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* move d_rcu from overlapping d_child to overlapping d_aliasAl Viro2014-11-031-3/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-04-031-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits) selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux evm: enable key retention service automatically ima: skip memory allocation for empty files evm: EVM does not use MD5 ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails integrity: fix checkpatch errors ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr security: integrity: Use a more current logging style MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm() fs: move i_readcount ima: use static const char array definitions security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error ima: new helper: file_inode(file) kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c capability: Use current logging styles ...
| * security: replace strict_strto*() with kstrto*()Jingoo Han2014-02-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be used. Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callersNikolay Aleksandrov2014-03-101-10/+18
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet and peer classes.Chris PeBenito2013-07-251-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules were maliciously flushed. Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or labeled IPSEC configuration. Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct. The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel change fell on the floor. Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* new helper: file_inode(file)Al Viro2013-02-221-12/+8
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* mm: kill vma flag VM_RESERVED and mm->reserved_vm counterKonstantin Khlebnikov2012-10-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A long time ago, in v2.4, VM_RESERVED kept swapout process off VMA, currently it lost original meaning but still has some effects: | effect | alternative flags -+------------------------+--------------------------------------------- 1| account as reserved_vm | VM_IO 2| skip in core dump | VM_IO, VM_DONTDUMP 3| do not merge or expand | VM_IO, VM_DONTEXPAND, VM_HUGETLB, VM_PFNMAP 4| do not mlock | VM_IO, VM_DONTEXPAND, VM_HUGETLB, VM_PFNMAP This patch removes reserved_vm counter from mm_struct. Seems like nobody cares about it, it does not exported into userspace directly, it only reduces total_vm showed in proc. Thus VM_RESERVED can be replaced with VM_IO or pair VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP. remap_pfn_range() and io_remap_pfn_range() set VM_IO|VM_DONTEXPAND|VM_DONTDUMP. remap_vmalloc_range() set VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c fixup] Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* userns: Convert selinux to use kuid and kgid where appropriateEric W. Biederman2012-09-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itselfAl Viro2012-07-231-3/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* selinuxfs snprintf() misusesAl Viro2012-05-291-29/+7
| | | | | | | | a) %d does _not_ produce a page worth of output b) snprintf() doesn't return negatives - it used to in old glibc, but that's the kernel... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent stateEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief that they are non-zero length. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> cc: stable@kernel.org
* SELinux: remove needless sel_div functionEric Paris2012-04-091-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's useless. Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0. That means that part of the function never does anything. Thus it's just a normal /. Just do that instead. I don't even understand what that operation was supposed to mean in the signed case however.... If it was signed: sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0)) ((0) - ((-2) < 0)) ((0) - (1)) (-1) What actually happens: sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0)) ((4611686018427387903) - ((2 < 0)) (4611686018427387903 - 0) ((unsigned int)4611686018427387903) (4294967295) Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me. So I'm getting rid of the function entirely. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: loosen DAC perms on reading policyEric Paris2012-04-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root only. There are selinux checks which should control this access. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: allow seek operations on the file exposing policyEric Paris2012-04-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | sesearch uses: lseek(3, 0, SEEK_SET) = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek) Make that work. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* selinuxfs: merge dentry allocation into sel_make_dir()Al Viro2012-03-311-66/+44
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* selinuxfs: remove custom hex_to_bin()Andy Shevchenko2011-11-161-10/+4
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink codeJames Morris2011-09-091-2/+0
| | | | | | Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfsJames Morris2011-09-091-1/+1
| | | | | | Fixes several sparse warnings for selinuxfs.c Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.hJames Morris2011-09-091-1/+0
| | | | | | Sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* doc: Update the email address for Paul Moore in various source filesPaul Moore2011-08-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have to worry about doing this again any time soon. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* VFS : mount lock scalability for internal mountsTim Chen2011-07-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For a number of file systems that don't have a mount point (e.g. sockfs and pipefs), they are not marked as long term. Therefore in mntput_no_expire, all locks in vfs_mount lock are taken instead of just local cpu's lock to aggregate reference counts when we release reference to file objects. In fact, only local lock need to have been taken to update ref counts as these file systems are in no danger of going away until we are ready to unregister them. The attached patch marks file systems using kern_mount without mount point as long term. The contentions of vfs_mount lock is now eliminated. Before un-registering such file system, kern_unmount should be called to remove the long term flag and make the mount point ready to be freed. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux ↵James Morris2011-06-151-1/+36
|\ | | | | | | into for-linus
| * selinux: fix case of names with whitespace/multibytes on /selinux/createKohei Kaigai2011-05-261-1/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I submit the patch again, according to patch submission convension. This patch enables to accept percent-encoded object names as forth argument of /selinux/create interface to avoid possible bugs when we give an object name including whitespace or multibutes. E.g) if and when a userspace object manager tries to create a new object named as "resolve.conf but fake", it shall give this name as the forth argument of the /selinux/create. But sscanf() logic in kernel space fetches only the part earlier than the first whitespace. In this case, selinux may unexpectedly answer a default security context configured to "resolve.conf", but it is bug. Although I could not test this patch on named TYPE_TRANSITION rules actually, But debug printk() message seems to me the logic works correctly. I assume the libselinux provides an interface to apply this logic transparently, so nothing shall not be changed from the viewpoint of application. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@emea.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into ↵James Morris2011-05-241-3/+25
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | for-linus Conflicts: lib/flex_array.c security/selinux/avc.c security/selinux/hooks.c security/selinux/ss/policydb.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c Manually resolve conflicts. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELINUX: add /sys/fs/selinux mount point to put selinuxfsGreg Kroah-Hartman2011-05-111-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the interest of keeping userspace from having to create new root filesystems all the time, let's follow the lead of the other in-kernel filesystems and provide a proper mount point for it in sysfs. For selinuxfs, this mount point should be in /sys/fs/selinux/ Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzerqung@0pointer.de> Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> [include kobject.h - Eric Paris] [use selinuxfs_obj throughout - Eric Paris] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: add type_transition with name extension support for selinuxfsKohei Kaigai2011-04-011-2/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object managers. If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel. In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched kernel. Thanks, Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@eu.nec.com> [manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-05-231-4/+4
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (39 commits) b43: fix comment typo reqest -> request Haavard Skinnemoen has left Atmel cris: typo in mach-fs Makefile Kconfig: fix copy/paste-ism for dell-wmi-aio driver doc: timers-howto: fix a typo ("unsgined") perf: Only include annotate.h once in tools/perf/util/ui/browsers/annotate.c md, raid5: Fix spelling error in comment ('Ofcourse' --> 'Of course'). treewide: fix a few typos in comments regulator: change debug statement be consistent with the style of the rest Revert "arm: mach-u300/gpio: Fix mem_region resource size miscalculations" audit: acquire creds selectively to reduce atomic op overhead rtlwifi: don't touch with treewide double semicolon removal treewide: cleanup continuations and remove logging message whitespace ath9k_hw: don't touch with treewide double semicolon removal include/linux/leds-regulator.h: fix syntax in example code tty: fix typo in descripton of tty_termios_encode_baud_rate xtensa: remove obsolete BKL kernel option from defconfig m68k: fix comment typo 'occcured' arch:Kconfig.locks Remove unused config option. treewide: remove extra semicolons ...
| * | treewide: remove extra semicolonsJustin P. Mattock2011-04-101-4/+4
| |/ | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* | selinux: avoid unnecessary avc cache stat hit countLinus Torvalds2011-05-191-3/+7
|/ | | | | | | | | | There is no point in counting hits - we can calculate it from the number of lookups and misses. This makes the avc statistics a bit smaller, and makes the code generation better too. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-01-101-338/+311
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| * SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfsEric Paris2010-11-301-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinuxfs carefully uses i_ino to figure out what the inode refers to. The VFS used to generically set this value and we would reset it to something useable. After 85fe4025c616 each filesystem sets this value to a default if needed. Since selinuxfs doesn't use the default value and it can only lead to problems (I'd rather have 2 inodes with i_ino == 0 than one pointing to the wrong data) lets just stop setting a default. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.cEric Paris2010-11-301-337/+311
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on error. For the most part transition to rc=errno if (failure) goto out; [...] out: cleanup() return rc; Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex functions which have cleanup routines on error. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | fs: dcache rationalise dget variantsNick Piggin2011-01-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | dget_locked was a shortcut to avoid the lazy lru manipulation when we already held dcache_lock (lru manipulation was relatively cheap at that point). However, how that the lru lock is an innermost one, we never hold it at any caller, so the lock cost can now be avoided. We already have well working lazy dcache LRU, so it should be fine to defer LRU manipulations to scan time. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
* | fs: dcache remove dcache_lockNick Piggin2011-01-071-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | dcache_lock no longer protects anything. remove it. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
* | fs: dcache scale subdirsNick Piggin2011-01-071-2/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | Protect d_subdirs and d_child with d_lock, except in filesystems that aren't using dcache_lock for these anyway (eg. using i_mutex). Note: if we change the locking rule in future so that ->d_child protection is provided only with ->d_parent->d_lock, it may allow us to reduce some locking. But it would be an exception to an otherwise regular locking scheme, so we'd have to see some good results. Probably not worthwhile. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
* convert get_sb_single() usersAl Viro2010-10-291-5/+4
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: do not assign default i_ino in new_inodeChristoph Hellwig2010-10-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of always assigning an increasing inode number in new_inode move the call to assign it into those callers that actually need it. For now callers that need it is estimated conservatively, that is the call is added to all filesystems that do not assign an i_ino by themselves. For a few more filesystems we can avoid assigning any inode number given that they aren't user visible, and for others it could be done lazily when an inode number is actually needed, but that's left for later patches. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* selinux: implement mmap on /selinux/policyEric Paris2010-10-211-0/+44
| | | | | | | | /selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel. This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: allow userspace to read policy back out of the kernelEric Paris2010-10-211-0/+95
| | | | | | | | | | There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file /selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)KaiGai Kohei2010-10-211-0/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications read-only mmap(2). This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space. struct selinux_kernel_status { u32 length; /* length of this structure */ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */ }; When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce to keep consistency. However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process. In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache. If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own worker thread from the module. If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce. A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space. Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing mode, without any system call invocations. This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need to wait for a while if it is odd number. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: use generic_file_llseekArnd Bergmann2010-08-021-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | The default for llseek will change to no_llseek, so selinuxfs needs to add explicit .llseek assignments. Since we're dealing with regular files from a VFS perspective, use generic_file_llseek. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Security: Fix coding style in security/wzt.wzt@gmail.com2010-04-091-22/+22
| | | | | | | Fix coding style in security/ Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: fix memory leak in sel_make_boolsXiaotian Feng2010-02-091-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In sel_make_bools, kernel allocates memory for bool_pending_names[i] with security_get_bools. So if we just free bool_pending_names, those memories for bool_pending_names[i] will be leaked. This patch resolves dozens of following kmemleak report after resuming from suspend: unreferenced object 0xffff88022e4c7380 (size 32): comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294677173 backtrace: [<ffffffff810f76b5>] create_object+0x1a2/0x2a9 [<ffffffff810f78bb>] kmemleak_alloc+0x26/0x4b [<ffffffff810ef3eb>] __kmalloc+0x18f/0x1b8 [<ffffffff811cd511>] security_get_bools+0xd7/0x16f [<ffffffff811c48c0>] sel_write_load+0x12e/0x62b [<ffffffff810f9a39>] vfs_write+0xae/0x10b [<ffffffff810f9b56>] sys_write+0x4a/0x6e [<ffffffff81011b82>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: allow MLS->non-MLS and vice versa upon policy reloadGuido Trentalancia2010-02-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | Allow runtime switching between different policy types (e.g. from a MLS/MCS policy to a non-MLS/non-MCS policy or viceversa). Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: change the handling of unknown classesStephen Smalley2010-01-181-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If allow_unknown==deny, SELinux treats an undefined kernel security class as an error condition rather than as a typical permission denial and thus does not allow permissions on undefined classes even when in permissive mode. Change the SELinux logic so that this case is handled as a typical permission denial, subject to the usual permissive mode and permissive domain handling. Also drop the 'requested' argument from security_compute_av() and helpers as it is a legacy of the original security server interface and is unused. Changes: - Handle permissive domains consistently by moving up the test for a permissive domain. - Make security_compute_av_user() consistent with security_compute_av(); the only difference now is that security_compute_av() performs mapping between the kernel-private class and permission indices and the policy values. In the userspace case, this mapping is handled by libselinux. - Moved avd_init inside the policy lock. Based in part on a patch by Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>. Reported-by: Andrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: dynamic class/perm discoveryStephen Smalley2009-10-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_boolStephen Smalley2009-05-191-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On Tue, 2009-05-19 at 00:05 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote: > Recent versions of coreutils have bumped the read buffer size from 4K to > 32K in several of the utilities. > > This means that "cat /selinux/booleans/xserver_object_manager" no longer > works, it returns "Invalid argument" on F11. getsebool works fine. > > sel_read_bool has a check for "count > PAGE_SIZE" that doesn't seem to > be present in the other read functions. Maybe it could be removed? Yes, that check is obsoleted by the conversion of those functions to using simple_read_from_buffer(), which will reduce count if necessary to what is available in the buffer. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Permissive domain in userspace object managerKaiGai Kohei2009-04-021-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly. Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode, even if the global setting is enforcing mode. However, we don't have an application program interface to inform what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not. It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly. This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace. If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should allow any required actions, as the kernel doing. This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions without read_lock(&policy_rwlock). Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 30 +++++------------------------- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: Remove the "compat_net" compatibility codePaul Moore2009-03-281-68/+0
| | | | | | | | | | The SELinux "compat_net" is marked as deprecated, the time has come to finally remove it from the kernel. Further code simplifications are likely in the future, but this patch was intended to be a simple, straight-up removal of the compat_net code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: remove unused av.decided fieldEric Paris2009-02-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential performance win. We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space. This patch completely drops the av.decided concept. This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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