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* encrypted-keys: add ecryptfs format supportRoberto Sassu2011-06-274-8/+180
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token structure. This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'. More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* encrypted-keys: add key format supportRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-40/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces a new parameter, called 'format', that defines the format of data stored by encrypted keys. The 'default' format identifies encrypted keys containing only the symmetric key, while other formats can be defined to support additional information. The 'format' parameter is written in the datablob produced by commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' and is integrity protected by the HMAC. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* encrypted-keys: added additional debug messagesRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-11/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Some debug messages have been added in the function datablob_parse() in order to better identify errors returned when dealing with 'encrypted' keys. Changelog from version v4: - made the debug messages more understandable Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* encrypted-keys: fixed valid_master_desc() function descriptionRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Valid key type prefixes for the parameter 'key-type' are: 'trusted' and 'user'. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* encrypted_keys: avoid dumping the master key if the request failsRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-3/+5
| | | | | | | | Do not dump the master key if an error is encountered during the request. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* KEYS: Don't return EAGAIN to keyctl_assume_authority()David Howells2011-06-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | Don't return EAGAIN to keyctl_assume_authority() to indicate that a key could not be found (ENOKEY is only returned if a negative key is found). Instead return ENOKEY in both cases. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: simplify and clean up inode_has_perm()Linus Torvalds2011-06-081-10/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL "struct common_audit_data" pointer argument. And in that case it has to provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure. However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case! So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few) functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has no adp argument). This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead, and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need the dummy structure. And a denser stack not only means less stack space usage, it means better cache behavior. So we have a win-win-win from this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and better cache behavior. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattrKees Cook2011-06-011-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit now requires that the profile passed is not NULL. Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to setprocattr. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'docs-move' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-05-276-7/+7
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs * 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs: Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
| * Create Documentation/security/,Randy Dunlap2011-05-196-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
* | selinux: don't pass in NULL avd to avc_has_perm_noauditLinus Torvalds2011-05-262-11/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now security_get_user_sids() will pass in a NULL avd pointer to avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which then forces that function to have a dummy entry for that case and just generally test it. Don't do it. The normal callers all pass a real avd pointer, and this helper function is incredibly hot. So don't make avc_has_perm_noaudit() do conditional stuff that isn't needed for the common case. This also avoids some duplicated stack space. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | cgroups: add per-thread subsystem callbacksBen Blum2011-05-261-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add cgroup subsystem callbacks for per-thread attachment in atomic contexts Add can_attach_task(), pre_attach(), and attach_task() as new callbacks for cgroups's subsystem interface. Unlike can_attach and attach, these are for per-thread operations, to be called potentially many times when attaching an entire threadgroup. Also, the old "bool threadgroup" interface is removed, as replaced by this. All subsystems are modified for the new interface - of note is cpuset, which requires from/to nodemasks for attach to be globally scoped (though per-cpuset would work too) to persist from its pre_attach to attach_task and attach. This is a pre-patch for cgroup-procs-writable.patch. Signed-off-by: Ben Blum <bblum@andrew.cmu.edu> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Set cred->user_ns in key_replace_session_keyringSerge E. Hallyn2011-05-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since this cred was not created with copy_creds(), it needs to get initialized. Otherwise use of syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); can lead to a NULL deref. Thanks to Robert for finding this. But introduced by commit 47a150edc2a ("Cache user_ns in struct cred"). Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.39) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into ↵James Morris2011-05-2411-208/+370
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | for-linus Conflicts: lib/flex_array.c security/selinux/avc.c security/selinux/hooks.c security/selinux/ss/policydb.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c Manually resolve conflicts. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELINUX: add /sys/fs/selinux mount point to put selinuxfsGreg Kroah-Hartman2011-05-111-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the interest of keeping userspace from having to create new root filesystems all the time, let's follow the lead of the other in-kernel filesystems and provide a proper mount point for it in sysfs. For selinuxfs, this mount point should be in /sys/fs/selinux/ Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzerqung@0pointer.de> Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> [include kobject.h - Eric Paris] [use selinuxfs_obj throughout - Eric Paris] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: introduce path_has_permEric Paris2011-04-281-14/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm. dentry_has_perm just calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data. But dentry_has_perm can take either a dentry or a path. Split those to make the code obvious and to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a valid dentry and mnt. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | flex_array: flex_array_prealloc takes a number of elements, not an endEric Paris2011-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change flex_array_prealloc to take the number of elements for which space should be allocated instead of the last (inclusive) element. Users and documentation are updated accordingly. flex_arrays got introduced before they had users. When folks started using it, they ended up needing a different API than was coded up originally. This swaps over to the API that folks apparently need. Based-on-patch-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Tested-by: Chris Richards <gizmo@giz-works.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.38+]
| * | SELinux: pass last path component in may_createEric Paris2011-04-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only passed the path component information all the way down the security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places to harmonize the calculations and checks. Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtableEric Paris2011-04-283-61/+135
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To shorten the list we need to run if filename trans rules exist for the type of the given parent directory I put them in a hashtable. Given the policy we are expecting to use in Fedora this takes the worst case list run from about 5,000 entries to 17. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: generic hashtab entry counterEric Paris2011-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of a hashtab entry counter function only useful for range transition rules make a function generic for any hashtable to use. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: calculate and print hashtab stats with a generic functionEric Paris2011-04-281-19/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We have custom debug functions like rangetr_hash_eval and symtab_hash_eval which do the same thing. Just create a generic function that takes the name of the hash table as an argument instead of having custom functions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: skip filename trans rules if ttype does not match parent dirEric Paris2011-04-283-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now we walk to filename trans rule list for every inode that is created. First passes at policy using this facility creates around 5000 filename trans rules. Running a list of 5000 entries every time is a bad idea. This patch adds a new ebitmap to policy which has a bit set for each ttype that has at least 1 filename trans rule. Thus when an inode is created we can quickly determine if any rules exist for this parent directory type and can skip the list if we know there is definitely no relevant entry. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: rename filename_compute_type argument to *type instead of *conEric Paris2011-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | filename_compute_type() takes as arguments the numeric value of the type of the subject and target. It does not take a context. Thus the names are misleading. Fix the argument names. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: fix comment to state filename_compute_type takes an objname not a qstrEric Paris2011-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | filename_compute_type used to take a qstr, but it now takes just a name. Fix the comments to indicate it is an objname, not a qstr. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SMACK: smack_file_lock can use the struct pathEric Paris2011-04-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_file_lock has a struct path, so use that instead of only the dentry. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATHEric Paris2011-04-254-42/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODEEric Paris2011-04-255-68/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code complexity. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safeEric Paris2011-04-253-25/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not be RCU safe. This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue. Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-254-7/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: security_read_policy should take a size_t not ssize_tEric Paris2011-04-252-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t. Easy enough fix to silence build warnings. We have no need for signed-ness. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: silence build warning when !CONFIG_BUGEric Paris2011-04-252-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If one builds a kernel without CONFIG_BUG there are a number of 'may be used uninitialized' warnings. Silence these by returning after the BUG(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: delete debugging printks from filename_trans rule processingEric Paris2011-04-201-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The filename_trans rule processing has some printk(KERN_ERR ) messages which were intended as debug aids in creating the code but weren't removed before it was submitted. Remove them. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | Initialize policydb.process_class eariler.Harry Ciao2011-04-071-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Initialize policydb.process_class once all symtabs read from policy image, so that it could be used to setup the role_trans.tclass field when a lower version policy.X is loaded. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | selinux: Fix regression for XorgStephen Smalley2011-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 introduced a bug in the handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class. Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | selinux: add type_transition with name extension support for selinuxfsKohei Kaigai2011-04-013-12/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object managers. If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel. In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched kernel. Thanks, Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@eu.nec.com> [manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: Write class field in role_trans_write.Harry Ciao2011-03-281-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If kernel policy version is >= 26, then write the class field of the role_trans structure into the binary reprensentation. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: Compute role in newcontext for all classesHarry Ciao2011-03-281-11/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Apply role_transition rules for all kinds of classes. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: Add class support to the role_trans structureHarry Ciao2011-03-283-2/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If kernel policy version is >= 26, then the binary representation of the role_trans structure supports specifying the class for the current subject or the newly created object. If kernel policy version is < 26, then the class field would be default to the process class. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | | Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2011-05-2415-41/+66
|\ \ \
| * \ \ Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2011-05-197-36/+69
| |\ \ \ | | | |/ | | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: include/linux/capability.h Manually resolve merge conflict w/ thanks to Stephen Rothwell. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | TOMOYO: Fix wrong domainname validation.Tetsuo Handa2011-05-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In tomoyo_correct_domain() since 2.6.36, TOMOYO was by error validating "<kernel>" + "/foo/\" + "/bar" when "<kernel> /foo/\* /bar" was given. As a result, legal domainnames like "<kernel> /foo/\* /bar" are rejected. Reported-by: Hayama Yossihiro <yossi@yedo.src.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | TOMOYO: Fix refcount leak in tomoyo_mount_acl().Tetsuo Handa2011-04-201-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, reference to device file (e.g. /dev/sda1) was leaking. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | Merge branch 'master'; commit 'v2.6.39-rc3' into nextJames Morris2011-04-198-13/+13
| |\ \ \
| * | | | TOMOYO: Fix infinite loop bug when reading /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/auditTetsuo Handa2011-04-191-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In tomoyo_flush(), head->r.w[0] holds pointer to string data to be printed. But head->r.w[0] was updated only when the string data was partially printed (because head->r.w[0] will be updated by head->r.w[1] later if completely printed). However, regarding /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query , an additional '\0' is printed after the string data was completely printed. But if free space for read buffer became 0 before printing the additional '\0', tomoyo_flush() was returning without updating head->r.w[0]. As a result, tomoyo_flush() forever reprints already printed string data. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | TOMOYO: Don't add / for allow_unmount permission check.Tetsuo Handa2011-04-191-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "mount --bind /path/to/file1 /path/to/file2" is legal. Therefore, "umount /path/to/file2" is also legal. Do not automatically append trailing '/' if pathname to be unmounted does not end with '/'. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | TOMOYO: Fix race on updating profile's comment line.Tetsuo Handa2011-04-191-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In tomoyo_write_profile() since 2.6.34, a lock was by error missing when replacing profile's comment line. If multiple threads attempted echo '0-COMMENT=comment' > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile in parallel, garbage collector will fail to kfree() the old value. Protect the replacement using a lock. Also, keep the old value rather than replace with empty string when out of memory error has occurred. Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Wang <wangxiaochen0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | capabilities: do not special case exec of initEric Paris2011-04-041-9/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the global init task is exec'd we have special case logic to make sure the pE is not reduced. There is no reason for this. If init wants to drop it's pE is should be allowed to do so. Remove this special logic. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | tomoyo: fix memory leak in tomoyo_commit_ok()Xiaochen Wang2011-03-311-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When memory used for policy exceeds the quota, tomoyo_memory_ok() return false. In this case, tomoyo_commit_ok() must call kfree() before returning NULL. This bug exists since 2.6.35. Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Wang <wangxiaochen0@gmail.com> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | | | Merge branch 'next-queue' into nextJames Morris2011-03-309-25/+47
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| | * | | | security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on ARM.Paul Gortmaker2011-03-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says: For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map. So select the right value if we know we are building ARM. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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