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* KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zeroMark Rutland2017-06-091-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc() will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero. Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to be freed behind our back. This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment atomically. Fixes: fff292914d3a2f1e ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP APIMat Martineau2017-06-092-103/+171
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration. This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly alignedEric Biggers2017-06-091-13/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules. Just make the counter a __be32 instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDFEric Biggers2017-06-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it. Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with EFAULT in this scenario). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hashEric Biggers2017-06-091-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0. Fix it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeingEric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this: "Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact, just be a value stored in the struct key itself." In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to determine which keys have recently been in use. This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key materialEric Biggers2017-06-091-28/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key materialEric Biggers2017-06-091-18/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys derived from the master key. Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information does not necessarily need to be kept secret. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloadsEric Biggers2017-06-091-4/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them. This prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab caches after a key is released. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloadsEric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to hold the key payload copied from userspace. This may contain sensitive key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()Eric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | key_update() freed the key_preparsed_payload even if it was not initialized first. This would cause a crash if userspace called keyctl_update() on a key with type like "asymmetric" that has a ->preparse() method but not an ->update() method. Possibly it could even be triggered for other key types by racing with keyctl_setperm() to make the KEY_NEED_WRITE check fail (the permission was already checked, so normally it wouldn't fail there). Reproducer with key type "asymmetric", given a valid cert.der: keyctl new_session keyid=$(keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s < cert.der) keyctl setperm $keyid 0x3f000000 keyctl update $keyid data [ 150.686666] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001 [ 150.687601] IP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 [ 150.688139] PGD 38a3d067 [ 150.688141] PUD 3b3de067 [ 150.688447] PMD 0 [ 150.688745] [ 150.689160] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 150.689455] Modules linked in: [ 150.689769] CPU: 1 PID: 2478 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-xfstests-00187-ga9f6b6b8cd2f #742 [ 150.690916] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014 [ 150.692199] task: ffff88003b30c480 task.stack: ffffc90000350000 [ 150.692952] RIP: 0010:asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 [ 150.693556] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000353e58 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 150.694142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 150.694845] RDX: ffffffff81ee3920 RSI: ffff88003d4b0700 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 150.697569] RBP: ffffc90000353e60 R08: ffff88003d5d2140 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 150.702483] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 150.707393] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: ffff880038a4d2d8 R15: 000000000040411f [ 150.709720] FS: 00007fcbcee35700(0000) GS:ffff88003fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 150.711504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 150.712733] CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 0000000039eab000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 [ 150.714487] Call Trace: [ 150.714975] asymmetric_key_free_preparse+0x2f/0x40 [ 150.715907] key_update+0xf7/0x140 [ 150.716560] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [ 150.717319] keyctl_update_key+0xb0/0xe0 [ 150.718066] SyS_keyctl+0x109/0x130 [ 150.718663] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 [ 150.719440] RIP: 0033:0x7fcbce75ff19 [ 150.719926] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5d167088 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa [ 150.720918] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000404d80 RCX: 00007fcbce75ff19 [ 150.721874] RDX: 00007ffd5d16785e RSI: 000000002866cd36 RDI: 0000000000000002 [ 150.722827] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000000002866cd36 R09: 00007ffd5d16785e [ 150.723781] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000404d80 [ 150.724650] R13: 00007ffd5d16784d R14: 00007ffd5d167238 R15: 000000000040411f [ 150.725447] Code: 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 74 23 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb <48> 8b 3f e8 06 21 c5 ff 48 8b 7b 08 e8 fd 20 c5 ff 48 89 df e8 [ 150.727489] RIP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 RSP: ffffc90000353e58 [ 150.728117] CR2: 0000000000000001 [ 150.728430] ---[ end trace f7f8fe1da2d5ae8d ]--- Fixes: 4d8c0250b841 ("KEYS: Call ->free_preparse() even after ->preparse() returns an error") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero lengthEric Biggers2017-06-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's ->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparisonEric Biggers2017-06-091-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent timing attacks. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: fix race causing incorrect HMAC calculationsEric Biggers2017-06-091-83/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform, which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes. The following script reproduces the bug: keyctl new_session keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s for i in $(seq 2); do ( set -e for j in $(seq 1000); do keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s) datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s) keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null done ) & done Output with bug: [ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22) add_key: Invalid argument add_key: Invalid argument Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()Eric Biggers2017-06-091-16/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffersEric Biggers2017-06-091-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the decryption padding. Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y: keyctl new_session keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s) datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" keyctl unlink $keyid keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s) datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" [ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!" Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() failsEric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new error label at which the keyring reference is dropped. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in ↵Markus Elfring2017-06-091-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | get_derived_key() Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in this function. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Link: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/LCJ16-Refactor_Strings-WSang_0.pdf Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* security: use READ_ONCE instead of deprecated ACCESS_ONCEDavidlohr Bueso2017-06-091-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the new standardized functions, we can replace all ACCESS_ONCE() calls across relevant security/keyrings/. ACCESS_ONCE() does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For example gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such accesses during the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145 Update the new calls regardless of if it is a scalar type, this is cleaner than having three alternatives. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* security/keys: add CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT to KconfigBilal Amarni2017-06-091-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT is defined in arch-specific Kconfigs and is missing for several 64-bit architectures : mips, parisc, tile. At the moment and for those architectures, calling in 32-bit userspace the keyctl syscall would return an ENOSYS error. This patch moves the CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT option to security/keys/Kconfig, to make sure the compatibility wrapper is registered by default for any 64-bit architecture as long as it is configured with CONFIG_COMPAT. [DH: Modified to remove arm64 compat enablement also as requested by Eric Biggers] Signed-off-by: Bilal Amarni <bilal.amarni@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-05-093-4/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this pile, sorry" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs/affs: add rename exchange fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx() fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu() fs: completely ignore unknown open flags fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS fs: remove _submit_bh() fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super() fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks fs/affs: remove node generation check fs/affs: import amigaffs.h fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
| * fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()Eric Biggers2017-04-263-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection. This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also constifies tree_descr.name. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | apparmorfs: replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time()Deepa Dinamani2017-05-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CURRENT_TIME macro is not y2038 safe on 32 bit systems. The patch replaces all the uses of CURRENT_TIME by current_time(). This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe. current_time() is also planned to be transitioned to y2038 safe behavior along with this change. CURRENT_TIME macro will be deleted before merging the aforementioned change. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-11-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | treewide: use kv[mz]alloc* rather than opencoded variantsMichal Hocko2017-05-081-16/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are many code paths opencoding kvmalloc. Let's use the helper instead. The main difference to kvmalloc is that those users are usually not considering all the aspects of the memory allocator. E.g. allocation requests <= 32kB (with 4kB pages) are basically never failing and invoke OOM killer to satisfy the allocation. This sounds too disruptive for something that has a reasonable fallback - the vmalloc. On the other hand those requests might fallback to vmalloc even when the memory allocator would succeed after several more reclaim/compaction attempts previously. There is no guarantee something like that happens though. This patch converts many of those places to kv[mz]alloc* helpers because they are more conservative. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103327.2766-2-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> # Xen bits Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com> # Lustre Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> # KVM/s390 Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> # nvdim Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> # btrfs Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # Ceph Acked-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> # mlx4 Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # mlx5 Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: Santosh Raspatur <santosh@chelsio.com> Cc: Hariprasad S <hariprasad@chelsio.com> Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com> Cc: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com> Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | mm: introduce kv[mz]alloc helpersMichal Hocko2017-05-085-44/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Patch series "kvmalloc", v5. There are many open coded kmalloc with vmalloc fallback instances in the tree. Most of them are not careful enough or simply do not care about the underlying semantic of the kmalloc/page allocator which means that a) some vmalloc fallbacks are basically unreachable because the kmalloc part will keep retrying until it succeeds b) the page allocator can invoke a really disruptive steps like the OOM killer to move forward which doesn't sound appropriate when we consider that the vmalloc fallback is available. As it can be seen implementing kvmalloc requires quite an intimate knowledge if the page allocator and the memory reclaim internals which strongly suggests that a helper should be implemented in the memory subsystem proper. Most callers, I could find, have been converted to use the helper instead. This is patch 6. There are some more relying on __GFP_REPEAT in the networking stack which I have converted as well and Eric Dumazet was not opposed [2] to convert them as well. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170130094940.13546-1-mhocko@kernel.org [2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485273626.16328.301.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com This patch (of 9): Using kmalloc with the vmalloc fallback for larger allocations is a common pattern in the kernel code. Yet we do not have any common helper for that and so users have invented their own helpers. Some of them are really creative when doing so. Let's just add kv[mz]alloc and make sure it is implemented properly. This implementation makes sure to not make a large memory pressure for > PAGE_SZE requests (__GFP_NORETRY) and also to not warn about allocation failures. This also rules out the OOM killer as the vmalloc is a more approapriate fallback than a disruptive user visible action. This patch also changes some existing users and removes helpers which are specific for them. In some cases this is not possible (e.g. ext4_kvmalloc, libcfs_kvzalloc) because those seems to be broken and require GFP_NO{FS,IO} context which is not vmalloc compatible in general (note that the page table allocation is GFP_KERNEL). Those need to be fixed separately. While we are at it, document that __vmalloc{_node} about unsupported gfp mask because there seems to be a lot of confusion out there. kvmalloc_node will warn about GFP_KERNEL incompatible (which are not superset) flags to catch new abusers. Existing ones would have to die slowly. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: f2fs fixup] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320163735.332e64b7@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103032.2540-2-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> [ext4 part] Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-05-0341-590/+851
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: IMA: - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules KEYS: - add a system blacklist keyring - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction functionality to userland via keyctl() LSM: - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux - revive security_task_alloc hook TPM: - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits) tpm: Fix reference count to main device tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836 apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls(). smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str() KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type ...
| * \ Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris2017-04-192-34/+94
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
| | * | ima: provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules.Mikhail Kurinnoi2017-03-131-28/+87
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For now we have only "=" operator for fowner/uid/euid rules. This patch provide two more operators - ">" and "<" in order to make fowner/uid/euid rules more flexible. Examples of usage. Appraise all files owned by special and system users (SYS_UID_MAX 999): appraise fowner<1000 Don't appraise files owned by normal users (UID_MIN 1000): dont_appraise fowner>999 Appraise all files owned by users with UID 1000-1010: dont_appraise fowner>1010 appraise fowner>999 Changelog v3: - Removed code duplication in ima_parse_rule(). - Fix ima_policy_show() - (Mimi) Changelog v2: - Fixed default policy rules. Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
| | * | ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILEDaniel Glöckner2017-03-071-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created, is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed, verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file already existed. With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to open testfile: $ rm -f testfile $ ( echo test >&3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3>testfile A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital signature demanded by the policy. Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner <dg@emlix.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | integrity: mark default IMA rules as __ro_after_initJames Morris2017-03-061-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The default IMA rules are loaded during init and then do not change, so mark them as __ro_after_init. Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.12' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into ↵James Morris2017-04-192-4/+2
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | next
| | * | | Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().Tetsuo Handa2017-04-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since all callers of smk_netlbl_mls() are GFP_KERNEL context (smk_set_cipso() calls memdup_user_nul(), init_smk_fs() calls __kernfs_new_node(), smk_import_entry() calls kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)), it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from netlbl_catmap_setbit(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()Tetsuo Handa2017-04-041-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> fixes: 3bf2789cad9e6573 ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data") Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com> Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | | Merge branch 'stable-4.12' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2017-04-198-60/+57
| |\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | | selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bugDan Carpenter2017-03-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably required. The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker does. Fixes: 9c312e79d6af ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Remove unnecessary check of array base in selinux_set_mapping()Matthias Kaehlcke2017-03-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array of u32 values. This fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array 'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion] while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) { Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinuxfs: Use seq_puts() in sel_avc_stats_seq_show()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A string which did not contain data format specifications should be put into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function "seq_puts". This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Adjust two checks for null pointersMarkus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following. Comparison to NULL could be written !… Thus fix affected source code places. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Use kmalloc_array() in sidtab_init()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation indicated that an array data structure should be processed. Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array". This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in roles_init()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in perm_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in common_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in class_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in role_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in type_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in user_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Improve another size determination in sens_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size determination a bit safer according to the Linux coding style convention. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in sens_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in cat_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | | selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()Markus Elfring2017-03-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The local variable "rt" will be set to an appropriate pointer a bit later. Thus omit the explicit initialisation at the beginning which became unnecessary with a previous update step. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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