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* Merge tag 'trace-v4.17' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-04-101-1/+7
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace Pull tracing updates from Steven Rostedt: "New features: - Tom Zanussi's extended histogram work. This adds the synthetic events to have histograms from multiple event data Adds triggers "onmatch" and "onmax" to call the synthetic events Several updates to the histogram code from this - Allow way to nest ring buffer calls in the same context - Allow absolute time stamps in ring buffer - Rewrite of filter code parsing based on Al Viro's suggestions - Setting of trace_clock to global if TSC is unstable (on boot) - Better OOM handling when allocating large ring buffers - Added initcall tracepoints (consolidated initcall_debug code with them) And other various fixes and clean ups" * tag 'trace-v4.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: (68 commits) init: Have initcall_debug still work without CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS init, tracing: Have printk come through the trace events for initcall_debug init, tracing: instrument security and console initcall trace events init, tracing: Add initcall trace events tracing: Add rcu dereference annotation for test func that touches filter->prog tracing: Add rcu dereference annotation for filter->prog tracing: Fixup logic inversion on setting trace_global_clock defaults tracing: Hide global trace clock from lockdep ring-buffer: Add set/clear_current_oom_origin() during allocations ring-buffer: Check if memory is available before allocation lockdep: Add print_irqtrace_events() to __warn vsprintf: Do not preprocess non-dereferenced pointers for bprintf (%px and %pK) tracing: Uninitialized variable in create_tracing_map_fields() tracing: Make sure variable string fields are NULL-terminated tracing: Add action comparisons when testing matching hist triggers tracing: Don't add flag strings when displaying variable references tracing: Fix display of hist trigger expressions containing timestamps ftrace: Drop a VLA in module_exists() tracing: Mention trace_clock=global when warning about unstable clocks tracing: Default to using trace_global_clock if sched_clock is unstable ...
| * init, tracing: instrument security and console initcall trace eventsAbderrahmane Benbachir2018-04-061-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Trace events have been added around the initcall functions defined in init/main.c. But console and security have their own initcalls. This adds the trace events associated for those initcall functions. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1521765208.19745.2.camel@polymtl.ca Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Abderrahmane Benbachir <abderrahmane.benbachir@polymtl.ca> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
* | selinux: fix missing dput() before selinuxfs unmountStephen Smalley2018-04-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") triggers a BUG when SELinux is runtime-disabled (i.e. systemd or equivalent disables SELinux before initial policy load via /sys/fs/selinux/disable based on /etc/selinux/config SELINUX=disabled). This does not manifest if SELinux is disabled via kernel command line argument or if SELinux is enabled (permissive or enforcing). Before: SELinux: Disabled at runtime. BUG: Dentry 000000006d77e5c7{i=17,n=null} still in use (1) [unmount of selinuxfs selinuxfs] After: SELinux: Disabled at runtime. Fixes: 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-04-0716-68/+207
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps. Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew Garrett: For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible. which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA: In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did previously" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement() ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init() integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement() ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[] evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted ima: fail signature verification based on policy ima: clear IMA_HASH ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
| * | ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithmPetr Vorel2018-03-252-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's early use. The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be compiled-in. The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls ima_post_path_mknod()). Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm. Fixed crash: $ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m [ 0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4 ... [ 1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2) ... [ 2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4 [ 2.613080] Supported: Yes [ 2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1 [ 2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728 [ 2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000 [ 2.613080] FS: 00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 [ 2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2.613080] Call Trace: [ 2.613080] ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0 [ 2.613080] ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40 [ 2.613080] SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220 [ 2.613080] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085 [ 2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660 [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20 [ 2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]--- [ 2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 [ 2.673052] [ 2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure listMartin Townsend2018-03-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is required to use SMACK and IMA/EVM together. Add it to the default nomeasure/noappraise list like other pseudo filesystems. Signed-off-by: Martin Townsend <mtownsend1973@gmail.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | evm: check for remount ro in progress before writingSascha Hauer2018-03-251-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EVM might update the evm xattr while the VFS performs a remount to readonly mode. This is not properly checked for, additionally check the s_readonly_remount superblock flag before writing. The bug can for example be observed with UBIFS. UBIFS checks the free space on the device before and after a remount. With EVM enabled the free space sometimes differs between both checks. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()Thiago Jung Bauermann2018-03-251-13/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace nested ifs in the EVM xattr verification logic with a switch statement, making the code easier to understand. Also, add comments to the if statements in the out section and constify the cause variable. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
| * | ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()Thiago Jung Bauermann2018-03-251-8/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The "goto out" statement doesn't have any purpose since there's no cleanup to be done when returning early, so remove it. This also makes the rc variable unnecessary so remove it as well. Also, the xattr_len and fmt variables are redundant so remove them as well. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGSThiago Jung Bauermann2018-03-251-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This macro isn't used anymore since commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock"), so remove it. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()Tycho Andersen2018-03-251-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In keeping with the directive to get rid of VLAs [1], let's drop the VLA from ima_audit_measurement(). We need to adjust the return type of ima_audit_measurement, because now this function can fail if an allocation fails. [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621 v2: just use audit_log_format instead of doing a second allocation v3: ignore failures in ima_audit_measurement() Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interfaceJiandi An2018-03-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support. If it is built as a module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init. tpm_pcr_read() in IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually there is a TPM chip on the system. ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19) Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel and initializes before IMA. Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]Hernán Gonzalez2018-03-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no gain from doing this except for some self-documenting. Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.cHernán Gonzalez2018-03-233-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These variables are not used where they are was defined. There is no point in declaring them there as extern. Move and constify them, saving 2 bytes. Function old new delta init_desc 273 271 -2 Total: Before=2112094, After=2112092, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar> Tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | ima: fail signature verification based on policyMimi Zohar2018-03-234-6/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for example using a pre-built kernel. This patch defines a new builtin policy named "fail_securely", which can be specified on the boot command line as an argument to "ima_policy=". Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * | ima: clear IMA_HASHMimi Zohar2018-03-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IMA_APPRAISE and IMA_HASH policies overlap. Clear IMA_HASH properly. Fixes: da1b0029f527 ("ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystemsMimi Zohar2018-03-231-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure" environment, with a correctly enforced security policy, which is willing to assume the inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems that are well defined and properly implemented. As there is no way for the kernel to detect file changes, the kernel ignores the cached file integrity results and re-measures, re-appraises, and re-audits the file. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * | ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystemsMimi Zohar2018-03-231-1/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | FUSE can be mounted by unprivileged users either today with fusermount installed with setuid, or soon with the upcoming patches to allow FUSE mounts in a non-init user namespace. This patch addresses the new unprivileged non-init mounted filesystems, which are untrusted, by failing the signature verification. This patch defines two new flags SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE and SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * | IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policyMatthew Garrett2018-03-237-29/+79
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did previously. After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of: measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to: measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes into. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Changelog: - initialize ima_creds_status
| * | security: Add a cred_getsecid hookMatthew Garrett2018-03-233-0/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* | | Merge branch 'next-smack' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-04-071-0/+2
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull smack update from James Morris: "One small change for Automotive Grade Linux" * 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: Handle CGROUP2 in the same way that CGROUP
| * \ \ Merge branch 'smack-for-4.17' of git://github.com/cschaufler/next-smack into ↵James Morris2018-03-271-0/+2
| |\ \ \ | | |/ / | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | next-smack Pull request from Casey.
| | * | Smack: Handle CGROUP2 in the same way that CGROUPJosé Bollo2018-02-281-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new file system CGROUP2 isn't actually handled by smack. This changes makes Smack treat equally CGROUP and CGROUP2 items. Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | | | Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-04-074-27/+35
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull general security layer updates from James Morris: - Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon. - Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred), from Stephen Smalley. - Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: convert security hooks to use hlist exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
| * | | | security: convert security hooks to use hlistSargun Dhillon2018-03-311-11/+11
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * | | Merge tag 'v4.16-rc6' into next-generalJames Morris2018-03-232-23/+88
| |\ \ \ | | | |/ | | |/| | | | | Merge to Linux 4.16-rc6 at the request of Jarkko, for his TPM updates.
| * | | usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to ↵Stephen Smalley2018-03-074-16/+24
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill commit d178bc3a708f39cbfefc3fab37032d3f2511b4ec ("user namespace: usb: make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)") changed kill_pid_info_as_uid to kill_pid_info_as_cred, saving and passing a cred structure instead of uids. Since the secid can be obtained from the cred, drop the secid fields from the usb_dev_state and async structures, and drop the secid argument to kill_pid_info_as_cred. Replace the secid argument to security_task_kill with the cred. Update SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor to use the cred, which avoids the need for Smack and AppArmor to use a secid at all in this hook. Further changes to Smack might still be required to take full advantage of this change, since it should now be possible to perform capability checking based on the supplied cred. The changes to Smack and AppArmor have only been compile-tested. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-04-0628-1224/+2311
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "A bigger than usual pull request for SELinux, 13 patches (lucky!) along with a scary looking diffstat. Although if you look a bit closer, excluding the usual minor tweaks/fixes, there are really only two significant changes in this pull request: the addition of proper SELinux access controls for SCTP and the encapsulation of a lot of internal SELinux state. The SCTP changes are the result of a multi-month effort (maybe even a year or longer?) between the SELinux folks and the SCTP folks to add proper SELinux controls. A special thanks go to Richard for seeing this through and keeping the effort moving forward. The state encapsulation work is a bit of janitorial work that came out of some early work on SELinux namespacing. The question of namespacing is still an open one, but I believe there is some real value in the encapsulation work so we've split that out and are now sending that up to you" * tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: wrap AVC state selinux: wrap selinuxfs state selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classes selinux: Update SELinux SCTP documentation selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functions selinux: wrap global selinux state selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declaration selinux: Add SCTP support sctp: Add LSM hooks sctp: Add ip option support security: Add support for SCTP security hooks netlabel: If PF_INET6, check sk_buff ip header version
| * | | selinux: wrap AVC stateStephen Smalley2018-03-209-297/+512
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and pass it explicitly to all AVC functions. The AVC private state is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced from the selinux_state. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: wrap selinuxfs stateStephen Smalley2018-03-201-177/+261
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move global selinuxfs state to a per-instance structure (selinux_fs_info), and include a pointer to the selinux_state in this structure. Pass this selinux_state to all security server operations, thereby ensuring that each selinuxfs instance presents a view of and acts as an interface to a particular selinux_state instance. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). It merely wraps the selinuxfs global state, links it to a particular selinux_state (currently always the single global selinux_state) and uses that state for all operations. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classesStephen Smalley2018-03-201-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If security_get_bools/classes are called before the selinux state is initialized (i.e. before first policy load), then they should just return immediately with no booleans/classes. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failureRichard Haines2018-03-021-12/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the following error when running regression tests using LTP as follows: cd /opt/ltp/ cat runtest/syscalls |grep connect01>runtest/connect-syscall ./runltp -pq -f connect-syscall Running tests....... connect01 1 TPASS : bad file descriptor successful connect01 2 TPASS : invalid socket buffer successful connect01 3 TPASS : invalid salen successful connect01 4 TPASS : invalid socket successful connect01 5 TPASS : already connected successful connect01 6 TPASS : connection refused successful connect01 7 TFAIL : connect01.c:146: invalid address family ; returned -1 (expected -1), errno 22 (expected 97) INFO: ltp-pan reported some tests FAIL LTP Version: 20180118 Reported-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functionsPaul Moore2018-03-026-14/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename is_enforcing() to enforcing_enabled() and enforcing_set() to set_enforcing(). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: wrap global selinux stateStephen Smalley2018-03-0125-797/+1155
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server functions. The public portion of the structure contains state that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode. The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose definition is private to the security server and contains security server specific state such as the policy database and SID table. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it explicitly as needed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declarationArnd Bergmann2018-02-261-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A missing 'struct' keyword caused a build error when CONFIG_NETLABEL is disabled: In file included from security/selinux/hooks.c:99: security/selinux/include/netlabel.h:135:66: error: unknown type name 'sock' static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk) ^~~~ security/selinux/hooks.c: In function 'selinux_sctp_sk_clone': security/selinux/hooks.c:5188:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone'; did you mean 'selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] Fixes: db97c9f9d312 ("selinux: Add SCTP support") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: Add SCTP supportRichard Haines2018-02-265-32/+408
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in: Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | security: Add support for SCTP security hooksRichard Haines2018-02-221-0/+22
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds2018-04-062-1/+1
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge updates from Andrew Morton: - a few misc things - ocfs2 updates - the v9fs maintainers have been missing for a long time. I've taken over v9fs patch slinging. - most of MM * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (116 commits) mm,oom_reaper: check for MMF_OOM_SKIP before complaining mm/ksm: fix interaction with THP mm/memblock.c: cast constant ULLONG_MAX to phys_addr_t headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h include/linux/mmdebug.h: make VM_WARN* non-rvals mm/page_isolation.c: make start_isolate_page_range() fail if already isolated mm: change return type to vm_fault_t mm, oom: remove 3% bonus for CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes mm, page_alloc: wakeup kcompactd even if kswapd cannot free more memory kernel/fork.c: detect early free of a live mm mm: make counting of list_lru_one::nr_items lockless mm/swap_state.c: make bool enable_vma_readahead and swap_vma_readahead() static block_invalidatepage(): only release page if the full page was invalidated mm: kernel-doc: add missing parameter descriptions mm/swap.c: remove @cold parameter description for release_pages() mm/nommu: remove description of alloc_vm_area zram: drop max_zpage_size and use zs_huge_class_size() zsmalloc: introduce zs_huge_class_size() mm: fix races between swapoff and flush dcache fs/direct-io.c: minor cleanups in do_blockdev_direct_IO ...
| * | | headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.hRandy Dunlap2018-04-052-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source files that do not use it. This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig. It would be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes. I have neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes. Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms. Both of them reported 2 build failures for which patches are included here (in v2). [ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't combine all of those. ] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [2 build failures] Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> [2 build failures] Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | | Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-04-061-1/+0
|\ \ \ \ | |/ / / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted stuff, including Christoph's I_DIRTY patches" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: move I_DIRTY_INODE to fs.h ubifs: fix bogus __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_SYNC | I_DIRTY_DATASYNC) call ntfs: fix bogus __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_SYNC | I_DIRTY_DATASYNC) call gfs2: fix bogus __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_SYNC | I_DIRTY_DATASYNC) calls fs: fold open_check_o_direct into do_dentry_open vfs: Replace stray non-ASCII homoglyph characters with their ASCII equivalents vfs: make sure struct filename->iname is word-aligned get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.h [poll] annotate SAA6588_CMD_POLL users
| * | | get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.hAl Viro2018-02-221-1/+0
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | Merge branch 'userns-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-04-033-201/+120
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "There was a lot of work this cycle fixing bugs that were discovered after the merge window and getting everything ready where we can reasonably support fully unprivileged fuse. The bug fixes you already have and much of the unprivileged fuse work is coming in via other trees. Still left for fully unprivileged fuse is figuring out how to cleanly handle .set_acl and .get_acl in the legacy case, and properly handling of evm xattrs on unprivileged mounts. Included in the tree is a cleanup from Alexely that replaced a linked list with a statically allocated fix sized array for the pid caches, which simplifies and speeds things up. Then there is are some cleanups and fixes for the ipc namespace. The motivation was that in reviewing other code it was discovered that access ipc objects from different pid namespaces recorded pids in such a way that when asked the wrong pids were returned. In the worst case there has been a measured 30% performance impact for sysvipc semaphores. Other test cases showed no measurable performance impact. Manfred Spraul and Davidlohr Bueso who tend to work on sysvipc performance both gave the nod that this is good enough. Casey Schaufler and James Morris have given their approval to the LSM side of the changes. I simplified the types and the code dealing with sysvipc to pass just kern_ipc_perm for all three types of ipc. Which reduced the header dependencies throughout the kernel and simplified the lsm code. Which let me work on the pid fixes without having to worry about trivial changes causing complete kernel recompiles" * 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: ipc/shm: Fix pid freeing. ipc/shm: fix up for struct file no longer being available in shm.h ipc/smack: Tidy up from the change in type of the ipc security hooks ipc: Directly call the security hook in ipc_ops.associate ipc/sem: Fix semctl(..., GETPID, ...) between pid namespaces ipc/msg: Fix msgctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces ipc/shm: Fix shmctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces. ipc/util: Helpers for making the sysvipc operations pid namespace aware ipc: Move IPCMNI from include/ipc.h into ipc/util.h msg: Move struct msg_queue into ipc/msg.c shm: Move struct shmid_kernel into ipc/shm.c sem: Move struct sem and struct sem_array into ipc/sem.c msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks pidns: simpler allocation of pid_* caches
| * | | ipc/smack: Tidy up from the change in type of the ipc security hooksEric W. Biederman2018-03-271-139/+58
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename the variables shp, sma, msq to isp. As that is how the code already refers to those variables. Collapse smack_of_shm, smack_of_sem, and smack_of_msq into smack_of_ipc, as the three functions had become completely identical. Collapse smack_shm_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security and smack_msg_queue_alloc_security into smack_ipc_alloc_security as the three functions had become identical. Collapse smack_shm_free_security, smack_sem_free_security and smack_msg_queue_free_security into smack_ipc_free_security as the three functions had become identical. Requested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * | | msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooksEric W. Biederman2018-03-223-36/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * | | shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooksEric W. Biederman2018-03-223-30/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel.. Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * | | sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooksEric W. Biederman2018-03-223-30/+30
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array. Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array to become private to ipc/sem.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-nextDavid S. Miller2018-03-311-6/+1
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2018-03-31 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. The main changes are: 1) Add raw BPF tracepoint API in order to have a BPF program type that can access kernel internal arguments of the tracepoints in their raw form similar to kprobes based BPF programs. This infrastructure also adds a new BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN command to BPF syscall which returns an anon-inode backed fd for the tracepoint object that allows for automatic detach of the BPF program resp. unregistering of the tracepoint probe on fd release, from Alexei. 2) Add new BPF cgroup hooks at bind() and connect() entry in order to allow BPF programs to reject, inspect or modify user space passed struct sockaddr, and as well a hook at post bind time once the port has been allocated. They are used in FB's container management engine for implementing policy, replacing fragile LD_PRELOAD wrapper intercepting bind() and connect() calls that only works in limited scenarios like glibc based apps but not for other runtimes in containerized applications, from Andrey. 3) BPF_F_INGRESS flag support has been added to sockmap programs for their redirect helper call bringing it in line with cls_bpf based programs. Support is added for both variants of sockmap programs, meaning for tx ULP hooks as well as recv skb hooks, from John. 4) Various improvements on BPF side for the nfp driver, besides others this work adds BPF map update and delete helper call support from the datapath, JITing of 32 and 64 bit XADD instructions as well as offload support of bpf_get_prandom_u32() call. Initial implementation of nfp packet cache has been tackled that optimizes memory access (see merge commit for further details), from Jakub and Jiong. 5) Removal of struct bpf_verifier_env argument from the print_bpf_insn() API has been done in order to prepare to use print_bpf_insn() soon out of perf tool directly. This makes the print_bpf_insn() API more generic and pushes the env into private data. bpftool is adjusted as well with the print_bpf_insn() argument removal, from Jiri. 6) Couple of cleanups and prep work for the upcoming BTF (BPF Type Format). The latter will reuse the current BPF verifier log as well, thus bpf_verifier_log() is further generalized, from Martin. 7) For bpf_getsockopt() and bpf_setsockopt() helpers, IPv4 IP_TOS read and write support has been added in similar fashion to existing IPv6 IPV6_TCLASS socket option we already have, from Nikita. 8) Fixes in recent sockmap scatterlist API usage, which did not use sg_init_table() for initialization thus triggering a BUG_ON() in scatterlist API when CONFIG_DEBUG_SG was enabled. This adds and uses a small helper sg_init_marker() to properly handle the affected cases, from Prashant. 9) Let the BPF core follow IDR code convention and therefore use the idr_preload() and idr_preload_end() helpers, which would also help idr_alloc_cyclic() under GFP_ATOMIC to better succeed under memory pressure, from Shaohua. 10) Last but not least, a spelling fix in an error message for the BPF cookie UID helper under BPF sample code, from Colin. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | macro: introduce COUNT_ARGS() macroAlexei Starovoitov2018-03-281-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | move COUNT_ARGS() macro from apparmor to generic header and extend it to count till twelve. COUNT() was an alternative name for this logic, but it's used for different purpose in many other places. Similarly for CONCATENATE() macro. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* | | | security: Remove rtnl_lock() in selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload()Kirill Tkhai2018-03-291-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rt_genid_bump_all() consists of ipv4 and ipv6 part. ipv4 part is incrementing of net::ipv4::rt_genid, and I see many places, where it's read without rtnl_lock(). ipv6 part calls __fib6_clean_all(), and it's also called without rtnl_lock() in other places. So, rtnl_lock() here was used to iterate net_namespace_list only, and we can remove it. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | net: Introduce net_rwsem to protect net_namespace_listKirill Tkhai2018-03-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rtnl_lock() is used everywhere, and contention is very high. When someone wants to iterate over alive net namespaces, he/she has no a possibility to do that without exclusive lock. But the exclusive rtnl_lock() in such places is overkill, and it just increases the contention. Yes, there is already for_each_net_rcu() in kernel, but it requires rcu_read_lock(), and this can't be sleepable. Also, sometimes it may be need really prevent net_namespace_list growth, so for_each_net_rcu() is not fit there. This patch introduces new rw_semaphore, which will be used instead of rtnl_mutex to protect net_namespace_list. It is sleepable and allows not-exclusive iterations over net namespaces list. It allows to stop using rtnl_lock() in several places (what is made in next patches) and makes less the time, we keep rtnl_mutex. Here we just add new lock, while the explanation of we can remove rtnl_lock() there are in next patches. Fine grained locks generally are better, then one big lock, so let's do that with net_namespace_list, while the situation allows that. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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