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* security: Yama LSMKees Cook2012-02-101-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMimi Zohar2011-07-181-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
* AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security moduleJohn Johansen2010-08-021-0/+2
| | | | | | | Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* NOMMU: Optimise away the {dac_,}mmap_min_addr testsDavid Howells2009-12-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | In NOMMU mode clamp dac_mmap_min_addr to zero to cause the tests on it to be skipped by the compiler. We do this as the minimum mmap address doesn't make any sense in NOMMU mode. mmap_min_addr and round_hint_to_min() can be discarded entirely in NOMMU mode. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove root_plugJames Morris2009-10-201-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and increasingly broken in various ways. Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo! Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.hThomas Liu2009-08-171-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability. - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead. Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version behaves the same way as the unpatched version. Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space, once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the unpatched. I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after this patch. Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addrEric Paris2009-08-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Revert "SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h"James Morris2009-07-131-1/+3
| | | | | | | | This reverts commit 8113a8d80f4c6a3dc3724b39b470f3fee9c426b6. The patch causes a stack overflow on my system during boot. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.hThomas Liu2009-07-131-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability and for less code duplication. - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead. I have tested to make sure that the avcs look the same before and after this patch. Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* smack: implement logging V3Etienne Basset2009-04-141-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions. This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \ It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch : 0: no logging 1: log denied (default) 2: log accepted 3: log denied&accepted Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: change link order of LSMs so security=tomoyo worksJames Morris2009-02-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | LSMs need to be linked before root_plug to ensure the security= boot parameter works with them. Do this for Tomoyo. (root_plug probably needs to be taken out and shot at some point, too). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Kconfig and MakefileKentaro Takeda2009-02-121-0/+2
| | | | | | | | TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: IMA as an integrity service providerMimi Zohar2009-02-061-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITYEric Paris2008-08-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the full LSM needs to be built to build this fs. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dummy moduleMiklos Szeredi2008-07-141-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default. Compile and boot tested. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* cgroups: implement device whitelistSerge E. Hallyn2008-04-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement a cgroup to track and enforce open and mknod restrictions on device files. A device cgroup associates a device access whitelist with each cgroup. A whitelist entry has 4 fields. 'type' is a (all), c (char), or b (block). 'all' means it applies to all types and all major and minor numbers. Major and minor are either an integer or * for all. Access is a composition of r (read), w (write), and m (mknod). The root device cgroup starts with rwm to 'all'. A child devcg gets a copy of the parent. Admins can then remove devices from the whitelist or add new entries. A child cgroup can never receive a device access which is denied its parent. However when a device access is removed from a parent it will not also be removed from the child(ren). An entry is added using devices.allow, and removed using devices.deny. For instance echo 'c 1:3 mr' > /cgroups/1/devices.allow allows cgroup 1 to read and mknod the device usually known as /dev/null. Doing echo a > /cgroups/1/devices.deny will remove the default 'a *:* mrw' entry. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to change permissions or move another task to a new cgroup. A cgroup may not be granted more permissions than the cgroup's parent has. Any task can move itself between cgroups. This won't be sufficient, but we can decide the best way to adequately restrict movement later. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix may-be-used-uninitialized warning] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Looks-good-to: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Daniel Hokka Zakrisson <daniel@hozac.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control KernelCasey Schaufler2008-02-051-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC, and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires an absolute minimum of application support and a very small amount of configuration data. Smack uses extended attributes and provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of system Smack attributes. The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script, and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on http://www.schaufler-ca.com Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine environment and on an old Sony laptop. Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not include "/". A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it. Smack defines and uses these labels: "*" - pronounced "star" "_" - pronounced "floor" "^" - pronounced "hat" "?" - pronounced "huh" The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order: 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" is permitted. 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" is permitted. 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same label is permitted. 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded rule set is permitted. 7. Any other access is denied. Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access triples to /smack/load. Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time of day. Some practical use cases: Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack to support this, these rules could be defined: C Unclass rx S C rx S Unclass rx TS S rx TS C rx TS Unclass rx A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it. An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it has to be explicitly stated. Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a subject cannot access an object with a different label no access rules are required to implement compartmentalization. A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated with this Smack access rule: A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does: ESPN ABC r ABC ESPN r On my portable video device I have two applications, one that shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which is just as well all things considered. Another case that I especially like: SatData Guard w Guard Publish w A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label. The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label. This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish file system object because file system semanitic require read as well as write. The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least for a while. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security moduleChris Wright2006-09-291-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer attention. Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around. It is time to remove this one. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] add securityfs for all LSMs to useGreg KH2005-07-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a small patch against 2.6.13-rc2 that adds securityfs, a virtual fs that all LSMs can use instead of creating their own. The fs should be mounted at /sys/kernel/security, and the fs creates that mount point. This will make the LSB people happy that we aren't creating a new /my_lsm_fs directory in the root for every different LSM. It has changed a bit since the last version, thanks to comments from Mike Waychison. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+19
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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