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* security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmapEric Paris2007-07-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to 0, preserving existing behavior. This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea) Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitionsStephen Smalley2007-04-261-179/+0
| | | | | | | | | Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission definitions and userland definitions may change. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [SELinux]: Add support for DCCPJames Morris2006-12-021-0/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP (http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers. The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of TCP. A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind, name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled networking is not, at this stage. Patches for SELinux userspace are at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/ I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real difference being that it's a different protocol. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Granular IPSec associations for use in MLS environmentsVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and security associations. This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System, traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to these security levels). This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with each association used in the security context it is defined for. It also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of appropriately labeled IPSec associations. Description of changes: A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on the inbound. Outbound case: 1. Find policy for the socket. 2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy. NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket. This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS, and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket. 3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found, create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE, include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE daemon. Inbound case: 1. OLD: Find policy for the socket. NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).) 2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with the policy sec_ctx-wise. (It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that this was being accomplished by (x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok, but it turns out tmpl->id.spi would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one at the template level, which they usually don't). NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(). Forward case: This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3 from the Outbound case. Outstanding items/issues: - Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed by this patch set. This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm policy rule. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr APIEric Paris2006-06-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same. I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label. I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label of the running process. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keysMichael LeMay2006-06-261-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystemMichael LeMay2006-06-221-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings within the SELinux initialization routine. Has passed David's testsuite. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [SECMARK]: Add new flask definitions to SELinuxJames Morris2006-06-171-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/ Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/ The code has been tested with various compilation options and in several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection tracking. This patch: Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for adding labeling rules. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [SELINUX]: add security class for appletalk socketsChristopher J. PeBenito2006-06-171-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be distinguished in SELinux policy. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Corrections to LSM-IPSec NethooksTrent Jaeger2006-01-061-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains two corrections to the LSM-IPsec Nethooks patches previously applied. (1) free a security context on a failed insert via xfrm_user interface in xfrm_add_policy. Memory leak. (2) change the authorization of the allocation of a security context in a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state from both relabelfrom and relabelto to setcontext. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Per-packet access control.Trent Jaeger2006-01-031-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies (xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the security association's negotiated and used have the same security context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such security contexts for policies and security associations. It also enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned. Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be sent in that manner. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used, then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet, respectively. The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via selinux_xfrm_state_alloc. When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone. When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or selinux_xfrm_state_free. Testing: The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We created policies and security associations with particular security contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no security context was supplied (which either did or did not use security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] selinux: add executable heap checkLorenzo Hernández García-Hierro2005-06-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous memory mapped in order to make it executable. The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs. making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed. The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at: http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: add executable stack checkLorenzo Hernandez García-Hierro2005-06-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is not passed the necessary information presently. The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for /proc/<pid>/maps markers. (http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2) The patches also can be found at: http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in order to support the execstack permission and exclude it from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te. kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: add finer grained permissions to Netlink audit processingJames Morris2005-05-011-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of Netlink sockets under SELinux. 1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux permission has been implemented and applied to the operation: nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read. 2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel, collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is written to the kernel. Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging, so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only used to check user->kernel messages). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENTJames Morris2005-04-161-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket class. Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+902
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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