summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-234-29/+41
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman: "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete implementation. Highlights: - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe. - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe. - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared uids remains the same. - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or better than it is today. - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or operationally with the user namespace enabled. - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1 billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to 164ns per stat operation). - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value. Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause entertaining failures in userspace. - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails. I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and handle the case where setuid fails. - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we can't map. - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities. My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1." Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) userns: Silence silly gcc warning. cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids. userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate. userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces. userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace. userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs ...
| * userns: Convert capabilities related permsion checksEric W. Biederman2012-05-031-15/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Use uid_eq when comparing kuids Use gid_eq when comparing kgids - Use make_kuid(user_ns, 0) to talk about the user_namespace root uid Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Store uid and gid values in struct cred with kuid_t and kgid_t typesEric W. Biederman2012-05-031-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile and behave correctly. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Convert group_info values from gid_t to kgid_t.Eric W. Biederman2012-05-031-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As a first step to converting struct cred to be all kuid_t and kgid_t values convert the group values stored in group_info to always be kgid_t values. Unless user namespaces are used this change should have no effect. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Simplify the user_namespace by making userns->creator a kuid.Eric W. Biederman2012-04-261-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Transform userns->creator from a user_struct reference to a simple kuid_t, kgid_t pair. In cap_capable this allows the check to see if we are the creator of a namespace to become the classic suser style euid permission check. This allows us to remove the need for a struct cred in the mapping functions and still be able to dispaly the user namespace creators uid and gid as 0. - Remove the now unnecessary delayed_work in free_user_ns. All that is left for free_user_ns to do is to call kmem_cache_free and put_user_ns. Those functions can be called in any context so call them directly from free_user_ns removing the need for delayed work. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Add an explicit reference to the parent user namespaceEric W. Biederman2012-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I am about to remove the struct user_namespace reference from struct user_struct. So keep an explicit track of the parent user namespace. Take advantage of this new reference and replace instances of user_ns->creator->user_ns with user_ns->parent. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * cred: Refcount the user_ns pointed to by the cred.Eric W. Biederman2012-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete with reference counting. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * userns: Use cred->user_ns instead of cred->user->user_nsEric W. Biederman2012-04-074-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference from user_struct. Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and instead go straight to cred->user_ns. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-3.5' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-221-8/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo: "cgroup file type addition / removal is updated so that file types are added and removed instead of individual files so that dynamic file type addition / removal can be implemented by cgroup and used by controllers. blkio controller changes which will come through block tree are dependent on this. Other changes include res_counter cleanup and disallowing kthread / PF_THREAD_BOUND threads to be attached to non-root cgroups. There's a reported bug with the file type addition / removal handling which can lead to oops on cgroup umount. The issue is being looked into. It shouldn't cause problems for most setups and isn't a security concern." Fix up trivial conflict in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt * 'for-3.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (21 commits) res_counter: Account max_usage when calling res_counter_charge_nofail() res_counter: Merge res_counter_charge and res_counter_charge_nofail cgroups: disallow attaching kthreadd or PF_THREAD_BOUND threads cgroup: remove cgroup_subsys->populate() cgroup: get rid of populate for memcg cgroup: pass struct mem_cgroup instead of struct cgroup to socket memcg cgroup: make css->refcnt clearing on cgroup removal optional cgroup: use negative bias on css->refcnt to block css_tryget() cgroup: implement cgroup_rm_cftypes() cgroup: introduce struct cfent cgroup: relocate __d_cgrp() and __d_cft() cgroup: remove cgroup_add_file[s]() cgroup: convert memcg controller to the new cftype interface memcg: always create memsw files if CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP cgroup: convert all non-memcg controllers to the new cftype interface cgroup: relocate cftype and cgroup_subsys definitions in controllers cgroup: merge cft_release_agent cftype array into the base files array cgroup: implement cgroup_add_cftypes() and friends cgroup: build list of all cgroups under a given cgroupfs_root cgroup: move cgroup_clear_directory() call out of cgroup_populate_dir() ...
| * | cgroup: convert all non-memcg controllers to the new cftype interfaceTejun Heo2012-04-011-8/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert debug, freezer, cpuset, cpu_cgroup, cpuacct, net_prio, blkio, net_cls and device controllers to use the new cftype based interface. Termination entry is added to cftype arrays and populate callbacks are replaced with cgroup_subsys->base_cftypes initializations. This is functionally identical transformation. There shouldn't be any visible behavior change. memcg is rather special and will be converted separately. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <paul@paulmenage.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-2150-1102/+1857
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "New notable features: - The seccomp work from Will Drewry - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook" Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits) apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate() Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4 gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()? Smack: recursive tramsmute Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable() TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / . KEYS: Add invalidation support KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat Yama: remove an unused variable samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros Yama: add additional ptrace scopes ...
| * \ Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2012-05-2229-335/+415
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | Per pull request, for 3.5.
| | * | SELinux: remove unused common_audit_data in flush_unauthorized_filesEric Paris2012-04-091-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't need this variable and it just eats stack space. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: avc: remove the useless fields in avc_add_callbackWanlong Gao2012-04-096-47/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations. So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now. Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: replace weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL in avc_add_callbackWanlong Gao2012-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | avc_add_callback now only called from initcalls, so replace the weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL, and mark this function __init to make a warning when not been called from initcalls. Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: unify the selinux_audit_data and selinux_late_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-093-91/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We no longer need the distinction. We only need data after we decide to do an audit. So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we currently have as "data". Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: remove auditdeny from selinux_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-091-8/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's just takin' up space. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: do not initialize common_audit_data to 0Eric Paris2012-04-0911-44/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles? Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: BUILD_BUG_ON if the common_audit_data union ever growsEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We did a lot of work to shrink the common_audit_data. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON so future programers (let's be honest, probably me) won't do something foolish like make it large again! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: remove the task field from common_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-092-7/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack space for the common_audit_data. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | apparmor: move task from common_audit_data to apparmor_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-093-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | apparmor is the only LSM that uses the common_audit_data tsk field. Instead of making all LSMs pay for the stack space move the aa usage into the apparmor_audit_data. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | LSM: remove the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT type expansionEric Paris2012-04-0910-43/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just open code it so grep on the source code works better. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: move common_audit_data to a noinline slow path functionEric Paris2012-04-091-11/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_inode_has_perm is a hot path. Instead of declaring the common_audit_data on the stack move it to a noinline function only used in the rare case we need to send an audit message. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: remove inode_has_perm_noadpEric Paris2012-04-091-24/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit results. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permissionEric Paris2012-04-093-70/+105
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data. Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(), avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving measurable time in a hot path. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent stateEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief that they are non-zero length. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> cc: stable@kernel.org
| | * | SELinux: remove needless sel_div functionEric Paris2012-04-091-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's useless. Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0. That means that part of the function never does anything. Thus it's just a normal /. Just do that instead. I don't even understand what that operation was supposed to mean in the signed case however.... If it was signed: sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0)) ((0) - ((-2) < 0)) ((0) - (1)) (-1) What actually happens: sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0)) ((4611686018427387903) - ((2 < 0)) (4611686018427387903 - 0) ((unsigned int)4611686018427387903) (4294967295) Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me. So I'm getting rid of the function entirely. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: possible NULL deref in context_struct_to_stringEric Paris2012-04-091-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext. However if this is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup(). This is bad. Instead just return the len. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: audit failed attempts to set invalid labelsEric Paris2012-04-091-2/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We know that some yum operation is causing CAP_MAC_ADMIN failures. This implies that an RPM is laying down (or attempting to lay down) a file with an invalid label. The problem is that we don't have any information to track down the cause. This patch will cause such a failure to report the failed label in an SELINUX_ERR audit message. This is similar to the SELINUX_ERR reports on invalid transitions and things like that. It should help run down problems on what is trying to set invalid labels in the future. Resulting records look something like: type=AVC msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): avc: denied { mac_admin } for pid=2594 comm="chcon" capability=33 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=capability2 type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): op=setxattr invalid_context=unconfined_u:object_r:hello:s0 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): arch=c000003e syscall=188 success=no exit=-22 a0=a2c0e0 a1=390341b79b a2=a2d620 a3=1f items=1 ppid=2519 pid=2594 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="chcon" exe="/usr/bin/chcon" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=CWD msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): item=0 name="test" inode=785879 dev=fc:03 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_openEric Paris2012-04-096-15/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: check OPEN on truncate callsEric Paris2012-04-091-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In RH BZ 578841 we realized that the SELinux sandbox program was allowed to truncate files outside of the sandbox. The reason is because sandbox confinement is determined almost entirely by the 'open' permission. The idea was that if the sandbox was unable to open() files it would be unable to do harm to those files. This turns out to be false in light of syscalls like truncate() and chmod() which don't require a previous open() call. I looked at the syscalls that did not have an associated 'open' check and found that truncate(), did not have a seperate permission and even if it did have a separate permission such a permission owuld be inadequate for use by sandbox (since it owuld have to be granted so liberally as to be useless). This patch checks the OPEN permission on truncate. I think a better solution for sandbox is a whole new permission, but at least this fixes what we have today. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: add default_type statementsEric Paris2012-04-094-6/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/rangeEric Paris2012-04-096-8/+109
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: loosen DAC perms on reading policyEric Paris2012-04-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root only. There are selinux checks which should control this access. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | SELinux: allow seek operations on the file exposing policyEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sesearch uses: lseek(3, 0, SEEK_SET) = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek) Make that work. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected pathJohn Johansen2012-05-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/955892 All failures from __d_path where being treated as disconnected paths, however __d_path can also fail when the generated pathname is too long. The initial ENAMETOOLONG error was being lost, and ENAMETOOLONG was only returned if the subsequent dentry_path call resulted in that error. Other wise if the path was split across a mount point such that the dentry_path fit within the buffer when the __d_path did not the failure was treated as a disconnected path. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfinedJohn Johansen2012-05-181-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038 also affects apparmor portion of BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371 The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a new policy namespace. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter nameMimi Zohar2012-05-161-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When IMA was first upstreamed, the bprm filename and interp were always the same. Currently, the bprm->filename and bprm->interp are the same, except for when only bprm->interp contains the interpreter name. So instead of using the bprm->filename as the IMA filename hint in the measurement list, we could replace it with bprm->interp, but this feels too fragil. The following patch is not much better, but at least there is some indication that sometimes we're passing the filename and other times the interpreter name. Reported-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'for-1205' of http://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel into nextJames Morris2012-05-164-539/+981
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull request from Casey.
| | * | | Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4Casey Schaufler2012-05-144-526/+941
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | V4 updated to current linux-security#next Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Modern application runtime environments like to use naming schemes that are structured and generated without human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23 characters for a label name is perfectly rational for human use there have been complaints that the limit is a problem in environments where names are composed from a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution channel and application name. Names like softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255 characters instead of the old 23. The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets. This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label names consistent. The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones have been introduced. The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO header is now computed when a label is imported rather than on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack label is now allocated separately from the containing structure, allowing for larger strings. Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified in fixed length arrays. The access interface is supplemented with the check interface: access "Subject Object rwxat" access2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface: load "Subject Object rwxat" load2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface: load-self "Subject Object rwxat" load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt" The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface: cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..." cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..." The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?Tetsuo Handa2012-05-141-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Dave Chinner wrote: > Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except > for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the > filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the > only really safe way to allocate memory here. I see. Thank you. I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem? ---------- [PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage. new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS. smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g. btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is using GFP_NOFS. smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock held. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
| | * | | Smack: recursive tramsmuteCasey Schaufler2012-05-142-9/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases. It seems the users of this facility would expect that the transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem to add any additional complexity to the understanding of how the system works. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | | KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()David Howells2012-05-161-24/+16
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't bother checking for NULL key pointer in key_validate() as all of the places that call it will crash anyway if the relevant key pointer is NULL by the time they call key_validate(). Therefore, the checking must be done prior to calling here. Whilst we're at it, simplify the key_validate() function a bit and mark its argument const. Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()Kees Cook2012-05-151-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When checking capabilities, the question we want to be asking is "does current() have the capability in the child's namespace?" Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .Tetsuo Handa2012-05-152-21/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The pathname of /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy seen from Ubuntu 12.04 Live CD is squashfs:/usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy rather than /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy . Therefore, we need to accept manager programs which do not start with / . Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | KEYS: Add invalidation supportDavid Howells2012-05-118-28/+110
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for invalidating a key - which renders it immediately invisible to further searches and causes the garbage collector to immediately wake up, remove it from keyrings and then destroy it when it's no longer referenced. It's better not to do this with keyctl_revoke() as that marks the key to start returning -EKEYREVOKED to searches when what is actually desired is to have the key refetched. To invalidate a key the caller must be granted SEARCH permission by the key. This may be too strict. It may be better to also permit invalidation if the caller has any of READ, WRITE or SETATTR permission. The primary use for this is to evict keys that are cached in special keyrings, such as the DNS resolver or an ID mapper. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | | KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyringsDavid Howells2012-05-112-7/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do an LRU discard in keyrings that are full rather than returning ENFILE. To perform this, a time_t is added to the key struct and updated by the creation of a link to a key and by a key being found as the result of a search. At the completion of a successful search, the keyrings in the path between the root of the search and the first found link to it also have their last-used times updated. Note that discarding a link to a key from a keyring does not necessarily destroy the key as there may be references held by other places. An alternate discard method that might suffice is to perform FIFO discard from the keyring, using the spare 2-byte hole in the keylist header as the index of the next link to be discarded. This is useful when using a keyring as a cache for DNS results or foreign filesystem IDs. This can be tested by the following. As root do: echo 1000 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys kr=`keyctl newring foo @s` for ((i=0; i<2000; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a $kr; done Without this patch ENFILE should be reported when the keyring fills up. With this patch, the keyring discards keys in an LRU fashion. Note that the stored LRU time has a granularity of 1s. After doing this, /proc/key-users can be observed and should show that most of the 2000 keys have been discarded: [root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/key-users 0: 517 516/516 513/1000 5249/20000 The "513/1000" here is the number of quota-accounted keys present for this user out of the maximum permitted. In /proc/keys, the keyring shows the number of keys it has and the number of slots it has allocated: [root@andromeda ~]# grep foo /proc/keys 200c64c4 I--Q-- 1 perm 3b3f0000 0 0 keyring foo: 509/509 The maximum is (PAGE_SIZE - header) / key pointer size. That's typically 509 on a 64-bit system and 1020 on a 32-bit system. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | | KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring listDavid Howells2012-05-112-40/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make use of the previous patch that makes the garbage collector perform RCU synchronisation before destroying defunct keys. Key pointers can now be replaced in-place without creating a new keyring payload and replacing the whole thing as the discarded keys will not be destroyed until all currently held RCU read locks are released. If the keyring payload space needs to be expanded or contracted, then a replacement will still need allocating, and the original will still have to be freed by RCU. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | | KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destructionDavid Howells2012-05-111-29/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the keys garbage collector invoke synchronize_rcu() prior to destroying keys with a zero usage count. This means that a key can be examined under the RCU read lock in the safe knowledge that it won't get deallocated until after the lock is released - even if its usage count becomes zero whilst we're looking at it. This is useful in keyring search vs key link. Consider a keyring containing a link to a key. That link can be replaced in-place in the keyring without requiring an RCU copy-and-replace on the keyring contents without breaking a search underway on that keyring when the displaced key is released, provided the key is actually destroyed only after the RCU read lock held by the search algorithm is released. This permits __key_link() to replace a key without having to reallocate the key payload. A key gets replaced if a new key being linked into a keyring has the same type and description. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
| * | | KEYS: Announce key type (un)registrationDavid Howells2012-05-111-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Announce the (un)registration of a key type in the core key code rather than in the callers. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud