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* mm: mark most vm_operations_struct constKirill A. Shutemov2015-09-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct structs should be constant. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-09-0820-362/+1732
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea. ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora ** - Smack - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data - SELinux: - add ioctl whitelisting (see http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf) - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change - Seccomp: - add ptrace options for suspend/resume" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits) PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore modsign: Handle signing key in source tree modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key Move certificate handling to its own directory sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer PKCS#7: Check content type and versions MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved ...
| * Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into nextJames Morris2015-08-1512-110/+907
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| | * selinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label [ver #3]David Howells2015-07-131-46/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create a common helper function to determine the label for a new inode. This is then used by: - may_create() - selinux_dentry_init_security() - selinux_inode_init_security() This will change the behaviour of the functions slightly, bringing them all into line. Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * selinux: Augment BUG_ON assertion for secclass_map.Stephen Smalley2015-07-131-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ensure that we catch any cases where tclass == 0. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * selinux: initialize sock security class to default valueStephen Smalley2015-07-131-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Initialize the security class of sock security structures to the generic socket class. This is similar to what is already done in inode_alloc_security for files. Generally the sclass field will later by set by socket_post_create or sk_clone or sock_graft, but for protocol implementations that fail to call any of these for newly accepted sockets, we want some sane default that will yield a legitimate avc denied message with non-garbage values for class and permission. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * selinux: reduce locking overhead in inode_free_security()Waiman Long2015-07-131-3/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The inode_free_security() function just took the superblock's isec_lock before checking and trying to remove the inode security struct from the linked list. In many cases, the list was empty and so the lock taking is wasteful as no useful work is done. On multi-socket systems with a large number of CPUs, there can also be a fair amount of spinlock contention on the isec_lock if many tasks are exiting at the same time. This patch changes the code to check the state of the list first before taking the lock and attempting to dequeue it. The list_del_init() can be called more than once on the same list with no harm as long as they are properly serialized. It should not be possible to have inode_free_security() called concurrently with list_add(). For better safety, however, we use list_empty_careful() here even though it is still not completely safe in case that happens. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * selinux: extended permissions for ioctlsJeff Vander Stoep2015-07-1311-60/+834
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * security: add ioctl specific auditing to lsm_auditJeff Vander Stoep2015-07-131-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add information about ioctl calls to the LSM audit data. Log the file path and command number. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2015-08-141-14/+18
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfiguredCasey Schaufler2015-08-121-14/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues that were bothering me. Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2015-08-114-208/+807
| |\ \ \ | | |/ / | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | Kernel threads excluded from smack checksRoman Kubiak2015-08-101-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adds an ignore case for kernel tasks, so that they can access all resources. Since kernel worker threads are spawned with floor label, they are severely restricted by Smack policy. It is not an issue without onlycap, as these processes also run with root, so CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE kicks in. But with onlycap turned on, there is no way to change the label for these processes. Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | Smack: Three symbols that should be staticCasey Schaufler2015-07-312-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kbuild test robot reported a couple of these, and the third showed up by inspection. Making the symbols static is proper. Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | Smack: IPv6 host labelingCasey Schaufler2015-07-283-160/+578
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses. This patch also cleans up some of the conditional compilation associated with the introduction of secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit of code goes with which feature. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | sysfs: fix simple_return.cocci warningskbuild test robot2015-07-221-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security/smack/smackfs.c:2251:1-4: WARNING: end returns can be simpified and declaration on line 2250 can be dropped Simplify a trivial if-return sequence. Possibly combine with a preceding function call. Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/simple_return.cocci Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount dataVivek Trivedi2015-07-222-40/+219
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for setting smack mount labels(using smackfsdef, smackfsroot, smackfshat, smackfsfloor, smackfstransmute) for filesystems with binary mount data like NFS. To achieve this, implement sb_parse_opts_str and sb_set_mnt_opts security operations in smack LSM similar to SELinux. Signed-off-by: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | Yama: remove needless CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKEDKees Cook2015-07-284-43/+14
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively a no-op change. Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | | fs: create and use seq_show_option for escapingKees Cook2015-09-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or in other situations with delegated mount privileges. Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use of "sudo" is something more sneaky: $ BASE="ovl" $ MNT="$BASE/mnt" $ LOW="$BASE/lower" $ UP="$BASE/upper" $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000" $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK" $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt $ cat /proc/mounts none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0 $ fusermount -u /proc $ cat /proc/mounts cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees] [keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | capabilities: add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISEAndy Lutomirski2015-09-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes from adding capabilities to their ambient set. For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than just disabling setting previously cleared bits. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | capabilities: ambient capabilitiesAndy Lutomirski2015-09-042-10/+93
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based on Christoph's patch. ===== The status quo ===== On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that they hold. Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP), inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify what capabilities can be in pE. Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI. If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it can remove capabilities from X. Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1]. If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP) and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2]. File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them. A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are: pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) X is unchanged For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently (primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP are empty and fE is false. As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set, LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc. This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged program to change its security state in a way that persists cross execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped programs to be exploited for privilege escalation. ===== The problem ===== Capability inheritance is basically useless. If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated capabilities if you aren't root. On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems. If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with secure exec rules, breaking many things. This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use capabilities for anything useful. ===== The proposed change ===== This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA). pA does what most people expect pI to do. pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore, setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can re-add bits to pA afterwards. The capability evolution rules are changed: pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA) pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA') X is unchanged If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah! Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace) and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less impossible. Hallelujah! You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch. Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping privileges will still work. It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker *already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though -- setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so, and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more paranoid route. We can revisit this later. An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than it is with this patch. ===== Footnotes ===== [1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false. The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason. [2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask; it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who has tried to use file capabilities. [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly discarded. Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2 Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality (from Christoph): /* * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities. * * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> * Released under: GPL v3 or later. * * * Compile using: * * gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng * * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly: * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE * * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is: * * setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test * * * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes: * * ./ambient_test /bin/bash * * * Verifying that it works: * * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run * * cat /proc/$$/status * * and have a look at the capabilities. */ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <cap-ng.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <linux/capability.h> /* * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed * when the /usr/include files have these defined. */ #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 static void set_ambient_cap(int cap) { int rc; capng_get_caps_process(); rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap); if (rc) { printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n"); exit(2); } capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS); /* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) { perror("Cannot set cap"); exit(1); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc; set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW); set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN); set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE); printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n"); if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1)) perror("Cannot exec"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-09-011-1/+1
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start implementing executable files, as the there are application today that are only secure because such files do not exist. It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from /proc/<pid>/ns/*. It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel. Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application, by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted on /sys/fs/cgroup. The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch. and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0. userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing. unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
| * | | vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.Eric W. Biederman2015-07-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and enforce that flag. Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the execute bit is cleared. The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | | | Merge branch 'core-rcu-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-08-311-3/+3
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main RCU changes in this cycle are: - the combination of tree geometry-initialization simplifications and OS-jitter-reduction changes to expedited grace periods. These two are stacked due to the large number of conflicts that would otherwise result. - privatize smp_mb__after_unlock_lock(). This commit moves the definition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() to kernel/rcu/tree.h, in recognition of the fact that RCU is the only thing using this, that nothing else is likely to use it, and that it is likely to go away completely. - documentation updates. - torture-test updates. - misc fixes" * 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits) rcu,locking: Privatize smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() rcu: Silence lockdep false positive for expedited grace periods rcu: Don't disable CPU hotplug during OOM notifiers scripts: Make checkpatch.pl warn on expedited RCU grace periods rcu: Update MAINTAINERS entry rcu: Clarify CONFIG_RCU_EQS_DEBUG help text rcu: Fix backwards RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() in synchronize_rcu_tasks() rcu: Rename rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() rcu: Make rcu_is_watching() really notrace cpu: Wait for RCU grace periods concurrently rcu: Create a synchronize_rcu_mult() rcu: Fix obsolete priority-boosting comment rcu: Use WRITE_ONCE in RCU_INIT_POINTER rcu: Hide RCU_NOCB_CPU behind RCU_EXPERT rcu: Add RCU-sched flavors of get-state and cond-sync rcu: Add fastpath bypassing funnel locking rcu: Rename RCU_GP_DONE_FQS to RCU_GP_DOING_FQS rcu: Pull out wait_event*() condition into helper function documentation: Describe new expedited stall warnings rcu: Add stall warnings to synchronize_sched_expedited() ...
| * \ \ \ Merge branch 'for-mingo' of ↵Ingo Molnar2015-08-121-3/+3
| |\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu Pull RCU changes from Paul E. McKenney: - The combination of tree geometry-initialization simplifications and OS-jitter-reduction changes to expedited grace periods. These two are stacked due to the large number of conflicts that would otherwise result. [ With one addition, a temporary commit to silence a lockdep false positive. Additional changes to the expedited grace-period primitives (queued for 4.4) remove the cause of this false positive, and therefore include a revert of this temporary commit. ] - Documentation updates. - Torture-test updates. - Miscellaneous fixes. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| | * | | | rcu: Rename rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN()Paul E. McKenney2015-07-221-3/+3
| | |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit renames rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() for consistency with the WARN() series of macros. This also requires inverting the sense of the conditional, which this commit also does. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | | | | LSM: restore certain default error codesJan Beulich2015-08-261-5/+6
|/ / / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While in most cases commit b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") retained previous error returns, in three cases it altered them without any explanation in the commit message. Restore all of them - in the security_old_inode_init_security() case this led to reiserfs using uninitialized data, sooner or later crashing the system (the only other user of this function - ocfs2 - was unaffected afaict, since it passes pre-initialized structures). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | | | Adding YAMA hooks also when YAMA is not stacked.Salvatore Mesoraca2015-08-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Without this patch YAMA will not work at all if it is chosen as the primary LSM instead of being "stacked". Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | | | KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is validColin Ian King2015-07-281-3/+5
| |/ / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | __key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical existing key is added with add_key(). The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through __key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit. CVE-2015-1333 Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | | Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2015-07-112-1/+8
|\ \ \ | |/ / |/| / | |/ into for-linus2
| * selinux: fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm changeStephen Smalley2015-07-101-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 66fc13039422ba7df2d01a8ee0873e4ef965b50b ("mm: shmem_zero_setup skip security check and lockdep conflict with XFS") caused a regression for SELinux by disabling any SELinux checking of mprotect PROT_EXEC on shared anonymous mappings. However, even before that regression, the checking on such mprotect PROT_EXEC calls was inconsistent with the checking on a mmap PROT_EXEC call for a shared anonymous mapping. On a mmap, the security hook is passed a NULL file and knows it is dealing with an anonymous mapping and therefore applies an execmem check and no file checks. On a mprotect, the security hook is passed a vma with a non-NULL vm_file (as this was set from the internally-created shmem file during mmap) and therefore applies the file-based execute check and no execmem check. Since the aforementioned commit now marks the shmem zero inode with the S_PRIVATE flag, the file checks are disabled and we have no checking at all on mprotect PROT_EXEC. Add a test to the mprotect hook logic for such private inodes, and apply an execmem check in that case. This makes the mmap and mprotect checking consistent for shared anonymous mappings, as well as for /dev/zero and ashmem. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1.x Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: don't waste ebitmap space when importing NetLabel categoriesPaul Moore2015-07-091-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At present we don't create efficient ebitmaps when importing NetLabel category bitmaps. This can present a problem when comparing ebitmaps since ebitmap_cmp() is very strict about these things and considers these wasteful ebitmaps not equal when compared to their more efficient counterparts, even if their values are the same. This isn't likely to cause problems on 64-bit systems due to a bit of luck on how NetLabel/CIPSO works and the default ebitmap size, but it can be a problem on 32-bit systems. This patch fixes this problem by being a bit more intelligent when importing NetLabel category bitmaps by skipping over empty sections which should result in a nice, efficient ebitmap. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-07-041-13/+6
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related stuff). UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle). 9P fixes. fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work" [ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups". The file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge. - Linus ] * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits) 9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write} p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req() 9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache dax: Add block size note to documentation fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install() fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino namei: make set_root_rcu() return void make simple_positive() public ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages() pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there remove the pointless include of lglock.h fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything ...
| * | make simple_positive() publicAl Viro2015-06-231-13/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-07-033-16/+13
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all. Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced. There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount points on proc and sysfs that are created specially. This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime, read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid attributes remains for another time. This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was converted) and is not now actively wrong. There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that I will mention briefly. It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount. At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the performance part of pathname resolution. As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once they are recognized" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points. kernfs: Add support for always empty directories. proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints. fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories. vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
| * | | sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_pointEric W. Biederman2015-07-013-16/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows for better documentation in the code and it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of fs_fully_visible to be written. The mount points converted and their filesystems are: /sys/hypervisor/s390/ s390_hypfs /sys/kernel/config/ configfs /sys/kernel/debug/ debugfs /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ efivarfs /sys/fs/fuse/connections/ fusectl /sys/fs/pstore/ pstore /sys/kernel/tracing/ tracefs /sys/fs/cgroup/ cgroup /sys/kernel/security/ securityfs /sys/fs/selinux/ selinuxfs /sys/fs/smackfs/ smackfs Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | | | Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-07-012-4/+4
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux Pull module updates from Rusty Russell: "Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization to speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module lock doing that too. A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load another module (yeah, really). Unfortunately that broke the usual suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were appended too" * tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits) modules: only use mod->param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS. rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() module: add per-module param_lock module: make perm const params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes. modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'. kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks module: Rework module_addr_{min,max} module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup() module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch() ...
| * | | | kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops usesLuis R. Rodriguez2015-05-282-4/+4
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops, sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle. In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request. Test compiled on x86_64 against: * allnoconfig * allmodconfig * allyesconfig @ const_found @ identifier ops; @@ const struct kernel_param_ops ops = { }; @ const_not_found depends on !const_found @ identifier ops; @@ -struct kernel_param_ops ops = { +const struct kernel_param_ops ops = { }; Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* | | | Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/auditLinus Torvalds2015-06-271-1/+1
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Four small audit patches for v4.2, all bug fixes. Only 10 lines of change this time so very unremarkable, the patch subject lines pretty much tell the whole story" * 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit: audit: Fix check of return value of strnlen_user() audit: obsolete audit_context check is removed in audit_filter_rules() audit: fix for typo in comment to function audit_log_link_denied() lsm: rename duplicate labels in LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK audit message type
| * | | | lsm: rename duplicate labels in LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK audit message typeRichard Guy Briggs2015-05-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK pid= and comm= labels are duplicates of those at the start of this function with different values. Rename them to their object counterparts opid= and ocomm= to disambiguate. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: minor merging needed due to differences in the tree] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | | | | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-06-2728-2427/+1767
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking, allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor). See https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/ This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits) tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add() vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level. ima: update builtin policies ima: extend "mask" policy matching support ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii() Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj() selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS selinux: Remove unused permission definitions selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files. selinux: update netlink socket classes signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds() selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation() ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter ...
| * | | | | ima: update builtin policiesMimi Zohar2015-06-161-9/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch defines a builtin measurement policy "tcb", similar to the existing "ima_tcb", but with additional rules to also measure files based on the effective uid and to measure files opened with the "read" mode bit set (eg. read, read-write). Changing the builtin "ima_tcb" policy could potentially break existing users. Instead of defining a new separate boot command line option each time the builtin measurement policy is modified, this patch defines a single generic boot command line option "ima_policy=" to specify the builtin policy and deprecates the use of the builtin ima_tcb policy. [The "ima_policy=" boot command line option is based on Roberto Sassu's "ima: added new policy type exec" patch.] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
| * | | | | ima: extend "mask" policy matching supportMimi Zohar2015-06-161-5/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC. This patch extends the "mask" option to match files opened containing one of these modes. For example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
| * | | | | ima: add support for new "euid" policy conditionMimi Zohar2015-06-161-4/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified effective uid (euid). In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures files with the specified uid or suid. Changelog: - fixed checkpatch.pl warnings - fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
| * | | | | ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()Mimi Zohar2015-06-163-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng". Changelog: - change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13
| * | | | | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.2-stacked' of ↵James Morris2015-06-131-7/+9
| |\ \ \ \ \ | | |_|_|_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into next
| | * | | | Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()Dan Carpenter2015-06-121-7/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This code used to rely on the fact that kfree(NULL) was a no-op, but then we changed smk_parse_smack() to return error pointers on failure instead of NULL. Calling kfree() on an error pointer will oops. I have re-arranged things a bit so that we only free things if they have been allocated. Fixes: e774ad683f42 ('smack: pass error code through pointers') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
| * | | | | selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFSJ. Bruce Fields2015-06-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Before calling into the filesystem, vfs_setxattr calls security_inode_setxattr, which ends up calling selinux_inode_setxattr in our case. That returns -EOPNOTSUPP whenever SBLABEL_MNT is not set. SBLABEL_MNT was supposed to be set by sb_finish_set_opts, which sets it only if selinux_is_sblabel_mnt returns true. The selinux_is_sblabel_mnt logic was broken by eadcabc697e9 "SELinux: do all flags twiddling in one place", which didn't take into the account the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior that had been introduced for nfs with eb9ae686507b "SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels". This caused setxattr's of security labels over NFSv4.2 to fail. Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.13 Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com> Reported-by: Richard Chan <rc556677@outlook.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: added the stable dependency] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * | | | | selinux: Remove unused permission definitionsStephen Smalley2015-06-041-14/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux. Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0. Some of them were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and fully removed in Linux 2.6.30. Permissions never used in mainline Linux: file swapon filesystem transition tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom } node enforce_dest unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom } Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30: socket { recv_msg send_msg } node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send } netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send } Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * | | | | selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore filesStephen Smalley2015-06-041-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Support per-file labeling of sysfs and pstore files based on genfscon policy entries. This is safe because the sysfs and pstore directory tree cannot be manipulated by userspace, except to unlink pstore entries. This provides an alternative method of assigning per-file labeling to sysfs or pstore files without needing to set the labels from userspace on each boot. The advantages of this approach are that the labels are assigned as soon as the dentry is first instantiated and userspace does not need to walk the sysfs or pstore tree and set the labels on each boot. The limitations of this approach are that the labels can only be assigned based on pathname prefix matching. You can initially assign labels using this mechanism and then change them at runtime via setxattr if allowed to do so by policy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Suggested-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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