers/xen')

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
index 1078e8d..fb02214 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
@@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
 	struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data = NULL;
 	struct xen_pci_op *op = &pdev->op;
 	int test_intx = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_MSI
+	unsigned int nr = 0;
+#endif
 
 	*op = pdev->sh_info->op;
 	barrier();
@@ -361,6 +364,7 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
 			op->err = xen_pcibk_disable_msi(pdev, dev, op);
 			break;
 		case XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix:
+			nr = op->value;
 			op->err = xen_pcibk_enable_msix(pdev, dev, op);
 			break;
 		case XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msix:
@@ -383,7 +387,7 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
 	if (op->cmd == XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix && op->err == 0) {
 		unsigned int i;
 
-		for (i = 0; i < op->value; i++)
+		for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
 			pdev->sh_info->op.msix_entries[i].vector =
 				op->msix_entries[i].vector;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.1