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* random32: avoid attempt to late reseed if in the middle of seedingSasha Levin2014-03-281-1/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 4af712e8df ("random32: add prandom_reseed_late() and call when nonblocking pool becomes initialized") has added a late reseed stage that happens as soon as the nonblocking pool is marked as initialized. This fails in the case that the nonblocking pool gets initialized during __prandom_reseed()'s call to get_random_bytes(). In that case we'd double back into __prandom_reseed() in an attempt to do a late reseed - deadlocking on 'lock' early on in the boot process. Instead, just avoid even waiting to do a reseed if a reseed is already occuring. Fixes: 4af712e8df99 ("random32: add prandom_reseed_late() and call when nonblocking pool becomes initialized") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: use msecs_to_jiffies for reseed timerDaniel Borkmann2013-11-141-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | Use msecs_to_jiffies, for these calculations as different HZ considerations are taken into account for conversion of the timer shot, and also it makes the code more readable. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add __init prefix to prandom_start_seed_timerDaniel Borkmann2013-11-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | We only call that in functions annotated with __init, so add __init prefix in prandom_start_seed_timer() as well, so that the kernel can make use of this hint and we can possibly free up resources after it's usage. And since it's an internal function rename it to __prandom_start_seed_timer(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add test cases for taus113 implementationDaniel Borkmann2013-11-111-6/+189
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We generated a battery of 100 test cases from GSL taus113 implemention and compare the results from a particular seed and a particular iteration with our implementation in the kernel. We have verified on 32 and 64 bit machines that our taus113 kernel implementation gives same results as GSL taus113 implementation: [ 0.147370] prandom: seed boundary self test passed [ 0.148078] prandom: 100 self tests passed This is a Kconfig option that is disabled on default, just like the crc32 init selftests in order to not unnecessary slow down boot process. We also refactored out prandom_seed_very_weak() as it's now used in multiple places in order to reduce redundant code. GSL code we used for generating test cases: int i, j; srand(time(NULL)); for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { int iteration = 500 + (rand() % 500); gsl_rng_default_seed = rand() + 1; gsl_rng *r = gsl_rng_alloc(gsl_rng_taus113); printf("\t{ %lu, ", gsl_rng_default_seed); for (j = 0; j < iteration - 1; ++j) gsl_rng_get(r); printf("%u, %lu },\n", iteration, gsl_rng_get(r)); gsl_rng_free(r); } Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: upgrade taus88 generator to taus113 from errata paperDaniel Borkmann2013-11-111-34/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since we use prandom*() functions quite often in networking code i.e. in UDP port selection, netfilter code, etc, upgrade the PRNG from Pierre L'Ecuyer's original paper "Maximally Equidistributed Combined Tausworthe Generators", Mathematics of Computation, 65, 213 (1996), 203--213 to the version published in his errata paper [1]. The Tausworthe generator is a maximally-equidistributed generator, that is fast and has good statistical properties [1]. The version presented there upgrades the 3 state LFSR to a 4 state LFSR with increased periodicity from about 2^88 to 2^113. The algorithm is presented in [1] by the very same author who also designed the original algorithm in [2]. Also, by increasing the state, we make it a bit harder for attackers to "guess" the PRNGs internal state. See also discussion in [3]. Now, as we use this sort of weak initialization discussed in [3] only between core_initcall() until late_initcall() time [*] for prandom32*() users, namely in prandom_init(), it is less relevant from late_initcall() onwards as we overwrite seeds through prandom_reseed() anyways with a seed source of higher entropy, that is, get_random_bytes(). In other words, a exhaustive keysearch of 96 bit would be needed. Now, with the help of this patch, this state-search increases further to 128 bit. Initialization needs to make sure that s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15, s4 > 127. taus88 and taus113 algorithm is also part of GSL. I added a test case in the next patch to verify internal behaviour of this patch with GSL and ran tests with the dieharder 3.31.1 RNG test suite: $ dieharder -g 052 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus88 $ dieharder -g 054 -a -m 10 -s 1 -S 4137730333 #taus113 With this seed configuration, in order to compare both, we get the following differences: algorithm taus88 taus113 rands/second [**] 1.61e+08 1.37e+08 sts_serial(4, 1st run) WEAK PASSED sts_serial(9, 2nd run) WEAK PASSED rgb_lagged_sum(31) WEAK PASSED We took out diehard_sums test as according to the authors it is considered broken and unusable [4]. Despite that and the slight decrease in performance (which is acceptable), taus113 here passes all 113 tests (only rgb_minimum_distance_5 in WEAK, the rest PASSED). In general, taus/taus113 is considered "very good" by the authors of dieharder [5]. The papers [1][2] states a single warm-up step is sufficient by running quicktaus once on each state to ensure proper initialization of ~s_{0}: Our selection of (s) according to Table 1 of [1] row 1 holds the condition L - k <= r - s, that is, (32 32 32 32) - (31 29 28 25) <= (25 27 15 22) - (18 2 7 13) with r = k - q and q = (6 2 13 3) as also stated by the paper. So according to [2] we are safe with one round of quicktaus for initialization. However we decided to include the warm-up phase of the PRNG as done in GSL in every case as a safety net. We also use the warm up phase to make the output of the RNG easier to verify by the GSL output. In prandom_init(), we also mix random_get_entropy() into it, just like drivers/char/random.c does it, jiffies ^ random_get_entropy(). random-get_entropy() is get_cycles(). xor is entropy preserving so it is fine if it is not implemented by some architectures. Note, this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel, but rather as a fast PRNG for various randomizations i.e. in the networking code, or elsewhere for debugging purposes, for example. [*]: In order to generate some "sort of pseduo-randomness", since get_random_bytes() is not yet available for us, we use jiffies and initialize states s1 - s3 with a simple linear congruential generator (LCG), that is x <- x * 69069; and derive s2, s3, from the 32bit initialization from s1. So the above quote from [3] accounts only for the time from core to late initcall, not afterwards. [**] Single threaded run on MacBook Air w/ Intel Core i5-3317U [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/12103/ [4] http://code.google.com/p/dieharder/source/browse/trunk/libdieharder/diehard_sums.c?spec=svn490&r=490#20 [5] http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add prandom_reseed_late() and call when nonblocking pool becomes ↵Hannes Frederic Sowa2013-11-111-1/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | initialized The Tausworthe PRNG is initialized at late_initcall time. At that time the entropy pool serving get_random_bytes is not filled sufficiently. This patch adds an additional reseeding step as soon as the nonblocking pool gets marked as initialized. On some machines it might be possible that late_initcall gets called after the pool has been initialized. In this situation we won't reseed again. (A call to prandom_seed_late blocks later invocations of early reseed attempts.) Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: add periodic reseedingHannes Frederic Sowa2013-11-111-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current Tausworthe PRNG is never reseeded with truly random data after the first attempt in late_initcall. As this PRNG is used for some critical random data as e.g. UDP port randomization we should try better and reseed the PRNG once in a while with truly random data from get_random_bytes(). When we reseed with prandom_seed we now make also sure to throw the first output away. This suffices the reseeding procedure. The delay calculation is based on a proposal from Eric Dumazet. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* random32: fix off-by-one in seeding requirementDaniel Borkmann2013-11-111-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For properly initialising the Tausworthe generator [1], we have a strict seeding requirement, that is, s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15. Commit 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement") introduced a __seed() function that imposes boundary checks proposed by the errata paper [2] to properly ensure above conditions. However, we're off by one, as the function is implemented as: "return (x < m) ? x + m : x;", and called with __seed(X, 1), __seed(X, 7), __seed(X, 15). Thus, an unwanted seed of 1, 7, 15 would be possible, whereas the lower boundary should actually be of at least 2, 8, 16, just as GSL does. Fix this, as otherwise an initialization with an unwanted seed could have the effect that Tausworthe's PRNG properties cannot not be ensured. Note that this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel. [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa. Fixes: 697f8d0348a6 ("random32: seeding improvement") Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* prandom: introduce prandom_bytes() and prandom_bytes_state()Akinobu Mita2012-12-171-0/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add functions to get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. The difference from get_random_bytes() is that it generates pseudo-random numbers by prandom_u32(). It doesn't consume the entropy pool, and the sequence is reproducible if the same rnd_state is used. So it is suitable for generating random bytes for testing. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* random32: rename random32 to prandomAkinobu Mita2012-12-171-24/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* lib: reduce the use of module.h wherever possiblePaul Gortmaker2012-03-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | For files only using THIS_MODULE and/or EXPORT_SYMBOL, map them onto including export.h -- or if the file isn't even using those, then just delete the include. Fix up any implicit include dependencies that were being masked by module.h along the way. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
* Merge branch 'master' into for-nextJiri Kosina2010-06-161-21/+17
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| * lib/random32: export pseudo-random number generator for modulesJoe Eykholt2010-05-271-21/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch moves the definition of struct rnd_state and the inline __seed() function to linux/random.h. It renames the static __random32() function to prandom32() and exports it for use in modules. prandom32() is useful as a privately-seeded pseudo random number generator that can give the same result every time it is initialized. For FCoE FC-BB-6 VN2VN mode self-selected unique FC address generation, we need an pseudo-random number generator seeded with the 64-bit world-wide port name. A truly random generator or one seeded with randomness won't do because the same sequence of numbers should be generated each time we boot or the link comes up. A prandom32_seed() inline function is added to the header file. It is inlined not for speed, but so the function won't be expanded in the base kernel, but only in the module that uses it. Signed-off-by: Joe Eykholt <jeykholt@cisco.com> Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | fix typos concerning "initiali[zs]e"Uwe Kleine-König2010-06-161-1/+1
|/ | | | | Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* random32: seeding improvementStephen Hemminger2008-07-301-21/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The rationale is: * use u32 consistently * no need to do LCG on values from (better) get_random_bytes * use more data from get_random_bytes for secondary seeding * don't reduce state space on srandom32() * enforce state variable initialization restrictions Note: the second paper has a version of random32() with even longer period and a version of random64() if needed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* [NET]: srandom32 fixes for networking v2Andi Kleen2008-04-031-4/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | - Let it update the state of all CPUs. The network stack goes into pains to feed the current IP addresses in, but it is not very effective if that is only done for some random CPU instead of all. So change it to feed bits into all CPUs. I decided to do that lockless because well somewhat random results are ok. v2: Drop rename so that this patch doesn't depend on x86 maintainers Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] severing module.h->sched.hAl Viro2006-12-041-0/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] rename net_random to random32Stephen Hemminger2006-10-171-0/+142
Make net_random() more widely available by calling it random32 akpm: hopefully this will permit the removal of carta_random32. That needs confirmation from Stephane - this code looks somewhat more computationally expensive, and has a different (ie: callee-stateful) interface. [akpm@osdl.org: lots of build fixes, cleanups] Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@hpl.hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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