summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* wrappers for ->i_mutex accessAl Viro2016-01-223-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested}, inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex). Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle ->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held only shared. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checksJann Horn2016-01-201-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasksJann Horn2016-01-202-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch, all modes have flags ORed into them. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()Yevgeny Pats2016-01-201-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2016-0728. If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already set as its session, we leak a keyring reference. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stddef.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) { int i = 0; key_serial_t serial; serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } } return 0; } If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in /proc/keys: 3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run, then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed. Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-1729-160/+967
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring. - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks. - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2. - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits) selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix KEYS: refcount bug fix ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking IMA: policy can be updated zero times selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() selinux: export validatetrans decisions gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code ...
| * Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-01-141-8/+2
| |\ | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fixAndreas Gruenbacher2016-01-081-8/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about 10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original performance. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris2016-01-103-21/+17
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into ra-next
| | * | KEYS: refcount bug fixMimi Zohar2016-01-072-12/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes the key_ref leak, removes the unnecessary KEY_FLAG_KEEP test before setting the flag, and cleans up the if/then brackets style introduced in commit: d3600bc KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | ima: ima_write_policy() limit lockingPetko Manolov2016-01-031-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long. We only need it around ima_parse_add_rule(). Changelog: - The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.5' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2015-12-261-1/+23
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | Smack: type confusion in smak sendmsg() handlerRoman Kubiak2015-12-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall is vulnerable to type confusion issue what can allow to privilege escalation into root or cause denial of service. A malicious attacker can create socket of one type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into sendmsg() function ensuring that this is AF_INET socket. Remedy Do not trust user supplied data. Proposed fix below. Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | Smack: File receive for socketsCasey Schaufler2015-12-091-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing file receive hook checks for access on the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate access relationship between the receiving (current) process and the socket. If the process can't write to the socket's send label or the socket's receive label can't write to the process fail. This will allow the legitimate cases, where the socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate. Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | | Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2015-12-268-73/+274
| |\ \ \ \ | | | |_|/ | | |/| | | | | | | into next
| | * | | selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()Vladis Dronov2015-12-241-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types. Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam. The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so print the triggering command name and pid. Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: export validatetrans decisionsAndrew Perepechko2015-12-244-8/+111
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs. "/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose. This functionality is needed by file system servers implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS layer. Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext" to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition is allowed and -EPERM otherwise. Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru> CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labelsAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-241-8/+68
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When fetching an inode's security label, check if it is still valid, and try reloading it if it is not. Reloading will fail when we are in RCU context which doesn't allow sleeping, or when we can't find a dentry for the inode. (Reloading happens via iop->getxattr which takes a dentry parameter.) When reloading fails, continue using the old, invalid label. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labelsAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-243-10/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached information becomes invalid. Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes invalid. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_securityAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-241-41/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add functions dentry_security and inode_security for accessing inode->i_security. These functions initially don't do much, but they will later be used to revalidate the security labels when necessary. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-constAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-243-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-constAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-243-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_securityAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-241-2/+0
| | |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris2015-12-2619-84/+623
| |\ \ \ | | | |/ | | |/| | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
| | * | IMA: policy can be updated zero timesSasha Levin2015-12-243-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the policy would be updated at least once. If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which means that invalid memory will be accessed. Changelog: - Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | security/integrity: make ima/ima_mok.c explicitly non-modularPaul Gortmaker2015-12-151-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is: ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings" ...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone. Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only. Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | ima: update appraise flags after policy update completesMimi Zohar2015-12-151-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the existing policy. This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag. Only when the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
| | * | IMA: prevent keys on the .ima_blacklist from being removedMimi Zohar2015-12-151-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace from removing keys from the keyring. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyringsMimi Zohar2015-12-152-11/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings (eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire. This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed out a key on a keyring. When this flag is set on the keyring, all keys subsequently added are flagged. In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be cleared. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policyPetko Manolov2015-12-154-8/+253
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyringsPetko Manolov2015-12-154-0/+87
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot. IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | IMA: policy can now be updated multiple timesPetko Manolov2015-12-153-28/+75
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue. The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations. On success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced. IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to writes, the match code is RCU protected. The updater side also does list splice in RCU manner. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | evm: EVM_LOAD_X509 depends on EVMArnd Bergmann2015-12-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error: security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys': digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509' This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when CONFIG_EVM is set as well. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Fixes: 2ce523eb8976 ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | evm: reset EVM status when file attributes changeDmitry Kasatkin2015-12-151-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status and if it was successful, never re-verified again when IMA passes the 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr(). When file attributes or extended attributes change, we may wish to re-verify EVM integrity as well. For example, after setting a digital signature we may need to re-verify the signature and update the iint->flags that there is an EVM signature. This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to INTEGRITY_UKNOWN state. Changes in v2: * Flag setting moved to EVM layer Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | evm: provide a function to set the EVM key from the kernelDmitry Kasatkin2015-12-152-14/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A crypto HW kernel module can possibly initialize the EVM key from the kernel __init code to enable EVM before calling the 'init' process. This patch provides a function evm_set_key() to set the EVM key directly without using the KEY subsystem. Changes in v4: * kernel-doc style for evm_set_key Changes in v3: * error reporting moved to evm_set_key * EVM_INIT_HMAC moved to evm_set_key * added bitop to prevent key setting race Changes in v2: * use size_t for key size instead of signed int * provide EVM_MAX_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h> * provide EVM_MIN_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loadedDmitry Kasatkin2015-12-154-3/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to enable EVM before starting the 'init' process, evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Previously non-zero indicated that the HMAC key was loaded. When EVM loads the X509 before calling 'init', with this patch it is now possible to enable EVM to start signature based verification. This patch defines bits to enable EVM if a key of any type is loaded. Changes in v3: * print error message if key is not set Changes in v2: * EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC * EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509 Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | evm: load an x509 certificate from the kernelDmitry Kasatkin2015-12-154-0/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring. Changes in v4: * Patch description updated Changes in v3: * Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used directly. Changes in v2: * default key patch changed to /etc/keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyringDmitry Kasatkin2015-11-237-22/+35
| | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring. This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring(). Changes in v3: * Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper. * Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Changes in v2: * Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option * Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policyJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-201-0/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use authorization policies to seal trusted keys. Two following new options have been added for trusted keys: * 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing. * 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing. If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this will result an error because the state of the option would become mixed. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
| * | keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chipsJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-202-1/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key() syscall and documentation for it. Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support TPM_ALG_SM3_256: * hash_algo_name * hash_digest_size Includes support for the following hash algorithms: * sha1 * sha256 * sha384 * sha512 * sm3-256 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
| * | keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key optionsJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-201-0/+3
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The trusted keys option parsing allows specifying the same option multiple times. The last option value specified is used. This is problematic because: * No gain. * This makes complicated to specify options that are dependent on other options. This patch changes the behavior in a way that option can be specified only once. Reported-by: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* | Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-124-168/+82
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing. Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted cleanups and fixes from various people, etc. One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications, but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I *am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock taken shared. There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of ->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/ inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then: ----- | This is an automated patch using | | sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/' | sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/' | | with a very few manual fixups ----- I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking merges)" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits) nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common() logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE fs: xattr: Use kvfree() [s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE nbd: use ->compat_ioctl() fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user() cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user() rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user() mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user() [um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul() [um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user() ...
| * \ Merge branch 'for-linus' into work.miscAl Viro2016-01-081-9/+9
| |\ \
| * | | fix the leak in integrity_read_file()Al Viro2016-01-041-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | selinuxfs: switch to memdup_user_nul()Al Viro2016-01-041-73/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Nothing in there gives a damn about the buffer alignment - it just parses its contents. So the use of get_zeroed_page() doesn't buy us anything - might as well had been kmalloc(), which makes that code equivalent to open-coded memdup_user_nul() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | convert a bunch of open-coded instances of memdup_user_nul()Al Viro2016-01-042-90/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A _lot_ of ->write() instances were open-coding it; some are converted to memdup_user_nul(), a lot more remain... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | | Merge branch 'work.xattr' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-111-2/+0
|\ \ \ \ | |_|/ / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro: "Andreas' xattr cleanup series. It's a followup to his xattr work that went in last cycle; -0.5KLoC" * 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: xattr handlers: Simplify list operation ocfs2: Replace list xattr handler operations nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattr xfs: Change how listxattr generates synthetic attributes tmpfs: listxattr should include POSIX ACL xattrs tmpfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure btrfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure vfs: Distinguish between full xattr names and proper prefixes posix acls: Remove duplicate xattr name definitions gfs2: Remove gfs2_xattr_acl_chmod vfs: Remove vfs_xattr_cmp
| * | | nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattrAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-131-2/+0
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com> Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | KEYS: Fix race between read and revokeDavid Howells2015-12-191-9/+9
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2015-7550. There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key. This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key and doesn't check for a NULL pointer. Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking semaphore instead of before. I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code. This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version: #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> #include <pthread.h> void *thr0(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; keyctl_revoke(key); return 0; } void *thr1(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; char buffer[16]; keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16); return 0; } int main() { key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); pthread_t th[5]; pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_join(th[0], 0); pthread_join(th[1], 0); pthread_join(th[2], 0); pthread_join(th[3], 0); return 0; } Build as: cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread Run as: while keyctl-race; do :; done as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be summarised as: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7 [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0 [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2015-11-261-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | into for-linus2
| * | selinux: fix bug in conditional rules handlingStephen Smalley2015-11-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended permissions (xperms) structure. Access checks from userspace using /sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that interface does not presently expose extended permission information. As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by conditional rules in the policy. Fix the bug by only skipping computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire conditional rules processing. Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: fixed long lines in patch description] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud