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* [PATCH] selinux: endian fixAlexey Dobriyan2006-05-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: check for failed kmalloc in security_sid_to_context()Serge E. Hallyn2006-05-151-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Check for NULL kmalloc return value before writing to it. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable.Stephen Smalley2006-05-032-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace, and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is not enabled in configuration. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Tested-by: Jon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Reworked patch for labels on user space messagesSteve Grubb2006-05-011-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The below patch should be applied after the inode and ipc sid patches. This patch is a reworking of Tim's patch that has been updated to match the inode and ipc patches since its similar. [updated: > Stephen Smalley also wanted to change a variable from isec to tsec in the > user sid patch. ] Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] change lspp ipc auditingSteve Grubb2006-05-013-14/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | Hi, The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the inode audit change patch already being applied. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] audit inode patchSteve Grubb2006-05-011-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | Previously, we were gathering the context instead of the sid. Now in this patch, we gather just the sid and convert to context only if an audit event is being output. This patch brings the performance hit from 146% down to 23% Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] support for context based audit filteringDarrel Goeddel2006-05-016-10/+302
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] selinux: Fix MLS compatibility off-by-one bugRon Yorston2006-04-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix an off-by-one error in the MLS compatibility code that was causing contexts with a MLS suffix to be rejected, preventing sharing partitions between FC4 and FC5. Bug reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=188068 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Improve usage of memory barriers and remove IRQ disablementDavid Howells2006-04-111-21/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove an unnecessary memory barrier (implicit in rcu_dereference()) from install_session_keyring(). install_session_keyring() is also rearranged a little to make it slightly more efficient. As install_*_keyring() may schedule (in synchronize_rcu() or keyring_alloc()), they may not be entered with interrupts disabled - and so there's no point saving the interrupt disablement state over the critical section. exec_keys() will also be invoked with interrupts enabled, and so that doesn't need to save the interrupt state either. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [Security] Keys: Fix oops when adding key to non-keyringDavid Howells2006-04-102-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522]. The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the keyring it's been given is actually a keyring. I've fixed this problem by: (1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring; and (2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring, and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't. This can be tested by: keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s` Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [SELINUX] Fix build after ipsec decap state changes.Dave Jones2006-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram': security/selinux/xfrm.c:284: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x' security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb': security/selinux/xfrm.c:317: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x' Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Merge branch 'audit.b3' of ↵Linus Torvalds2006-03-255-61/+86
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current * 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits) [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking [PATCH] Fix audit operators [PATCH] promiscuous mode [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records [PATCH] add/remove rule update [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer [PATCH] SE Linux audit events [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing. [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information. [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing. [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks. [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages. [PATCH] Filter rule comparators ... Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
| * [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumerAmy Griffis2006-03-201-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Updated patch to dynamically allocate audit rule fields in kernel's internal representation. Added unlikely() calls for testing memory allocation result. Amy Griffis wrote: [Wed Jan 11 2006, 02:02:31PM EST] > Modify audit's kernel-userspace interface to allow the specification > of string fields in audit rules. > > Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from 5ffc4a863f92351b720fe3e9c5cd647accff9e03 commit)
| * [PATCH] SE Linux audit eventsSteve Grubb2006-03-202-6/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit system. Please Apply. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
| * [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixesDustin Kirkland2006-03-202-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently added to -mm1: * fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode * fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off due to a missing function in security/dummy.c * fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing return just before an error_path label * some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(), audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context() Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
| * [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.Dustin Kirkland2006-03-202-51/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver of an action. These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the appropriate record in the audit code. This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP). [AV: fixed kmalloc flags use] [folded leak fixes] [folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)] [folded audit_inode_context() leak fix] [folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT] Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.Steve Grubb2006-03-201-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch updates various items for the new user space messages. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | [PATCH] make cap_ptrace enforce PTRACE_TRACME checksChris Wright2006-03-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>. Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does PTRACE_TRACEME). Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] refactor capable() to one implementation, add __capable() helperChris Wright2006-03-251-23/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for capabiilty of any process. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] Keys: Replace duplicate non-updateable keys rather than failingDavid Howells2006-03-251-5/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cause an attempt to add a duplicate non-updateable key (such as a keyring) to a keyring to discard the extant copy in favour of the new one rather than failing with EEXIST: # do the test in an empty session keyctl session # create a new keyring called "a" and attach to session keyctl newring a @s # create another new keyring called "a" and attach to session, # displacing the keyring added by the second command: keyctl newring a @s Without this patch, the third command will fail. For updateable keys (such as those of "user" type), the update method will still be called rather than a new key being created. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] Keys: Fix key quota management on key allocationDavid Howells2006-03-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make key quota detection generate an error if either quota is exceeded rather than only if both quotas are exceeded. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] strndup_user: convert keyctlDavi Arnaut2006-03-241-105/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the type.) Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] Bug fixes and cleanup for the BSD Secure Levels LSMDavi Arnaut2006-03-231-97/+113
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch address several issues in the current BSD Secure Levels code: o plaintext_to_sha1: Missing check for a NULL return from __get_free_page o passwd_write_file: A page is leaked if the password is wrong. o fix securityfs registration order o seclvl_init is a mess and can't properly tolerate failures, failure path is upside down (deldif and delf should be switched) Cleanups: o plaintext_to_sha1: Use buffers passed in o passwd_write_file: Use kmalloc() instead of get_zeroed_page() o passwd_write_file: hashedPassword comparison is just memcmp o s/ENOSYS/EINVAL/ o misc (akpm: after some discussion it appears that the BSD secure levels feature should be scheduled for removal. But for now, let's fix these problems up). Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] SELinux: add slab cache for inode security structJames Morris2006-03-221-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is allocated for every inode instantiated by the system. The memory savings are considerable. On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96 bytes, saving 32 bytes per object. After booting, I see about 4000 of these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile. With this patch, we save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case. On 32-bit, the savings are about half of this. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] SELinux: cleanup stray variable in selinux_inode_init_security()James Morris2006-03-221-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove an unneded pointer variable in selinux_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] SELinux: fix hard link count for selinuxfs root directoryJames Morris2006-03-221-5/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A further fix is needed for selinuxfs link count management, to ensure that the count is correct for the parent directory when a subdirectory is created. This is only required for the root directory currently, but the code has been updated for the general case. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinuxfs cleanups: sel_make_avc_filesJames Morris2006-03-221-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix copy & paste error in sel_make_avc_files(), removing a supurious call to d_genocide() in the error path. All of this will be cleaned up by kill_litter_super(). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinuxfs cleanups: sel_make_boolsJames Morris2006-03-221-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the call to sel_make_bools() from sel_fill_super(), as policy needs to be loaded before the boolean files can be created. Policy will never be loaded during sel_fill_super() as selinuxfs is kernel mounted during init and the only means to load policy is via selinuxfs. Also, the call to d_genocide() on the error path of sel_make_bools() is incorrect and replaced with sel_remove_bools(). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinuxfs cleanups: sel_fill_super exit pathJames Morris2006-03-221-17/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unify the error path of sel_fill_super() so that all errors pass through the same point and generate an error message. Also, removes a spurious dput() in the error path which breaks the refcounting for the filesystem (litter_kill_super() will correctly clean things up itself on error). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinuxfs cleanups: use sel_make_dir()James Morris2006-03-221-8/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use existing sel_make_dir() helper to create booleans directory rather than duplicating the logic. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinuxfs cleanups: fix hard link countJames Morris2006-03-221-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the hard link count for selinuxfs directories, which are currently one short. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinux: simplify sel_read_boolStephen Smalley2006-03-221-19/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Simplify sel_read_bool to use the simple_read_from_buffer helper, like the other selinuxfs functions. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] sem2mutex: security/Ingo Molnar2006-03-223-16/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Semaphore to mutex conversion. The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated automatically via a script as well. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinux: Disable automatic labeling of new inodes when no policy is ↵Stephen Smalley2006-03-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | loaded This patch disables the automatic labeling of new inodes on disk when no policy is loaded. Discussion is here: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=180296 In short, we're changing the behavior so that when no policy is loaded, SELinux does not label files at all. Currently it does add an 'unlabeled' label in this case, which we've found causes problems later. SELinux always maintains a safe internal label if there is none, so with this patch, we just stick with that and wait until a policy is loaded before adding a persistent label on disk. The effect is simply that if you boot with SELinux enabled but no policy loaded and create a file in that state, SELinux won't try to set a security extended attribute on the new inode on the disk. This is the only sane behavior for SELinux in that state, as it cannot determine the right label to assign in the absence of a policy. That state usually doesn't occur, but the rawhide installer seemed to be misbehaving temporarily so it happened to show up on a test install. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [SELINUX]: selinux_socket_getpeer_{stream,dgram} fixupCatherine Zhang2006-03-201-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
* | [SECURITY] getpeersec: Fix build breakageArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2006-03-201-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A recent changeset removes dummy_socket_getpeersec, replacing it with two new functions, but still references the removed function in the security_fixup_ops table, fix it by doing the replacement operation in the fixup table too. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | [SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersecCatherine Zhang2006-03-204-9/+117
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | [IPSEC]: Sync series - update selinuxJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-201-0/+7
|/ | | | | | | Add new netlink messages to selinux framework Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] selinux: tracer SID fixStephen Smalley2006-03-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix SELinux to not reset the tracer SID when the child is already being traced, since selinux_ptrace is also called by proc for access checking outside of the context of a ptrace attach. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: require AUDITStephen Smalley2006-02-072-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Make SELinux depend on AUDIT as it requires the basic audit support to log permission denials at all. Note that AUDITSYSCALL remains optional for SELinux, although it can be useful in providing further information upon denials. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: require SECURITY_NETWORKStephen Smalley2006-02-053-22/+5
| | | | | | | | | | Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Fix keyctl usage of strnlen_user()Davi Arnaut2006-02-031-5/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | In the small window between strnlen_user() and copy_from_user() userspace could alter the terminating `\0' character. Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: remove security struct magic number fields and testsStephen Smalley2006-02-012-52/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the SELinux security structure magic number fields and tests, along with some unnecessary tests for NULL security pointers. These fields and tests are leftovers from the early attempts to support SELinux as a loadable module during LSM development. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: change file_alloc_security to use GFP_KERNELStephen Smalley2006-02-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes the SELinux file_alloc_security function to use GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_ATOMIC; the use of GFP_ATOMIC appears to be a remnant of when this function was being called with the files_lock spinlock held, and is no longer necessary. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: fix and cleanup mprotect checksStephen Smalley2006-02-011-29/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the SELinux mprotect checks on executable mappings so that they are not re-applied when the mapping is already executable as well as cleaning up the code. This avoids a situation where e.g. an application is prevented from removing PROT_WRITE on an already executable mapping previously authorized via execmem permission due to an execmod denial. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Don't try to "validate" a non-existing timeval.Linus Torvalds2006-01-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | settime() with a NULL timeval is silly but legal. Noticed by Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Unlinline a bunch of other functionsArjan van de Ven2006-01-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Remove the "inline" keyword from a bunch of big functions in the kernel with the goal of shrinking it by 30kb to 40kb Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [NET]: Use NIP6_FMT in kernel.hJoe Perches2006-01-131-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIP6 strings. ie: net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c There are errors and inconsistency in the display of NIPQUAD strings too. ie: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c This patch: adds NIP6_FMT to kernel.h changes all code to use NIP6_FMT fixes net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c adds NIPQUAD_FMT to kernel.h fixes net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ftp.c changes a few uses of "%u.%u.%u.%u" to NIPQUAD_FMT for symmetry to NIP6_FMT Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] move capable() to capability.hRandy.Dunlap2006-01-114-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | - Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h; - Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used (in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/, mm/, security/, & sound/; many more drivers/ to go) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: Remove unneeded k[cm]alloc() return value castsJesper Juhl2006-01-101-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | Remove redundant casts of k*alloc() return values in security/selinux/ss/services.c Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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